Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941

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Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941
Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941

Video: Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941

Video: Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941
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The battle for Kharkov in the history of the Great Patriotic War occupies a separate tragic page. The Soviet leadership perfectly understood the strategic importance of Kharkov, which was forcedly surrendered to the Germans in October 1941, practically without a fight, and undertook four large-scale strategic operations to return it. All operations, except for the last one, ended in major failures, and only in August 1943, Kharkov was finally liberated. In this regard, the city has a reputation as a "cursed place of the Red Army."

Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941
Kharkov battle. Forced surrender of Kharkov in October 1941

The strategic importance of Kharkiv

What was Kharkov like by the fall of 1941? In terms of its industrial, transit and human potential, Kharkov was the third city after Moscow and Leningrad and the largest city in the USSR occupied by the Wehrmacht during the war years. Kharkiv was the largest industrial center of the Soviet Union, primarily of heavy engineering, for example, here at the plant No. 183 before the war, the T-34 tank was developed and mass-produced.

The city was also the largest strategic junction of railways, highways and air routes running in the west-east and north-south directions and was practically equal in importance to the Moscow transport junction. The Kharkov railway junction connected the central regions of the USSR with the Crimea, Caucasus, Dnieper and Donbass. Kharkov ensured the rapid transfer of troops both in the frontal and in the rokad directions of the front.

Before the war, 900 thousand people lived in Kharkov (in Kiev only 846 thousand), by the end of August 1941 the population had increased to one and a half million due to the refugees and the wounded.

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The defensive line of Kharkov was part of the defense system of the Southwestern Front, which suffered two catastrophic defeats in July-September 1941. Near Uman, on August 7, the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front were surrounded and destroyed, and on September 24, near Kiev, the main forces of the Southwestern Front, consisting of five Soviet armies, were surrounded and destroyed. Only in the "Uman cauldron" 110 thousand Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner, and an unprecedented number of our servicemen were captured in the "Kiev cauldron" - 665 thousand.

The Southwestern Front collapsed, and the Wehrmacht troops rushed into Kharkov into the gap. The Germans already captured Poltava on September 18, and on September 20 Krasnograd in the Kharkov region, in connection with which a ledge was formed in the direction of Kharkov, and the fate of the city was in the balance.

The active offensive actions of our troops in the Krasnograd area in order to liberate the city and cut off the wedged enemy grouping continued until October 5, 1941 and did not bring success, parts of the 52nd and 44th army corps of the Wehrmacht were able to hold their positions.

Since the end of July, the city and the stations of the Kharkov railway junction have been subjected to massive air raids. The main targets were railway and military facilities, as well as warehouses for finished products of the most important enterprises. The factories themselves were practically not subjected to blows - the Germans tried to preserve the production base of the Kharkov industrial region for themselves.

Reasons that prompted to leave the city

In order to cover the Southwestern Front, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive on September 27-30, conducting concerted actions against the Bryansk and Southern fronts. The first tank group of Colonel-General Kleist broke through the defenses of the weakened Southern Front in the Dnepropetrovsk region and entered the operational space. At the same time, the 2nd Panzer Group of Colonel-General Guderian, having broken through the defenses at the junction of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, began an offensive in the Oryol direction. The three armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded, and on October 3, German tanks broke into Oryol, cutting off the strategic railway and the Moscow-Kharkov highway and creating an immediate threat to Moscow. On October 16, panic began in Moscow and the question of evacuating the capital was considered.

As a result of the Wehrmacht offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front were captured from both flanks, and the depth of coverage was 60-200 kilometers. Under these conditions, on October 6, the command of the Southwestern Front decided to withdraw the right-flank armies 45-50 kilometers to the Sumy-Akhtyrka line in order to cover Belgorod and the northern approaches to Kharkov.

It was not possible to implement these plans, the 29th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht broke into Sumy, and the 51st captured Akhtyrka. The intended line of withdrawal was occupied by the enemy and the Soviet troops retreated further east. Taking advantage of this, the 17th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht struck at the junction of our 21st and 38th armies and broke through the defenses. The right flank of the 38th Army was upset, the enemy captured Bogodukhov on October 7 and an immediate threat to Kharkov from the north was created.

