In the first article of the series, I tried to give a quantitative assessment of the tank fleet of the Soviet Union at the time of the German attack. Now let's talk about the quality characteristics of the tanks and armored units of the Red Army. How significant it was, and how different the reality was from what was written on paper …
In the first article of the series, I tried to give a quantitative assessment of the tank fleet of the Soviet Union at the time of the German attack. Now let's talk about the quality characteristics of the tanks and armored units of the Red Army. How significant was it, and how different was reality from what was written on paper?
According to the draft decree of 1940, the Soviet tank division was supposed to consist of two tank regiments, each of which was to consist of a battalion of heavy tanks, two battalions of medium tanks, and a battalion of "chemical" (ie flamethrower) tanks. In addition, the division was supposed to have a motorized regiment, a howitzer artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, reconnaissance, pontoon-bridge, medical and sanitary, motor transport, repair and restoration battalions, a communications battalion, a regulation company, a field bakery. The division was supposed to have 386 tanks (105 KV, 227 T-34, 54 "chemical"), 108 armored vehicles, 42 artillery pieces, 72 mortars.
However, in the end, the state No. 010/10 was approved with some changes [1]:
Command staff - 746 people.
The commanding staff - 603 people.
Junior commanding staff - 2438 people.
Privates - 6777 people.
Total personnel - 10564 people.
972 SVT self-loading rifles
3651 Mosin rifles
1270 carbine
45 sniper rifles.
Cars - 46 pcs.
Trucks - 1243 pcs.
Special vehicles - 315 pcs.
Tractors - 73 pcs.
Autokitchens - 85 pcs.
Heavy tanks - 105 pcs.
Medium tanks - 210
Flamethrower tanks - 54 pcs.
Light tanks - 44 pcs.
Medium BA - 56 pcs.
Light BA - 35 pcs.
Motorcycles with a machine gun - 212 pcs.
Motorcycles without a machine gun - 113 pcs.
Artillery pieces:
152 mm - 12 pcs.
122 mm - 12 pcs.
76 mm zen. - 4 things.
37 mm zen. - 12 pcs.
Mortars:
50 mm - 27 pcs.
82 mm - 18 pcs.
Heavy machine guns - 45 pcs.
Light machine guns - 169 pcs.
Heavy machine guns - 6 pcs.
As you can see, on paper, the Soviet tank division of the 1941 model looked pretty impressive: there were only half a thousand tanks alone! But, as they say, "it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines" …
To begin with, none of the Soviet tank divisions were manned to their full strength. Everyone knows this. In addition, there was a certain qualitative assessment of the materiel of the armored forces. According to the orders of the NKO of the USSR No. 12-16 on January 10, 1940 and the "Manual on accounting and reporting in the Red Army" dated April 10, 1940, it was envisaged that all the property of the Red Army, according to its quality condition, was divided into five categories:
1. New, not used, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and quite fit for use for its intended purpose.
2. The former (being) in operation, completely serviceable and suitable for use for its intended purpose. This category also includes property requiring military repair (current repair).
3. Requiring repairs in the district workshops (medium repair).
4. Requiring repairs in central workshops and industrial factories (overhaul).
5. Not suitable.
Of particular interest is the 2nd category, or rather the phrase that "this also includes property requiring military repair." Such a streamlined wording leads to gloomy reflections that some of the tanks belonging to the 2nd category and considered in almost all works devoted to the history of the Soviet armored forces to be combat-ready, were not able not only to engage in battle, but also, sometimes, just move around on your own.
Quite a lot of engine malfunctions can (and should) be eliminated by tank unit repair shops. That is, the tank is in the 2nd category, but in fact it is not able to move independently. But I mentioned the tank engine only as an example, in fact, there are many options for various malfunctions that should be eliminated in the troops by current repairs, but which do not allow effective (and sometimes even even) use of the tank in battle. Engine (partly), gearbox (partly), clutches, final drives, ventilation, control devices, and observation, tank gun and its components … leaks, misalignments, jamming - this is not a complete list of faults that may be present and must be eliminated, but in the presence of which the tank on paper continues to be considered "quite serviceable and fit for use for its intended purpose." This is a paper balancing act that has caught quite a lot of researchers.
For example, the 125th Tank Regiment of the 202nd MD of the 12th MK PribOVO on June 22, 1941 brought out 49 T-26s on alarm, and abandoned 16 combat vehicles (about 30 percent!) Defective in the parks, although they seemed to belong to the same, 2nd category and on paper were "quite serviceable and fit" [2].
Or, for example, the 28th TD of the same 12th MK on alarm brought 210 BT-7s out of the parks, leaving 26 vehicles inoperable in the parks, managed to withdraw 56 T-26 tanks, leaving 13 [3].
The 3rd TD of the 1st "exemplary" MK LVO withdrew 32 out of 40 T-28 tanks from the fleets, and a little later another 17 tanks lagged behind on the march due to damage to the brakes [4].
The 21st TD of the 10th MK LVO launched 160 of 177 T-26s, the 24th TD of the same building brought out 232 BT-2 and BT-5 and left 49 vehicles of these types in the parks, and both T -26 divisions [5].
The 10th TD of the 15th MK KOVO brought out 37 T-34 tanks on alarm, leaving 1 tank of this type in the park, brought out 44 and left 17 T-28s, brought out 147 and left 34 BT-7s, brought out 19 and left 3 T -26 [5].
This mournful list can be continued for a very long time, in almost every tank division of every mechanized corps the same thing happened. And note that these are only cars that could move by themselves. That is, some of those withdrawn from the park probably had some other malfunctions that affected their combat effectiveness.
As for abandoned vehicles, it turns out that in fact, from 10 to 25% of tanks were left in the parks (in the overwhelming number of cases - of old types). Although, according to the reports of units and formations, they belonged to the 2nd category and were considered quite combat-ready.
Why, in fact, there were so many abandoned cars that were listed as "quite serviceable"? This was primarily due to the lack of repair funds, and most importantly, the almost complete lack of spare parts for both new tanks and old types of combat vehicles. Soviet industry fulfilled the plan for the production of spare parts for tanks in 1940 by only 30%. For example, plant No. 183 was supposed to produce spare parts for BT tanks in the amount of 20,300,000 rubles, but produced only 3,808,000 rubles. For T-34 tanks, the same plant, having a plan to produce spare parts for 6 million rubles, was able to produce the most scarce spare parts for the V-2 engines and for the gearbox for only 1.65 million rubles. STZ, having a plan for spare parts for the T-34 for 10 million rubles, was able to fulfill only 5% of the plan. As for spare parts for tanks, KV LKZ fulfilled the plan by … 0%!
