Recently, the RF Ministry of Defense issued a statement that quite thoroughly stirred up the domestic media. This refers to the message about the possibility of creating mono-ethnic units in the Russian Armed Forces.
Why suddenly our military department decided to take such a step will be discussed below. But first it makes sense to consider, so to speak, the "history of the issue."
FOR THREE CENTURIES
In the regular Russian army, born under Peter I, national formations appeared almost immediately, even during the Northern War. They were recruited either by "friendly foreigners" - as a rule, by immigrants from the regions of Europe, where Orthodoxy was professed, or by "foreigners" - representatives of peoples who did not supply recruits and were not Orthodox. The former included, for example, Moldovan and Serbian regiments, the latter - Kalmyk, Bashkir, Kabardian.
By the way, the Bashkir horsemen, who entered Paris in 1814 together with the Russian troops, were armed not only with firearms, but also with bows, for which the French called them “northern cupids”. In general, during the Patriotic War of 1812, national units accounted for up to five percent of the Russian army. And during and after the end of the conquest of the Caucasus, it also included Caucasian formations, for example, the Dagestan Cavalry Irregular Regiment, which existed from 1851 to 1917 and took part in all the wars of Russia - from the Crimean to the First World War.
The famous Wild Division, which included the Kabardian, Dagestan, Chechen, Ingush, Circassian and Tatar regiments, the Ossetian brigade and the Don Cossack artillery division, belongs to the same type of formations. To a certain extent, the Cossack units could also be considered national. Moreover, there were quite a few Kalmyks among the Don Cossacks, and Buryats among the Trans-Baikal Cossacks.
In 1874, general military service was introduced in the Russian Empire. Although it did not apply to all peoples, most parts of the Russian army became multinational. The revival of national formations took place during the First World War. In addition to the Wild Division, these were Turkmen cavalry units, Polish and Baltic (Latvian and Estonian) formations, Serbian divisions, a corps manned by Czechs and Slovaks mobilized into the Austro-Hungarian army and surrendered.
During the Civil War in Russia, both the Reds and the Whites had many national units. Moreover, it should be noted that, on the whole, the "foreigners" remained loyal to the "white tsar" much longer than the Russians, and were distinguished by extreme cruelty towards the supporters of Soviet power. At the same time, the most excellent punishers among the Bolsheviks, as a rule, were "foreigners", only European ones. The Latvian riflemen were especially "famous" in this regard.
When the Civil War ended, many national units of the Red Army retained their status. However, in reality, they began to "blur", turning into ordinary multinational, and in 1938 they were transformed into ordinary ones. However, as soon as the Great Patriotic War broke out, they began to be created again. This was largely due to the fact that the natives of the Caucasus and Central Asia often knew very little Russian, so it was assumed that they would be better commanded by their fellow tribesmen. It was also thought that such units would be more cohesive and efficient.
As a result, the Latvian and Estonian rifle corps were formed, about 30 national rifle divisions (Transcaucasian and Baltic), up to 30 cavalry divisions (Bashkir, Kalmyk, North Caucasian, Central Asian) and 20 rifle brigades (Central Asian plus one Sino-Korean, in which the battalion commander was Kim Il Sung). Not all of these formations fought at the front, and if some happened to go to the front line, then they showed themselves there in very different ways.
Gradually, the national units again began to "erode" in composition and in the late 50s were finally eliminated. After that, the Soviet army became ideally international, which by no means meant the absence of national problems within it.
The fact is that representatives of different nationalities were not equivalent warriors. And in terms of combat training, and moral and psychological qualities. Everywhere and always there were exceptions, but in general, the Slavs, the Balts, representatives of the majority of the peoples of the RSFSR (Volga, Ural, Siberian) were highly valued, and among the Caucasians, the Ossetians and Armenians.
With the rest of the Caucasians, as well as Tuvans and Central Asians, it was not possible, let's say, to avoid some difficulties. Meanwhile, the share of representatives of “problem” nationalities in the Armed Forces of the USSR was gradually growing. Because it was among them that the birth rate remained high, while among the Slavs, Balts and most of the peoples of Russia, it was very rapidly declining. As a result, “problematic” recruits gradually had to not only replenish construction battalions, railway and motorized rifle units, but more and more often sent them to those types of troops where there was a lot of sophisticated equipment. From this, the fighting efficiency, to put it mildly, did not grow. On the other hand, internal relations in the army rapidly deteriorated, since offenses committed by the "community" were added to the "usual" hazing.
GOD DON'T GIVE SUCH "HAPPINESS"
The collapse of the USSR automatically freed the Russian Armed Forces from a significant part of the “problem fighters, but not all of them. To a certain extent, the Tuvans have remained such, but nevertheless, it is not they who are now giving the commanders of units and subunits the main concern. A more serious problem was and remains the North Caucasus, especially its eastern part, primarily Dagestan.