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In the south, the Wehrmacht captured the most important railway junctions Lozovaya and Bliznyuki, cutting off the communication along the Kharkov-Rostov line and taking control of the ferries on the Seversky Donets. 11th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht advanced along the Krasnograd-Kharkov highway, covering the city from the south. As a result, by October 15, 1941, Wehrmacht units approached Kharkov at a distance of up to 50 kilometers and could attack the city simultaneously from three converging directions.

By that time, Kharkov was seriously preparing for defense, by October 20, the evacuation of the main industrial facilities from Kharkov was completed, 320 echelons with equipment from 70 large factories were sent to the rear.

Around the city, along the outer contour, a defensive area was equipped with continuous lines of trenches with a total length of up to 40 kilometers, over 250 artillery and about 1000 machine-gun bunkers and dugouts were prepared, up to three thousand anti-tank hedgehogs and bunkers were installed.

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In the city itself, on the central streets, several hundred barricades with a total length of 16 thousand meters have been erected, using over four hundred city transport cars. Also, 43 city bridges were mined, more than ten bridges were destroyed in advance. According to experts, Kharkiv was well prepared for defense, even in an encirclement it could hold out for a long time.

But all this was not required, the situation changed dramatically on the evening of October 15 with the receipt of directive No. 31 of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the front headquarters, in which the front was tasked with withdrawing troops to the line Kastornaya - Stary Oskol - Novy Oskol - Valuyki - Kupyansk - Krasny Liman on October 17-30 and withdraw to the front reserve at least six rifle divisions and two cavalry corps. This meant that the troops of the front had to retreat from 80 to 200 kilometers and leave Kharkov, Belgorod and the Donetsk industrial region. The decision of the Stavka was caused by the catastrophic situation in the defensive zone of the neighboring fronts, and by the rapid pace of the German offensive in the Moscow direction. In order for the troops in the Kharkov region not to find themselves in another "cauldron", they were ordered to conduct only rearguard battles, holding back the enemy until October 25 and then leave the city.

Mining activities in Kharkov

In preparing Kharkov for defense in case the city was surrendered, a group of Colonel Starinov was sent there on September 27 to carry out a number of special measures to mine defensive lines, disable industrial enterprises, railway junctions and communication centers, bridges, communication lines, power plants and other important objects of the city economy by detonation, arson and mining. For this, more than 110 tons of explosives, tens of thousands of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, as well as radio-controlled mines and mines with delayed-action fuses were allocated.

Over 30,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, about 2,000 delayed-action mines, about 1,000 booby traps and over 5,000 decoys were planted in the Kharkov region. Bridges, highways, railways, airfields were mined. In the city, the central telephone exchange, power plants, water supply and sewerage networks, the city's central heating system, workshops and premises of all large enterprises in the city were mined and destroyed, and the remaining equipment was damaged or mined. Using radio-controlled mines, several mansions in the city center, where the deployment of German headquarters were supposed to be, were also mined.

As a result of the measures taken, Kharkiv was deprived of strategic importance as the largest industrial and transport center. The German command planned to use the industrial and transport capabilities of Kharkov for their own purposes. However, German experts stated the extreme degree of their destruction. Having made colossal efforts to restore the infrastructure, they were able to restore the capabilities of the Kharkov transport hub only at the beginning of 1942, and the industrial infrastructure for the repair of Wehrmacht military equipment was restored only by May 1942.

Dozens of enemy trains, more than 75 vehicles, 28 armored vehicles, over 2,300 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed on mines set when leaving Kharkov, and on November 14, a mansion was blown up on a radio signal from Voronezh, where the commandant of the city, General von Braun, was.

It should be noted, however, that the destruction of power supply systems, water supply and sewerage networks, and the central heating system put the residents of the city in dire conditions under the German occupation.