From year to year, not coping with the plan for the release of spare parts for tanks and cars, the USSR industry created a dramatic situation, reflected in the report of the head of the GABTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko:
“To ensure the operation of the available fleet of vehicles in 1941, as well as to lay an emergency reserve for spare parts in the Red Army, spare parts and assemblies are required: for 1941, the supply of NCOs with spare parts for tanks, tractors and cars is not enough, namely:
a) tank spare parts were allocated for 219 million rubles. instead of 476 million rubles required upon application;
b) automobile and tractor - funds allocated for 112, 5 million rubles against 207 million rubles for an annual application.
The receipts from the auto parts industry (per one car) are decreasing from year to year: for tank ones it remains almost unchanged, despite the fact that the cars are aging and wearing out …
In 1941, factories No. 26, 48 and Kirovsky, due to the transition to the production of new products, stopped the production of spare parts for T-28 tanks and M-5 and M-17 engines.
Plants No. 37, 174 and 183 are reducing the production of spare parts for the BT, T-26 T-37 - 38 tanks and the Comintern tractor.
The situation is especially bad with the supply of highly scarce tank and auto-tractor parts by NPOs. Parts of the engine group (pistons, connecting rods, piston rings, etc.) and a number of others are not supplied by the industry from year to year."
On June 18, 1941 (4 days before the start of the war!) Fedorenko sent an angry letter to the People's Commissar of Medium Machine Building Malyshev, in which he paints a deplorable picture of the production of spare parts by industrial plants. And you can understand General Fedorenko - out of the 285 M-17 engines ordered at factory # 183 (spare parts for BT tanks), 0 were produced by June 1, 1941! Zero! Out of 100 M-5 engines - 57 (half), out of 75 V-2 diesel engines - 43 (slightly more than half), out of 300 gearboxes - only 6 (in words - six!). In addition, practically not produced: gearboxes, gearboxes, axle shafts, complete wheels and motor equipment.
Plants "GlavtoTraktorDetal" were supposed to produce spare parts for BT tanks for 9 million rubles. By June 1, parts were released for 25 thousand rubles, or 0.3%! But the factories of this association produced spare parts that were urgently needed in the troops: wheels, axle shafts, balancers, cranks, final drive covers, guitars, trucks, etc.
As for spare parts for T-34 tanks at plant No. 183, the picture is the same: out of 150 ordered V-2 engines, 0 were delivered, out of 200 gearboxes - 50. Plant No. 75 thwarted the plan for the production of V-2 diesel engines: out of the ordered 735 units, it was accepted in half a year state acceptance only 141 pcs.
Directly in tank units and formations, the situation with the presence / absence of spare parts looked like this [9]:
6th mechanized corps.
“For combat vehicles, there are no spare parts for the T-28 tank for the onboard transmission chassis. There are no tracked drive wheels and semi-axles to the BT tank. For other brands of combat vehicles, the supply of spare parts is 60-70%.
For auxiliary vehicles, the availability of spare parts is extremely insufficient. For the 4th quarter of 1940, 10% of the demand was received, for the 1st quarter of 1941 the situation did not improve.
Revolving units are completely absent, such as: motors, gearboxes, rear axles for all brands of cars.
The provision of rubber for M-1 cars is completely absent, as a result of which 30-40% of M-1 cars in parts are without rubber. Armored vehicles BA-20 are not fully provided with gusmatics.
Due to the absence of acutely scarce spare parts, there is no possibility of timely restoration of machines with average and current repairs”[7].
8th mechanized corps
“7th motorized rifle division. It is equipped with repair facilities by 22%. In the RVB (repair and restoration battalion - author's note) there are no stationary workshops and machine tools.
The division is provided with spare parts for the repair of combat and wheeled vehicles by 1%. There are no spare parts in "NZ" for combat and wheeled vehicles.
Trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber for 60%, armored vehicles for 100%. Out of the number of trucks available, 200 stand on pads due to the lack of rubber. Average wear of rubber by 70%”[8].
9th mechanized corps
“The availability of spare parts is unsatisfactory, there are no spare parts in NZ at all. There are also no spare parts on the current ration, with the exception of a certain amount of occasional slow-moving parts."
And so on and so forth…
As a result of this provision of spare parts, after June 22, 1941, hundreds, if not thousands of tanks were abandoned at the locations of our tank units and formations, often with minimal damage. And the repair of the damaged vehicles, which nevertheless managed to be pulled out of the battlefield, was carried out mainly in the most barbaric way - by the "cannibalization" method, that is, out of two or three failed tanks, one serviceable one was going to be assembled. Until the war began, no one, of course, allowed the almost combat-ready tanks to be dismantled awaiting the arrival of spare parts or orders for repairs.
Well, the reader will say, even so. Let the N-th number of tanks in the Soviet troops be incapable of combat. But even these very solid figures do not negate the very fact of a two-fold superiority ?! Of course it is. However, the tank itself is just a pile of iron, and it takes hard work of many people to turn it into a full-fledged combat unit. A tank requires ammunition, competent maintenance, fuel and lubricants, a trained crew, etc. etc.
Let's start with ammunition. Again, everyone knows that the F-34 cannon, which was on the T-34 tank, was the most powerful tank gun installed on production tanks in 1941 (the ZiS-5 cannon for the KV-1 tanks had identical characteristics and the same ammunition). and hit almost any German tank from any range of actual fire. I repeat once again - everyone knows this. But enemy tanks do not scatter in panic, barely seeing the silhouette of a T-34! German tanks - who would have thought - should be shot! And here a new series of problems begins.
So, in the statement for military unit 9090 dated April 30, 1941, in the column "76-mm armor-piercing tracer" there is a bold zero. It is supposed to have 33,084 shots, 33,084 shots are missing, the percentage of security is zero! Do you know what kind of military unit 9090 is this? This is, no less, the 6th mechanized corps of the ZAPOVO under the command of Major General M. G. Khatskilevich is the most powerful mechanized corps in the Western Military District and one of the most staffed in the Red Army. So, the most powerful and equipped mechanized corps ZAPOVO on June 22, 1941 had 238 T-34 tanks, 113 KV tanks and … not a single armor-piercing projectile for them!
