The first two attempts to liberate Kharkov (January 1942 and May 1942) ended in failure and in the "Barvenkovo cauldron". After the defeat by the Germans at Stalingrad, the German troops rolled back to the west without offering serious resistance. In the euphoria of victories, the Soviet leadership decided that the German troops had been decisively defeated and they no longer pose a serious danger. The headquarters considered that the Soviet troops were able to conduct serious offensive operations of a strategic scale and decided for the third time to implement the obsession to defeat the enemy in the Kharkov region and reach the Dnieper, encircling and eliminating the southern group of Germans, pushing them to the Azov and Black Seas.
Plans and state of forces of the opposing sides
In fact, the forecasts of the Soviet command were far from reality, the German troops had not yet lost their power, the German command was in control of the situation and was considering options for stopping the offensive of the Soviet troops and delivering a counterstrike against them.
The commander of Army Group Don (later South) Manstein saw the main danger in the possibility of cutting off the southern group of forces from the Dnieper to the Sea of Azov and believed that it was necessary to strengthen the Kharkov grouping and withdraw the southern grouping to a new defensive line along the Mius River.
Stalin approved on January 23 the plan proposed by the General Staff for the operations "Star" and "Skip". Operation Zvezda was carried out by the forces of the left wing of the Voronezh Front under the command of Golikov in cooperation with the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Vatutin and envisaged a massive tank strike in the direction of Kharkov and further Zaporozhye in order to liberate the Kharkov industrial region and create favorable opportunities for offensive to Donbass.
Operation "Jump" was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front and provided for the encirclement and destruction of German troops in the area between the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper, the liberation of Donbass, access to the Dnieper in the Zaporozhye region and the elimination of the southern German grouping.
The main blow was delivered by the troops of the Voronezh Front with the forces of the 38th, 60th and 40th armies and the 18th separate rifle corps. On the left flank, the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front interacted with them, reinforced by Rybalko's 3rd Tank Army, the 6th Cavalry Corps, three rifle divisions and other formations and units from the Supreme Command's reserve. The general objective of the operation was the capture of Kursk, Belgorod, the breakthrough of tank and cavalry formations into the rear of the Kharkov enemy grouping and its encirclement. It was planned to advance the Voronezh Front by about 150 km, followed by an offensive on Poltava.
The troops of the Voronezh Front were opposed by the German 2nd Army (7 infantry divisions against the Soviet 38th and 60th armies) and the Lanz army group. Soviet troops advancing on Kharkov numbered up to 200 thousand people, they were opposed by the German army group "Lanz" of up to 40 thousand people, which achieved a significant superiority over the enemy, especially almost threefold in tanks.
At the same time, the Soviet command did not attach due importance to the information that the 40th, 48th and 57th German tank corps had not been defeated and that a fresh SS tank corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Hausser, consisting of elite tank divisions "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler "," Death's Head "and" Reich ".
Start of Operations Star and Leap
The first began on January 29, 1943, Operation "Skip", with the offensive of the 6th Army against the right wing of the Army Group "Lanz" in the Kupyansk region. By February 6, the Oskol River was forced and the troops reached the right flank on the Seversky Donets River, Kupyansk, Izyum and Balakleya were taken, and the 6th Army advanced 127 kilometers.
Operation Zvezda began on February 2 with an offensive by the troops of the Voronezh Front, the 3rd Panzer Army (2 tank corps, 5 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades, 2 cavalry divisions) attacked Kharkov from the east, the 69th Army (4 rifle divisions) and the 40th army (1 tank corps, 6 rifle divisions, 3 tank brigades) advanced through Belgorod. To the north, the 38th Army advanced on Oboyan, and the 60th Army advanced on Kursk.
Troops of the 40th and 60th armies by February 9 took Kursk and Belgorod and rushed from the north to Kharkov, from the east through Volchansk to the city the 69th army broke through, from the southeast, Rybalko's 3rd tank army moved to Kharkov in interaction with the 6th Cavalry Corps. However, the advance of the 3rd Panzer Army to Kharkov was stopped on February 5, 45 km east of Kharkov, by the SS Reich Panzer-Grenadier Division.
The troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts were ordered, without taking into account the logistical support, to break through the battle formations of the retreating enemy and reach the Dnieper before the onset of the spring thaw. The implementation of such an order often led to tragic consequences. So, near the village of Malinovka on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets, an infantry unit was thrown into battle without the support of tanks and artillery. The Germans pressed it to the ground with artillery fire and did not give the opportunity to move forward and retreat. In the 20th degree frost, more than a thousand soldiers simply froze to death in the trenches with weapons in their hands and could not be saved. After the support of the tanks, the Severskiy Donets was nevertheless forced and on February 10 they captured Chuguev.
