The most important problem of military education in Russia is the modernization of the officer training system. Changes were made to the training and education of cadets of military schools. But new sections are still being added, the list of planned topics is constantly expanding. At the same time, there is a lot of unnecessary in the programs, while many questions remain outside the scope of training.
Reasonable initiative should not be punished
Not a single military training program provides for the development of initiative in future officers, the ability to generate their own solutions. Of course, you need to know the fundamental laws, principles and rules of warfare, but very often commanders in battle have to make decisions, relying solely on their ingenuity.
Since the formation of the regular Russian army, close attention has been paid to the upbringing of initiative and independence of officers. The officers were given the initiative to act in accordance with the "occasion" and "custom" of the enemy. For "negligence" in battle, the officer was severely punished. It was especially emphasized that in the military regulations "the orders are written, but there are no times and cases," therefore, in military operations, one must have "reasoning", in accordance with the circumstances, and not adhere to the regulations, "like a blind wall."
Unfortunately, these abilities began to be gradually lost by the officers. “After the war, at operational-tactical exercises and exercises, it was customary to say that the decision of this or that commander meets or does not meet the requirements of the charter,” says General of the Army Gareev. - But the decision on a specific problem cannot and should not correspond to the statutes or other theoretical provisions. It can be vital only if it takes into account all the shades of the prevailing conditions, corresponds to a specific situation and ensures the most effective fulfillment of the assigned task … The most terrible enemy of rational military art is template and dogmatism. The strength of the art of war lies in creativity, innovation, originality, and, consequently, in the unexpectedness of decisions and actions for the enemy."
The future officer needs fundamental knowledge of the history of military art. But not for elevation to the rank of dogma, but for comprehension and creative application to modern conditions. Although the classical theories of war in the development of Sun Tzu, Vegetia, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Svechina, Garth require adaptation to the current era, they remain fundamentally valid. The logic of war and strategic thinking is as universal and endless as human nature itself.
Cadets of military schools should receive such knowledge that would enable them to master any military specialty in a short time. Taking into account that the concept of armed struggle and military equipment are changing dramatically within 5-10 years, a future officer must be able to learn and acquire knowledge on his own. An example in this was shown by Alexander Suvorov, who by the age of 20 independently studied and thoroughly knew all the campaigns of the Macedonian, Hannibal, Caesar, Conde and other then famous generals. Later he mastered seven foreign languages, including Turkish and Finnish, perfectly mastered mathematics and other sciences. And he has not lost a single battle.
In a military university, teachers must do everything possible so that the cadets completely forget school training in the form of "coaching" to take the Unified State Exam. Future officers need to be taught to think independently, and not to train them as teachers, as is done in school. Cadets should be guided towards an independent search for the necessary solution to problematic issues, and not towards the ability to find the desired option from the presented set of them.
The study of natural sciences, especially mathematics and computer science, is of great help in the development of creative thinking. The use of information technology is at the heart of all the concepts of armed struggle of the future. Therefore, without knowledge of computer science, without the ability to apply algorithmic methods for solving problems of optimal planning and control, the formation of a future commander is impossible. Each student must carry out calculations using spreadsheets, work with databases, create algorithms and write programs in high-level programming languages.
An important role in the formation of the future commander is played by the study of the humanities, primarily pedagogy and psychology. The commander is required to be able to convince people.
Combat, political and physical training
Combat training is essential. The main teaching method should be visual, not verbal, as in most military universities at the present time. The main study time should be devoted to parading and practicing practical actions - it is better to see once than hear a hundred times, but even better - to do it once than to see a hundred times.
For high-quality training, constant training of cadets in military units is necessary. At present, internships are carried out only in the last year of cadets' training. As a result, after graduating from college, officers need additional training and adaptation to the specifics of service in a military unit. An internship in military units at the end of each course at a military university will not only contribute to better training of future officers, but will also allow the commanders of military units to select in advance a reserve for filling vacant officer posts. In addition, close interaction of military universities with military units allows solving many problems in the training and education of cadets. Unfortunately, most military universities do not use this huge potential.
Political preparation is equally important. Throughout the history of the Russian army, they tried to involve officers in politics, to win over to their side, proceeding from a variety of beliefs and beliefs.
The tsarist government forbade officers to turn to politics. During the production of officers, a subscription was given with the following content (its text remained unchanged until 1917): they did not exist by names, I did not belong and will not continue to belong, and that not only did I not belong to members of these societies by obligation, through an oath or word of honor, and I did not visit and did not even know about them, and through collusion outside the lodges, Doom The manager, both about the societies and about the members, did not know anything either and did not give any obligations without forms and oaths."
