After three unsuccessful attempts to liberate Kharkov, in January and May 1942 and February 1943, following the defeat of the Germans at the Kursk Bulge in August 1943, the Belgorod-Kharkov operation ("Commander Rumyantsev") was carried out, which led to the final liberation of Kharkov. From the Soviet side, the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Vatutin and the Steppe Front under the command of Konev acted. The coordination of the fronts was carried out by Marshal Vasilevsky.
Great importance was attached to this operation. The front forces had three combined arms, two tank and one air armies, two armies were in the headquarters reserve. A high concentration of equipment and artillery was created in the sectors of the fronts designated for a breakthrough, for which artillery, self-propelled guns and tanks were additionally transferred here.
On the German side, the infantry and tank armies, as well as 14 infantry and 4 tank divisions, held the defense. After the start of the operation, the German command urgently transferred reinforcements from the Bryansk front and Mius to the area where it was being conducted, including the Totenkompf, Viking and Reich divisions, well-known here. Field Marshal Manstein commanded the troops of the South Group.
Start of operation
Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" began on August 3 and was initially more than successful. The troops were tasked with encircling and destroying the enemy's Kharkov grouping in order to prevent them from going beyond the Dnieper.
Within five days, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts recaptured significant territories from the enemy. Large groups of the Wehrmacht were destroyed near Borisovka and Tomarovka, and on August 5 Belgorod and Bogodukhov were liberated. The spearhead of the offensive was the 1st and 5th tank armies, which were supposed to create conditions for the encirclement and destruction of the Kharkov group.
Soviet tankers on August 6 completed the liquidation of the enemy in the Tomarovsky cauldron and the 5th Panzer Army moved to Zolochev, which, as a result of a night attack, was captured on August 9. After that, the army was withdrawn to the reserve and subordinated to the commander of the Steppe Front.
The troops continued their further coverage of Kharkov through Bohodukhiv and Akhtyrka. At the same time, units of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts launched offensive operations in the Donbass, advancing towards the Voronezh Front. This did not allow the Germans to transfer reinforcements to Kharkov, and on August 10, the Kharkov-Poltava railway was taken under control.
With the beginning of the Soviet offensive, Field Marshal Manstein, from the experience of previous battles near Kharkov, did not believe in the possibility of the Steppe Front to conduct large-scale operations and took measures to strengthen the defense, but the Wehrmacht troops were retreating. Most of all, he feared an offensive not from the northern direction, but an attack by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front south of Kharkov.
By August 11, the 53rd, 69th and 7th armies of the Steppe Front came close to the outer Kharkov defensive loop, and the 57th Army, having farcised the Seversky Donets, captured Chuguev on August 11 and from the east and southeast came to the approaches to Kharkov. At this time, the troops of the Voronezh Front advanced even further south and southwest, creating the possibility of deep coverage of the German group in the Kharkov region. The German command was also aware of the special importance of the defense of the Kharkov industrial region, and Hitler demanded that Army Group South hold Kharkov under any circumstances.
The command of Army Group South, concentrating three tank divisions south of Bogodukhov, launched a counterstrike in the area of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka on 12 August at the 1st Tank Army and the left flank of the 6th Army, trying to cut off and defeat the 1st Tank Army and seize the railway Kharkov - Poltava. However, the Wehrmacht only managed to push the Soviet units by 3-4 km. The 1st Panzer Army continued to control the Kharkiv-Poltava railway, and on August 13, the 6th Guards Army, developing its offensive, advanced south to 10 km and liberated 16 settlements.
Only on August 14, the enemy's tank divisions managed to press out the formations of the 1st tank and 6th armies weakened in battles and on August 16 again seize the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The 5th Panzer Army was transferred to the threatened direction and the enemy's advance on August 17 was suspended, as a result, the Germans failed to stop the Soviet offensive.
The German command in the current situation begins to realize that it is not possible to hold Kharkov and the Left Bank, and Manstein decides to step-by-step retreat beyond the Dnieper with the containment of Soviet troops on the intermediate defense lines.
The troops of the Steppe Front on August 13, having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, break through the outer defensive loop, located 8-14 km from Kharkov, and by the end of August 17, they engage in battles on the northern outskirts of the city. The troops of the 53rd Army on August 18 began fighting for the forest on the northwestern outskirts of the city and on August 19 they knocked the Germans out of there.
