At the turn of the 1960s and 70s, experimental developments on the topic of heavy torpedoes, aimed at the wake of enemy ships, appeared in the Soviet Union.
Around the same time, when asked by a war correspondent: "How are you going to protect aircraft carriers from Russian super-torpedoes?" one of the high-ranking representatives of the US Navy gave a simple and laconic answer: "Let's put a cruiser in the wake of each aircraft carrier."
Thus, the Yankees recognized the absolute vulnerability of aircraft carrier groups to Soviet torpedo weapons and chose the best, in their opinion, option of two evils: to use their own cruiser as a "human shield".
Actually, there was not much to choose from the US Navy - the 11-meter 65-76 "Kit" ammunition of 650 mm caliber, better known as the "Soviet fat torpedo", left the American sailors no choice. This is inevitable death. A dexterous and long "arm" that allowed to hold the "potential enemy" fleet by the throat.
The Soviet Navy has prepared for the enemy a "farewell surprise" - two alternative endings of a naval battle: to get half a ton of TNT on board and fall into the bottomless depths of the sea, tumbling and choking in the cold water, or find quick death in a thermonuclear flame (half of the "long torpedoes "Equipped with SBCH).
The phenomenon of torpedo weapons
Every time, referring to the topic of confrontation between the USSR Navy and the US Navy, the authors and participants in the discussions for some reason forget that in addition to the existence of anti-ship cruise missiles, in naval war there is one more specific means - a mine and torpedo weapon (Combat Unit-3 according to the organization of the domestic Navy).
Modern torpedoes pose no less (and further great) danger that supersonic anti-ship missiles - primarily, due to their increased stealth and powerful warhead, 2-3 times the mass of warheads of anti-ship missiles. The torpedo is less dependent on weather conditions and can be used in conditions of strong waves and heavy gusts of wind. In addition, an attacking torpedo is much more difficult to destroy or "knock off course" by jamming - despite all efforts to counter torpedo weapons, designers regularly propose new guidance schemes that devalue all previous efforts to create "anti-torpedo" barriers.
In contrast to the damage caused by an anti-ship missile strike, where such problems as “fighting fires” and “fighting for survivability” are still relevant, an encounter with a torpedo poses a simple question for the unfortunate sailors: where are the life rafts and inflatable vests? - ships of the class "destroyer" or "cruiser" are simply broken in half by the explosion of conventional torpedoes.
The decommissioned Australian frigate was destroyed by the Mark.48 torpedo (warhead weight - 295 kg)
The reason for the terrible destructive effect of the torpedo is obvious - water is an incompressible medium, and all the energy of the explosion is directed into the hull. Damage in the underwater part does not bode well for sailors and, as a rule, lead to the quick death of the ship.
Finally, the torpedo is the main weapon of submarines, and this makes it an especially dangerous means of naval combat.
Russian answer
During the Cold War, a very absurd and ambiguous situation developed at sea. The American fleet, thanks to carrier-based aircraft and advanced air defense systems, managed to create an exceptional naval air defense system, which made American squadrons practically invulnerable to air attack weapons.
The Russians did in the best traditions of Sun Tzu. The ancient Chinese treatise "The Art of War" says: go where they least expect it, attack where you are less prepared. Indeed, why "climb on the pitchfork" of carrier-based fighters and modern anti-aircraft systems, if you can hit from under the water?
In this case, the AUG loses its main trump card - the submarines are completely indifferent to how many interceptors and early warning aircraft are on the Nimitz's decks. And the use of torpedo weapons will make it possible to avoid encounters with formidable air defense systems.
Multipurpose nuclear-powered ship project 671RTM (K)
The Yankees appreciated the Russian humor and began frantically to seek means to prevent underwater attacks. They succeeded in something - by the beginning of the 1970s, it became clear that a torpedo attack by the AUG with the available means was fraught with mortal risk. The Yankees organized a continuous ASW zone within a radius of 20 miles from the aircraft carrier order, where the main role was assigned to the under-keel sonars of the escort ships and the ASROC anti-submarine rocket torpedoes. The detection range of the most advanced American sonar AN / SQS-53 was up to 10 miles in active mode (line of sight); in passive mode up to 20-30 miles. The firing range of the ASROC complex did not exceed 9 kilometers.
The "dead sectors" under the bottoms of the ships were reliably covered by multipurpose nuclear submarines, and somewhere far in the ocean, tens of miles from the marching squadron, anti-submarine helicopters and specialized aircraft "Viking" and "Orion" were continuously searching.
Sailors from the aircraft carrier "George W. Bush" release the towed anti-torpedo trap AN / SLQ-25 Nixie overboard
In addition, the Americans took decisive measures to counter the fired torpedoes: the float of the AN / SLQ-15 Nixie towed noise trap "dangled" behind the stern of each ship, which made the use of torpedoes with passive guidance on the noise of enemy ships' propellers ineffective.
