Boats with the name "Borey" became known in Russia and abroad long before they entered service - all thanks to the expected successes and high-profile failures in the launch of the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Every opinion should strive for objectivity. Convulsive enthusiasm ("has no analogues in the world") and frenzied criticism ("will not float, will not fly") should be based on concrete knowledge and facts. The submarine missile carrier clearly does not deserve disdain - a clot of combat matter weighing 15 thousand tons, capable of destroying life on the whole continent …
The boat glides silently at a depth of 400 meters - where the pressure on each square meter of the hull reaches 40 tons! Clamped in a monstrous vice, its body deforms elastically under the onslaught of millions of cubic meters of water, but the crew is calm - it is still far from the crushing depth. The jokers pull the thread across the compartment and watch it sag as the boat sinks into the depths - a high-strength alloy steel shell reliably protects people from a hostile environment.
The Borey nuclear-powered ship is capable of not showing up on the surface for months. It draws air and fresh water directly from the seawater. It is fast, low-noise and is well aware of everything that happens outside of it: the main 7-meter and auxiliary antennas of the Irtysh-Amphora-B-055 hydroacoustic complex are capable of tracking ships and vessels in the noise and echo direction finding mode for tens of miles around, detect the hydroacoustic signals of enemy sonars, measure the thickness of the ice, look for holes and streaks in the polar latitudes, timely warn about the presence of mines and torpedoes coming to the ship.
Project 955 "Borey" sometimes evokes not only sincere admiration. Appreciate actions, words are worthless - this is the point of view that skeptics adhere to, offering to look at the current successes of Boreyev. There are successes, but there are not so many of them yet.
For example, the lead boat of Project 955, the K-535 Yuri Dolgoruky, and so far the only one in the fleet, has never gone on combat patrols. In general, the situation is natural - the boat was accepted into the Northern Fleet in January 2013, the crew needs time to test new technology. However, the last unsuccessful launch of the serial Bulava, made on September 6, 2013 from the K-550 Alexander Nevsky submarine (the missile crashed in the 2nd minute of the flight, falling into the Arctic Ocean), confirmed serious concerns - Bulava Was put into service prematurely.
The identified problems in the design of SLBMs and the subsequent decision to suspend state tests of the Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh submarines soon pose a certain threat to achieving operational readiness on time for all submarines of this project.
"Yuri Dolgoruky" is the only nuclear submarine adopted by the Russian Navy over the past 12 years and the only strategic submarine adopted over the past 23 years. After these facts, the calculations of analysts from the FAS (Federation of American Scientists), with all the possible bias of this resource, no longer seem so shockingly implausible: strategic submarine missile carriers of the Russian Navy made only 5 combat patrols in 2012 - less than ever before.
There is an urgent need to build up KOH (operational stress ratio) and increase the readiness of the naval nuclear forces - a key element of the country's security. However, for various reasons, the Borei are in no hurry to assume responsibility for protecting the borders of Russia. Most modern boats prefer to spend time on government trials.
Let's hope that the described problems will be resolved in the very near future. To date, three missile carriers of this project have already been built. The lead K-535 "Yuri Dolgoruky" was accepted into the Navy and is preparing for its first military campaign, which is scheduled for 2014.
K-550 "Alexander Nevsky" successfully completed state tests (the only doubt is its main weapon - R-30 "Bulava". The only launch from its side ended in failure. The second test launch was canceled). It is expected that the new missile carrier will be accepted into the Navy in late 2013 - early 2014.
The third boat, K-551 Vladimir Monomakh, launched in December 2012, is under sea trials.
Further plans of the Navy include the construction of 5 more submarines of this project.
On July 30, 2013, in the presence of top officials of the state, the next, fourth missile carrier "Prince Vladimir" was laid down. This ship is being built according to the upgraded project 955U "Borey-A". The main differences from the first "Boreev" will be less noise and more accurate and stable "holding" of a given depth - a critical moment in salvo firing SLBMs.
It is expected that in 2014 "Alexander Suvorov" will be laid down. A year later - the next ship. And so on - only 8 formidable combat units, which will replace the missile carriers pr. 667BDR "Kalmar" and 667BDRM "Dolphin".
Real heroes?
In the history of "Boreyev" there are many paradoxical facts, many of which can cause genuine bewilderment.
There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Yuri Dolgoruky was laid down in 1996, launched in 2008 and handed over to the Navy in 2013: there are well-known political and economic events at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. dramatically slowed down the pace of construction of Russian submarines, making them "long-term construction", worthy of the Guinness Book of Records. By now the situation has noticeably improved: the third Borey - Vladimir Monomakh - was laid down in 2006 and, very likely, will become part of the Navy in 2014. The duration of construction is still 2-3 times higher than the Soviet standards, but still progress is obvious.