The same situation can be seen not only in the 6th MK, but also, for example, in the 3rd MK PribOVO: on April 25, KV tanks - 51, T-34 tanks - 50, according to the state 17,948 armor-piercing 76-mm shells, available - 0. I repeat once again - zero, zero, nothing, dummy.
And what about the provision of 76-mm shells in the most equipped with new types of tanks mechanized corps of the Red Army: in the 4th mechanized corps KOVO? probably there they are!
No, they are not there either: available (as of May 1, 1941): KV tanks - 72, T-34 tanks - 242. It is supposed to have 66 964 artillery rounds for 76-mm tank guns, of which there is … you already guessed … zero! Maybe there are other shells? Say, armor-piercing tracer or at least high-explosive fragmentation? No. They are also zero.
At the beginning of June, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of D. I. Ryabyshev: out of the 8,163 armor-piercing shells laid down in the state, there were as many as 2,350 pieces in the hull, that is, almost a third of the need.
Aha, the discerning reader will say, so all these shells were in the warehouses, they simply did not have time to be delivered to the units! We are forced to disappoint such a reader: there were no 76 mm armor-piercing shells in the warehouses either. According to a certificate from the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, drawn up 20 days before the start of World War II, the situation with 76-mm armor-piercing shells was deplorable:
Table 1. Information on the progress of orders for the manufacture of 76-mm armor-piercing shells for 1936-1940. (compiled on June 3, 1941) [9]
Moreover, about 100 thousand shells of 76-mm shells released by the industry were never equipped by March 1941.
The situation with 76-mm armor-piercing shells was a real disaster. In it, as in a mirror, the general problems of the military-industrial complex of the USSR were reflected. Until the beginning of the 30s of the twentieth century, there was no talk at all about the production of special armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm guns, because almost all tanks of that period had bullet-proof booking with which, for example, a 76-mm shrapnel shell supplied “to blow. The Soviet military industry was unable to react in time to the next round of the technological race - the appearance of the first generation of tanks with anti-cannon armor. The situation was aggravated by the worse quality of Soviet ammunition, in comparison with German ammunition of comparable caliber (75 mm).
There was a terrible staff shortage in the USSR. Our country simply did not have a sufficient number of qualified specialists. As a result, the USSR could not provide the line for the production of armor-piercing shells with three (turner, welder, stamping machine) highly qualified specialists, as the Germans did. In the USSR, such people were in abundance, they were distributed to factories "by the piece". Yes, the Soviet armor-piercing projectile was simpler, more technologically advanced, cheaper, and it was made only by a turner. But in terms of quality, it was inferior to a similar 75-mm German projectile. What did it turn into? On the one hand, the additional sacrifices of our soldiers, tankers. On the other hand, no one will argue that it is better to have 15-20 shells of deteriorated quality than to have one "gold" - every gunner will tell you this.
With the outbreak of the war and the evacuation of many specialized enterprises, the situation worsened even more. From the report TsNII-48 of July 22, 1942 "The defeat of the armor of German tanks" shows that a year after the beginning of the Second World War, the situation with armor-piercing 76-mm shells did not improve much. The very first line of the report states that "due to the lack of the required number of chamber armor-piercing shells at the present time …" and further in the text. In the list of 76-mm ammunition used by Soviet artillery and tanks in the fight against enemy tanks, the second place is the high-explosive steel grenade, the third is the shrapnel, the fourth is the incendiary projectile, the fifth is the high-explosive steel grenade, the sixth is the fragmentation grenade. steel cast iron. Even the appearance of a simplified armor-piercing projectile BR-350BSP ("solid" - that is, just a steel blank) only partially removed the acuteness of the problem, but did not completely solve it.
So Soviet tankers went to attack German tanks and infantry without shells. I do not claim that this was a universal phenomenon, but that it took place - I hope it is now clear to the reader. Knowing the situation with ammunition in tank units, now you are not particularly surprised by the memoirs of former enemy soldiers and officers, in which they repeatedly describe the attacks of our tanks without opening fire on them. We are also not surprised by the numerous photographs of our tanks ramming German tanks, guns and vehicles. There are no shells - you have to go to the ram, trying to inflict damage on the enemy even so.
Now about the people who fought in the formidable KV and T-34, and the not so formidable BT, T-26, T-28, etc.
Let's start with a very painful topic - the general educational level of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the pre-war tank forces. Let me make a reservation right away: for more than 20 years of Soviet power, the situation with education in Russia / USSR has changed dramatically. So, in 1914, 61% of the rank and file of the Russian army was illiterate, on the eve of the beginning of the Second World War, this figure fluctuated in different parts from 0.3 to 3 percent. However, in 1914 the enemy's percentage of illiterates was 0.4%, and by 1941 this value in the Wehrmacht was tending to zero - 98% of the soldiers of the German army had completed secondary education.
Despite the titanic efforts of the USSR to raise the educational level of the population, we could not catch up with Germany in this indicator by 1941. From the surviving Soviet documents of that time, a rather bleak picture will appear before us. Take, for example, the already mentioned 6th MK. Let me remind you that this is one of the strongest and most staffed in the Red Army. In the 7th TD of this corps, out of 1,180 command personnel, 484 people had education from 1 to 6 grades, 528 people from 6 to 9 grades, 148 secondary and higher - only 20 people. Of the 19,809 junior commanders and privates of the 6th MK, 11,942 people graduated from grades 1 to 6, from 7 to 9 - 5,652, 1,979 people had secondary education, and 236 graduated from higher education.
In the mechanized corps of the second wave of formation, the situation was even worse. For example, in the 31st Panzer Division of the 13th MK with enlisted personnel, the situation was like this:
“There are 30 illiterates, 1st grade - 143, 2 classes - 425, 3 classes - 529, 4 classes - 1528, 5 classes - 682, 6 classes - 464, 7 classes - 777, 8 classes - 167, 9 classes - 116, average - 320, higher - 20 ". [eleven]
In the 203rd Motorized Division:
“Illiterate people - 26, 1 grade - 264, 2 grades - 444, 3 grades - 654, 4 grades - 1815, 5 grades - 749, 6 grades - 437, 7 grades - 684, 8 grades - 199, 9 grades - 122, secondary - 374, higher - 33 ". [eleven]
Let me remind you that in the pre-war period there were 4 classes in the Soviet elementary school, and not three as in the subsequent. That is, the education of the 4th grade is the level of the current third-grader!