Aspect ratio on the eve of the storming of the city

Kharkov was preparing to surrender. According to the plans of the front headquarters, the 38th Army was supposed to hold its positions at a distance of 30-40 kilometers from Kharkov until October 23. However, these plans were thwarted, on October 20, units of the 55th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht captured the key defense point Lyubotin, and the forward patrols reached the suburbs of Kharkov. Over the next day, due to uncoordinated actions on the withdrawal of the 38th Army's formations, the Wehrmacht captured the village of Dergachi north of Kharkov, and units of the 11th Army Corps captured the city of Zmiev south of Kharkov. Kharkov was in a semi-encirclement, covered by the enemy from three sides.

For the immediate protection of Kharkov in the rearguard battles, only the forces of the garrison remained, commanded by the regional military commander Maslov, on October 20, the command was transferred to the chief of defense of Kharkov, General Marshalkov. The troops of the garrison included the 216th rifle division (11 thousand people), the 57th separate brigade of the NKVD, the Kharkov people's militia regiment, separate battalions of local rifle troops and an armored detachment. The total number of troops in the garrison was 19,898 people with 120 guns and mortars and 47 tanks.

The 216th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel Makshanov was formed in early October from conscripts and servicemen from the rear units. The personnel of the division did not have combat training, were not fired upon and poorly prepared for battles in the city, but they were well armed. On the first day of the fighting, the divisional commander showed cowardice and was replaced.

The Kharkiv people's militia regiment and battalions of local rifle troops consisted of local residents of different ages who signed up as volunteers and had a poor level of combat training, moreover, they were armed exclusively with rifles. A separate armored detachment included 47 units of obsolete armored vehicles: T-27, T-26 and T-35. Subsequent battles showed that only the fighters of the NKVD brigade and the militia fought bravely, the fighters of the 216th division were subject to panic, often fled from the battlefield and deserted.

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The Soviet troops were opposed by the 55th Army Corps under the command of General of the Infantry Erwin Firov, which was part of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht under the command of Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau. The 101st Light and 239th Infantry Divisions were reassigned to the corps, and heavy artillery units were also attached. The offensive was to be carried out by the forces of three divisions, one more division was in reserve. The main blow was delivered by the 57th Infantry Division, which was conducting a frontal offensive from the west with the support of units of the 101st and 100th Light Infantry Divisions advancing from the north and south.

Rearguard battles in Kharkov

On October 19, the Wehrmacht troops occupied the suburban defense line almost unhindered from the west. To eliminate this ledge, the commander of the 38th Army ordered the 216th Infantry Division, the main unit of the Kharkov garrison, to move out of the city to the suburb of Peresechnoye. The division, making a march at night, fell into disarray and lost its combat effectiveness, and one of the regiments got lost and was found only a day and a half later, and in addition, during the marches, up to 30% of the personnel deserted. After the first order to advance, a few hours later, another order was received - to return to their original positions. As a result, the division, without occupying the lines in the suburbs, returned to its original positions. By the end of October 20, German troops reached the city outskirts of Kharkov, and the Soviet units did not have a continuous line of defense.

Under these conditions, the command of the 38th Army assumes direct control of the city's defense, subjugating the Kharkiv defense headquarters, headed by General Marshalkov. In practice, this led to the fact that the units defending the city received sometimes conflicting orders simultaneously from two control centers - the army headquarters and the headquarters of the Kharkov garrison.

On October 22, Soviet troops unexpectedly for the enemy launched a counterattack with the forces of the 57th brigade of the NKVD and two regiments of the 216th rifle division in the direction of Kuryazh - Pesochin. Throughout the day, protracted battles continued, but by evening the Soviet troops withdrew to their original positions.

On the morning of October 23, German troops launched an offensive from the west and entrenched themselves in residential areas of the New Bavaria region. At noon, the main forces of the 57th Infantry Division went over to the offensive. Slowly moving along the streets of the city, the assault groups, overcoming the barricades, ditches and minefields erected at each intersection, reached the railway line in the evening.

Attempts by individual units of the Wehrmacht to bypass the city and break into it from the north along the Belgorod highway were suppressed by militias on the defensive lines in Sokolniki.

