Comparing what our fleet could be if the money spent on it were spent wisely (see. “There was money for the fleet. They even spent them ) one involuntarily has to touch upon such a question as the possibilities of industry. Subsectors manufacturing subsystems for ships - weapons, radars, sonar systems, engines, and so on. It is no secret that the shipyard itself or the shipyard produces mainly the hull. Other enterprises, subcontractors are responsible for its filling.
And here those who like to defend what the Navy has become start their favorite song: “The industry couldn't cope. We simply cannot build normal ships, we have to build all sorts of patrol and small missile ships, otherwise nothing will be built at all! We must saturate the fleet with at least this! This myth has been wandering around the network lately, slowly acquiring new supporters who start a song about whether to build gunboats of 800 tons each, or nothing. Industry cannot.
In fact, this is not true. Similarly to the fact that there was allegedly no money (but in fact they were and they were spent on all sorts of experiments such as "patrol" ships, underfrigate project 20386 and the like - dismantled by reference), the industry also quite "could". And more than that, she did it. Made weapons, radars, rocket launchers … engines too, yeah. Once again, all this not only could be produced, it was actually produced. But at the end it turned out what happened.
Let's deal with the fact that our industry allegedly could not produce.
Let's make a reservation right away - the need to have frigates of projects 11356 and 22350 is not in doubt, we are considering the situation with ships in the near sea zone. It is also probably worth recognizing the construction of small artillery ships of project 21630 for the Caspian flotilla, and "Tatarstan" with "Dagestan" for it as well. And also do not question the fact that these ships should have been born, and approximately the way they appeared. Therefore, we will not "touch" them.
Let's revise everything else now.
Weapons and armaments
Let's start with weapons.
Artillery first. So, since the beginning of the 2000s, to date, it has been built or is under construction:
- corvettes 20380 - 8 units (6 built, 2 more in the final stage before launching, and we do not take into account 2 more remaining in the construction, a lot has simply not been produced for them);
- corvettes 20385 - 2 units;
- MRK project 21631 - 10 units (7 built, 3 more will be commissioned by the end of 2020, the rest of the series is not taken into account);
- MRK project 22800 - 5 units (roughly, 1 built and handed over, 1 on trials, 1 in completion afloat, 1 launched, perhaps another 1 ship can soon be launched, the rest will not be taken into account);
- Project PC 22160 - 4 units (2 in service, 1 launched, 1 will be launched this year, the rest are not taken into account).
What about their artillery? And what is installed on the mentioned ships or will be installed very soon:
- 100 mm guns - 20 units;
- 76 mm guns - 9 units.
A total of 29 full-fledged ship guns. Is it a lot or a little? This is one more gun than the main warships (destroyers, frigates, corvettes and patrol ships) of the Italian Navy have. It's a lot.
And this is exactly what the industry gave, and not really straining in terms of quantity (although with gigantic problems in terms of the quality of 100 graph paper. However, they have been resolved for today).
Thus, we find that the cannons were just enough for us to reproduce not the weakest fleet, and with a margin. If we add to this the possibility of using 76-mm guns, which were previously on decommissioned ships, and remained in good condition (and there are many examples), then Italy could, as they say, “surpass” quite unconditionally.
But maybe the industry could not produce rocket launchers? Well, again we look at the numbers.
Two corvettes of project 20385 and the entire brood of the above-mentioned MRKs are 15 vertical launchers 3S-14P. For 8 cruise missiles each. That is, this is the equivalent of 15 Project 20385 corvettes for a missile salvo. It is worth noting that no one has ever claimed that there are any problems with the production of this PU. For the same series 21631 installations are supplied at a good pace, another thing is that there is a simplified version of the UKSK, which is not capable of using either PLUR or Onyx, but this would be solved if installations were made for some other project.
In reality, of course, there are no problems with the production of these PUs. The industry will do as much as necessary, however, operating with the installations already produced and installed on the ships, we have a proven fact, which is very important in order not to allow the defenders of the existing wretched order of things to prove that it could not have been otherwise.
Let it not, but here they are, 15 launchers, paid for and manufactured, let someone now prove that they, too, could not have been made.
And of course - the launchers of the Uranus complex. In reality, they certainly are not a deficit at all, especially if you remember how many of them are put on modernized RTOs, or exported …
This also applies to shipborne air defense systems "Redut".
And attempts to also accurately assess the production of anti-aircraft 30-mm automatic guns will ultimately lead to the same - they could not only be produced in large quantities, they were produced in these quantities and put on a huge number of all sorts of different ships - and not only Russian ones.
In general, we state that there were no problems with artillery and rocket launchers - they could be produced in sufficient quantities, moreover, they were produced in these quantities.