Liberation of Kharkov
Soviet troops continued to develop the offensive, bypassing Kharkov from the north and south. In general, the 40th Army carried out an operation to encircle Kharkov, advancing from the north and at the same time bypassing it from the north-west and west. Having felt a weak spot in the German defense, it was broken through from the south, and the 6th Cavalry Corps, which was not restrained by anyone, was introduced into the breakthrough.
Lanz regrouped his formations for the defense of Kharkov from the east and north-east, ordered the Reich division units to withdraw to the western bank of the Seversky Donets, and created a mobile group for a counterattack against the 6th cavalry corps that had broken through bypassing Kharkov.
A real threat of surrender hung over Kharkov. Hitler issued an order prohibiting the surrender of the city and on February 6 personally flew to Zaporozhye and demanded that Field Marshal Manstein strengthen measures for the defense of Kharkov.
Manstein assessed the situation in this sector of the front in a completely different way. He objectively believed that it was impossible to hold Kharkov, it was necessary to withdraw troops in the south to a new line of defense along the Mius River, allow Soviet troops to advance west and south-west as far as possible, strike them in the flank and destroy them. He hardly convinced Hitler that he was right, and he approved the "Manstein plan".
To the south and southeast of Kharkov, the troops of the 3rd Panzer Army received the task of capturing the starting positions for the assault on the city. On February 11, the formations of the 3rd Panzer Army fought on the eastern approaches to the city, the 6th Cavalry Corps was tasked to form a barrier to the west of the city, intercepting the roads leading from Kharkov to the west and southwest.
The introduction of Kravchenko's 5th Panzer Corps into battle on February 12 significantly accelerated the offensive of the 40th Army, and already on February 13 its units liberated Dergachi and entered the outskirts of Kharkov. General Kravchenko's corps burst into a wide gap and quickly reached the Olshany region, north-west of Kharkov. By February 14, the forward detachments of the corps had already reached the area of Lyubotin and Bogodukhov, deeply bypassing Kharkov. The corps continued the offensive and on February 23 liberated Akhtyrka, the farthest point in the west.
The two Soviet fronts continued their successful offensive, continuing to climb further and further into the "bag" prepared by Manstein. Soviet intelligence did not work and did not reveal the danger threatening the troops. By mid-February, the German command was finally convinced that the main blow of the Soviet troops was being carried out in the direction of Zaporozhye through the gap between the 1st Panzer Army in the south and the Lanz group in the north in order to seize the crossings on the Dnieper. German troops completed preparations for the implementation of the "Manstein plan" and were ready to strike at the flank.
Lanz tried to defeat the 6th Cavalry Corps south of Kharkov, but the activity of Moskalenko's 40th Army did not allow him to eliminate the threat of bypassing the right flank of the army group. While the hardest fighting was going on on the streets of Kharkov, a significant part of the Reich division continued to fight against the 6th Cavalry Corps south of the city. The advance of the cavalry corps was finally stopped in the area of Novaya Vodolaga, and on February 13, the cavalry corps was driven out of this area.
The situation in Kharkov by noon on February 14 became critical for the Germans, the encirclement of the city was almost complete. Groups of Soviet tanks broke through the defensive lines from the north, north-west and south-east and reached the outskirts of the city. The supply route Kharkov - Poltava was shot through by Soviet artillery. On February 15, the troops of the Soviet 3rd Tank Army, the 40th and 69th Armies (a total of 8 tank brigades, 13 rifle divisions) began an assault on Kharkov from three directions. The Soviet troops were opposed by two German SS divisions - "Reich" and "Adolf Hitler". In the ring around the city, there was only one small passage in the southeast.
Hitler continued to insist on holding Kharkov. Under the threat of encirclement, the commander of the SS Panzer Corps Hausser, who was not inclined to participate in the new "Stalingrad", ordered his units to leave the city, despite Hitler's categorical ban.
It was almost impossible to stop the withdrawal that had begun. Despite the order to hold Kharkov "to the last man", Hausser's corps units withdrew from Kharkov, making a breakthrough to the southwest. Tanks paved the way for the grenadiers, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and sappers covered the flanks, ensuring the withdrawal of the grouping to the Uda River area. By the end of the day on February 15, the troops of the 40th Army cleared the south-western, western and north-western parts of the city from the enemy. From the east and southeast, part of the divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army entered Kharkiv. According to the recollections of the Kharkovites who survived the occupation, the Soviet troops entered the city exhausted and tired, there was little equipment, the artillery was dragged not only by horses, but even by oxen.
Upon receiving a report that the SS Panzer Corps had disobeyed his orders, Hitler was furious. A few days later, the commander of the Kharkov group of forces, General Lanz, was replaced by General Kempf of the tank forces and this group of forces received the official name "Army Group Kempf".
