The 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) is largely deprived of the attention of researchers. She did not have a chance to take a large-scale participation in major military operations. She did not have any special samples of military equipment in service, and her organizational structure did not stand out among other infantry brigades of the Krai army. But the combat path of the brigade serves as a good illustration of how the Serbian units in Krajina were formed, how they developed and what challenges they faced during the hostilities.
Positions held by the brigade
Throughout the war of 1991-1995. The 2nd Brigade held positions southwest of Knin, the capital of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Accordingly, it was part of the 7th North Dalmatian Corps and operated in the North Dalmatia region. In its area of responsibility were such settlements as Kistanje, Dzhevrske, Bratishkovtsi, Bribir, Varivode and others. In almost all of them, before the war, Serbs constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Accordingly, the team was staffed with them. In addition to local residents, it was replenished by Serbs, expelled from Croatian cities on the Adriatic coast.
The immediate predecessor of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the SVK was the 2nd Brigade of the Territorial Defense (TO). The territorial defense in Yugoslavia was essentially a mass militia tasked with providing support to the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in the event of war. Each of the six Yugoslav republics had their own territorial defenses. With the expansion of the Yugoslav crisis and the beginning of the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia, the Croatian TO split into two parts - the one that remained under the control of the government in Zagreb and the one that came under the control of the emerging authorities of the Serbian Krajina.
The Serbian militia in Kistanje was subordinate to the TO headquarters in Knin. During the summer of 1991, he was involved in organizing and distributing personnel to the emerging units. As in other settlements of the Serbian Krajina, residents of Kistanja, Bribir and other cities and villages, which after the formation of the SVK will be in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, replenished two components of TO - maneuverable and local. The first consisted of brigades and detachments and its task was to fight with Croatian forces. The second was organized from companies, platoons and squads, which were to carry out guard duty in the rear. That is, to protect settlements, important objects, patrol roads, etc. The formation of TO units in the summer of 1991 was complicated by the fact that many of the soldiers who replenished its ranks were at the same time JNA reservists. And the army, more and more often the target of Croatian attacks, began to mobilize local Serbs into their units. In Northern Dalmatia, the 9th Kninsky corps was located, in the brigades and regiments of which the Serbs, already distributed among the TO units, were called up.
Krajinskaya TO is often underestimated and relegated to the background in the description of that war. On the one hand, it really was less organized and armed than units of the federal Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Its personnel were characterized by a much weaker discipline. But it was the TO formations that were the first to take part in the battles with Croatian special forces and guards in the spring and summer of 1991, when the JNA forces still adhered to a policy of neutrality and sought to prevent battles between the warring parties. Up to the participation of the army in large-scale battles against Croatian forces, which began in the late summer of the same year, the fighters held the emerging front line and repelled Croatian attacks.
In September 1991, realizing that the Croatian side openly began hostilities against the JNA and the Krajina Serbs, the military leadership in Belgrade undertook a reorganization of the military service of the Serbian Krajina. In the course of these transformations, Serbian formations in Kistanje, Dzhevrsk and surrounding settlements were transformed into the 2nd brigade of TO "Bukovitsa". It consisted of three infantry battalions and a headquarters and, according to the state, numbered 1428 soldiers and officers.
However, the brigade did not manage to reach the full strength "according to the list" at that time. This was due to the fact that the JNA brigades also mobilized the local Serbs liable for military service. In Northern Dalmatia, all Krajina formations were subordinate to the 9th Knin corps of the Yugoslav army, the striking force of which was the 180th and 221st motorized brigades. It was in their units that some of the fighters who had previously joined the ranks of the units of the Krai's TO, left. The formation and mobilization of the 2nd brigade began on October 24, 1991. By the end of the same month, there were already about 800 people in it. The creation of a new formation was seriously complicated by the fact that the platoons and companies that were included in its composition had different numbers and weapons, and, in addition, actively participated in hostilities. After formation, the brigade was subordinated to the headquarters of the 221st motorized brigade of the JNA. At the same time, an artillery division from the 9th mixed artillery regiment and armored vehicles from the 180th motorized brigade were transferred to its area of responsibility.