But maybe the problem was in anti-submarine weapons? And again no, PU SM-588 for the Package complex is consistently reproduced for corvettes of project 20380, 20385 and frigates of project 22350. And, again, there is no evidence that the industry is experiencing difficulties with the production of both the launcher itself and the control system.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation - the SM-588 is not optimal, as is the placement of 324-mm torpedoes and anti-torpedoes in a TPK with a gas generator, and it is necessary to develop a normal torpedo tube with a pneumatic torpedo launch (explanation - here). Nevertheless, we can well state the possibility of obtaining at least CM-588 in the required quantities.
What's next? Maybe GAK and radar?
Nowhere and never have any of the specialists involved in the production ever stated that there are delays in hydroacoustic systems. On the built corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 there are both bulb and towed GAS. In total, there are 10 of them in the mentioned list, but it is worth remembering that our industry has never really reached the limit of production capabilities in hydroacoustics in the post-Soviet period. There is no evidence of this.
A similar situation with the radar. Thus, project 22800 RTOs have a Mineral-M complex designed to detect surface targets, and the first two ships are equipped with a Pozitiv-MK radar capable of detecting air targets. This is not to say that it was the most modern radar system, but it also definitely cannot be called bad. Let's just say - for a mass ship BMZ it is quite sufficient. In parallel with the installation of the "Positive-MK" radar on the "Karakurt", 4 more sets have already been mounted or are being mounted on the 4 mentioned patrol ships of Project 22160. Moreover, the production program of these ships eloquently indicates that there are no problems with components for them - they are being built very quickly for Russia. Specifically, the six "Positive-MK" mentioned above were produced or are about to be produced in the period from the beginning of 2014 to the present - more than a set per year. And, taking into account the fact that 22160 continue to be built, radars will also be produced. So there is power.
But the matter is not limited to them alone. Russia has been building a lot of warships since the early 2000s, including the completion of 11661 "Tatarstan", and "Dagestan" with its UKSK, and export ships for Vietnam, and so on. Naturally, for all these ships, radars were also produced - "Furke" for corvettes 20380 and radar "Puma" for them, various navigation and artillery radars for ships of other classes, old "Positives" for 21631 and 11661, etc.
Thus, it is worth noting that there were no problems with the radar - in reality there were no problems, they were made, which means that they would have done the same for several other ships.
What, then, does our industry lack and lack for the construction of full-fledged multi-functional ships? Maybe steel? No, this is quite the edge, we still have steel in our country. As a last resort, the Chinese can sell. So what can't she produce?
Maybe they are pipes? Cable? Dye? Radio stations? Plumbing? Light bulbs? Any information display devices? Furniture? Searchlights?
No.
In fact, we had real problems only with the production of the main power plants - ship engines and gearboxes. But here, too, the apologists of the opinion “we cannot build anything good, we must build something bad” will have to move forward.
Engines question
It is worthwhile to stipulate this immediately. We have problems with the power plant, but they began only in 2014, after the events in Ukraine. Before that, Ukrainian turbines with gearboxes were available, and German MTU diesel engines were imported into the country without any problems and got on the MRK of project 21631. And from this follows conclusion number one - if there is a deliberate shipbuilding policy, without throwing and shuffling from side to side, Opportunities to obtain turbines with gearboxes and diesel units were limited only by the capabilities of the Ukrainian and German industries for their production, and the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense for their purchase. MO, by the way, managed to buy twenty MTU 16V4000M90 diesel engines and install them on five Buyan-M missile gunboats.
Could have bought more serious engines for more serious ships, if they had hurried in advance and there would have been where to put them this year in 2011. But they didn’t hurry up and there wasn’t.
The question of what to buy them for was sorted out in the article, the link to which is given above, and, taking into account the fact that the infusion of money into shipbuilding began in 2009, our shipbuilders had almost five years to overstock the required amount of ANY foreign engines. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Defense knew about the future financing in advance - there is no such thing that at the end of 2008 you would not have planned the budget for 2009. And the money went in 2009.
Of course, then problems would begin with the projects that were made for these engines, but they, firstly, began this way, and secondly, let's also admit that the active import substitution of Ukrainian equipment for the RF Armed Forces began long before the Maidan. Someone would definitely need, for example, not only to substitute import turbines, but also reducers. And the money of the Ministry of Industry and Trade is not for dubious projects like the Pulsar supermotor, which in the end never took off, but for something more mundane.
Nevertheless, even taking into account all the problems with imports, Russia had another option, and it was even used. We are talking about the Kolomna diesel engines of the 49th family. The very ones that move almost everything that we build - and frigates 22350 on the economic course, and corvettes 20380 and 20385, and the large landing craft "Ivan Gren", and patrolmen 22160 - a lot of things.
We are mainly interested in the 16D49 engine with a capacity of 6000 hp. and the units assembled with it - DDA12000 and DRRA6000.