Analyzing the current situation, the Soviet sailors rightly judged that the chance of being detected by anti-submarine aircraft is relatively small - any AUG, convoy or detachment of warships is unlikely to be able to constantly keep more than 8-10 vehicles in the air. Too small to control tens of thousands of square kilometers of the surrounding body of water.
The main thing is not to be seen by the sonars of the escort cruisers and nuclear submarines of the US Navy. In this case, torpedoes must be fired from a distance of at least 40 … 50 kilometers (≈20 … 30 nautical miles). There were no problems with detection and target designation - the roar of the propellers of large ship formations was clearly audible from a hundred kilometers away.
Heavy torpedo 65-76 "Kit". Length - 11.3 m. Diameter - 650 mm. Weight - 4.5 tons. Speed - 50 knots. (sometimes up to 70 knots are indicated). The cruising range is 50 km at 50 knots or 100 km at 35 knots. Warhead weight - 557 kg. Guidance is carried out on the wake
Having decided on the choice of weapons, the sailors turned to industry representatives for help and were quite surprised by the answer they received. It turned out that the Soviet military-industrial complex acted in advance and had been developing "long-range" torpedoes since 1958. Of course, the special capabilities required special technical solutions - the dimensions of the super-torpedo went beyond the usual 533 mm torpedo tubes. At the same time, the achieved speed, firing range and weight of the warhead brought the sailors into indescribable delight.
In the hands of the Soviet Navy was the most powerful underwater weapon ever created by man.
65-76 "Whale"
… the 11-meter "arrow" rushes through the water column, scanning the space with a sonar for the presence of irregularities and eddies of the water environment. These eddies are nothing more than a wake - water disturbances that remain behind the stern of a sailing ship. One of the main unmasking factors, the "standing wave" is discernible even many hours after the passage of large naval equipment.
The "fat torpedo" cannot be fooled with the AN / SLQ-25 Nixie or knocked off course using dropable traps - the hellish underwater tracker is oblivious to noise and interference - he only reacts to the ship's wake. In a few minutes, a soulless robot will bring 557 kilograms of TNT as a gift to American sailors.
The crews of American ships are in disarray: a terrible illumination flashed and shone on the sonar screens - a high-speed small-sized target. Until the last moment, it remains unclear: who will get the "main prize"? The Americans have nothing to shoot the torpedo with - there are no weapons on the US Navy ships like our RBU-6000. It is useless to use universal artillery - going at a depth of 15 meters, a "thick torpedo" is difficult to detect on the surface. Small-sized anti-submarine torpedoes Mk.46 are flying into the water - it's late! the reaction time is too long, the Mk.46 seeker does not have time to capture the target.
Torpedo shot Mk. 46
Here on the aircraft carrier they figure out what to do - the command “Stop car! Full back!”, But the 100,000-ton ship by inertia continues to stubbornly crawl forward, leaving a treacherous trail behind the stern.
The deafening rumble of an explosion, and the escort cruiser Belknap disappears from the rear of the aircraft carrier. On the left abeam, new fireworks break out - the second explosion tore apart the frigate "Knox". The aircraft carrier realizes with horror that they are next!
At this time, the next two torpedoes rush to the doomed compound - the submarine, having reloaded the devices, sends the Yankees a new gift. In total, the Barracuda's ammunition load contains twelve super-ammunition. One by one, the boat fires off "thick torpedoes" from a distance of fifty kilometers, watching the Yankee ships rushing across the ocean surface. The boat itself is invulnerable to the anti-aircraft weapons of the aircraft carrier group - they are separated by 50 kilometers.
The task is completed!
The position of the American sailors was complicated by the fact that the "thick torpedoes" were included in the ammunition of 60 nuclear-powered ships of the USSR Navy.
The carriers were multipurpose nuclear submarines of projects 671 RT and RTM (K), 945 and 971. Also, the "batons" of the 949 project were equipped with super-torpedoes (yes, dear reader, in addition to the P-700 missiles, the "baton" could hit a "potential enemy" a dozen torpedoes 65-76 "Kit"). Each of the above submarines had two or four torpedo tubes of 650 mm caliber, the ammunition ranged from 8 to 12 "thick torpedoes" (of course, not counting the usual 533 mm ammunition).
Location of 8 torpedo tubes in the bow of the multipurpose nuclear submarine pr. 971 (code "Shchuka-B")
The "fat torpedo" also had a twin brother - the 65-73 torpedo (as follows from the index, it was created a few years earlier, in 1973). Continuous drive and fire!
