The development and testing of the new Armata tank is being delayed for various reasons. There is no tank in the troops yet, in this regard, some exotic ways are beginning to be proposed to speed up the issue of introducing a tank into the troops. One of these methods is a publication in which, due to possible problems with an uninhabited tank turret, it is proposed to install an inhabited turret of a T-90M tank on the Armata platform or return to a unified turret, which was previously developed according to the already forgotten Burlak theme.
How serious this is and what is behind it is not entirely clear, at least it is proposed to create a new tank on a modular basis using a set of modules of both existing and developing tanks. This issue has already been discussed many times and it is more relevant when creating special-purpose vehicles on the basis of a tank.
Does a tank need modularity? This issue should be considered in several aspects, from the point of view of production, modernization, repair and operation of tanks. In tank production, modularity is important to simplify and reduce the cost of production. When upgrading tanks, modularity allows you to install more advanced modules with minimal modifications. For simplicity and ease of repair, the interchangeability of units and parts of the tank is important. When operating a tank, modularity does not matter. With which modules the tank left the factory assembly line, with such modules it lives until it is decommissioned, while no one replaces the fighting compartments or power plants.
It's another matter when special-purpose vehicles are developed on the basis of a tank: anti-aircraft, missile, flamethrower, repair and evacuation and other purposes. For this, the fighting compartment module is removed and another target module is installed in its place.
Modularity of the T-64, T-72 and T-80 family of tanks
In a tank with a classic layout, two main modules can be distinguished: the fighting compartment (tower, armament, sighting system and automatic loader) and the power plant (engine, engine systems and transmission). The question of the interchangeability of these modules was repeatedly considered at various stages of the development of Soviet tanks, which is typical for the example of the formation and development of the T-64, T-72 and T-80 family of tanks.
This family was created as modifications of one T-64 tank, almost the same interchangeable fighting compartment module was installed on all tanks, on the T-72 it differed only in the automatic loader. There were three variants of the power plant modules with 5TD, V-45 and GTE engines, which were installed in any tank hull with minimal structural modifications.
On this family of tanks, it was forbidden to change the borrowed units and parts without the consent of the holder of the documentation. For example, when I was a young specialist in the design bureau, in 1973, I was instructed to consider a letter from N. Tagil with a request to change one size in the details of the sighting complex of the commander of the T-72 tank. I was then surprised that, despite the fact that the T-72 tank was already mass-produced there, in order to exclude the unification of the borrowed units and parts, the developer of the tank had no right to change something in the design of the unit that was installed on another tank, and this was justified. This approach remained for quite a long time, although three modifications of tanks were already produced in serial production at different factories. Later, this principle was violated. Instead of three modifications of one tank with different power plants, three different tanks with the same tactical and technical characteristics appeared.
The turrets on these tanks were also interchangeable in seats and docking units through a rotating contact device of the same type, through which control signals were transmitted from the turret to the hull and vice versa.
This principle allowed in 1976, at the request of senior management, to remove the turret from one of the T-64B tanks, which were passing the first stage of tests with the Ob and Cobra sighting systems, and mount it on the T-80 hull. So after the second stage of testing, the T-80B tank appeared with the most advanced weapons complex at that time.
On tanks of this family, serious attention was paid not to the possibility of changing these modules during the operation of the tank, but to the possibility of mass and cheap production of tanks and the possibility of quick and cheap repair and modernization of tanks by maintaining the interchangeability of components and assemblies. Then, under the modules, for example, the power plant, we understood the monoblock of all units of the power plant, which can be quickly replaced during the repair of the tank.
Why does the Armata tank need the T-90M turret and Burlak?
Returning to the proposal to install the manned turret of the T-90M tank on the Armata tank platform, one must first of all understand the purpose for which all this is being undertaken, the technical possibilities of such an implementation and the possibility of achieving this goal.
They try not to advertise the reasons for the delay in the adoption of the Armata tank. Surely there are technical problems with certain components and systems of the tank, which have not yet been brought to the required level. There are also conceptual issues of a fundamentally new layout of a tank with an uninhabited turret.