The first ones are used in pairs - two units per ship, or four diesel engines and a pair of gearboxes. Such power plants for 24,000 hp. are on the corvettes of both projects - 20380 and 20385.
The latter are also used in pairs for the construction of a two-shaft power plant with two units and a total power of 12,000 hp, taken from two engines. Such installations are serially (and very quickly, by the way) produced for ships of project 22160.
What kind of ships could be built on such a power industry?
Well, let's take a look at the Chinese, for example. Project 054 frigates and its modifications are equipped with a diesel power plant based on four SEMT Pielstik diesel engines, with a total capacity of 25,300 hp.
At the same time, the frigates have a displacement of 3900 tons, air defense systems, a helicopter, anti-submarine weapons, and are an example of a completely successful, massive ship of the far sea zone - seaworthy enough to send it anywhere.
Our DDA12000 units, installed in pairs, add up to 24,000 hp. - a comparable indicator. If we add to this the magic of the Krylov State Scientific Center, which is quite capable of "playing back" the lack of power by contours, it turns out that we can build similar ships on Kolomny too - with our weapons, of course, which are basically (not everything, but basically, alas) better than Chinese, like REV and RTV.
If you look at the parameters of the "Pilsticks" installed on the Chinese, they are close to ours.
PIELSTICK 16 PA6 V - 280:
Power - 5184 kW
Weight - 30.5 tons
16D49:
Power - 4412 kW
Weight - 26 tons
Our sizes are slightly smaller.
How many such power plants have the industry given to the fleet and is preparing to give it right now? That's right - those same 10 sets, and by 2022 - two more, we did not take these two ships into account either in the case of guns or in the case of missiles, but generally speaking they will be available soon.
But what about the corvettes then? Well, let's look at the Chinese again - project 056.
This is not to say that this is a very successful ship, and, frankly, for our fleet it will be, as the British say, "downgrade" - a step back. But on the other hand, if even then, in the late 90s, we would have made similar decisions with the Chinese, now we could well have a certain number of good diesel frigates, perhaps the same dozen, and all of them would carry "Caliber" on board, and diesel small corvettes with 2DRRA6000, apparently from the UKSK, apparently compact enough to be built anywhere - both on the Amur and in Zelenodolsk - anywhere. And they, too, would have Caliber on board. But unlike the actually built RTOs, they could also fight with submarines, and perform tasks in the DMZ on a frigate much more conveniently, although to tell the truth, 20380 corvettes also perform them.
At the same time, the speed with which the ships of project 22160 are surrendered clearly indicates that there are no special problems with obtaining DRRA6000 units, and if necessary, they can be supplied in significant quantities. The main thing is not to try to move huge barges of 1900 tons with ugly contours with them, but to use them on the corresponding hulls.
Once again, this is not a call to drop everything and copy the Chinese link 056 + 054 (although that would not be so bad), this is an example of how much we underestimate ourselves.
It is worth noting that the main problem in the production of diesel-diesel units is not how Kolomensky Zavod delivers engines, but the speed of two engines and one gearbox (produced in St. Petersburg at OOO Zvezda-reduktor) complete the finished twin-engine DDA12000. Roughly now, without a crunch, this is one unit per year. Accordingly, a kit for a corvette 20380/20385 or a hypothetical frigate for two.
This roughly corresponds to how many corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 received and will receive their power plants from about 2012 to 2020. Approximately, because it was still possible to "accelerate" by 1-2 sets, but oh well.
What is the reason for such poor performance? First, Zvezda-Reducer is slowly making gearboxes. Secondly, the diesel-diesel unit is a complex machine and its final assembly and testing are carried out at a special stand. There is only one such stand.
Let us ask a question - what if, when it became clear that funding had appeared, instead of the Pulsar project, the money would have been directed, for example, to the second stand? Or instead of one of the RTOs of project 21631? In this case, the gearbox bottleneck would expand to the number of gearboxes that Star Gearbox can produce.
Suppose, using different methods, it would be possible to achieve (in the presence of a second stand) one more gearbox in two years. It is not to prepare for the Sochi Olympics, if the state set itself such a goal, it would have achieved it, even though the manufacturer is a private company.
Then, from 2009 to the present, it would have been possible to obtain 5 more gearboxes by now, and by the end of 2021 - 6, which would have given by the end of 2020 three additional power plants from a pair of DDA12000 each.
These are three additional corvettes 20380 or 20385.
And what if it was possible to “squeeze out” from Zvezda Reducer not one additional reducer in two years, but two additional ones in three years?
Then by 2022, plus 8 more gearboxes. That is, there are already four additional corvettes. Now in total the series 20380 will end on 10 units, and the series 20385 will be limited with two more. There are 12 ships in total by 2022.