Manstein's counterstrike
Hitler arrived at Manstein's headquarters in Zaporozhye on February 18. As a result of two-day meetings, it was decided to abandon attempts to return Kharkov. Hitler gave Manstein the green light to carry out an operation to encircle the Soviet 6th Army and Popov's tank group. The Fuehrer authorized a significant strategic retreat and agreed to surrender the eastern Donetsk region as far as Mius.
Operational group "Hollidt" with battles retreated from the Seversky Donets to the less extended Miusskaya position, where it was supposed to provide a continuous front. The formations of the 1st Panzer Army under the command of General Mackensen were transferred to the Seversky Donets to strengthen the northern wing of the army group. From the Lower Don, Gotha's 4th Panzer Army was being transferred north to the western wing of Army Group Don to the area between the Seversky Donets and the bend of the Dnieper. Manstein was preparing a grouping of troops for a counterattack in order to exclude the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper in the Kremenchug region, which opens the way for them to the Crimea itself.
Stalin and the high Soviet command were convinced that Manstein's armies were retreating along the entire front and the withdrawal of the Hollidt task force from the Seversky Donets was regarded as direct evidence of this and nothing could prevent the German catastrophe between the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper. Moreover, all reconnaissance data indicated that the enemy was evacuating from the Seversky Donets area and withdrawing troops across the Dnieper.
Manstein saw through Stalin's plan with his risky operation to cut off the southern group of the Wehrmacht and decided to play along with him, creating the illusion of a massive retreat and concentrating troops for a flank attack.
Meanwhile, the advanced units of Popov's tank group, as a result of a raid in Krasnoarmeyskoye, cut the Dnipropetrovsk-Stalino railway and ended up about sixty kilometers from Zaporozhye, threatening the industrial heart of the Donetsk basin.
On February 19, Manstein gave the order to the 4th Panzer Army on a counterattack to destroy the 6th Soviet Army, which was advancing through Pavlograd to Dnepropetrovsk and to the Kampf army group to block the path of Soviet advance to the Dnieper from the north through Krasnograd and Kremenchug. At dawn on February 20, units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps and 48th Panzer Corps go over to the offensive against the troops of the Southwestern Front, and the SS Reich Division strikes deep into the flank of the 6th Soviet Army.
With the support of aviation, the tank corps are rapidly advancing and on February 23, units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps and the 48th Panzer Corps merge in Pavlograd and reliably surround two Soviet tank and one cavalry corps, which were heading for Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye.
General Popov, on the night of February 20-21, requested Vatutin's sanction for the withdrawal of his tank group, but did not receive consent and now there was no way to save the encircled troops. It was only on February 24 that Vatutin finally realized the full extent of the delusion and understood Manstein's plan, which made it possible for the Soviet troops of the two fronts to get involved in battles, be left without reserves, and only then launched a counterstrike. Now Vatutin hastily ordered the army group to suspend the offensive and go on the defensive. But it was too late, Popov's tank group was completely defeated, and the 6th Army was in a desperate situation, its large parts were cut off and surrounded. Popov's group tried to break through to the north, but they had only a few tanks without fuel and ammunition, there was also no artillery, and the Germans stopped this attempt.
To alleviate the position of his armies, Vatutin asked Headquarters to intensify offensive operations in the southern sector of the front at Mius. But these operations also ended in complete failure, parts of the 4th mechanized corps that broke through the German positions at Matveyev Kurgan were surrounded and almost completely destroyed or captured, and parts of the 8th cavalry corps, which broke through the front line, at Debaltsev were also surrounded, defeated and taken prisoner.
The advanced units of the German troops, suppressing the last centers of resistance in the Krasnoarmeyskoye area, on February 23 with a wide front, flowing around Barvenkovo, moved north and west and pursued the retreating Soviet units. The initiative finally passed to the Germans and the Soviet troops did not have the opportunity to establish a new line of defense. On February 25, the divisions "Reich" and "Totenkopf" occupied Lozovaya during fierce battles.
With a swift advance, Hoth's Panzer Corps pursued the retreating Soviet troops, surrounded and destroyed before they reached the Seversky Donets. As a result of the breakthrough of the Soviet front, the German command had a chance to again seize the line along the Seversky Donets and go into the rear of the Soviet grouping in the Kharkov region.
On the evening of February 28, 40th Panzer Corps was already on a wide front in the Seversky Donets area south of Izyum, in positions that it left in January during the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. Popov's Panzer Group, the front’s powerful forward formation, simply ceased to exist. She left on the battlefield between Krasnoarmeisky and Izium 251 tanks, 125 anti-tank guns, 73 heavy guns and thousands of killed.