I already had to write that an uninhabited tower is one of the most problematic issues in this tank layout. If the tank's power supply system fails for any reason or the device is damaged, which ensures the transmission of control signals from the crew from the tank hull to the turret, the tank becomes completely unusable, there are no duplicate firing systems in the tank. The tank is a weapon of the battlefield and must ensure high reliability in firing in case of possible system failures, and in this direction it is necessary to continue to search for ways to increase the reliability of the tank when operating in real conditions.
The proposal to put on a new tank a turret from a serial tank looks like something frivolous. Firstly, the Armata tank is fundamentally different, not of the classic layout, and during its creation, as I understand it, no options for "crossing" with the existing generation tanks were envisaged. Of course, any options can be considered and it is possible to implement them, but what this will result in, how much it will cost and whether the required efficiency will be achieved is a big question. Secondly, as I understand it, the main task is to return to the manned tower, but there are other much more effective design solutions for its solution.
When implementing this proposal, a number of purely technical questions arise: how close are the docking assemblies of the Armata tank hull and the T-90M tank turret, what is their shoulder strap diameter and the design of the turret turning mechanism, is the Armata tank hull height sufficient to accommodate the turret mechanisms and autoloader, how compatible are the systems for transmitting control signals from the hull to the turret.
Simply installing such a turret does not solve many problems in the layout of the Armata tank, in this tank the entire crew is housed in an armored capsule in the hull of the tank, and the T-90M two crew members are housed in the turret. Therefore, the body of the tank will have to be rearranged and decided what to do with the capsule, while one of the advantages of the Armata tank will be lost - the placement of the entire crew in a well-protected armored capsule.
The installation of such a tower can lead to a change in the mass of the tank and a shift in the center of mass, and how this will affect the power plant and chassis must be calculated. So far, such a proposal is very crude and in many aspects it is not substantiated by anything. If the problem with an uninhabited turret really arose, then in order to increase the reliability of firing from a tank, it is easier to work out a backup version of the layout with a manned turret, which solves this problem. If this is so, then the designers in this direction are probably already working and it will be much more effective than fussing some palliatives with an incomprehensible result.
An attempt to "cross" tanks of the new and previous generations with a fundamentally different layout will not lead to anything good. This problem was easily solved on the T-64, T-72 and T-80 family of tanks. There, tank turrets were interchangeable and easily installed one instead of the other.
On the new generation of tanks, modularity is, of course, needed from the point of view of creating a family of special-purpose vehicles on this basis. At the same time, the accepted concept of the layout of the tank should not collapse.
Even more exotic is the proposal to put on the Armata platform a turret developed in the 2000s on the Burlak theme as a unified fighting compartment for the modernization of T-72 and T-80 tanks. This search work ended in nothing, only a paper project, and had no further development. The principal difference was a new overweight turret with ammunition and a new automatic loader placed in the rear of the turret, and what new this mythical turret will bring to the Armata is completely incomprehensible.
So the urgent need to install on a new generation tank a turret from a T-90M tank or the "Burlak" developed on the topic is not particularly necessary, it gives little and the goal is very dubious.
Possible prospects for the layout of the tank "Armata"
It should also be borne in mind that the Armata tank has a lot of new things besides the layout. This is a power plant with a fundamentally new engine, a cannon with high muzzle energy, a new generation of active protection, a tank information and control system, a radar system for detecting targets on the battlefield and an all-round visibility system from a tank. All this goes through a cycle of testing and refinement and should not die if the adopted concept of the tank layout turns out to be unusable.
Now the military are thinking about the future of the Armata tank, the wave of euphoria has subsided and the stage has come when it is necessary to carefully weigh everything, conduct tests and, having their results in hand, make a decision on the future fate of this tank, and not look for some palliative decisions that fundamentally do not solve this problem.
The most optimal here is the development of two options for the layout of a new generation tank with an inhabited and uninhabited turret, the production of batches of such tanks, their military tests, including in real combat conditions in one of the hot spots, which are now more than enough. Based on the results of such tests, conclude which layout is the most rational for a new generation tank, and implement it in mass production.