It would be 16.
The example with "Russian 054" given above is not entirely honest - we could not order a ship that we never wanted, although it would be better than corvettes.
But something in between 20380 and 20385 has been quite realistic since the late 2000s. A certain ship with UKSK and UVP "Reduta" at the stern, like in 20385, but with a simplified REV, similar to the usual 20380 or closer to the radar, for example, to the "Karakurt", was quite real. And these additional 4 corvettes could very well be like that.
Moreover, after the 20380 series is completed in real life, in some ideal reality these corvettes could be laid further.
And if it turned out (and it would have turned out) that the number of carriers of "Caliber" needs to be increased faster, then they could be increased due to simplified corvettes with 2DRRA6000, "Russian 056", unified with 2038X in arms, with the same Kolomna diesel engines, but with two, not four, in a smaller hull, without a hangar, without a huge cellar for aircraft weapons …
Since we were so squeezed with gearboxes, this was quite a way out, and much better than the highly specialized Buyany-M with Chinese diesels unsuitable for a military ship (even this!), And than the Karakurt, for which in general there are no engines, and now, because of this, they will be built for five to six years.
This is what reality looks like. We have engines for bigger ships, but not for small things. And there is nowhere to take them in the foreseeable future. The idea that “we need to adjust what we can, otherwise we will be left without ships at all” is correct. But we can only build ships of a class from a corvette and more, but for every little thing we have NO ENGINES IN THE RIGHT QUANTITY, AND WILL NOT BE FOR MANY YEARS, AND IT IS ALMOST FIXED.
This is what the real world looks like. Not the other way around. From this point of view, continuing to bookmark the same RTOs is pure madness. No discounts. Why lay down ships, which are then doomed to wait for engines for many years? There is nowhere to put the money?
Why is it like this?
Take the Chinese, for example. They firmly know why they need a fleet - to secure the interests of China in Africa and other similar places by force, firstly, and to prevent a blockade of China from the sea, secondly. At the same time, they see the US maritime power as the main enemy. Hence the program for the construction of aircraft carriers, URO ships, the creation of expeditionary amphibious forces, but hence the massive corvettes. The Chinese not only know what they need a fleet for, they also understand that it should be as large as possible, so the "workhorses" - the same 056 are specially made primitive, much simpler than China could build - but there are really a lot of them.
Since the Chinese know what they want and imagine how they can quickly achieve this with their economy, long-term programs for the construction of the same type of warships and long typed series take place in their military shipbuilding. Our fleet does not recognize the last phrase, although it has come to the point that even the Ministry of Industry and Trade began to hint at the need to reduce the type of warships. It's funny, but that's it.
In the absence of an understanding of "where to live" by society, the Ministry of Defense and the Navy, the decision-making mechanism regarding the construction of warships begins to be based on the voluntarism of individual chiefs, on their connections in industry and material interests. Nobody even remembers this boring fighting efficiency of yours.
Example
The contracted misunderstandings of projects 21631 and 22160 soon end at Zelenodolsk plant. How to load the plant? And so the management starts looking for something else to build. And he finds support in the Navy, in the person of Rear Admiral V. M. Tryapichnikov, head of the Navy's shipbuilding department.
The head of the shipbuilding department of the Russian Navy, Vladimir Tryapichnikov, expressed the hope that the construction of the upgraded ships of Project 21631 will begin in 2024.
According to Tryapichnikov, the upgraded ships of Project 21631 will receive an increased ammunition load.
Probably, they will decide something with diesel engines - maybe they will increase the ship under 2DRRA6000, from 22160, not on Chinese diesel engines, they do not "take out" this battleship, and Kolomna also needs to be fed in the conditions of the termination of the 20380 series, and once they will "Kolomna", then there will be an increase in the size of the ship, here and an additional launcher for 8 "Caliber" can be added - the same increased ammunition. There is where. And everyone is happy. Zelenodolsk will receive money and work, the population will have the opportunity to toss up their caps in a patriotic frenzy, looking at the new miracle ship, which has as many as 16 "Calibers", everyone is happy, everyone is happy, we have done it. Rear Admiral Tryapchnikov will also rejoice along with everyone.
Experienced "military experts" will explain in the press how ingenious this project is, the non-existent combat capabilities of the superkanboats will be replaced by tales told by citizens to each other on forums about all-conquering missiles capable of sinking an American aircraft carrier thousands of kilometers away …
… and so on until the first old foreign submarine, the crew of which will receive an order with the word “destroy” and a parting word from their command with the word “sink”.
This is how it works for us.
No goal-setting - no fleet. With no industry and no funding. Let it be small, but we had money for a normal balanced fleet. And albeit modest, but we had and still have the technological capabilities for its construction. The opposite is not true.