Do you think things were better in other buildings? Let's take a look, for example, at the 17th MK of Lieutenant General Petrov:
“The recruitment of the rank and file is mainly due to the March conscription of recruits (70-90%). Some units are staffed with 100% recruits.
The number of replenishment by education - up to 50% education is not higher than 4 classes.
The presence of a large number of nationalities who know poorly and do not speak Russian at all will complicate the preparation. " [12]
The 4th MK met the war as the most powerful mechanized unit of the Red Army. And what about the personnel in the corps of Major General A. A. Vlasov?
"Education: Higher - 592, secondary - 3521, 9-7 grades - 5609, 6-3 grades - 16662, illiterate - 1586, illiterate - 127". Instead of combat training, it was necessary to start teaching the fighters basic things, and some also the Russian language. It is not surprising that the corps received a "mediocre" grade based on the results of the training audit in the 1940/41 academic year.
“The personnel have studied the material part well. New models of T-34 tanks have not been sufficiently studied.
The units are mediocre prepared for independent actions …
Tank units are mediocre prepared for marches …
Control and communication in battle are mediocre …
The tactical training of troops is mediocre. " [13]
Even if 50% of the personnel have a clearly low educational level, they can be trained, another reader might think. Of course you can, if there are teaching aids, and, most importantly, there is someone to teach! For example, in the 4th MK there are no: training ground, firing tables for 122-mm howitzers, tank guns L-10 and L-11, a manual for the materiel of 122-mm howitzers, a manual for materiel for tank guns L-10 and L-11, training tower layouts, etc. etc.
The 15th MK has an insufficient barracks fund, as a result of which there are no classrooms, no teaching and visual aids, manuals. There are no such fundamental instructions as ABTKOP-38 [Fire training course for armored forces in 1938 - approx. author], there is a lack of training devices, machine tools, training rifles (!), etc.
In the 16th MK, there is a serious lack of teaching aids, charters, instruments, training materiel and fuels and lubricants, classes, shooting ranges, shooting ranges - in general, everything.
“B / part 8995 and 9325 - classes are not provided due to the lack of premises. There are not enough textbooks: there are no manuals on KV and T-34 tanks, manuals on the new material part of weapons, BUP (infantry combat regulations - author's note) Part II, UTV [tank forces regulations - approx. author] Part II, manuals on the field service of headquarters. There is no new charter for the rear. There are no visual aids on new models of weapons …
Military unit 9325 - the existing range (Green) is not equipped with a sufficient number of dugouts and devices for firing at moving targets.
Military unit 8995 - the units do not have training grounds, shooting ranges and training fields, since the entire adjacent territory belongs to peasants and is occupied by crops … Plots of land for shooting ranges and training fields have not yet been assigned to the units. Materials on the issue of consolidation have been provided. " [fourteen]
This is again about the 6th Mechanized Corps, or rather about the 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions. The commander of the 19th MK, General Feklenko, also complains:
“The building is mainly staffed by Russian and Ukrainian nationalities, but there are 4308 people.of different nationalities who either have little or no command of Russian”.
But at the time of drawing up the report, there were 20,575 privates and junior command personnel in the 19th MK! That is, one in five, instead of driving a tank and firing a cannon, had to be put at a desk and just taught Russian.
And further:
“43rd Panzer Division.
There are almost no teaching aids, there are also no necessary models and manuals for the study of new materiel and weapons.
40th Panzer Division. The units of the division are not satisfied with the teaching aids and instruments of the division (the whole unit has 2 copies of ABTKOP-38), there is not a single copy of the Driving Course for Combat and Transport Vehicles.
213 motorized division. No more than 10% are provided with teaching aids”.
But the "record holder" of the spring of 1941 is the 24th mechanized corps: "There are no visual aids, training devices, training weapons at all." In terms of personnel, the corps also "distinguished itself": out of 21556 people, 238 people have higher education, 19 unfinished higher education, 1947 secondary education, 410 grades 9, 1607 grades 7, 2,160 grades 7, 1046 grades 6, 5 grades - 1468, 4 grades - 4040, 3 grades - 3431, 2 grades - 2281, 1 grade - 2468, illiterate people - 441. The corps is staffed by 70% with new recruits for the March draft. What did they manage to teach by June 22, 1941 without visual aids, training devices and training weapons? And the "examiners" of the fighters and commanders of the 24th mechanized corps were not the inspectors from Moscow, but the tanks and guns of the Germans.
There was a huge shortage of commanders of companies, platoons and junior command personnel. In the already mentioned 11th MK of Major General D. K. Mostovenko's command staffing looked like this:
Of the general shortage in the command staff, without taking into account those appointed by the order, but not yet arrived, the shortage of the link of company commanders and platoon commanders is sharply expressed.
So, for example, staffing (percentage)
But it was the commanders of companies, platoons and junior command personnel who were responsible for the main task of training the rank and file. They were the ones who were supposed to lead the soldiers into battle. And they are barely 30% recruited. And the connection? Corps OBS 7486 (OBS - a separate communications battalion) of the required 91 junior command personnel has 10, out of the required 36 middle command personnel - 16. None of the OBS 7486 commanders knows the radio business, since they are all "guides", that is wire communication specialists! There is no one to teach OBS 7486 drivers, because neither junior nor middle commanders know how to drive a car themselves.
So maybe the 11th mechanized corps is just an annoying exception? No, and in the 13th MK, the situation is similar: in the 521st OBS of the rank and file 99% of the staff, senior and middle command personnel - 50%, junior - 11%.
17th MK:
“The command and control personnel of the division are staffed by 15-20%. 21 TD is especially poorly equipped.
The junior command personnel of the division are staffed by an average of 11%”.
20th MK ZAPOVO:
“The rank and file are staffed - 84%. Junior command personnel - 27%. Com. Composition: Senior - 90%, senior - 68%, medium - 27%. Engineers - 2, 3%. Technicians - 35%.
And in KOVO everything is the same. The commander of the 9th mechanized corps, Major General K. K. Rokossovsky writes:
“There is a great lack of engineering and technical personnel in the parts (there are 165 engineers, 3% security, 489 technicians have a staff of 110, 22.5% security).
Manning the command staff at the expense of those who did not graduate from tank schools extremely complicates the issues of combat and special training.
The divisional regiments are not fully staffed with communications and radio operators; there are absolutely no platoon commanders and radio technicians.
