Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?

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Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?
Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?

Video: Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?

Video: Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?
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Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?
Why a battleship if there is an aircraft carrier?

Fantastic progress in aviation, observed in the 1920s, made us take a fresh look at the role of the air force in armed conflicts. The planes soared confidently in the sky and led to victory. Some of the eccentric military theorists have already predicted the imminent disappearance of the classical armed forces - a downpour of fire from heaven can decide the outcome of any war.

It is not surprising that sailors became interested in a promising type of armed forces - an airplane instead of an artillery piece … why not? Aircraft carriers were rapidly gaining popularity - aviation turned out to be a formidable tool in the sea. The creators of cruisers and battleships began to fuss - the decks of the ships were adorned with dozens of anti-aircraft gun barrels.

The situation, it would seem, is obvious - an artillery ship is weak in front of the power of aircraft with well-trained crews. The combat radius of the aircraft is ten times greater than the firing range of an artillery gun. Probably it was worth sending as many forces as possible to the construction of aircraft carrier ships?

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Spithead Marine Parade, UK, 1937

However, nothing of the kind happened: even during World War II, the leading maritime powers continued the massive construction of super-battleships and cruisers: British King George V, American North Caroline, South Dakota, Iowa, incredible Japanese Yamato … the number of cruisers built in general was in the tens of units - 14 Baltimors, 27 Cleveland-class cruisers … Do not forget about 1200 Kriegsmarine submarines and 850 US Navy destroyers.

Currently, a persistent misconception has formed that the main operating force in the Pacific theater of operations was carrier-based aircraft. One after another, absurd "proofs" of this theory appear - for example, it suddenly turned out that cruisers, battleships and submarines were in "auxiliary roles", and "serious" strategic tasks were solved exclusively by aircraft carriers.

Pearl Harbor, Midway, Doolittle Raid. A beautifully soaring plane, accompanied by a standing ovation from the deck crew - this image has little to do with the real war in the Pacific Ocean.

78 large-scale amphibious assault forces. Brutal artillery duels off the Savo Island and in the Surigao Strait, squadron battles, daily shelling of the coast, battles of destroyers, deadly submarines that sank everyone who got in their way.

The famous Midway and the Battle of the Coral Sea are only rare exceptions when the situation depended on aircraft carrier ships. In all other cases (months-long porridge on Guadalcanal, the assault on Kwajalein, a meat grinder in Okinawa, etc.), operations were carried out by diverse aviation and navy forces, with the support of the marines and army units, using ersatz airfields and ground-based aircraft, command transports shipping and auxiliary forces. Aircraft carriers are simply lost against the background of this power.

Only an aircraft carrier can solve strategic tasks … What a pity that Karl Doenitz did not know about this, who sent hundreds of U-bots to the Atlantic every month. Their task was the most serious - the naval blockade of the British Isles. Deficiency of the simplest goods. Potatoes on the lawns of Buckingham Palace.

By the way, the task turned out to be unfulfilled and, in principle, impossible - the forces of the Kriegsmarine and the opposing navies of Great Britain and the United States were too incommensurable.

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Bunker for German submarines, Bordeaux

To prove all of the above, I would like to briefly review two of the most enchanting legends. The first is "the sinking of the battleship Yamato by carrier-based aircraft in two hours." The second story is "how six escort aircraft carriers beat up a Japanese squadron." Let's start with her.

Battle of Samar Island, October 25, 1944

One of the strangest naval battles (however, each naval battle is a unique phenomenon) with an obvious balance of forces and a seemingly unobvious ending. The Americans are still wondering how a large Japanese squadron of 23 pennants ended up in the most vulnerable spot of the American fleet, in the landing zone in the Philippines. It seems that the US Navy carrier-based aviation, which is responsible for the control of sea communications, stupidly "missed" the appearance of the enemy.

Early in the morning of October 25, in the hour before dawn, an anti-submarine patrol taking off from the escort aircraft carrier St. Lo, suddenly saw through a veil of rain the pagodas of ship superstructures and a waving Japanese flag ("meatball", according to American sailors). "Japanese!" - the pilot only had time to exhale.

In the next second, giant columns of water shot up between the American escort aircraft - the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Haruna, Congo, the cruisers Haguro, Chokai, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone, Yahagi and Noshiro, supported by 11 destroyers, opened a hurricane of artillery fire on the US Navy compound. Good Morning America!

And then usually follows a touching story, how six little escortmen run away at a 16-knot speed from bad Japanese battleships and cruisers, viciously snapping at their planes. In an unequal battle the escort aircraft carrier "Gambier Bay" dies, the other five little heroes safely save themselves and save the entire landing operation in the Philippines. The Japanese squadron loses three heavy cruisers and, in disgrace, goes on the opposite course. Happy end!

As the reader has already guessed, in reality everything was somewhat different. More precisely, it was not like that at all.

Realizing that they were tightly "nailed", the Americans used an unusual fighting technique for them - self-sacrifice.