By the end of 1991, the front line in Dalmatia had stabilized. The JNA and the Krajina militia partially completed the tasks of unblocking the army facilities besieged by the Croats and defended the Serb-populated areas from attacks by Croatian guards and police. The hostilities were reduced to trench warfare - artillery shelling, skirmishes, raids of sabotage groups behind enemy lines. The line of defense of the 2nd brigade in December 1991 looked like this. It began south of the village of Chista-Velika, went around Chista-Mala, then went southeast to Lake Proklyanskoye, then along its northern shore and from there eastward to the bank of the Krka. Here the Croats controlled Skradin and it was this settlement that was subsequently regularly mentioned in the combat plans of the brigade - according to the plans of the Serbs, in the event of a large-scale attack on Croatian positions, one of the main tasks of the 2nd brigade was to eliminate this "bridgehead" of the enemy on the right bank of the Krka. The left neighbor was the 1st TO brigade and parts of the 221st motorized brigade of the JNA. To the right of the 2nd brigade, the positions were held by the 3rd TO brigade and the 180th motorized brigade of the JNA.
From October 1991 to June 1992, the brigade was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Jovan Grubich.
By the beginning of 1992, the number of the brigade had grown to 1114 people. But they were still armed and equipped in different ways. The soldiers of the Krajina TO, and the 2nd brigade in particular, lacked camouflage, steel helmets, military-style boots, raincoats, binoculars, etc.
On January 2, 1992, Croatia and the Yugoslav People's Army signed the Sarajevo Armistice. The basis of the peace settlement was the plan of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative Cyrus Vance, which implied the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Krajina and Croatia, the introduction of UN peacekeepers stationed between Serbian and Croatian formations, the disarmament and demobilization of the Krajina units and negotiations to achieve peace. Preparing to leave Krajina, the Yugoslav General Staff undertook two more reorganizations of the Krajina TO - at the end of February and the end of April 1992. The first changed the structure of the TO. The second ordered the creation of several more units and brigades of the Separate Police Units (OPM). The PKO brigades were supposed to take control of the demarcation line after the demobilization of the TO and protect the RSK in the event that Croatia violates the truce (which subsequently happened).
According to Vance's plan, the entire TO of the Serbian Krajina was demobilized by the summer of 1992. The personnel were dispersed to their homes or transferred to the formed PKO brigades, and heavy weapons were stored under the supervision of UN peacekeepers. As in other brigades and detachments, in the 2nd brigade only the headquarters and a few soldiers remained, watching the stored equipment. Another part of the fighters was called up to serve in the 75th brigade of the OPM, commanded by Milorad Radic, who previously commanded the military police battalion of the 9th Knin corps of the JNA. The last Yugoslavian units left Krajina at the beginning of June 1992 and from that moment the Krajina Serbs were left alone with the enemy.
Curiously, the TO structure approved in February 1992 by the Yugoslav General Staff did not provide for the existence of the 2nd brigade. But her headquarters continued to function. In June-July, Lieutenant Colonel Zhivko Rodic was the acting brigade, then Major Radoslav Zubac and Captain Raiko Bjelanovic held this position.
In the spring and autumn of 1992, there were no major hostilities in Dalmatia, with the exception of the Croatian attack on the Miljevach plateau on June 21-22 (in the area of responsibility of the 1st TO brigade). Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Krajina units and the unfinished formation of OPM brigades, two Croatian brigades attacked the area between the Krka and Chikola rivers and captured a number of settlements. The area of responsibility of the 2nd brigade was not affected by the Croatian offensive, but Kistanje and a number of other villages came under heavy artillery fire from enemy artillery. In June-July 1992, a small number of fighters from the 2nd TO brigade and the 75th OPM brigade took part in the battles in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting the Bosnian Serb forces in Operation Corridor 92, during which ground communications were restored between Krajina and Western Bosnia on the one hand and Eastern Bosnia and Yugoslavia on the other, previously interrupted by the Croatian troops operating in Bosnia.