The junior commanders of the communications unit are staffed by 30%, the rest of the ISS positions are performed by a corporal. The units are 100% staffed with rank-and-file personnel."
I would like to finish the review of the personnel of the mechanized corps in 1941 with a rather lengthy document. I hope the reader will forgive me for such an extensive quote, however, it very well depicts the real situation with the personnel in the armored forces of the Red Army on the eve of the start of the Great Patriotic War.
“Report on the manning of the 20th division as of March 10, 1941:
Commanding staff
The state employs 1342 people, there are 584 people. or 43%.
The situation is especially bad with the staffing of staffs of all levels. There are not enough staff commanders - 85 people, including: battalion adjutants - 32, regimental staff workers - 42, division headquarters workers - 11 people. In the headquarters of the regiments, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th units are completely understaffed, there is no one to plan and control combat training.
The division is staffed with medical personnel by 25%, the shortage is 52 people.
The sapper companies are not at all staffed with command personnel.
There is not enough up to a staff of 25 signalmen, there are no chemists in any part.
It is bad with the staffing of artillery supply workers, the latter is a shortage of 74 people, which jeopardizes the accounting and saving of weapons.
There are 72% shortage of tank commanders, including: commanders of heavy tanks - 60 people, commanders of tank and armored car platoons - 48 people, company commanders - 12 people. in technical part, the company - 12 people, pom. for the technical part of battalions - 8 people, tank technicians - 32 people, repairmen - 18 people.
The situation is the same with motorists.
Of the commanders assigned to the division by KOVO orders, 52 people have not yet arrived in the division. Their arrival is doubtful, tk. to a number of requests from the units from which the commanders were appointed, the latter replied that the commanders assigned to us left by telegrams from the OK (recruiting department - author's note) KOVO to completely different units.
For example: a military technician of the 2nd ranaga V. From the 33rd auto regiment, appointed by order, departed by OK KOVO telegram to unit 2113, Chernivtsi, a military technician of the 1st rank M. and Lieutenant P. from the 3rd auto regiment, assigned to a part of the division, telegram OK KOVO to unit 2434. The same with the command personnel assigned from units of the 15th Panzer Division.
Some of the command personnel assigned to the division, in terms of their qualities, do not correspond to the positions to which they were appointed:
Sent by the commanders of tank platoons ml. Lieutenants K. and K. have an extremely negative characterization and were warned by the Military Council of KOVO about incomplete service compliance in January of this year.
Captain G., who was sent to the position of the division's chief supplies,, according to the latest certification, is subject to immediate transfer from economic work to the cavalry unit to the position of squadron commander, he does not want and cannot work as chief products. Had a number of penalties for the collapse of the work.
The quartermaster of the 3rd rank L., appointed by the Divisional Supply Inspector, according to the attestation available in the case, is subject to dismissal from the army or transfer to the beginning. OVS battalion. The second appointed Supply Inspector, Captain D., is sick with tuberculosis and must be transferred to a non-combatant unit, sanatorium or hospital.
The same situation with the political personnel sent to the division from other parts of the KOVO on the orders of the UPP KOVO. For example, out of 8 people sent by the 45th rifle division to the position of deputy company commanders for political affairs, 6 have negative characteristics.
Ml. political instructor R. - in December 1940 was expelled from the candidates of the CPSU (b).
Ml. political instructor K. - in December 1940, the KDP (divisional party commission - author's note) of the 45th rifle division pronounced a severe reprimand for hooliganism and harmful talk. It still works badly in the unit.
Art. political instructor B. - in December 1940, the KDP of the 45th Infantry Division was severely reprimanded for drunkenness and corruption in everyday life.
Ml. political instructor M. - speaks Russian poorly, does not want to study, never conducts political studies, has not finished any courses, education of 4 groups. He has an unhealthy mood - several times he raised the question of sending him to the Uzbek SSR, he does not want to take his family to Ukraine.
Ml. political instructor L. - education of the 4th group, almost does not speak Russian, does not work in the company due to ignorance of the language.
Political instructor J. - presented for dismissal from the army as an unworkable and undisciplined political worker.
From the 8th Panzer Division arrived ml. political instructor B., expelled from the CPSU (b) by the District Party Commission in September 1940.
Political instructor F. arrived from the same division, who was transferred from Stryi to Lvov 3 months ago due to the illness of children who require special treatment. Just started to treat, he was transferred to Shepetovka. As a result, he has an extremely unhealthy mood that is reflected in his work.
He presented material for dismissal from the army to the political instructor of the K OPP of the 8th Panzer Division and at the same time sent him to our division. Now K. is transferred to the reserve.
The 32nd cavalry division dispatched ml. political instructor G., submitted for dismissal from the army for health reasons.
The same with the political staff arrived from the 10th tank. Divisions.
As can be seen from these examples, the units of the District did not make a proportional selection of command personnel for recruiting our division, but a real screening out.
Junior command staff
The division is staffed with junior officers by 21%.
Shortage - 1910 people. The KOVO was dressed up to cover the shortage of the OU, and the division received enlisted personnel and corporals from 10 and 15 tank divisions. The quality of the sent corporals is very low, the latter cannot fulfill the posts of junior command personnel, both in terms of their development and training. Among the corporals: 211 people. of non-Russian nationality who speak Russian poorly, 2 Germans, 1 Persian, 7 illiterate people, 70 illiterate people, demoted from the junior command staff to the rank and file for indiscipline 11 people who were on trial before the army and convicted - 18 people, whose relatives were repressed - 12 people, unfit for combat service - 20 people.
All the corporals sent are now used in the posts of junior command personnel, but they are of little use, tk. rank-and-file Red Army men of the 1940 draft are better prepared today.
For the preparation of junior command personnel in the units of the division, training units were formed with a training period up to September 1941, the release of which will cover the shortage.
Rank and file
To date, the division is staffed with rank-and-file personnel, plus 1,910 people were received. enlisted personnel to cover the shortage of junior command personnel and plus 120 people in excess of the staff. from 131 motorized divisions alongside the corps. As a result, the division has a superstaff of enlisted personnel of 127 people.
People entered the division from all parts of the KOVO and even from other districts. Units, sending people to the division, contrary to the instructions of the OU KOVO, sent out screenings. This forced me not to accept some of the people sent from rifle divisions and artillery regiments and return them back for replacement.
