The photo shows a joint flight of an Iranian strategic air transport tanker based on a Boeing 747, an F-14A Tomcat fighter-interceptor, an F-4E fighter-bomber and a MiG-29UB combat training fighter over Tehran on April 18, 2015, on the air unit military parade in honor of the Day of the Armed Forces of Iran
Today, 102 Israeli F-16I Sufa multirole fighters and 25 F-15I Ra'am long-range tactical fighters remain the main strike backbone of the Israel Air Force in the Middle East. In addition, the Raams, thanks to a high afterburner speed of 2655 km / h and a ceiling of 18300 m, can perform the functions of long-range interceptors capable of conducting long-range aerial combat with AIM-120D missiles at a distance of up to 150-160 km, as well as employing a huge range of tactical missiles. and guided aerial bombs (UAB) against various ground targets (from bunkers and headquarters to relay nodes and air defense radar systems). For these qualities, the F-15I is considered in Hel Haavir a "strategic" asset in Tel Aviv throughout Asia Minor. And it is not surprising, because for centuries the main enemy of this Middle Eastern state has been the current regional superpower - the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Since the spring of 2016, the Iranian Air Force has already received part of the S-300PMU-2 anti-aircraft missile systems divisions to increase the defense capability of the country's military and industrial strategic facilities on the Persian Gulf coast and in the area of the state's capital, which has caused a lot of criticism and fears from the Israeli leadership: Impunity for violation of the Iranian air borders has become a thing of the past for Hel Haavir, who for decades have been developing and nursing concepts for the destruction of Iran's nuclear program. Israel is concerned not only about the arrival of 5 divisions of the best version of the "Three Hundred" in the Iranian Air Force, but also the actively developing concept of network-centric air defense, where system coordination between most of the elements of air defense and missile defense at the level of the operational-strategic command comes to the fore. In the center of the state (near Tehran) there is the Central Command Post of the Air Force and Air Defense, where all information about the air situation both within the Iranian airspace and beyond is systematized. The only ones who may not be connected to this link in the Iranian Armed Forces are the calculations of MANPADS and military air defense.
All this is taken into account by the Israeli Air Force command when developing a strategy for an aerospace offensive operation against Iran. The radio engineering subdivisions that are part of the Iranian air defense structure have a huge number of electronic and electronic intelligence equipment of Russian, Chinese and their own production. For example, the Iranian air defense system now has radar systems for the missile attack warning system "Gadir". The station operates in the meter wavelength range and is capable of detecting Israeli Jericho-type medium-range ballistic missiles at a distance of 1,100 km and an altitude of up to 300 km. There are also such radar-DRLO 1L119 "Sky-SVU". Some of these radars are deployed on the mountainous terrain of the northwestern part of the state, and therefore Israeli F-15Is simply will not be able to enter Iranian airspace unnoticed, especially considering that the RCS of these vehicles with full suspensions reaches 12 m2.
The Iranian air defense system is armed with a huge number of radar systems of various power, frequency of operation and purpose. One of them is RLK 1L119 "Sky-SVU". The computing facilities of the complex are capable of tracking more than 100 air targets on the passage at a range of up to 380 km and an altitude of up to 140 km. The presence of such means only makes it possible to notify the command and the attached air defense systems about the approach of a medium-altitude enemy, but without AWACS aircraft, further observation of the aircraft in the mode of following the terrain, and even more so the coordination of air combat, becomes impossible
Therefore, now "Raams" will either gradually recede into the background and will be intended only for conducting DVB with Iranian MiG-29A and F-14A, as well as for striking areas with weakened air defense (i.e., where there are no C-300PMU -2), or they will form the second echelon of suppressing air defense and electronic warfare, following "in the tail" of the F-35I, and carrying 4 PRLR HARM on the suspension points. With the "Lightning" ("Adir"), the Israeli Air Force is much more interesting. Now it is on the F-35I that the Israeli leadership is making the biggest bets, since its small radar signature, according to experts, should contribute to "eluding" the S-300PMU-2 air defense missile systems. This was stated by an unnamed Israeli source. But is it such a simple task - to "slip away" from the "Three hundred" 1000 km from the air bases of its own deployment? Not really.
