On March 28, 1963, the Soviet Army adopted a new multiple launch rocket system, which became the most massive in the world.
The fire is conducted by the BM-21 Grad divisional field multiple launch rocket system. Photo from the site
Soviet and then Russian multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have become the same world-famous symbol of the national weapons school, like their predecessors - the legendary Katyusha and Andryushi, they are also BM-13 and BM-30. But unlike the same "Katyusha", the history of the creation of which is well researched and studied, and even actively used for propaganda purposes, the beginning of work on the creation of the first mass post-war MLRS - BM-21 "Grad" - was often passed over in silence.
Whether the secrecy was the reason, or the reluctance to mention where the most famous post-war rocket system of the Soviet Union comes from, it is difficult to say. However, for a long time this did not arouse keen interest, since it was much more interesting to observe the actions and development of domestic MLRS, the first of which was put into service on March 28, 1963. And soon after that, she publicly declared herself, when with her volleys she actually multiplied by zero the units of the Chinese army, fortified on Damansky Island.
Meanwhile, "Grad", it must be admitted, "speaks" with a German accent. And what is especially curious, even the name of this multiple launch rocket system directly echoes the name of the German missile system, which was developed during the Second World War, but did not have time to seriously participate in it. But it helped the Soviet gunsmiths, who took it as a basis, to create a unique combat system that has not left theaters of combat around the world for more than four decades.
Typhoons threaten Librarians
Typhoon was the name of a family of unguided anti-aircraft missiles that German engineers from the Peenemünde missile center, famous for creating the world's first V-2 ballistic missile, began developing in the middle of World War II. The exact date of the start of work is unknown, but it is known when the first prototypes of Typhoons were submitted to the Ministry of Aviation of the Third Reich - at the end of 1944.
Most likely, the development of anti-aircraft unguided missiles in Peenemünde began not earlier than the second half of 1943, after the leadership of Nazi Germany - both political and military - became aware of the avalanche-like increase in the number of medium and heavy bombers in the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition. But most often, researchers cite the beginning of 1944 as a real date for the start of work on anti-aircraft missiles - and this seems to be true. Indeed, taking into account the existing developments in missile weapons, the missile designers from Peenemünde did not need more than six months to create a new type of missile weapons.
The Typhoon unguided anti-aircraft missiles were 100-mm missiles with a liquid (Typhoon-F) or solid-propellant (Typhoon-R) engine, a 700-gram warhead and stabilizers installed in the tail section. It was they, as conceived by the developers, who had to stabilize the missile on the course in order to ensure the flight range and accuracy of the hit. Moreover, the stabilizers had a slight inclination of 1 degree relative to the horizontal plane of the nozzle, which gave the rocket rotation in flight - by analogy with a bullet fired from a rifled weapon. By the way, the guides from which the missiles were launched were also screwed - with the same purpose to give them rotation, ensuring range and accuracy. As a result, "Typhoons" reached a height of 13-15 kilometers and could become a formidable anti-aircraft weapon.
Scheme of the Typhoon unguided anti-aircraft missile. Photo from the site
Options "F" and "P" differed not only in engines, but also externally - in size, weight and even the scope of the stabilizers. For liquid "F" it was 218 mm, for solid-fuel "P" - two millimeters more, 220. The length of the missiles was different, although not too much: 2 meters for "P" versus 1.9 for "F". But the weight differed dramatically: "F" weighed a little more than 20 kg, while "P" - almost 25!
While the engineers at Peenemünde were inventing the Typhoon rocket, their colleagues at the Skoda plant in Pilsen (now Czech Pilsen) were developing the launcher. As a chassis for it, they chose a carriage from the most massive anti-aircraft gun in Germany - 88-mm, the production of which was well-developed and carried out in large quantities. It was equipped with 24 (prototypes) or 30 (adopted for service) guides, and this "package" received the possibility of circular firing at high elevation angles: just what was required for salvo firing unguided anti-aircraft missiles.
