In 1965, the USSR Navy finalized the requirements for a new class of ships, which were later assigned the MRK (small missile ship) classification. It was originally planned that the new ship will have the dimensions and displacement characteristic of missile boats, but with better seaworthiness. However, the customer's constant demands to change the design, especially regarding the placement of six heavy anti-ship missiles P-120 "Malachite" on the ship, led to a significant increase in displacement, which subsequently reached 670 tons, which ultimately required the introduction of a new class of ships.
Since 1967, the construction of the project 1234 MRK began for the USSR Navy. For their time, these were in many ways unique ships. With a displacement of the western corvette (and a very light one), they carried an unprecedentedly powerful offensive rocket armament, a good for its time air defense system "Osa", a double-barreled artillery mount AK-725 with a caliber of 57 mm.
On the next series of ships, the composition of the weapon was continuously enhanced, a modernized air defense system appeared, instead of a 57-mm artillery mount, a more powerful single-barreled 76-mm AK-176 appeared. Added 30 mm AK-630M for firing at air targets. The ships had electronic warfare equipment and radar and electronic weapons developed for such a small ship.
The second quality was the "cutter" maximum speed - 35 knots. This provided superiority in speed over most surface ships of those years, albeit for a short time.
For its time, it really was a powerful strike weapon in the war at sea, and even now it has a high combat potential.
Small size (and visibility) and high-speed qualities of RTOs allowed them to "work" in the coastal zone, among the islands of various archipelagos, in the fjords of Norway and other similar places, and their only enemy in those years was strike aircraft, which, however, still had to get them. During peacetime combat missions, RTOs were effectively used in the course of "tracking with weapons", hanging on the tail of western warships and naval groups. At the same time, the latter were deprived of the opportunity to break away from such tracking. Their high speed allowed them to participate in raiding operations similar to those carried out in 1971 by the Indian Navy. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the only salvation from the Soviet MRK would be carrier-based attack aircraft. Where they were not, the prospects for US and NATO ships would become very dim. At the same time, RTOs were hardly vulnerable to the submarines of that time - the high speed of these ships in attack and the expectation of the target "on the stop" somewhere under the cover of the coast, in bays, fjords, behind rocks or islets made them a difficult target for submarines of those years. The ships were, among other things, unpretentious to the conditions of basing, their presence could be deployed anywhere where there was a berth and the ability to supply at least fuel from the shore for refueling.
The ships repeatedly went to military service in the Mediterranean Sea and Vietnam, and, in general, the old epithet given to them ("a pistol put to the temple of imperialism") was quite correct.
It was especially true in the case of a theoretical nuclear conflict. The western ships of those years could not repulse the massive attack of the P-120 anti-ship missile system - the newest American cruisers and destroyers had a chance to do this, provided that the salvo was not very dense. In other cases, a small MRK that used anti-ship missiles with a special warhead could inflict very significant losses on the enemy - up to tens of percent of the personnel and ships available in various navies. One.
Such a debut could not fail to impress, and the USSR continued, as they say, “investing” in RTOs. The 1234 series evolved smoothly, along the path of enhancing weapons and REV (from project 1234 to 1234.1), the final of which was the Nakat MRK of project 1234.7, armed with twelve Onyx missiles, built, however, in a single copy.
Also, much more advanced projects were created: 1239 with aerostatic air unloading (a type of air cushion, today two MRKs of this project "Bora" and "Samum" are in service on the Black Sea Fleet) and MRK project 1240 on hydrofoils. These ships had an even greater speed than the "classic" MRKs.
But time changed, and with it the approaches to war at sea should have changed. Already in the 80s, the enemy adapted.
The decline of past opportunities
In the course of endless confrontations with the USSR Navy, the US Navy has worked out the tactics of avoiding tracking.
The Americans have also gained a lot of practical experience in the combat use of the "Standard" missile defense system against surface targets at a short distance. This missile made it possible to inflict a truly instant blow on the pursuer ship, the time from the moment of its launch to hitting the target did not leave the RTOs an opportunity to counterattack. In theory, any missile defense system can do this, but there is a long distance from theory to the method repeatedly worked out in the exercises and missiles with corrected "childhood diseases".
The Americans gained extensive data on the performance characteristics and design of many Soviet missiles, and, as a result, effective jamming systems - they often turned out to be a more reliable means of defense than shipborne air defense systems. Finally, in the second half of the eighties, there was a massive entry into the US Navy's arsenal of BIUS AEGIS, radar with AFAR, and universal UVP Mk.41, which made it impossible to hit the ship by launching several missiles on it.
But most importantly, the very ideology of naval combat has changed. The Iranian operation "Pearl", the Falklands and the battle in Sirte Bay in 1986 showed that in the presence of a real threat, warships would not be "exposed" to attack. Aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles and submarines will deal with the enemy fleet.
In the Persian Gulf, the Iraqi "mosquito fleet" was destroyed not by Iranian corvettes, but by the Phantoms. In the Falklands, not a single ship was sunk by another ship in battle - a nuclear submarine was working on the British side, and on the Argentine aviation. During the battle in the Gulf of Sirte, the Libyan MRK was sunk by an air strike (the fact that domestic sources attribute this attack to the URO cruiser is a mistake, these were deck-based Intruders). In part, the clashes in the Persian Gulf in 1988 (Operation Praying Mantis) stand out from this row, but even here the course of events is more likely to "minus" the concept of a small URO ship - the Americans have shown very well what their ships can do with weaker enemy ships, inferior on electronic weapons. It is unlikely that the RTOs, if they were in Iran, would have shown themselves better.