In October-November 1992, a large-scale military reform was carried out in Krajina. Its final project was approved on November 27, 1992. Three months were allotted for the implementation of the reforms planned by the DGC leadership. According to the plan, OPM brigades were disbanded, and maintenance brigades became the basis for new formations. On the basis of the 2nd TO brigade, the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the 7th Corps was created. Its commander was appointed Milorad Radic, a native of the village of Radučić in the Knin community. He was characterized as a talented and enterprising officer, and was respected among the soldiers. The 2nd Infantry was replenished with fighters from the following brigades: 1st and 2nd TO, 75th and 92nd OPM. While the brigade was being formed, manning and the distribution of weapons, soldiers from the disbanded 75th brigade of the OPM continued to guard the line of contact. Formally, they already served as part of the new formations, but the old states of the border and guard companies were still valid at the front. Heavy weapons were still in warehouses under the control of UN peacekeepers.
The composition of the brigade was as follows: headquarters, three infantry battalions, a mixed artillery division, a mixed artillery anti-tank division, an air defense artillery-missile battery, a tank company, a communications company, a logistics company, a military police platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, an engineer platoon. The brigade was armed at various times with up to 15 T-34-85 tanks, 18 M-38 howitzers, three ZIS-3 guns, three M-48B1 mountain guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars of 60-mm, 82-mm, 120- mm, etc. Part of the equipment in the winter of 1994 was transferred to the 3rd Infantry Brigade.
The corps headquarters began to set the first tasks for the brigade command immediately after the start of its formation. For example, on December 4, 1992, the corps commander, Colonel Milan Djilas, ordered the subordinate brigades and regiments to increase their combat readiness, prepare to mobilize personnel and repel a possible Croatian attack. The 2nd brigade, according to the order, had to prepare to repel the enemy attack, relying on the support of one of the divisions of the 7th mixed artillery regiment and the help of neighboring units from the 75th motorized (left neighbor) and 92nd motorized (right neighbor) brigades … In the event of a breakthrough by Croatian troops, the Lepuri - Ostrvica - Bribir line became the last line of defense. Then the 2nd brigade was to conduct a counterattack, return the lost territory and remain ready to conduct active offensive operations. Since the brigade, like other corps formations, had just begun to form, the order emphasized that the deployment of units should take place under the cover of duty platoons and companies located on the line of contact.
The formation of the 2nd Infantry Brigade was interrupted by a large-scale Croatian offensive, which began on January 22, 1993. The targets of the Croatian army were the village of Maslenitsa, where the destroyed Maslenitsky bridge and the SVK positions near Zadar were located. Shrovetide was defended by the 4th light infantry brigade of the SVK, and battalions of the 92nd motorized brigade of the SVK were stationed near Zadar. The main headquarters of the Krajina army knew about the strengthening of Croatian units along the line of contact, but for unknown reasons did not attach importance to this and did not take appropriate measures in advance. As a result, the attack, which began early in the morning on January 22, came as a complete surprise to the Serbs.
Despite the fact that the area of responsibility of the 2nd brigade was relatively quiet, the headquarters of the corps ordered the start of its mobilization. A day later, 1,600 people were put under arms. First of all, the personnel of a mixed artillery division, a tank company and a battery of 120-mm mortars were mobilized. The brigade headquarters then began deploying infantry battalions. Weapons depots were opened in the villages of Kistanye, Dzhevrsk and Pajan, from where all serviceable equipment, despite the protests of the UN peacekeepers, was immediately sent to the units. On January 23, brigade commander Radic reported to the corps headquarters that the 1st battalion was 80% manned, the 2nd - 100%, and the 3rd - 95%. At the same time, a significant shortage of communications equipment was revealed, as well as small arms - immediately after mobilization, the brigade needed another 150 submachine guns.