Since, despite the novelty of the equipment, in mass production each Typhoon missile, even the more labor-consuming F, did not exceed 25 brands, the order was immediately placed for 1,000 P-type missiles and 5,000 F-type missiles. The next one was already much larger - 50,000, and by May 1945 it was planned to release 1.5 million rockets of this model every month! Which, in principle, was not so much, considering that each Typhoon missile battery consisted of 12 launchers with 30 guides, that is, its total salvo was 360 missiles. According to the plan of the Ministry of Aviation, by September 1945, it was necessary to organize as many as 400 such batteries - and then they would have fired 144 thousand missiles at armadas of British and American bombers in one salvo. So a monthly one and a half million would only be enough for ten such volleys …
"Strizh", which took off from the "Typhoon"
But neither by May, nor even more so by September 1945, no 400 batteries and 144,000 missiles came out in one salvo. The total release of "Typhoons", according to military historians, was only 600 pieces, which went for testing. In any case, there is no exact information about their combat use, and the Allied air command would not have missed an opportunity to take note of the use of new anti-aircraft weapons. However, even without that, both Soviet military specialists and their fellow allies immediately appreciated what an interesting piece of weapons they got into their hands. The exact number of Typhoon missiles of both types, which were at the disposal of the engineers of the Red Army, is unknown, but it can be assumed that these were not isolated copies.
The further fate of missile trophies and developments based on them was determined by the famous decree No. 1017-419 ss of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Questions of jet armament" of May 13, 1946. Work on Typhoons was divided based on the difference in engines. Liquid "Typhoons F" were taken up in the SKB at NII-88 Sergei Korolev - so to speak, according to jurisdiction, because work on all other liquid-propellant missiles, primarily on the "V-2", was also transferred there. And the solid-fuel Typhoon R was to be dealt with by the KB-2 created by the same decree, which was included in the structure of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering (here it is, pervasive secrecy!). It was this design bureau that was to create the domestic version of the Typhoon R - RZS-115 Strizh, which became the prototype of the missile for the future Grad.
The direction "Strizh" in KB-2, which since 1951 merged with the plant number 67 - the former "Workshops of heavy and siege artillery" - and became known as the State Specialized Research Institute-642, was engaged in the future academician, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, the creator of the famous missile systems "Pioneer" and "Topol" Alexander Nadiradze. Under his leadership, the developers of the "Swift" brought the work on this missile to tests that were carried out at the Donguz test site - at that time the only test site where all types of air defense systems were tested. For these tests, the former Typhoon R, and now the Strizh R-115 - the main element of the RZS-115 Voron reactive anti-aircraft system - came out in November 1955 with new characteristics. Its weight has now reached almost 54 kg, its length has grown to 2.9 meters, and the weight of the explosive in the warhead is up to 1.6 kg. The horizontal firing range has also increased - up to 22.7 km, and the firing height - the maximum is now 16.5 km.
Radar station SOZ-30, which was part of the RZS-115 Voron system. Photo from the site
According to the terms of reference, the battery of the Voron system, which consisted of 12 launchers, was supposed to fire up to 1440 missiles in 5-7 seconds. This result was achieved through the use of a new launcher designed at TsNII-58 under the leadership of the legendary artillery designer Vasily Grabin. She was towed and carried 120 (!) Tubular guides, and this package had the ability to fire a circular maximum elevation angle of 88 degrees. Since the missiles were unguided, they were fired in the same way as an anti-aircraft gun: aiming at the target was carried out at the direction of the firing control point with a gun aiming radar.
It is these characteristics that were shown by the RZS-115 "Voron" system in complex field tests, which took place from December 1956 to June 1957. But neither the high power of the salvo, nor the solid weight of the "Strizh" warhead did not compensate for its main drawback - low firing height and uncontrollability. As representatives of the Air Defense Command noted in their conclusion, “due to the low reach of Strizh projectiles in height and range (height 13.8 km with a range of 5 km), the limited capabilities of the system when firing at low-flying targets (less than at an angle of 30 °), as well as insufficient gain in the firing efficiency of the complex in comparison with one or three batteries of 130- and 100-mm anti-aircraft guns with a significantly higher consumption of projectiles, the RZS-115 reactive anti-aircraft system cannot qualitatively improve the armament of the country's anti-aircraft artillery troops. It is inexpedient to adopt the RZS-115 system into the armament of the Soviet army to equip parts of the anti-aircraft artillery troops of the country's air defense system."
Indeed, a missile that would have easily dealt with the Flying Fortresses and Librarians in the mid-1940s, ten years later could do nothing with the new B-52 strategic bombers and the increasingly fast and agile jet fighters. And therefore it remained just an experimental system - but its main component turned into a projectile for the first domestic rocket launcher M-21 "Grad".