Even more controversial is another feature of the Boreyevs - during their construction, ready-made sections from the Project 971 Shchuka-B submarines dismantled on the slipway and disposed of were used.
Project 971 Schuka-B nuclear submarine
The sub, known as the Yuri Dolgoruky missile carrier, was originally a multipurpose K-337 Cougar submarine. Laid down in 1992, it turned out to be unfinished and was eventually dismantled on a slipway in order to "cannibalize" its sections for new submarines.
"Alexander Nevsky" was once "Lynx". Vladimir Monomakh - Ak Barsom. K-480 "Ak Bars" served in the 24th submarine division of the Northern Fleet since 1989. In 2008, she was expelled from the Navy, the hull sections were used for the completion of the Vladimir Monomakh.
There is a version that this explains the recent news of the early decommissioning of the multipurpose atomarine K-263 "Barnaul" - sections of this boat are needed to complete the construction of the next missile carriers of the "Borey" family.
The author has come across the opinion more than once that the newest submarines are just a "prefabricated hodgepodge of rusty rubbish" with a flightless Bulava, obsolete radio electronics, and, moreover, turned into a hellish long-term construction.
What can you object to this? "Rusty stuff" is a clear exaggeration, the high-strength austenitic steel of the AK-100 grade, from which the hulls of the PLA project 971 were made, is practically not subject to corrosion. According to one of the versions, in the process of completing the construction, only the shells of the strong hull of boats of Project 971 were used - the entire "filling" was unrecognizably updated. In this case, the use of the groundwork from disassembled submarines to speed up the completion of the Boreyevs - if not good news (to be glad that one was built instead of two submarines is absurd), then at least evidence of a diligent attitude towards what was saved after the era shocks and orgies of the "free market".
The second question, directly arising from the fact of borrowing sections from the boats of previous projects, is whether it is possible to classify "Borey" as a submarine of the new, so-called. "Fourth" generation? Among the main requirements for such submarines is a low background noise, whose value is close to the natural noise background of the ocean. Better situational awareness, advanced detection and weapons. Also, a feature of such boats is the presence of high-tech techniques and new products that increase their versatility and combat capabilities. For example, a multifunctional optoelectronic mast instead of the usual periscope, an airlock for combat swimmers or a set of unmanned underwater vehicles for making passages in minefields, which is available on board American Virginia-class submarines.
Is there anything like this on board the domestic "Borey"?
The exact characteristics of "Borey" are classified, but something is already known. In addition to the sections of the strong hull, Borey uses a number of other mechanisms and systems, similar to those used in the construction of the boats of Project 971 "Shchuka-B" and "aircraft carrier killers" Project 949A "Antey". Among them are the OK-650V nuclear steam generating unit with a thermal capacity of 190 MW and the OK-9VM main turbo-toothed unit (steam turbine with a gearbox). Itchy coolant pumps and roaring GTZA are some of the main sources of noise. If all the elements remain the same, it means that the background noise could not undergo significant changes. For comparison: the new Russian multipurpose nuclear-powered ship pr. 885 "Yasen" uses a similar power plant, but at the same time has its own "know-how", a small feature, which radically increases its secrecy. At low speed, in the "sneaking" mode, the GTZA is disconnected from the shaft by a special coupling - the propeller shaft is rotated using a low-power electric motor.
Among the positive aspects of the "Borey" I would like to note its water jet propulsion device, whose use was supposed to reduce the noise when the submarine was moving. Among other attributes of the new generation boats is the highly sensitive spherical antenna of the Irtysh-Amphora State Joint Stock Company, which covers the entire bow of the ship. The use of this scheme, characteristic of foreign submarines, indicates a change in the entire paradigm in the domestic shipbuilding: special attention has been paid to detection means.
The use of the “outdated” OK-650V reactor instead of the low-noise reactors that are gaining popularity abroad with an emphasis on natural circulation of the coolant, as well as with a long service life without the need to recharge, is a justified decision.
On the one hand, no special measures were taken to reduce noise during the operation of the YPPU - at most, the matter was limited to new beds and better noise and vibration isolation. And that's bad. On the other hand, the pursuit of a long service life of fuel assemblies does not lead to anything good: firstly, all the efforts of American designers have led to the fact that the life of the S6W reactor core exceeds that of OK-650V by a maximum of 10 years - not too much. a great result, despite the fact that the very process of recharging boat reactors is not something special or requires supernatural efforts. Secondly, in order not to lose face, the Yankees go to the deliberate forgery - 30 years without recharging? Easy! But only with a limited number of outings to the sea.