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As a result of the first day of fighting, German troops managed to capture the western regions of Kharkov and reach the railway, and in some areas, and overcome it. Under these conditions, fearing encirclement, the commander of the 216th Infantry Division decided to withdraw his units to the eastern bank of Lopan, occupying the second line of defense. Upon learning of this, the command of the 38th Army canceled the order to withdraw and ordered the next day to knock the enemy out of the western part of Kharkov with a counterattack. However, the Soviet troops had already withdrawn across the river by this time.

In general, on the first day of the fighting, the organized defense of the city did not work out. Not having the proper combat training, the Soviet units immediately after the enemy managed to break into its western outskirts succumbed to panic and began to hastily retreat to its center. Due to the lack of the necessary means of communication and poorly organized interaction between units and subunits, the command and defense headquarters almost completely lost control over the actions of the troops in the first hours.

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On the morning of October 24, 1941, German troops occupied the city blocks between the railway and the river. Parts of the Wehrmacht also went to the area of the railway stations Balashovka and Levada and adjacent industrial enterprises. Having crossed the Lopan River, units of the 101st Light Division launched an offensive towards the aircraft plant and the central square of Dzerzhinsky. Fierce battles unfolded on Dzerzhinsky Square, where units of the people's militia held their defenses for more than five hours under the onslaught of superior enemy forces. Units of the 57th brigade of the NKVD, which were entrenched in the area of Osnova station, continued to stubbornly defend themselves.

By three o'clock in the afternoon, German troops captured the central regions of Kharkov. Resistance began to take on a focal character by the forces of scattered separate subdivisions and detachments. By the evening of October 24, units of the Wehrmacht reached the eastern outskirts of Kharkov, and the remnants of the garrison began to retreat to the east. The order to withdraw was given by the commander of the 216th rifle division Makshanov, who was removed from office in the morning by order of the army commander, but since the division headquarters had no connection with the army headquarters, the latter continued to lead the troops during the battles for the city. The new division commander, brigade commander Zhmachenko, managed to find and reassign only two battalions to himself. Until October 27, the division was actually controlled by two centers.

Formation of a new line of defense

The withdrawal of Soviet troops was carried out in conditions of roads sagging from the rain. The fuel for the equipment was running out, it had to be delivered in buckets. On the night of October 25, the commander of the forces of the garrison, Major General Marshalkov and the brigade commander Zhmachenko, set up several special barrage detachments on possible routes of withdrawal of the troops, whose duties were to detain the troops leaving the city. By morning, assembled overnight in units, forces up to two regiments, Soviet troops took up defensive positions in the area of the tractor plant, located outside the city. On the night of October 25-26, Soviet troops withdrew across the Seversky Donets River, and Belgorod was also surrendered on October 24. While the formations of the 38th Army held back the enemy in the Kharkov direction, the rest of the armies of the Southwestern Front continued to withdraw.

The main forces of the front on October 27 held their defenses along the Seversky Donets. By the end of October, German troops, having created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, went over to the defensive. The command of the Southwestern Front decided to stop the withdrawal of troops and go on the defensive in the Tim - Balakleya - Izium sector and further along the Seversky Donets River. This configuration of the front line made it possible to prepare for further operations with the aim of liberating Kharkov.

In October, the German command set as its goal not to squeeze out Soviet troops, but to cover the grouping of the Southwestern Front with the subsequent possibility of encirclement due to deep penetrating strikes. After the development of the German offensive and the defeat of the neighboring fronts, the troops of the Southwestern Front found themselves in a kind of protrusion, which could lead to a repetition of the "Kiev cauldron". Under these conditions, the decision of the Headquarters to abandon the Kharkov industrial region, part of the Donbass and the withdrawal of troops was, apparently, the only correct one. In the second half of October 1941, all actions of the Soviet troops, including the direct defense of Kharkov, were strictly linked to the schedule for the withdrawal of formations of the Southwestern Front.

Considering that by the end of October the troops of the Southwestern Front had passed to a solid defense on the lines outlined by the Headquarters, and the enemy did not show activity in this sector, the Soviet command considered the results of the Kharkov operation to be generally satisfactory. The Soviet leadership was well aware of the significance of the loss of Kharkov and made serious efforts to return the strategically important city. Already in January 1942, the first offensive against Kharkov began.

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