Three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps were reoriented on 28 February to take action against Rybalko's 3 TA. With converging blows, they took in ticks the Soviet grouping in the Kegichevka - Krasnograd - Berestovaya river triangle. The 6th Cavalry Corps, the 12th and 15th Tank Corps, the 111th, 184th, and 219th Infantry Divisions, numbering about 100 thousand people, were surrounded. Already surrounded, they received an order to withdraw and at dawn on March 3, they went to a breakthrough to the north in the direction of Taranovka. Having suffered heavy losses in men and equipment, part of the troops escaped from the encirclement, the rest surrendered on March 5. After leaving the encirclement, they were sent to the rear to re-form, since they suffered heavy losses. Having defeated the 3rd Panzer Army, the Germans opened their way to Kharkov.
By March 3, the troops of the Southwestern Front completed the withdrawal to the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River, formed a solid front on the Balakleya - Krasny Liman line and stopped the enemy offensive operations.
For three weeks of fighting, the Soviet command suffered terrible losses, the 6th and 69th Soviet armies, the 3rd Panzer Army and Popov's Panzer Group were practically defeated. Six armored corps, ten rifle divisions and half a dozen separate brigades were eliminated or suffered heavy losses. It was a fantastic victory for Manstein. The biggest threat to the German Eastern Front since the beginning of the campaign in 1941 and the threat of the complete destruction of the southern group were averted. The consequences of the defeat of the Germans in Stalingrad were also eliminated.
Delivery of Kharkov
The most tempting strategic goal for the Germans was Kharkov, and they decided to implement it. German troops launched an offensive on Kharkov on March 4 from a southern direction. The Hausser SS Panzer Corps (3 divisions) and the 48th Panzer Corps (2 Panzer and 1 Motorized Divisions) attacked the remnants of the 3rd Panzer Army and the 40th and 69th Armies. Under the onslaught of the Germans, Soviet troops began on March 7 to retreat to Kharkov. After the defeat of the strike group of the 3rd Panzer Army, the Hausser SS Panzer Corps was aimed at bypassing the city from the west and on March 8 reached the western outskirts.
On March 9, Manstein gave the order to take Kharkov. The Leibstandarte division was to attack the city from the north and northeast, the Reich division from the west. Division "Totenkopf" should cover the sector of the offensive from the Soviet attacks, threatening from the northwest and north. The task was also set to cut the Kharkov-Chuguev road and prevent the arrival of reinforcements.
By order of Hausser, Kharkov was blocked from the west and north by the divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Reich", which began to move with heavy battles to the railway station to dismember the city's defenses. They decided to take the city not by a frontal offensive, but by cutting off the defenders of the city from the possibility of receiving reinforcements from the north and east. In Kharkov, on March 14, three rifle divisions, the 17th NKVD brigade and two separate tank brigades were surrounded.
From March 12, fierce street fighting began in the city, which lasted four days. Soviet soldiers put up stubborn resistance, especially at intersections, meeting the German armored vehicles with anti-tank rifles. Snipers were beating from the rooftops, inflicting heavy casualties on manpower. By the end of the day on March 13, two-thirds of the city was already in the hands of the German troops, mainly the northern quarters, while the resistance of the defenders to the cities did not weaken.
During March 15, fighting in the city was still ongoing, the "Leibstandarte" Division carried out a sweep of the city mainly in its southeastern regions. The SS Totenkopf division broke through to Chuguev on the night of March 14 and, despite active resistance, cleared the city on March 15.
Vatutin ordered to leave Kharkov on March 15, by this time the garrison of the city was dismembered into two separate parts. General Belov, who led the defense of the city, decided to break through to the southeast, between Zmiyev and Chuguev. The breakthrough was carried out on the whole successfully, having escaped from the city and having passed 30 kilometers with battles, the defenders crossed the Seversky Donets and by March 17 joined up with the front forces.
General Hausser, who left the city four weeks ago in spite of Hitler's categorical orders, won this battle for Kharkov in six days and captured it again. This allowed the SS Panzer Corps to turn north and launch an offensive against Belgorod, which there was no one to defend and it fell on March 18. Soviet units were unable to recapture Belgorod with counterattacks, and from March 19 there was a pause on the entire front due to the spring thaw.
As a result of the battles from 4 to 25 March, the troops of the Voronezh Front retreated 100-150 km, which led to the formation of the Kursk salient, where a gigantic battle took place in July 1943. The third attempt to liberate Kharkov also ended tragically, the city remained under the Germans and the defeat of the Soviet troops overshadowed their defeat at Stalingrad. This victory returned the faith of the Wehrmacht troops to their own capabilities, and the Soviet troops now anxiously awaited the upcoming summer campaign, taught by the bitter experience of previous battles on this sector of the front.