A few more kind words about OK-650V. The installation has been well mastered by domestic sailors and nuclear specialists; for 30 years of operation, its design has been studied and "polished" to the smallest detail. Two YAPPUs of this type have proved their reliability, having survived a monstrous explosion on board the Kursk and automatically drowning out their core. OK-650V is one of the world's best nuclear powered missile systems for the submarine fleet, and the need to replace it is not at all as obvious as it might seem.
From my personal point of view, the requirements for the "fourth generation" submarines should be determined by their purpose. It is incorrect to compare the missions and capabilities of the multipurpose SeaWolfe, Virginia, or Ash with the Borey strategic missile carriers. What kind of "multifunctionality" and "wide range of tasks" can we talk about if the main and only task of SSBNs is to silently write out "eights" in the depths of the ocean and in readiness, on the first order, to release their ammunition to the cities and military bases of the "potential enemy"?
Generations of strategic missile carriers are determined to a greater extent by the performance characteristics of ballistic missiles on board than by their own characteristics of submarines. Given that the noise level of "Borea", all other things being equal, should be lower than that of "Squids" and "Dolphins" of the previous generation. The sensitivity of the Irtysh-Amphora hydroacoustic complex should also be higher than that of any SAC used on Soviet-built boats - what a giant spherical antenna in the bow of the Borey is worth! Powerful and reliable reactor. The presence of a floating emergency capsule capable of accommodating the entire crew of 107 people.
The main caliber of the boat is 16 R-30 Bulava solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Even during the development of the Bulava, the opinion was repeatedly voiced about the futility of this project. The fact is that Soviet and Russian SSBNs are traditionally equipped with missiles with liquid jet engines. The reason is simple: in terms of the specific impulse, the liquid-propellant engine always surpasses the solid-propellant rocket (a liquid-propellant rocket with the same mass of fuel will fly farther than a solid-propellant rocket). The velocity of gas outflow from the nozzle of modern liquid-propellant rocket engines can reach 3500 m / s and more, while for solid propellants this parameter does not exceed 2500 m / s. The second problem is that the production of solid propellants requires the highest technical culture and quality control, the slightest fluctuation in humidity / temperature will critically affect the stability of fuel combustion.
"Bulava" rages in the sky in front of astonished Norwegians
But why are solid-propellant SLBMs usually used on submarines of Western states, despite all their apparent shortcomings? Polaris, Poseidon, Trident …
Solid propellants have their own advantages, first of all - storage safety. It is enough to recall the death of K-219 to understand what is at stake. Spontaneous launch of solid propellants in a submarine shaft is practically impossible, in contrast to liquid rocket engines, in which a leak of propellant components can occur at any time. As for the increased requirements for the storage conditions of solid-propellant missiles - a thermostable container, and no threat of cracking / wetting the fuel plates.
Among other advantages of solid propellant rocket motors is the relative cheapness of manufacture and operation. The thermal container and the control of the stability of the parameters of solid fuel cannot be compared with the turbopump units, the mixing head and the shut-off valves of the liquid-propellant engine. In addition, solid fuels are non-toxic. The shorter length of solid-propellant rockets is the absence of a separated combustion chamber (the solid propellant rocket itself is the combustion chamber).
Ease of start-up - solid propellants do not require such complex and dangerous operations as filling fuel lines and cooling jackets or maintaining pressurization in tanks. After completing these actions, it is no longer possible to get from the start (or drain the fuel components and send the emergency rocket to the plant).
Finally, the last condition, whose relevance is increasing every year, is that solid-propellant missiles are more resistant to missile defense.
The first attempt to create a missile "like the Americans" ended in failure - a "boat that does not fit in the ocean" and the monstrous 90-ton SLBM R-39 (the main armament of the SSBN pr. 941 "Akula") were born. The Soviet industry was unable to create gunpowder with the necessary characteristics, the result was an indomitable growth in the size of the rocket and the carrier.
"Bulava" comes out of the launch shaft of TRPKSN "Dmitry Donskoy"
(test complex based on the "Shark" submarine)
Bulava is a fresh look at the problem of solid-propellant missiles. Yuri Solomonov, the general designer and former director of MIT, succeeded in the impossible: in conditions of underfunding, build a solid-fuel SLBM of acceptable dimensions, with decent performance characteristics and a launch range of 9000+ km. Moreover, it was partially unified with the Topol-M ground complex.
And even though the Bulava is inferior to the liquid R-29RM Sineva in terms of specific impulse, launch range and the mass of the thrown load, in exchange the domestic submarine fleet acquired a simple and safe missile in operation, which, without any irony, surpasses in reliability any of the SLBMs installed in service with the Navy of the USSR and Russia. Failures occur already during the flight - but we solve this issue by conducting new test launches and a comprehensive study of the results (ideally, building a ground test stand, for which, as usual, there is no money).
"Bulava" and "Borei" are necessary for the Russian fleet. And this question is beyond doubt.