The troops of the Steppe Front had a chance to encircle the Kharkov garrison on August 18, 1943 and disrupt Manstein's plans, but this direction was strengthened by the Germans, units of the Reich tank-grenadier division entered the village of Korotych and, with the support of artillery, stopped the advance of the 28th Infantry Division and 1 th mechanized corps.
The Germans decided to launch a counterattack on the advancing Soviet troops from the west, from the Akhtyrka area in the direction of Bohodukhiv, intending to cut off and defeat the troops of the 27th Army and two tank corps that had moved forward. For these purposes, they formed a grouping of the “Great Germany” motorized division, the “Death's Head” tank division, the 10th motorized division and units of the 7th, 11th and 19th tank divisions.
After a powerful artillery preparation and air raids on the morning of August 18, the Wehrmacht troops struck and, using the numerical superiority in tanks, on the first day managed to advance in the 27th Army's zone in a narrow sector of the front to a depth of 24 km. However, the enemy failed to develop a counterattack. The troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front, consisting of the 38th, 40th and 47th armies, successfully developing the offensive, hung from the north over the Akhtyr group of Germans. By the end of August 20, the 40th and 47th armies approached Akhtyrka from the north and north-west, deeply engulfing the left flank of the advancing Wehrmacht troops, which were delivering a counterstrike. The advance of German tanks was finally stopped and the command of the Wehrmacht gave the order to go over to the defensive.
The situation to the south of Kharkov was also unfavorable for the German command. Having launched an offensive in mid-August, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts broke through the defenses along the Seversky Donets and on Mius and advanced part of their forces south of Kharkov, and with their main forces into the central regions of Donbass.
Capture of Kharkov
On August 18, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front resumed the offensive, covering Kharkov from the south. To strengthen this direction, on August 20, two corps of the 5th Panzer Army were transferred to this area, the third corps remained with Bogodukhov.
Having prepared defensive positions along the Uda River, the Germans began a planned withdrawal of troops from Kharkov in the late evening of August 22, undermining and burning everything that they could not take out. The troops of the Steppe Front broke into a city free from the enemy on August 23, occupying the northern, eastern and central parts of the city. The Germans held the southern and southwestern parts of the city and, having entrenched themselves on the right bank of the Uda River in the area of New Bavaria, Osnova railway station and further up to the airport, put up fierce resistance. The entire city was shot through by German artillery and mortars, and aviation delivered air strikes.
On August 21, the commander of the Steppe Front, Konev, gave the 5th Panzer Army an order to launch an offensive on Korotych-Babai with the aim of encircling the enemy's Kharkov grouping from the south, and then seizing the crossings on the Merefa River. The Soviet troops managed to advance only 1 kilometer and even capture the village, but as a result of the Reich division's counterattack and a fierce tank battle, they were again knocked out and partially surrounded. This German counterstrike was not a means of turning the situation around, the Reich division simply held back the Soviets. troops, making it possible for the Kharkov group to retreat.
By the end of the day on August 23, the commander of the Steppe Front could have stopped the meaningless offensive near Korotych and Pesochin. But he did not do this, because he had already reported to Stalin about the capture of Kharkov and Moscow in the evening saluted the liberation of the city. And when he realized that the Germans were not going to completely leave the city, they fortified themselves on the prepared line along the Uda River, gave the command of the 5th Panzer Army and the 53rd Army to advance on Korotych, Merefa and Buda, in order to still surround the German troops, which had caught on over the southwestern part of Kharkov, and drove the last reserves there.
Fights near Korotych
The Germans were not going to leave this planned defensive line, and in the days following the capture of Kharkov near Korotych fierce tank battles unfolded. In which the Soviet troops faced unusually stubborn resistance from the German tank-grenadier divisions, suffered huge losses and did not fulfill their task.
The enemy organized a deeply echeloned anti-tank defense on the hills around Korotych, powerful anti-tank positions were equipped at all commanding heights, and mobile tank groups, depending on the situation and need, ensured a high density of fire in a specific sector. The Uda River became a serious obstacle for Soviet tankers, its banks were swamped and mined by the Germans, and bridges were destroyed. In addition, the Germans shot through practically the entire river valley from the commanding heights.