"For the boys on my right sink, put a smoke screen between the men and the enemy cruisers."

- Admiral of the United States Navy Clifton Sprague

Destroyers Johnston, Hoel, Heerman and the escort aircraft carrier Samuel B. Roberts departed to carry out the suicide order. Despite the fierce fire from the Japanese, the small ships stubbornly crawled forward, covering the aircraft carriers with a protective veil.

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However, the American destroyers were by no means passive targets for zeroing in on enemy guns. A clever combat turn - and each of the destroyers sends a 10-torpedo salvo as a gift to the Japanese.

After a couple of minutes, the results became known: two torpedoes from the destroyer Johnston blew off the nose of the Japanese cruiser Kumano. The crippled ship stops chasing and disappears into a veil of fog. One less enemy.

Trying to dodge the fired torpedoes, Japanese cruisers and battleships break formation and stupidly scatter over the sea surface. US aircraft carriers get a long respite.

The daring trick of the destroyers did not go unpunished - large-caliber Japanese shells tore the decks, burned combat posts and disabled most of the crews.

… Something inarticulate hissed telephone communication, dying officers writhed in the blood-soaked wheelhouse. From the stem to the archishtevnya, all the decks were littered with debris, tongues of flame oozed from the torn hull … and nevertheless, the destroyers' guns regularly sent round after round towards the Japanese squadron. The surviving gunners fed ammunition to the gun trays, and somewhere deep inside the hull, the Mk.37 fire control computer was buzzing, continuously reckoning the position of the Japanese ships, automatically deploying the guns according to the only accidentally surviving radar.

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Mark I Fire Control Computer. Weight 1363 kg. There are no electronic chips in an analog computer, but there are gyroscopes, relays and precise mechanics

The unique fire control system brought its results - in addition to two torpedoes, the destroyer Johnston planted 45 five-inch rounds into the heavy cruiser Kumano, destroying the entire superstructure, along with radars, anti-aircraft guns and rangefinder posts, and then fed the battleship Congo with shells …

The destroyers Samuel B. Roberts and Heerman unleashed surgical precision fire on the cruiser Tikuma. For half an hour of the battle, "Samuel B. Roberts" shot at the enemy all its ammunition - 600 five-inch ammunition. As a result, three of the four main-caliber turrets on the Tikum were out of order, the flight bridge collapsed and the communication and fire control systems were out of order.

But the gunners of the escort aircraft carrier "Kalinin Bay" achieved special success - a well-aimed shot from a single 127 mm gun hit the torpedo tube of the cruiser "Chokai" - a monstrous explosion turned the hull inside out. A few minutes later, the burning cruiser was finished off by carrier-based aircraft.

In total, in that battle, the Japanese lost three heavy cruisers, and three more ships were seriously damaged.

Official losses of the US Navy: the escort aircraft carrier "Gambier Bay" and three destroyers (one of which is an escort), 23 aircraft and 1,583 people killed and missing.

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Escort aircraft carrier "Gambier Bay" under fire from Japanese cruisers

The following reasons for the unexpected victory of the US Navy are cited:

1. Skillful and courageous actions of the destroyers who delayed the Japanese squadron at the cost of their death.

2. Japanese ships came under concentrated attacks by more than 500 carrier-based aircraft - vehicles from all over the area flew to the aid of six escort aircraft carriers. The air force of the Americans was equal in power to FIVE strike aircraft carriers.

Surprisingly, in this favorable situation, the Americans managed to sink only three cruisers - the rest of the Japanese squadron safely left the battle and returned to Japan, including the Kumano with its nose torn off.

3. But that's not all! The third important circumstance is the airbase on Leyte Island. "Deck" aircraft refueled, replenished ammunition and returned to sea again to attack the Japanese squadron. As a result, escort aircraft carriers did not need to adjust their course to the wind and provide takeoff and landing operations - otherwise, it would be unrealistic to escape from cruisers and battleships.

4. Classics. Japanese shells. Designed to destroy armored targets, they pierced the escort's tin boards like a sheet of plywood. The aircraft carrier Kalinin Bay received 12 direct hits with 203 mm shells and by the end of the battle it was a leaky sieve. It should be noted that if there were real Essex-class aircraft carriers in place of the escort, the Japanese combat score could be replenished with six trophies at once. The 37 … 64 mm thick armored deck was clearly not enough to stop the 8-inch projectile, but it was enough to activate its fuse and turn the ship into a fiery hell.

These are the comments on the battle at the island of Samar. Does this sound like a legend about how "escort aircraft carriers chased Japanese battleships in the tail and mane"?

The last trip "Yamato"

Death from above was his destiny

Torpedo tracks.

Black from planes

Sky.

Steel giant

Fell before the depths

Duty fulfilled.