On January 28, the brigade began active operations and began to conduct reconnaissance in force. All three infantry battalions received their zone of responsibility and prepared several reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which then made several attempts to penetrate the enemy's rear and conducted reconnaissance of the front edge of its defense. In some cases, their actions relied on fire support from a mixed artillery battalion. It should be noted that, given the significant numerical superiority of the Croatian army, the offensive of the 2nd Infantry Brigade could hardly have ended successfully. But the increased activity of the Serbs in this sector of the front forced the Croatian command to transfer reinforcements there, which somewhat eased the pressure on the Serb defense in the Maslenica area. In early February, the brigade allocated one infantry company and four T-34-85 tanks to the Battle Group-3, which was sent to Benkovac, where fierce battles were going on. In parallel with this, mobilization continued. In addition to local residents, the brigade was supplemented by volunteers from the Republika Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On February 9, 1993, its number reached 2572 soldiers and officers. On February 12, another infantry company was allocated from the brigade, attached to the shock battalion, created as a reserve of the corps.
On February 24, units of the 2nd brigade launched a successful attack on the village of Dragishich. The Croatian units defending it lost several people killed and wounded, 11 soldiers were captured by the Serbs. "On the shoulders" of the retreating enemy, the Serbs also occupied the Gradina hill. In this battle, the 2nd brigade lost two soldiers killed and five wounded. One T-34-85 was shot down, which was soon repaired and returned to service. But in the evening at about 21:00, the fighters remaining in the village, at the initiative of one of the officers, left him and retreated to their former positions. As a result, the Croats again occupied Gradina and Dragisic, but without a fight.
At the end of February 1993, the intensity of fighting in North Dalmatia dropped significantly, and in March, both sides no longer attempted large-scale offensives. For a long time, positional warfare began for the 2nd Infantry Brigade. A huge problem for the formation during this period was the fact that its commander, Milora Radic, was the only career officer in the entire brigade. Other officer posts in the headquarters and subunits were either empty or were occupied by reserve officers and sub-officers. Many of them did not have the relevant experience and this seriously affected the combat capabilities of the brigade. In particular, on April 14, 1993, the battalion's artillery could not act adequately, because, as indicated in the report, “the brigade commander was busy with another task” … In fact, Radich alone had to pull on all the staff work and, according to the corps headquarters, was at the limit of his own strength.
Combat efficiency and general situation
From the spring of 1993 to the summer of 1995, there were no major battles in the brigade's area of responsibility. The relative calm was disturbed by periodic firefights with the use of small arms, heavy machine guns, mortars. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were active on both sides. They were not only engaged in reconnaissance of enemy positions, but also often planted mines on patrol routes and roads in the rear. In the spring of 1994, another truce was signed and the Serbs took the artillery and armored vehicles of the brigade from the front line to the rear, to the villages of Dobrievichi, Knezhevichi and Pajane. The general situation both in the 7th corps and in Serbian Krajina as a whole affected the combat effectiveness of the formation. Payments to officers and soldiers were low and irregular. Therefore, in their free time from service, the fighters were forced to look for part-time jobs or combine combat duty in positions with some kind of permanent job. Under the conditions of a formal truce, the brigade, like the entire corps, switched to the principle of shift duty, when each soldier was in positions for three days and at home for six days. The entire Krajina army was extremely short of fuel for vehicles and armored vehicles, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade was no exception. Its headquarters managed to maintain a minimum supply of fuel for armored vehicles, but exercises with its use were infrequent. In the spring and summer of 1994, the 2nd brigade, as well as the entire 7th corps, underwent a number of changes in the organizational and staff structure associated with an attempt to reduce battalions to border companies and with the transfer of some of the personnel to a contract basis. Soon the brigade returned to its previous structure, the principle of border units during the demobilization of the main part of the formation was rejected.
In early May 1994, the brigade formed a combat group of an infantry company, a mortar battery, an air defense platoon, an anti-tank platoon and a logistics support platoon, which, together with similar consolidated detachments from other brigades of the 7th corps, participated in hostilities as part of the Bosnian Serb army near town of Brcko. This practice was continued later, when consolidated groups from the brigade were sent to strengthen their positions on Mount Dinara.
The brigade met the beginning of 1995 in a dual situation. On the one hand, during 1994, serious work was carried out to equip positions, install minefields, etc. In February 1995, the brigade's positions were assessed by a commission from the corps headquarters as the most prepared in the corps. A number of officers and sub-officers underwent retraining or advanced training. But on the other hand, the number of personnel has seriously decreased. If in February 1993, including volunteers, there were 2,726 people in the brigade, then in January 1995 there were 1,961 people. Of these, 90 officers, 135 sub-officers, 1746 soldiers. There were also problems with discipline and the execution of orders from the command.