Tankers of the 5th Panzer Army began to force the Uda River on August 21, under heavy shelling they themselves had to look for crossings and engage in battle on the move. As a result, 17 T-34 tanks were lost, they exploded on mines and got stuck in a swamp. The rest of the brigade's tanks could not cross the river. An attempt by rifle units to cross without the support of tanks was thwarted by heavy fire from the Germans.
The next day, groups of tanks attempted to break through to the Kharkov-Merefa-Krasnograd highway, but units of a tank-grenadier regiment, consisting of two companies of Panther tanks, advanced towards the Soviet tankmen. An oncoming tank battle took place, as a result of which we suffered serious losses. According to the recollections of German officers, on the first day of fighting in the 5th Panzer Army, more than a hundred tanks were destroyed.
On the morning of August 23, units of the 5th Panzer Army captured the southern outskirts of Korotych, the northern outskirts remained in the hands of the enemy, moreover, it was not possible to cross the railroad bed, since all approaches to it were mined.
The general attack undertaken that day with the participation of more than 50 tanks and infantry, up to a division in number, was repulsed by the Germans and by midnight the Soviet troops were driven out of Korotych. Only 78 T-34 and 25 T-70 tanks remained in the units.
All attempts to take Korotych on August 24 were unsuccessful. The enemy fortified on the southern part of the embankment of the Kharkiv-Poltava railway and brought up an infantry battalion, 20 tanks and anti-tank defense weapons from the SS Viking tank-grenadier division into the settlement.
Three attempts to capture Korotych on 25 August with powerful artillery support were also unsuccessful, T-34 tanks were shot from long distances by German Tigers and Panthers. Every day, the 5th Panzer Army received the task of advancing on Babai and Merefa, but was unable to capture even the Kommuna and Korotych farms.
On the night of August 25-26, the enemy, having suffered significant losses at the stronghold on the Kommuna farm, withdrew his troops from there. The attempts of the 5th Guards Tank Army on August 27 to attack Korotych and Rai-Yelenovka again failed.
In the 5th Panzer Army on August 28, only 50 tanks remained, less than 50% of artillery and 10% of motorized infantry. While Soviet troops unsuccessfully tried to take Korotych, the Germans created a new defensive bridgehead along the Mzha River and on the night of August 29 gave the order to retreat, leaving the rearguard.
On the night of August 28-29, Soviet troops launched an offensive on Rai-Yelenovka, Korotych, Kommunar, Stary Lyubotin, Budy and, without encountering serious resistance, captured them.
At dawn on August 29, German infantry up to a battalion, with the support of tanks, broke into Kharkov and easily advanced almost to the center of the city. To eliminate the breakthrough, tanks and anti-tank artillery were pulled together, which completely destroyed the German group. Then it became obvious that the German "sortie" to Kharkov was a distraction to ensure the retreat of the Germans from its suburbs.
As a result of month-long battles for Kharkov, the Steppe Front failed to encircle and destroy the Kharkov group of Germans, it managed to escape to the prepared intermediate defense line along the Mzha River, the 1st Tank Army lost almost 900 tanks, the 5th Tank Army, storming the heights near the village of Korotych, lost more than 550 tanks, and in the six days after the capture of Kharkov, the Steppe Front lost almost 35,000 people killed and wounded. These are the disappointing results of the fourth attempt to liberate Kharkov.
After the complete expulsion of the Germans from Kharkov, the Soviet command was finally able to hold a rally on August 30 on the occasion of the liberation of the city, although to this day August 23 is considered the official date of the liberation of Kharkov and is celebrated as the day of the city.
Returning to all the vicissitudes of the Kharkov battle, starting with the forced surrender of the city without a fight in October 1941, unsuccessful and tragic attempts to liberate it in January 1942, May 1942 and February 1943, it should be noted that the city has a reputation as a "cursed place of the Red Army." Despite the courage and heroism of its defenders and liberators, due to the incompetent leadership and blunders of the high command, catastrophic losses in people and equipment were suffered here, and the final liberation of the city also did not go without satisfying the ambitions of the command, for which thousands of lives were paid.