So, of the parts listed in the order of KOVO No. 058, I really did not accept people for the following reasons:
164th Infantry Division - sent 125 people on February 25th. There was no order to receive them in the division. A telegram from the corps about the outfit of people from the 164, 141 and 130 rifle divisions was received by division 1.3.41, it indicated that the receptionists were sent to select people in the listed units.
Among the 125 people sent by the division there were: 64% or 78 people of non-Russian nationalities, 22 people. old ages (28-30 years old) from the reserve of the 2nd category, 67 people. illiterate and semi-literate (educational program, 1-2 gr.), 3 people. repressed, 28 people. undisciplined, having disciplinary offenses up to unauthorized absences, as indicated in the characteristics sent with the people of the 164th rifle division, 28 people. patients, including: hernia - 1, heart disease - 2, trachoma - 3, rheumatism - 1, pulmonary process - 3, perforation of the tympanic membrane - 1, deformation of the chest and limbs - 3, appendicitis - 1, catarrh of the digestive system - 3.
I didn’t accept these people and returned them; instead, the representative I sent out selected and brought 120 people.
330 howitzer artillery regiment - people from the regiment arrived simultaneously with the outfit, the division did not have time to send its representative. I returned 50 people, including: illiterate and illiterate 31 people, convicted and repressed - 6 people, patients - 12 people, eczema - 1 person, pulmonary process - 3 people, low vision - 2 people. who do not speak Russian - 21 people.
On February 10, a representative was sent to the regiment by telegram from OU KOVO, who received in return those who were fit for service in tank units.
315 artillery division - the representative of the division did not have time to leave, as the regiment's men were sent to Shepetovka. I brought people back, including: illiterate - 15 people, semi-literate - 29 people, convicted and repressed - 13 people, who do not speak Russian at all - 17 people. In return, we received suitable ones.
The 15th and 10th tank divisions, according to the manning plan, were to send the first 679 people to the division, and the second 239 people. cadets to staff training divisions of the division from among the Red Army men of the 1940 draft, and the directive of the OU KOVO indicated that the divisions, before sending people to us, would screen out those unsuitable for training units and send only suitable ones. Upon the arrival of the people, I established that among those sent were people who were not only unsuitable for staffing training units, but also for service in tank units. So, among those sent by the 15th tank division were: 25 people. illiterate and illiterate, 17 people. patients, including: 5 people. hearing impaired, 5 people with low vision, 2 people lung process, 1 person with eczema, 1 person with curvature of the spine, 1 person with a hernia, 1 person with dropsy of the testicle, 1 pers. hemorrhoids and varicose veins.
This is confirmed by the commander of the 15th division, who, having received people back from us, sent them to the garrison commission, as a result of which 4 people. dismissed from the army, 7 people. put in the hospital, the rest were found fit for non-combatant service.
The 10th Panzer Division sent similar cadets, including 47 people returned to it. there were: 26 patients, illiterate, semi-literate, did not speak Russian and could not be in educational units. Other people were received from the division in exchange.
In addition to the listed units, which sent unusable rank-and-file personnel and, at my request, replaced, the rest of the units, which were given the outfit by the KOVO Headquarters, were also of low quality, especially many were sent undisciplined, with a number of major violations of discipline.
So, from the 348 artillery regiment of the 141st rifle division, 29 people arrived, including 12 non-Russian people, 7 illiterate people, 4 old age people. On the third day after the people were sent to the unit, four of them deserted. One of them was detained in Shepetivka, the rest are wanted. The detained Red Army deserter I. during his stay in the 348th artillery regiment (2 months) had penalties: 12.11.40 - reprimand for dishonest attitude to the horse, 7.12 - 5 days of arrest for violation of discipline, 23.12 - 5 days of arrest for evading drill training, 10.2 - 10 days for failure to comply with an order, 20.2 - 4 squads for a fight, 22.2 - 3 days of arrest for a fight, sued by a comradely court.
As a result of such recruitment, at the present time, in the units of the division entrusted to me, there are hundreds of people who, in their physical condition, literacy and knowledge of the Russian language, are completely unsuitable for service in the tank forces and are actually ballast, namely:
Natives nat. republics of non-Russian nationality - 1,914 people, or 23.2%. Of these, 236 people who do not speak Russian at all.
People by nationality not subject to sending to the troops of the border districts (Germans, Poles, Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Czechs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians) - 36 people.
Demoted from junior commanders to privates for lack of discipline - 13 people.
Illiterate 211 people, semi-literate (1-2 groups and educational program) - 622 people. and with the formation of 3-4 groups of 3571 people, old age - 26-30 years old - 745 people, who were on trial and convicted - 341 people, whose relatives were repressed - 137 people. Those who are not fit for combat service according to the conclusion of the garrison medical commission - 81 people. Unsuitable for service in tank units and for combat service according to the conclusion of the medical commission of the unit, but not yet passed the garrison commission - 418 people.
NECESSARY:
1. To speed up the appointment of commanders to a division, especially for staffing unit headquarters, tank crews and artillery supply commanders, since the absence of such impedes the planned and high-quality progress of combat training, control and planning of the latter, and putting together subunits.
2. To send out from the division the rank and file, unsuitable for service in tank units and being ballast, namely: 499 unfit for combat service, 833 illiterate and illiterate people, 478 people who were on trial and repressed. There are 236 people who do not speak Russian, 36 people are not subject to being sent to the troops of the border district. A total of 2082 people, instead of whom to dress people in quality fit for service in tank units. " [15]
An interesting document, isn't it? Who is its author? Some nervous schoolgirl? No, the commander of the 20th TD of the 8th MK at that time was Colonel M. E. Katukov, whom it is difficult to suspect of excessive nervousness and desire to "regret" the injustice of fate. And now, having read the report of Mikhail Efimovich, let the reader ask himself a simple question: would he not like to command Colonel Katukov's division in 1941? The reader has the opportunity to refuse, Mikhail Efpimovich did not. And what he managed to do in such a situation arouses only immense respect.
The problems of the Red Army armored forces on the eve of the beginning of the Second World War were by no means limited to a shortage of trained personnel and a lack of shells for new types of tank guns.
The shortage of combat vehicles was 5220 units, and the report of the head of the GABTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko, said that with the existing plan for the production of tanks, this shortage could be covered only by the beginning of 1943. Again, we are not talking about fully re-equipping the mechanized corps on the T-34, KV, T-50, but at least simply re-equipping them to their full strength while maintaining such "formidable" tanks as the ancient BT-2, twin-turret T-26 and "floaters" T-37A and T-38.