In early May 1995, Milorad Radic was promoted to head the 7th Corps headquarters. Major Rade Drezgić was appointed commander of the 2nd brigade.
The Croatian leadership decided to return Krajina to its control by force, and on August 4, 1995, Operation Tempest began. The Split corps of the Croatian army, the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and part of the formations of the Gospic corps acted against the 7th corps of the SVK. The Serb 2nd Infantry Brigade was directly opposed by the 113th Brigade (3,500 fighters) and the 15th Domobran Regiment (2,500 fighters). Thus, the ratio of forces was 3: 1 in favor of the Croats.
At 05:00 on August 4, the brigade's line of defense and settlements in its rear came under massive artillery fire. On the positions of the 2nd brigade and its area of responsibility, both the artillery of the opposing units and the artillery groups of the Split corps acted. After the artillery barrage, the Croats launched a cautious offensive with the support of armored vehicles. The fighting subsided only in the evening. Most of the positions were held, but on the right flank of the defense, the brigade surrendered well-fortified positions to the Croats near the villages of Chista-Mala, Chista-Velika and Ladzhevtsi. This endangered the left flank of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.
However, the outcome of the battles for North Dalmatia and Operation Tempest as a whole was decided not at the positions of individual brigades, but on Mount Dinara. Events for them took place on Dinar. By the middle of the day on August 4, two Croatian guards brigades broke through the defenses of the combined group of Militia fighters and soldiers of the 7th corps and rushed to Knin. In this situation, the President of Serbian Krajina, Milan Martic, decided to begin the evacuation of civilians from the communities of North Dalmatia. As a result, many fighters began to disperse from positions to their homes to save their families. This phenomenon did not bypass the 2nd brigade, where by the morning of August 5, a significant part of the soldiers had already left the front. By the middle of the day, the brigade left its positions and, together with the columns of refugees, began to retreat to the territory of the Republika Srpska.
The outcome of the battles for North Dalmatia and Operation Tempest
In fact, the 2nd brigade lost some of its positions in the battle with those who, although they outnumbered it, did not have an advantage in terms of training or organization. This is especially true of the soldiers of the 15th house-building regiment. The 2nd brigade had a prepared line of defense, had armored vehicles and artillery, and its battalions were mostly manned. But on August 4, she could not stop the enemy. In our opinion, the reasons for this were the following.
Firstly, the general condition of the corps was reflected in the brigade. The prolonged fighting on Dinar, which ended in defeat in July 1995, seriously depleted the corps's reserves, including the reserves of fuel and ammunition. The corps command was disrupted - the new commander, General Kovachevich, took up his duties just a few days before the "Tempest", and the chief of staff Milorad Radic was on Dinar, where he personally supervised the defense. Secondly, after the defeats in Western Slavonia and on Dinar, the fighting spirit in many Krajina units was low. In a number of units, the commanding staff was able to slightly improve the situation and maintain a certain level of discipline (as, for example, in the 4th brigade), and in some brigades the situation remained the same. Apparently, the 2nd Infantry Brigade was among those where the mood of the personnel was not up to par. Thirdly, with artillery strikes against communication centers and the use of electronic warfare equipment, Croatian troops managed to disrupt communication not only between the headquarters of the 2nd brigade and the 7th corps, but also between the headquarters of the brigade and the headquarters of its infantry battalions. The lack of orders and any information about what was happening from the neighbors led to the fact that a number of junior commanders panicked and withdrew their units to reserve positions, completely yielding the initiative to the enemy. Another important reason was that the brigade's armored vehicles were used as a reserve on its flanks. Apparently, the brigade commander Drezgich did not consider the possibility of using tanks in a counterattack, but preferred to leave them in contact with neighboring units of the SVK.
Having transferred weapons to units of the Bosnian Serb army, the 2nd brigade ceased to exist. The brigade's headquarters functioned as an organized unit for the longest time on the territory of the Republika Srpska, but soon it also disintegrated, and its officers joined the columns of refugees heading to Yugoslavia.