From anti-aircraft to ground
The BM-14-16 jet combat vehicle is one of the systems to be replaced by the future Grad. Photo from the site
What is noteworthy: the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 17, in which NII-642 was ordered to prepare a project for the development of an army high-explosive fragmentation projectile based on the R-115, was issued on January 3, 1956. At this time, the field tests of two launchers and 2500 Strizh missiles were just underway, and there was no question of testing the entire Voron complex. Nevertheless, in the military environment, there was a sufficiently experienced and intelligent person who appreciated the possibilities of using a multi-barreled launcher with rockets not against aircraft, but against ground targets. It is very likely that this thought was prompted by the sight of the Swifts launching from one hundred and twenty barrels - for sure it was very reminiscent of the volley of the Katyusha battery.
Reactive system BM-24 in the exercise. Photo from the site
But this was only one of the reasons why it was decided to convert the unguided anti-aircraft missiles into the same unguided rockets to destroy ground targets. Another reason was the clearly insufficient salvo power and firing range of the systems in service with the Soviet Army. Lighter and, accordingly, more multi-barreled BM-14 and BM-24 could fire 16 and 12 rockets at once, respectively, but at a distance of no more than 10 kilometers. The more powerful BMD-20, with its 200-mm feathered shells, fired almost 20 kilometers, but could fire only four missiles in one salvo. And the new tactical calculations unambiguously required a multiple launch rocket system, for which 20 kilometers would be not just maximum, but the most effective, and in which the total salvo power would increase at least twice as compared to the existing ones.
Combat vehicles BMD-20 at the November parade in Moscow. Photo from the site
Based on these inputs, one could assume that for the Strizh missile the declared range is quite achievable even now - but the weight of the explosive of the warhead is clearly insufficient. At the same time, the excess range allowed to increase the power of the warhead, due to which the range should have dropped, but not too much. This was exactly what the designers and engineers of GSNII-642 had to calculate and test in practice. But they were given very little time for this work. In 1957, the leapfrog began with transformations and revisions of the directions of the institute's activities: at first it was merged with OKB-52 of Vladimir Chelomey, calling the new structure NII-642, and a year later, in 1958, after the abolition of this institute, the former GSNII-642 turned into a branch Chelomeevsky OKB, after which Alexander Nadiradze went to work at NII-1 of the Ministry of Defense Industry (the current Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, which bears his name) and concentrated on the creation of ballistic missiles on solid fuel.
And the theme of the army rocket high-explosive fragmentation projectile from the very beginning did not fit into the direction of the newly formed NII-642, and in the end it was transferred for revision to the Tula NII-147. On the one hand, this was not his problem at all: the Tula Institute, created in July 1945, was engaged in research work in the production of artillery shells, developing new materials for them and new manufacturing methods. On the other hand, for the "artillery" institute it was a serious chance to survive and gain a new weight: Nikita Khrushchev, who replaced Joseph Stalin as head of the Soviet Union, was a categorical supporter of the development of rocket weapons to the detriment of everything else, primarily artillery and aviation. And the chief designer of NII-147, Alexander Ganichev, did not restrain himself, having received an order to start a completely new business for him. And he made the right decision: a few years later, the Tula Research Institute turned into the world's largest developer of multiple launch rocket systems.
"Grad" unfolds its wings
But before this happened, the staff of the institute had to make colossal efforts, mastering a completely new field for them - rocket science. Least of all problems were with the manufacture of hulls for future rockets. This technology was not too different from the technology for manufacturing artillery casings, except that the length was different. And NII-147's asset was the development of a deep drawing method, which could also be adapted for the production of thicker and stronger shells, which are the combustion chambers of rocket engines.
It was more difficult with the choice of the engine system for the missile and its very layout. After long research, only four options remained: two - with starting powder engines and sustainer solid-fuel engines of different designs, and two more - with two-chamber solid-fuel engines without starting powder, with rigidly fixed and folding stabilizers.
In the end, the choice was stopped on a rocket with a two-chamber solid-propellant engine and folding stabilizers. The choice of the power plant was clear: the presence of a starting powder engine complicated the system, which was supposed to be simple and cheap to manufacture. And the choice in favor of folding stabilizers was explained by the fact that the awkward stabilizers did not allow more than 12-16 guides to be installed on one launcher. This was determined by the requirements for the dimensions of the launcher for transporting it by rail. But the problem was that the BM-14 and BM-24 had the same number of guides, and the creation of a new MLRS provided for, among other things, an increase in the number of rockets in one salvo.
MLRS BM-21 "Grad" during exercises in the Soviet Army. Photo from the site
As a result, it was decided to abandon rigid stabilizers - despite the fact that at that time the point of view prevailed, according to which the deployable stabilizers must inevitably be less effective due to the gaps between them and the rocket body that arise when the hinges are installed. To convince their opponents of the opposite, the developers had to carry out field tests: at the Nizhny Tagil Prospector, from a converted machine from the M-14 system, they conducted control firing with two versions of rockets - with rigidly mounted and folding stabilizers. The results of the firing did not reveal the advantages of one type or another in terms of accuracy and range, which means that the choice was determined only by the possibility of mounting a larger number of guides on the launcher.