But the tanks are still okay! But what about the equipment that should serve combat vehicles? How are you doing with tank trucks, repair shops on an automobile chassis, mobile command posts of headquarters of all levels, and just trucks and cars?
From the report of the head of the GABTU, it follows that, according to the needs of peacetime, 26 thousand cars and pickups in the Red Army are required, while the need for wartime is 49305 units. There were only 17280 pieces in stock, that is, a shortage of "only" 32 thousand! That is, only 30% of what is required is available. True, according to calculations, another 23,864 cars should come from the national economy for mobilization. A logical question arises - when and in what condition will these cars go to specific parts and connections? Practice has shown that these vehicles arrived in significant quantities only in the second half of July 1941, that is, about a month later, when 80% of the vehicle fleet in the western border districts had already been destroyed. In addition, about a third of the number of vehicles received immediately after mobilization required major and medium repairs.
With trucks, the story was about the same: the need for peacetime is 211920, the need for wartime is 470827, and there are only 193,218 units available, which is much less than half. Even if we “scrape the bottom of the barrel” and strip the entire national economy of the USSR to the skin (which will give 209,880 more trucks of dubious quality and condition), a shortage of 67,729 trucks will remain.
With special machines, on the availability of which the combat effectiveness of the tank forces of the USSR largely depended, the situation was generally monstrous! For example, the need for repair shops of type "A" in peacetime - 5423 units, in wartime - 7972, and there were only 2729 units available. Moreover, no mob-reserve! These are special vehicles, they simply were not in the national economy. Thus, the shortage of type A mobile workshops amounted to 5243 pieces.
Type B mobile auto repair shops were required by the states of peacetime 3648 units, according to the states of wartime 4378 units, and in the presence of 1556 units. In the column "there will be vehicles for mobilization from the national economy" zero flaunts. Outcomplete 2822 pieces.
Gas tanks: the need for peacetime - 19683 units, the need for wartime - 60914, 11252 units are available. Incomplete - 49662 pieces. On mobilization - 0.
Camping charging stations: the need for peacetime is 1860 pieces, for wartime - 2571, there are 725 pieces in stock and there is nowhere to take them. Shortage - 1846 units.
Other special vehicles: peacetime need 81240, wartime - 159911, available 45380. Will be received on mobilization of 6,000 units. Incomplete - 108531 pieces.
All in all, cars of all types are required in wartime 755878 units, in peacetime 349775 units, and 272140 units are available. Another 239744 units will be received on mobilization, and still the shortage will be 234994. And almost all of it is special vehicles.
Lieutenant General Fedorenko emphasizes that “the Red Army has a significant shortage of ZIS trucks, type A and B workshops and mobile charging stations. As the experience of the Finnish and Polish campaigns has shown, it is not possible to count on covering the shortage of these vehicles at the expense of supplies from the national economy …”. [6]
As a result, the situation with vehicles in mechanized buildings looked like this [16]:
11th MK ZAPOVO
13th MK ZAPOVO
19th MK KOVO
7th MD 8th MK KOVO
Like the 7th MD, vehicles (except for special vehicles) are provided normally. But no, there is still a catch - remember, the commander of the 8th MK, Lieutenant General D. I. Ryabyshev writes on May 1, 1941: “Trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber for 60%, armored vehicles for 100%. Out of the number of trucks, 200 vehicles stand on pads due to the lack of rubber. Average rubber wear by 70%”
The lack of trucks and automobile tires called into question the ability of the mechanized corps of the Red Army, not only for a "deep operation", but even for counterattacks against an enemy that had broken through. An attempt to somehow establish the supply of fuel and ammunition to the tank divisions of mechanized corps, as a rule, left them without motorized infantry, which was forced to move after the tanks "on foot." I bring to the attention of the reader another interesting document [17]:
“CERTIFICATE ABOUT THE PREPAREDNESS OF TANK UNITS OF THE KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT as of May 5, 1941.
4 HOUSING
8th Panzer Division is fully combat-ready, vehicles are fully operational.
The 32nd Panzer Division is combat-ready, can conduct close combat, 35% is provided with vehicles.
81 motorized division - fully combat-ready, provided with vehicles.
8 BODY
The 12th Panzer Division is combat-ready, has no heavy tanks, and is fully equipped with vehicles.
The 34th Panzer Division is combat-ready, has no medium tanks, 60% by vehicles.
7 motorisations. the division is 60% combat-ready in combat vehicles, and 90% in vehicles.
9 BODY
The 20th Panzer Division is not combat-ready.
35th Panzer Division - not combat-ready
131 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready.
15 BODY
The 10th Panzer Division is fully combat-ready, vehicles are fully operational.
The 37th Panzer Division is combat-ready, has no heavy and medium tanks, vehicles - by 40%.
212 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready.
16 BODY
The 15th Panzer Division is combat-ready, has no heavy tanks, and is fully equipped with vehicles.
39th Panzer Division - 50% combat-ready, has no heavy and medium tanks.
240 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready.
19 BODY
The 43rd Panzer Division is 40% combat-ready; it has no heavy and medium tanks.
The 40th Panzer Division is not combat-ready.
213 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready.
22 BODY
19 Panzer Division is not combat-ready.
The 41st tank division is combat-ready, has no heavy and medium tanks, vehicles - by 50%.
215 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready.
24 BODY
The 45th Panzer Division is not combat-ready.
49th Panzer Division is not combat-ready.
216 motor vehicles. the division is not combat-ready."
Just think - out of 24 tank and motorized divisions, only 5, or 20% are fully combat-ready! 7 divisions are partially combat-ready, or 29%. The other 12 divisions are COMPLETELY INNOVATIVE. And this is the most powerful district in the USSR! Is it necessary to remind about the fighting efficiency of the Wehrmacht divisions?
In addition, somewhere out there, in the rear of the Soviet divisions rushing towards the tank wedges of the Wehrmacht, artillery dangles, towed at a snail's speed by agricultural tractors. And that's if they are available at all! For example, the motorized rifle regiment of the 37th TD with 12 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns had only 5 tractors. How to transfer artillery? In parts? In three "stages"? The first day we transport 5 guns, on the night of the tractor they return, on the second day the second 5 guns … And so on. And we pray that not a single tractor breaks down. In total, at least 3 days just to move 15 guns (instead of 16 existing ones). Three days in the summer of 1941 is an eternity! Will the Germans wait so long for our artillery? They won't. What will be the outcome? He is sad: the infantry, without artillery cover, is knocked out of their positions and destroyed. An attempt to counterattack the Soviet infantry without artillery preparation and escorting leads to huge losses from the enemy's unsuppressed firing points, it otsupayetsya with heavy losses and is already virtually incapable of further hostilities.