Such oaths had a detrimental effect on the political training of officers and were one of the reasons for the confusion of the officer corps during the events of February-October 1917. The political demarcation of officers became possible only as a result of their political ignorance, and their practical actions were often determined by the prevailing political situation, and not by ideological positions.
"The pursuit of leaving the army outside politics and public views is now nothing more than the fruit of clerical philosophizing," asserted the tsarist Major General Vladimir Voronetsky, who until July 1916 headed the headquarters of the 13th Army Corps.
The role of the political training of the officer corps is determined by the following circumstances.
First, the army is an instrument of power. The officer corps cannot wander in political darkness: it must be politically enlightened and involved in those state tasks that the authorities decide. An officer must be an active bearer of the state and national idea.
Secondly, the political preparation of the war, the political aspect of the war itself, requires high political qualifications not only of the highest, but also of senior and junior officers.
Thirdly, the war itself requires an officer to be able to manage and direct the energy of the masses to achieve victory, and without ideology it is impossible to cope with this task.
Fourth, attempts by political parties to use officers in the struggle for power require not only political vigilance, but also political foresight, the ability to see the common good of the state behind the actions of individual parties, groups and individuals.
Finally, fifthly, the officers should be viewed as the most important personnel reserve of the state.
Therefore, political training should become the most important area of training for cadets of military schools. At the same time, the political training of cadets is something more than just the sum of classes and seminars. This is a complex and multifaceted methodological complex that allows solving many issues of the formation of a future officer. Just informing about political issues is only half the battle. It is necessary to enter into a discussion on controversial provisions. Only then will the future officer become competent in making political decisions and will be able to convince and educate conscripts who may be members of various political parties and movements.
Now the physical health of Russian citizens has significantly decreased. The experience of the Chechen wars showed a weak level of physical training and many officers of the Armed Forces. It’s not even worth talking about the level of training of soldiers. Therefore, in military schools it is necessary to deal with the issues of strengthening and maintaining the health of cadets. It would be very beneficial to include martial arts training in the curriculum. There are such programs in China, Korea, Japan. We also had such an experience, when, for example, boxing was included in the program of the Suvorov schools, and ju-jutsu was included in the cadet schools.
The study of martial arts also contributes to the education of composure, attentiveness, the ability not to lose sight of details, to penetrate into the plans of the enemy. The methods of psychophysical education used in the martial arts are also used for the purpose of developing certain moral and volitional qualities, self-regulation skills, which make it possible to withstand the stresses and overloads of military service. Martial arts classes contribute to the development of activity, determination.
We are taught by those we have learned ourselves
The decisive role in the training of future officers belongs to the leadership of military education. Unfortunately, the Education Department of the RF Ministry of Defense, when it was headed by Yekaterina Priezzheva, did a lot to collapse the military education system. Many military academies and universities were liquidated, the teaching staff was reduced seven times. We switched to a three-tier Bologna system, which led to a decrease in the quality of training (by the way, Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu had already canceled it).
The most important role in the training of future officers is played by teachers of military schools. At the same time, the level of training of the teachers themselves has sharply decreased in recent years. This is due to the lack of combat experience in some teachers, and sometimes even service in the troops. One of my acquaintances from the military school went through the "combat path" from lieutenant to colonel, sitting at the same table in the same room and teaching cadets the regulations of the Armed Forces. Another colleague at the Military Academy, while writing his Ph. D. thesis on the operation of a combat missile system, went to the Central Museum of the Armed Forces to see how this complex looks live.
Therefore, it makes sense to rotate officers-teachers and officers from the troops, sending the former on a long mission to the troops to update and replenish knowledge, and send the most trained officers from the troops to military schools for teaching. For example, in the United States, after the Gulf War, officers who received combat experience were sent to teach at the National Defense University, military colleges and training centers in Forts Leavenworth, Knox, Benin and others.
In our civilian universities, more time is now devoted to the study of fundamental sciences, and highly specialized disciplines are included in the program of special courses and seminars. This contributes to the fact that each student can make a choice in the study of special disciplines, in accordance with their abilities and inclinations, which gives graduates a base for mastering any specialty in the profile of the university.
Such experience, I think, is useful for the Ministry of Defense as well. An increase in the time spent on the study of the fundamental sciences at the expense of a certain reduction in highly specialized disciplines and their more flexible distribution would contribute to an early increase in the number of military specialists employed in various fields of activity.