This is how rockets for the future Grad multiple launch rocket system were received - for the first time in Russian history! - Plumage deployed at the start, consisting of four curved blades. When loading, they were kept in a folded state by a special ring that was put on the lower part of the tail compartment. The projectile flew out of the launch tube, having received an initial rotation due to the screw groove inside the guide, along which the pin in the tail slid. And as soon as he was free, the stabilizers opened, which, like that of the Typhoon, had a deviation from the longitudinal axis of the projectile by one degree. Due to this, the projectile received a relatively slow rotating motion - about 140-150 rpm, which provided it with stabilization on the trajectory and accuracy of the hit.
What did Tula get
It is noteworthy that in recent years in the historical literature devoted to the creation of the MLRS "Grad", it is most often said that the NII-147 received an almost ready-made rocket in its hands, which was the R-115 "Strizh". Say, the institute's merit was not great in bringing someone else's development to serial production: all that was needed was to come up with a new method of hot drawing of the case - and that's it!
Meanwhile, there is every reason to believe that the design efforts of the NII-147 specialists were much more significant. Apparently, they received from their predecessors - subordinates of Alexander Nadiradze from GSNII-642 - only their developments, if possible, adapting an unguided anti-aircraft missile for use on ground targets. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why on April 18, 1959, the deputy director of NII-147 for scientific affairs, and he is also the chief designer of the institute, Alexander Ganichev, sent a letter that received outgoing No. GAU) Major General Mikhail Sokolov with a request to give permission to familiarize representatives of NII-147 with the data of the Strizh projectile in connection with the development of a projectile for the Grad system.
General scheme of the BM-21 combat vehicle, ascending into the Grad multiple launch rocket system. Photo from the site
And only this letter would be good! No, there is also an answer to it, which was prepared and sent to the director of NII-147 Leonid Khristoforov by the deputy chief of the 1st main department of ANTK, engineer-colonel Pinchuk. It says that the Artillery Scientific and Technical Committee is sending to Tula a report on tests of the P-115 projectile and drawings for the engine body of this projectile so that these materials can be used in the development of a rocket for the future Grad system. Curiously, both the report and the drawings were given to the Tula for a while: they had to be returned to the 1st Directorate of the ASTK GAU before August 15, 1959.
Apparently, this correspondence was just about finding a solution to the problem, which engine is best to use on a new rocket. So to say that the Strizh, like its progenitor Typhoon R, is an exact copy of the shell for the future Grad is at least unfair to the Tula NII-147. Although, as can be seen from the entire background of the development of the BM-21, traces of the German rocket genius in this combat installation, no doubt, are present.
By the way, it is very noteworthy that the Tula did not turn to anyone, but to Major General Mikhail Sokolov. This man, in May 1941, graduated from the Artillery Academy. Dzerzhinsky, took part in the preparation for the demonstration of the first copies of the legendary "Katyusha" to the leadership of the USSR: as you know, it took place in Sofrino near Moscow on June 17 of the same year. In addition, he was one of those who trained the crews of these combat vehicles and, together with the first commander of the Katyusha battery, Captain Ivan Flerov, taught the soldiers how to use the new equipment. So multiple launch rocket systems were not just a familiar subject for him - one might say that he devoted almost his entire military life to them.
There is another version of how and why the Tula NII-147 received an order from the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology on February 24, 1959 to develop a divisional multiple launch rocket system. According to it, initially the Sverdlovsk SKB-203, formed in 1949 specifically for the development and experimental production of ground-based missile technology, was to be engaged in the creation of a new system using the modified Strizh rocket. Say, when the SKB-203 realized that they could not fulfill the requirement to place 30 guides on the installation, since the clumsy rocket stabilizers interfere, they came up with the idea with a folding tail, which is held by a ring when loading. But since they could not actually bring this modernization of the rocket to serial production in SKB-203, they had to look for a contractor on the side, and by a lucky chance, the chief designer of the bureau, Alexander Yaskin, met at the GRAU with a Tula, Alexander Ganichev, who agreed to take on this work.