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The essence of the events: On April 6, 1945, the largest battleship in maritime history, the super-ship Yamato, accompanied by the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers, left the Kure naval base with the task of breaking through to the island of Okinawa. There was only enough fuel at one end - when approaching the island, the sailors intended to flood the battleship on the shallows and turn it into an invincible artillery battery.

It is fair to admit that the Yamato had practically no chance - at that moment, a group of 1,000 US Navy warships, including 5 dozen aircraft carriers, were maneuvering off the coast of Okinawa. There could be no question of any secrecy - the situation on the Kura naval base was carefully monitored by high-altitude reconnaissance officers based on the B-29.

A day later, on April 7, the squadron was sunk by the US Navy carrier-based aircraft. The largest ship of the Second World War was torn to pieces in just 2 hours. The Japanese lost 3,000 people. Americans -10 planes and 12 pilots.

Isn't this proof of the incredible power of carrier-based aircraft, capable of dealing with any naval enemy?

It turns out not.

Some notes on the death of the ship of the line:

1. The Yamato was sunk by the 58th US Navy Task Force. The most powerful squadron that has ever plowed the vastness of the ocean is hidden behind a completely everyday name. Attack aircraft carriers "Essex", "Hornet", "Hancock", "Bunker Hill", "Bennington", light aircraft carriers "Bellow Wood", "San Jacinto" and "Bataan" … a total of 11 aircraft carriers under the cover of fast battleships "Missouri", New Jersey, Massachusetts, Indiana, South Dakota, Wisconsin, two battle cruisers Alaska, Guam, five light cruisers and 21 destroyers.

Air wings of eight aircraft carriers participated in the attacks on the Yamato.

Eight against one! Scientifically speaking, the experiment was carried out incorrectly. The balance of interacting components was disrupted, the number of American aircraft carriers exceeded all reasonable limits. Therefore, the results of the experiment cannot be recognized as reliable.

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The position of the wreckage "Yamato" on the ground

2. However, there is an assumption that the minimum required number of aircraft carriers was not too different from reality. An effective air strike must be massive. To provide the necessary density of attacking aircraft, many airstrips are required - after all, those who have already taken off in the air cannot wait for an hour for those who are on deck. The fuel supply is strictly limited. Therefore, 8 aircraft carriers were able to form a strike group "only" of 227 aircraft.

In addition, it is worth considering that not all aircraft of those years could reach the target - in order to get a strike group of 227 aircraft over the target, the Americans had to lift 280 aircraft into the air - 53 of the planes that took off got lost and did not find the target.

3. The rapid death of the Yamato is not a sufficient criterion for asserting the weakness of artillery ships before attacks from the air.

By the end of the war, Japan was seriously behind in the development of fire control systems - the Japanese sailors did not have anything like the LMS Mk.37 or Ford Mk. I Fire Control Computer.

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American anti-aircraft projectile with a radar fuse.

The main know-how was radio tubes capable of withstanding an overload of 20,000 g when fired from a gun.

If the Japanese had computers for controlling anti-aircraft fire, rapid-fire five-inch anti-aircraft guns Mk.12, automatic 40 mm Bofors cannons, small-caliber Oerlikons with belt feed and shells with a radar fuse Mk.53 (everything that was at that time standard equipment ships of the US Navy) - I'm afraid "Yamato" would have killed American planes like a flock of bird flu, and died in an "honest" artillery battle with six American battleships.

4. The weakness of the Yamato air defense system is connected not only with technical reasons. It is usually not mentioned that the Japanese anti-aircraft gunners, corny, did not know how to shoot.

Anti-aircraft gunners need training - American sailors trained in towed cone shooting. The Japanese did not have enough fuel even for combat missions - as a result, the Yamato anti-aircraft crews practiced on air bunks. Frankly speaking, a bad simulator under conditions when the speed of the aircraft exceeded 600-700 km / h.

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Aircraft carriers of the 58th task force. How many of them are required to sink the lone Yamato? What if instead of the Yamato there was a ship similar to the Iowa?

There are a few more "trifles" that in one way or another influenced the quick death of the ship: for example, the lack of the required amount of fuel - as a result, the Yamato was forced to turn off some of the boilers and reduce its speed. Or the American submarines Treadfin and Hackleback, which discovered the Yamato squadron at night when leaving the Kure base and promptly warned the aircraft carriers about it.

Considering all of the above, the "reference" sinking of the Yamato turns into a story with an ordinary beating with complete quantitative and qualitative superiority. However, the Americans know about this better than you and I - the suspiciously quick death of the Japanese super-battleship has never been given much importance.

He accepted death

Hope not fading.

For the emperor, In the name of the Navy.

Shadow of the Admiral

I waited for him.

In the last spread

Towers - farewell.

Goodbye, A knight not defeated by anyone.

Let the body be yours

Torn apart by explosives

Lies at the bottom

But to this day, there, Where soared above the waves

A pillar of funeral smoke -

The golden flower is burning

On ghostly metal

/ Felix Brenner "On the death of" Yamato "/

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