The artillery regiment of the 212nd MD, having 8 76-mm cannons, 16 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns of the mech-traction means, had only one division. The guns had to be withdrawn to positions as the tractors were freed, or even manually.
Even where there seemed to be enough tractors, the situation was also difficult. For example, the commission that checked the 15th TD of the 8th MK indicated in the report that “the howitzer regiment is equipped with STZ-5 tractors. These tractors are low-powered and slow-moving. When going uphill, one implement has to be towed by two or three tractors. " [eighteen]
At a meeting of designers with representatives of the Red Army held in April 1941 at STZ regarding operation in the STZ-5 troops, the military did not hesitate in expressions: “… take this tractor and try to work with a gun: it does not pull the required weight of the gun, the power as a military vehicle is small … not smooth stroke, barbaric conditions for the driver in the cab completely devalue this tractor. And if this car is left as a transport vehicle and as a means of transporting goods, then it also does not fit in terms of carrying capacity … All your transport vehicles have a unique number of drawbacks … The maximum speed of this machine is 8 km / h, but usually it does 6 km / h … The car itself I can't pull myself at 4th speed … if I got into a combat position, and then I need to change the position immediately, but I need 40 minutes to just start the tractor … "[19]
In general, the technical characteristics of domestic tractors used for towing artillery pieces were not a secret for the leadership of the Red Army. In the same report of the head of the GABTU, Lieutenant-General Fedorenko, to the military council of the spacecraft on the state of the provision of armored vehicles and property of the Red Army, this is stated directly and unequivocally [6]:
“Among the total availability of tractors as of 15.06. 1941 There are 14277 obsolete tractors of the ChTZ-60, STZ-3 and Kommunar types, which are subject to confiscation, since, due to their technical qualities, they cannot ensure the combat work of military units, especially artillery.
The use of low-speed and low-power tractors ChTZ and STZ as artillery tractors for divisional and corps artillery does not provide artillery with tractors that meet its modern requirements ….
There is also given the total number and the need of the Red Army for tractors: the need for peacetime - 49552, wartime - 94548, available on 15.06.41 - 42931 units. Out of stock - 51653 pieces.
As a result, 1941 became a nightmare for all commanders of any Soviet mechanized formation. There are not enough vehicles for the delivery of fuels and lubricants and shells? We remove them from motorized divisions, as a result, motorized riflemen stomp on foot and turn into ordinary infantry, tanks automatically lose infantry support, and even with a successful counterattack, they cannot hold the captured territory, because the infantry, which is the backbone of any field defense, has not yet approached. There are not enough repair facilities, especially mobile ones, which means that we cannot repair damaged tanks, even if we risk our lives and pull them out of the battlefield. Don't have a tractor powerful enough to pull out wrecked cars? We have to pull out wrecked tanks by other tanks, wasting their already small service life, distracting them from solving their actual combat missions and putting valuable equipment in unnecessary danger. Tanks are forced to go on the offensive even without the support of artillery - it drags somewhere in the rear, especially heavy cannons and howitzers, moving at the speed of a pedestrian.
And so on and so forth. If tanks are a kind of "muscles" of mechanized corps; then trucks, repair shops, tank trucks, tractors are the "blood vessels" that feed the muscles. And we have barely half of them. Tank units without shells, fuel and lubricants, maintenance and repair are doomed to destruction. This is exactly what happened in practice. And the number of tanks here does not play the most important role!
And note that I have not yet mentioned factors such as:
1. Repeated optionality of the execution of orders of the senior command of the middle command.
2. Biased assessment of their activities.
3. Poor intelligence performance at all levels.
4. Poor communication, inability and fear of using radio communications.
5. The passivity of many commanders and their fear of taking the initiative, etc.
I repeat once again: an armored box on tracks together with its crew is just a small brick of a huge "tank unit" castle. For normal operation, each tank must have a larger train of "servants" than a medieval knight. Otherwise, the tank will turn into a "disabled person" and neither millimeters of armor, nor the power of the gun, nor speed will save it.
Of course, one can blame the Soviet military leadership for short-sightedness. They gave, they say, a huge number of tanks without bothering to provide these same tanks with crews with higher technical education, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, armored vehicles and other vehicles of the "tank train", as well as scurrying everywhere motorcyclists, hanging in the sky with reconnaissance aircraft, and further on the list - to the clutches and files in rembats. Sitting in the warmth behind a computer monitor it is easier to do this. I repeat my question: dear reader, would you like to command any (your choice!) Red Army tank division in June - July 1941?
If the reader thinks that this article is aimed at “denigrating” the tank forces of the pre-war Red Army, he will be deeply mistaken: “In total, there were 215 tanks in the … division. The only infantry unit was a motorized infantry battalion, transported by bus! There were practically no radio stations in the division, and orders were delivered to the units by cyclists. The division's artillery consisted of several parts of the reserve. Supply and maintenance services practically did not exist. " think. talking about the Red Army? You are mistaken, this is written by a certain General de Gaulle, don't you remember that? So the French (and the British, by the way, too) a year before the USSR faced the same problems - the presence of a large number of tanks in "semi-finished" tank units, lack of communications, inability to manage bulky mechanized formations, lack of "their" infantry in tank divisions, poor interaction of combat arms, etc. etc.
Moreover, the quality of the French tanks even surpassed the German ones, as well as the Soviet T-34 and KV. And the quantitative superiority was for the allies. At the same time, there was no talk of any surprise - the war had long been declared and had lasted for six months. Neither France nor England in the twentieth century had any revolutions or civil wars. No one shot officers with WWI experience or forced them into exile. French soldiers were to fight not for the "bloody dictator" Stalin, but for a completely democratic Third Republic. The educational level of the population in France and England was in every way higher than in the USSR. However, the result of a clash with the Wehrmacht turned out to be a real disaster for France and England.
Despite all its shortcomings, the Red Army, in contrast to the French, British, Polish, Belgian, Dutch, Yugoslavian, Greek troops, managed not only to stop, but even six months later inflict the first serious defeat of the strongest army in the world.