First, if you look at the map, the distance from the nearest Israeli Air Force base "Ramat David" to Iranian airspace is 960 km, and the combat radius of the Israeli F-35I "Adir" is only 1080 km without PTB, and about 1500 km with PTB. This is not enough to conduct a long-term operation to gain Iranian air superiority, but it is quite enough to "shoot" long-range tactical cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER at strategic targets remote inland. But here, too, there is a very interesting point that makes it difficult for Hel Haavir to act independently. The closest flight path to Iran extends over Iraq. Today it cannot be considered that Baghdad is a friendly side to Tel Aviv, but in relation to Moscow it is quite. Therefore, any maneuvers of Israeli F-35Is with refueling aircraft in the Iraqi sky, directed against Tehran, are ruled out. The Israeli Air Force can, of course, make a request for the use of the airspace of the countries of the "Arabian coalition", but this will already reveal all the maps of Tel Aviv, which sometimes should not even be known to Washington. In this case, a massive breakthrough of the Israeli "Adirs" does not threaten the Iranian airspace. But the model of the planned aggression against Iran may include not only a unilateral attack by the Israeli Air Force, but also a comprehensive aggression involving the countries of the "Arabian coalition", which are armed with more than 450 multirole fighters of the "4 + / ++" generation more than 900 fighters).
In this case, the position of the Iranian Air Force is really complicated. Here, and all the set "Favorites" may not be enough. On the territory of Iran, taking into account its "cheerful and friendly" environment, at least 25 such S-300PMU-2 divisions, or more S-300PS, are needed.
It is also annoying that the Iranian Air Force has no long-range radar detection and control aircraft of the A-50U type, or the Chinese counterparts of the KJ-2000. What kind of full-fledged defense of a mountainous state from the enemy's WTO can we talk about without the presence of data from AWACS ?! We know that the air component of the Iranian Air Force is in a difficult situation today: apart from the Falkrums and the modernized Tomkats, there is nothing else here. But even in such conditions, the RLDN aircraft could improve the situation for Iran, giving timely target designation to the calculations of the S-300PMU-2 divisions against the stealthy F-35I "Adir" "squeezing" through the mountain ranges and various cruise missiles of the "Arabian coalition", made according to the technology Stealth.
In the photo, Israeli Defense Minister A. Lieberman in the cockpit of the 1st, assembled for Hel Haavir, the 5th generation F-35I "Adir" multipurpose fighter (board "901"). In total, according to the first contract, the air force of the Jewish state should be armed with 50 F-35Is, which will significantly expand the capabilities of long-range air combat for the Israeli military aircraft fleet.
The situation with the Iranian Air Force fleet is also fixable. Back on August 15, 2015, active discussions began on Iranian Internet forums about the possible conclusion of a contract for the acquisition, and then licensed assembly of Russian super-maneuverable multi-role fighters of the 4 ++ generation MiG-35. Relatively inexpensive two-seater combat vehicles of the transitional generation are equipped with a whole set of optoelectronic defensive-aiming systems: a two-way station for detecting attacking missiles SOAR (scanning the lower and upper hemispheres for the presence of incoming anti-aircraft interceptor missiles and other airborne weapons), an optical-electronic sighting system OLS-K for work on land and sea targets, and the standard optical-electronic sighting and navigation complex OLS-UEM, capable of passively attacking enemy aircraft and missiles. Onboard radar with AFAR of the Zhuk-AE type is constantly being modernized. So the version of the station with 1016 transceiver modules will have a target detection range with an EPR of 0.2 m2 (F-35A / I) from 120 to 150 km, which will not allow the Israeli Adiram to dominate. And it will be the happiness of the Israeli F-35I not to get involved in close combat with the MiG-35, here the first will simply be doomed.
There were also reports about the conclusion of a contract between the Iranian Ministry of Defense and the Chinese company Chengdu for the purchase of 150 J-10A / B, but nothing is known about the results.
The ability of the Iranian Air Force to confront Israel without including the “Arabian coalition” and the United States in the “game” remains at a high level even today. But after the involvement of Doha, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, the Iranian Air Force will definitely not be able to do without the renewal of fighter aircraft and the adoption of "air radars".