BM-21 at the exercises of the National People's Army of the GDR - one of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, where the "Grad" was in service. Photo from the site
This version, which does not have any documentary evidence, looks, to put it mildly, strange, and therefore we will leave it on the conscience of its developers. We only note that in the plan of development work for 1959, approved by the Minister of Defense of the USSR and agreed with the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology, the Moscow NII-24, the future Scientific Research Machine-Building Institute named after Bakhireva, who at that time was the main developer of ammunition. And the most logical thing is that it was decided to shift the development of a rocket at NII-24 onto the shoulders of colleagues from the Tula NII-147, and for the Sverdlovsk SKB-203, and even recently organized, leave their purely professional sphere - the development of a launcher.
Damansky Island - and beyond everywhere
On March 12, 1959, the "Tactical and technical requirements for development work No. 007738" Divisional field rocket system "Grad" were approved, in which the roles of developers were once again distributed: NII-24 - the lead developer, NII-147 - the developer of the engine for the rocket, SKB-203 - launcher developer. On May 30, 1960, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 578-236 was issued, which set the beginning of work on the creation of a serial system "Grad" rather than an experimental one. By this document, SKB-203 was entrusted with the creation of combat and transport vehicles for the Grad MLRS, with NII-6 (today - the Central Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics) - the development of new varieties of RSI-grade gunpowder for a solid propellant charge of the engine, GSKB-47 - the future of NPO "Basalt" - the creation of a warhead for rockets, at the Scientific Research Technological Institute in Balashikha - the development of mechanical fuses. And then the Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense issued tactical and technical requirements for the creation of the "Grad" field reactive system, which was no longer considered as an experimental design topic, but as the creation of a serial weapons system.
After the government decree was issued, a year and a half passed before the first two combat vehicles of the new Grad MLRS, created on the basis of the Ural-375D vehicle, were presented to the military from the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Three months later, on March 1, 1962, the Grad test range began at the Rzhevka artillery range near Leningrad. A year later, on March 28, 1963, the development of the BM-21 ended with the adoption of a decree by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on putting the new Grad multiple launch rocket system into service.
"Grads" of early issues at divisional exercises in the Soviet Army. Photo from the site
Ten months later, on January 29, 1964, a new decree was issued - on the launch of Grad in serial production. And on November 7, 1964, the first serial BM-21 took part in the traditional parade on the occasion of the next anniversary of the October Revolution. Looking at these formidable installations, each of which could fire four dozen rockets, neither Muscovites, nor foreign diplomats and journalists, nor even many military participants in the parade had any idea that in reality none of them was capable of full-fledged combat work because of for the fact that the plant did not have time to receive and install the electric drive of the artillery unit.
Five years later, on March 15, 1969, the Grads accepted their baptism of fire. This happened during the battles for Damansky Island on the Ussuri River, where the Soviet border guards and the military had to repel the attacks of the Chinese army. After neither infantry attack nor tanks managed to drive out the Chinese soldiers from the captured island, it was decided to use a new artillery system. The 13th separate rocket artillery division under the command of Major Mikhail Vashchenko entered the battle, which was part of the artillery of the 135th motorized rifle division, which took part in repelling the Chinese aggression. As expected according to the state of peacetime, the division was armed with combat vehicles BM-21 "Grad" (according to the states of the time of war, their number increased to 18 machines). After the Grads fired a volley at Damansky, the Chinese lost, according to various sources, up to 1000 people in just ten minutes in ten minutes, and the PLA units fled.
Rockets for BM-21 and the launcher itself, which fell into the hands of the Afghan Taliban after the departure of Soviet troops from the country. Photo from the site
After that, "Grad" fought almost continuously - however, mainly outside the territory of the Soviet Union and Russia. The most massive use of these rocket systems should, apparently, be considered their participation in hostilities in Afghanistan as part of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops. On their own land, BM-21s were forced to shoot during both Chechen campaigns, and on foreign soil, perhaps in half of the world's states. Indeed, in addition to the Soviet Army, they were armed with the armies of another fifty states, not counting those that ended up in the hands of illegal armed formations.
To date, the BM-21 Grad, which has won the title of the most massive multiple launch rocket system in the world, is gradually being removed from the armament of the Russian army and navy: as of 2016, only 530 of these combat vehicles are in service (about 2,000 more are on storage). It was replaced by new MLRS - BM-27 "Uragan", BM-30 "Smerch" and 9K51M "Tornado". But it is too early to write off the Grads completely, just as it once turned out to be too early to abandon multiple launch rocket systems as such, which they did in the West and did not want to go to the USSR. And they did not lose.
The BM-21 Grad MLRS, which was adopted by the Soviet Army, is still in service with the Russian Army. Photo from the site