If representatives of all other regions of the Russian Federation "mow" from the army in all possible ways and mainly only representatives of the social lower classes go to it, then military service continues to be considered an obligatory, most important element of male initiation for Caucasian youths. Since the birth rate in the republics of the North Caucasus is in itself much higher than in the rest of the country, these two factors provide a very rapid increase in the proportion of Caucasians in the ranks of the Armed Forces. Dagestan is at the forefront here too. Both in terms of population and birth rate, it is ahead of even its Caucasian neighbors. Since now conscription into the Russian army is essentially selective, the order for Dagestan is almost always less than the number of potential recruits. Because of this, there is a phenomenon there that is completely surprising for the rest of Russia - people give bribes to be called. Because not joining the army is considered a shame there. About 50 years ago it was like this all over the country …
At the same time, which is especially important, there are almost no Russians left in Dagestan today. They are now less than five percent of the population (less - only in Chechnya), they live exclusively in Makhachkala and several other largest cities. Accordingly, young men, representing numerous local nationalities, come to the Russian army, to put it mildly, not fully adapted to life in Russian society. And because of the propaganda of radical Islam, again especially widespread among young people, Dagestani youths often simply do not consider this society their own. This is a paradox: it is imperative to go into the army, but whether it is your own army is still a question.
This does not mean that Dagestanis are necessarily bad soldiers. On the contrary, they often make excellent fighters, because they take the service more seriously than colleagues of other nationalities. But this is only if there are a maximum of two Dagestanis in the unit. If more, then there is a "community", after which the unit very quickly loses control and, accordingly, combat capability. As the share of Dagestanis in the troops grows, their "dispersal" becomes less and less possible. Possessing internal soldering, they, even being in a relative minority, easily subjugate the rest. Moreover, the "solidarity", "communality" and "conciliarity" of Russians is one of the greatest myths. There is hardly a nation on Earth that is more individualistic and incapable of unification and self-organization than the Russians. Other Russian peoples, alas, have inherited this unpleasant trait from us. In addition, in each separate division there are simply too few representatives of each individual people (non-Russians and non-Caucasians).
If it seemed to someone that the author of this article treats Dagestanis badly, then this is a deep delusion. Unlike most of our citizens, I have not forgotten that in August 1999, the Dagestanis, without the slightest exaggeration, saved Russia from a full-scale catastrophe, standing in the way of the Basayev and Khattab bands with arms in hand. It can also be recalled that in February 2004, two Dagestani contract soldiers (foreman Mukhtar Suleimenov and sergeant Abdula Kurbanov), who served in the border troops (actually at home), at the cost of their lives, destroyed one of the most famous leaders of the Chechen militants Ruslan Gelayev.
However, it cannot be denied in any way that the "Caucasian problem" exists in the Armed Forces, and is clearly getting worse. Hence the idea was born to form mono-ethnic units.
However, the possibility of creating units on the basis of "compatriots" has been discussed in Russia for a long time. It is believed that this should increase the internal cohesion of military collectives and automatically lower the level of hazing. It is assumed that the attitude to the fellow countryman will be completely different from that to the native of another part of giant Russia. This argumentation is supported by the fact that the pre-revolutionary army was almost entirely built according to the "compatriot" principle. Its regiments, as a rule, bore "regional" names and were actually staffed mainly by people from the corresponding province. Belonging to the "native" regiment was highly valued by its soldiers and officers, it seemed absolutely impossible to shame the honor of the regiment.
However, quite a lot has changed since then.
The most important argument against the creation of "compatriot" units in today's Russia is that this will encourage ethnic and purely regional separatism, which in our country, albeit in a latent form, is very strong (and the regional, perhaps, is even stronger and more dangerous than ethnic). Less often, another, no less fair argument sounds - the distribution of the population in the country does not at all coincide with how the Armed Forces formations should be deployed in accordance with real threats. In the end, Russia must come to the realization that impotent NATO does not pose a military threat to us. Threats come from Asia, with three quarters of the country's population living in its European part.
Of course, both of these arguments are easily countered. The "compatriot" principle is the principle of recruiting, but not in any way determining the place of deployment. The Kostroma regiment can be deployed in Kamchatka or in the Caucasus, and by no means near Kostroma. It is only completed by people from the Kostroma region. Actually, this was exactly the case in the tsarist army.
There are, however, more serious objections. They are determined by a radical change in the social structure of society and the structural and technical structure of the Armed Forces.
The tsarist army was an extremely socially simple organism. The rank and file are the peasantry, and mostly Slavs, the officers are usually from the nobility or commoners. The soldiers who came out of the peasants really had a rather strong sense of their community, which "moved" from the village to the army. In addition, the structure of the army was very homogeneous. It consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, which fit well into the cultural and educational level of the conscript contingent.