Unlike the "intellectual" 65-76, the predecessor was an ordinary "Kuz'ka mother" for the destruction of all living and nonliving in its path. 65-73 were generally indifferent to external interference - the torpedo was traveling in a straight line towards the enemy, guided by the data of the inertial system. Until a 20-kiloton warhead detonated at the calculated point of the route. Anyone within a radius of 1000 meters could safely return to Norfolk and get up for long-term repairs at the dock. Even if the ship did not sink, a nearby nuclear explosion tore out external electronic equipment and antenna devices with "meat", broke the superstructure and crippled the launchers - one could forget about performing any task.
In short, the Pentagon had something to think about.
Torpedo assassin
This is what the legendary 65-76 is called after the tragic events of August 2000. The official version says that the spontaneous explosion of the "thick torpedo" caused the death of the K-141 "Kursk" submarine. At first glance, the version, at least, deserves attention: the 65-76 torpedo is not a baby rattle at all. This is a dangerous weapon that requires special skills to handle.
Torpedo Propulsion 65-76
One of the "weak points" of the torpedo was called its propulsion unit - an impressive firing range was achieved using a propulsion unit based on hydrogen peroxide. And this means gigantic pressures, violently reacting components and the potential for the onset of an involuntary reaction of an explosive nature. As an argument, supporters of the "thick torpedo" version of the explosion cite the fact that all "civilized" countries of the world have abandoned torpedoes powered by hydrogen peroxide. Sometimes from the lips of "democratically minded specialists" one has to hear such an absurd statement that the "beggar scoop" allegedly created a torpedo on a peroxide-hydrogen mixture just out of a desire to "save money" and the history of the appearance of "thick torpedoes").
Nevertheless, most Moremans, who are not by hearsay familiar with this torpedo system, question the official point of view. There are two reasons for this.
Without going into the details of the strict instructions and prescriptions for storing, loading and firing "thick torpedoes", naval experts note that the reliability of the system was very high (how high the reliability of a modern combat torpedo can be). 65-76 had a dozen fuses and serious "foolproof" - it was necessary to perform some completely inadequate actions to activate the components of the torpedo's fuel mixture.
For a quarter of a century of operation of this system on 60 nuclear submarines of the USSR Navy, there were no difficulties and problems with the operation of this weapon.
The second argument sounds no less serious - who and how determined that the “fat torpedo” was the culprit of the boat's death? After all, the torpedo compartment of the Kursk was cut off and destroyed at the bottom by subversive charges. Why did you even need to saw off the nose? I'm afraid we won't know the answer soon.
As for the statement about the worldwide rejection of hydrogen peroxide torpedoes, this is also a delusion. Developed in 1984, the Swedish heavy torpedo Tr613, fueled by a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and ethanol, is still in service with the Swedish Navy and the Norwegian Navy. And no problem!
Forgotten hero
In the same year, when the destroyed Kursk submarine sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea, a major spy scandal erupted in Russia over the theft of state secrets - a certain US citizen Edmond Pope tried to secretly acquire documentation for the Shkval submarine torpedo missile. So the Russian public learned about the existence of underwater weapons capable of developing a speed of 200+ knots (370 km / h) under water. The inhabitants liked the high-speed underwater system so much that any mention of the Shkval rocket torpedo in the media causes no less a flurry of admiring responses and joyful declarations of love for this “miracle weapon”, which, of course, has no analogues.
The high-speed rocket-torpedo "Shkval" is a cheap rattle in comparison with the "Soviet fat torpedo" 65-76. The glory of the Shkval is undeserved - the torpedo is completely useless as a weapon, and its combat value tends to zero.
Shkval submarine missile. Interesting thing, but completely useless
Unlike the 65-76, which beats 50 or more kilometers, the Shkval's firing range does not exceed 7 km (the new modification is 13 km). Few, very few. In modern naval combat, reaching such a distance is an extremely difficult and risky task. The warhead of the rocket torpedo is almost 3 times lighter. But the main "snag" in this whole story - "Flurry", due to its high speed, is an unguided weapon, and the probability of its hitting even a weakly maneuvering target is close to 0%, especially considering that the "Flurry" attack is devoid of any stealth. An underwater missile moving on a combat course is easy to spot - and no matter how fast the "Shkval" is, during the time it covers 10 km, the ship will have time to change course and move a considerable distance from the calculated aiming point. It is not hard to imagine what will happen in this case to the submarine that released the "Shkval" - a distinct trail of the missile-torpedo will clearly indicate the location of the submarine.
In short, the wonder weapon "Shkval" is another fruit of journalistic fantasies and philistine imagination. At the same time, the Real Hero - the "Soviet fat torpedo", at the very mention of which the knees of NATO sailors trembled, was undeservedly slandered and buried under the weight of the past years.
In connection with the disaster of the nuclear submarine "Kursk", it was decided to remove the torpedo 65-76 "Kit" from the armament of the Russian Navy. This is a very dubious and unjustified decision, probably made not without prompting from our "Western partners". Now no "Shkval" will replace the lost combat capabilities of submarines.