In modern Russia, at least half of the conscription contingent (at least in theory) are residents of large cities, for which "fellowship" from a moral point of view means practically nothing. An ordinary person from a modern metropolis often does not even know his neighbors on the staircase. For this reason, it is not entirely clear what the "compatriot" principle will give here, what kind of cohesion it will provide. It is another matter that in reality today almost exclusively lumpen comes to the army from the two Russian capitals, from the regional centers; But for the lumpen, "compatriot" feelings are absolutely "up to the lantern." And from the peasant community, we have long since left no traces.
Of course, the Ministry of Defense is not going to form Tatar, Bashkir, Mordovian, Khakass, Yakut or Karelian units. Simply because the soldiers of these nationalities, like the representatives of the other northern, Volga, Ural and Siberian peoples, do not cause any special difficulties for the command. As in the Soviet army, they are no more problematic than the Slavs. Apparently, the matter concerns exclusively Caucasians, especially Dagestanis.
Actually, we already have mono-ethnic Caucasian units - in Chechnya. These are the well-known "Yamadaevskaya" and "Kadyrovskaya" battalions with "geographical" names. However, they were created with very narrow and understandable goals - "to turn the imperialist war into a civil war", to solve the Chechen problem by the hands of the Chechens themselves. Accordingly, the "habitat" of these battalions is very narrow - only Chechnya itself. Although in August 2008, the Yamadayevites were transferred to South Ossetia, where they turned out to be almost the most combat-ready part of the Russian army. The Georgians fled from them especially quickly.
However, in this article we are talking about "normal" units, which are not leading the war. Only Dagestanis should serve in them.
At first glance, the thought might seem interesting. Let them cook in their own juice. Now hot Caucasian guys very often refuse to engage in any kind of household work, since this is a "non-man's business." And very often the command of a unit cannot do anything, shifting the execution of such tasks to representatives of less ardent and proud peoples. If in the unit there are only Caucasians, then they will have to work hard. And there will be no one to scoff at, except each other.
But this consolation is weak, if not miserable. First of all, if, as they say, to look at the root, Caucasians are right. A soldier is not obliged to wash floors and peel potatoes (not to mention the construction of summer cottages and cowsheds, which is a criminal offense), he should only engage in combat training. Household work should be shifted either to civilian personnel (recently, such a practice has begun to be introduced, but very slowly and at high costs), or to "alternative workers", or to those conscripts who, in terms of intellectual parameters, are unable to do anything else in the army (among the latter, of course, there may also be Caucasians, but this is a completely different question).
Secondly and most importantly, the command should first of all think about how effective the unit is, and not who is peeling the potatoes in it. Once again, I would like to remind you that the Armed Forces exist to ensure the security of the country, everything else is particular. Serious doubts arise about the fighting efficiency of ethnic units.
If war breaks out (and the army is destined for war!), Will the Dagestanis want to fight for Russia? And if they want to, can they? Indeed, in the absence of Russians inside them, a showdown may begin between local nationalities (most of the Caucasian republics are multiethnic, Dagestan is generally almost the most multinational place on Earth with a huge number of interethnic conflicts) and clans. This will require officers (at least most of the command staff) of the same nationality: they will at least understand what is happening between subordinates.
As a result, we have a ready-made national army and in which region of Russia it is deployed - it is no longer very important. It would be better to avoid such "happiness".
DIFFICULT SITUATION
Discussing the problem of creating regional units, it should also be noted that modern Armed Forces are distinguished by an exceptionally high internal diversity in terms of species, genus, and technology. Even a motorized rifle (that is, in the old way - an infantry) brigade really includes, in addition to motorized riflemen itself, tankmen, artillerymen, signalmen, anti-aircraft gunners (rocket and artillerymen), and various logisticians. To what extent the mono-ethnic principle will fit into this diversity is difficult to understand.
The main thing is that in itself the conversation about the creation of mono-ethnic units is essentially a surrender, and a double one at that. In a narrow sense, the military command actually states that it is not yet able to achieve elementary discipline in the troops using the available means. By the way, isn't this the result of the latest massive redundancies in officers in general and educators in particular? In a broad national sense, it is a recognition that Russia is still far from true unity.
Now in Europe begins the painful process of revising the policy of "multiculturalism" and "tolerance". It turned out that European societies are incapable of "digesting" migrants from the Near and Middle East, from North Africa. As Tilo Saratsin wrote in his book “Germany Self-Destructs”: “I don’t want muezzins to set the pace of life in the country of my ancestors and my grandchildren, the population spoke Turkish and Arabic, and women wore hijabs. If I want to see all this, I will take a vacation and go to the East. I am not obliged to accept someone who lives at the expense of taxpayers, not recognizing the state feeding him. I also do not consider it reasonable to take care of the education of his children and thereby produce new girls wrapped in a veil."
Our situation is no less difficult. Europe is incapable of integrating migrants who are historically and mentally unrelated to it in any way and do not owe it anything. Russia is losing its ability to integrate its own citizens. Residents of regions that have been part of Russia for a century and a half. People whose ancestors fought and died for Russia.
However, are all Russians ready to die for Russia today? Or at least the majority of them?