This, of course, does not mean that RTOs have become completely inapplicable. This means that they have lost their former importance in striking surface ships - no one else was going to expose them under attack in the conditions of even a threatened period.
Moreover, the level of threat for the RTOs themselves has grown - now any patrol aircraft could attack them from a safe distance using anti-ship missiles, and submarines have high-speed telecontrolled torpedoes, with the help of which it would be possible to reach the fastest and most maneuverable surface target, except hydrofoil ships. The appearance of sea-based cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type in the United States and the Pomegranate in the USSR made the idea of a raid meaningless - now there is a technical opportunity to hit any naval base from a distance of more than a thousand kilometers.
By the end of the eighties, RTOs turned into a "niche" weapon, applicable in rare circumstances, mainly in the presence of a foolish person who was exposed to the enemy's blow. They, of course, allowed for traditional weapon tracking. But in a threatened period, the enemy would have withdrawn the surface forces further out to sea. They made it possible to quickly deploy a naval presence anywhere, but the enemy could send submarines there, which the RTOs alone could not cope with. They could protect the landing troops on the transition - but only from surface ships that a normal enemy would not send to intercept, they could support the landing with fire - but badly, the 76-mm cannon is not the best tool for this. Their speed meant little against strike aircraft, and the primitive electronic weapons did not allow them to act against modern large warships of a potential enemy. And so in everything.
In my mind, in the eighties it was necessary to close the topic, clearly realizing that the main efforts in BMZ should be directed at anti-submarine defense, the fight against mines and fire support for the landing, for which completely different ships were needed, but as usual, everything turned out to be not so simple.
New RTOs - a child of accidents
Since 2010, the Zelenodolsk shipyard began construction of a series of MRKs of project 21361 "Buyan-M". Although these ships were assigned to the same class as the "Gadflies" and "Sea Lions", in fact they were the product of a completely different concept. In these ships, the Navy "crossed a snake and a hedgehog" - perched on a non-seaworthy small artillery ship also a UKSK under eight "Caliber" cruise missiles.
It's funny, but the hybrid turned out to be quite functional. He could solve the tasks that the small artillery ship solved. It could pass from the Caspian to the Black Sea and back (but not to the Baltic - the height does not allow passing under the Alexander Bridge). And he allowed Russia to bypass the restrictions to which it signed into the INF Treaty.
This is not to say that such a decision was rational. The imported power plant made the ship disproportionately expensive in comparison with its combat potential. The lack of significant air defense systems and the complete lack of the ability to defend against submarines or torpedoes made the ship almost inapplicable in a "big" war, except for the tasks of launching a missile defense system from a safe distance. In fact, for the cost of two such ships, one could get a much more powerful ship, capable of fighting submarines, carrying cruise missiles, and interacting with a helicopter, if someone did it. Or it would be possible to get the corvette 20380, which also has incomparable combat potential, except for strikes on the coast, where the superiority was for 21361. And, the ship turned out to be non-seaworthy. The inter-base transition from the Black Sea to the Baltic for the ships turned out to be a very difficult test - and this despite the fact that there was no excitement of more than four points during the transition.
Then the "reactive effect" turned on - our RTOs are not seaworthy (and who ordered them to be seaworthy)? Does he have an imported power plant? Weak air defense? Is it expensive? We are doing a new project, seaworthy, with a domestic power plant, with enhanced air defense and cheaper.
This is how the project 22800 "Karakurt" was born. The ship, which is much closer to the "classic" MRK, than 21361. I must say that exactly how the MRK "Karakurt" was a success. It is truly fast and seaworthy, and like its predecessors, it has powerful offensive missile weapons. After the ZRAK "Pantsir" will be placed on the ships, it will also be able, at the very least, to repulse air attacks and missile strikes, albeit inflicted by small forces.
Like 21361, "Karakurt" can carry out the tasks of striking the coast with long-range cruise missiles. Everything seems to be great, but again the question is in the concept - the three "Karakurt" will easily sink the "Tikonderoga", but who will put the "Tikonderoga" under their blow? The answer is nobody. And what if they run into an enemy submarine? Speed will not save them, torpedoes are faster, ships devoid of hydroacoustic means cannot take measures to evade torpedoes. Namely, enemy submarines will be the first in our near sea zone. The MRK group will not be able to repulse a massive strike of large aviation forces. Namely, aviation will be the next threat after submarines.
So it turns out that anti-submarine ships, and ships capable of protecting them from an air strike, should also be attached to the RTOs, otherwise the RTOs themselves will become victims of the enemy. And this is what is called completely different money.
And all this is superimposed on problems with obtaining engines, which, it seems, will not be solved in the manner provided for by the project. We should expect the appearance of gas turbine afterburners in Karakurt.
Finally, the last nail in the coffin of the concept of the MRK-"Caliber carrier". The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty allows Russia to simply deploy long-range cruise missiles on an automobile chassis. Taking into account the small dimensions of the cruise missile, this does not necessarily have to be the expensive MZKT chassis, which is standard for the Iskander OTRK. It may be a banal KAMAZ. In such conditions, the construction of RTOs of existing projects finally loses all meaning.
Let's summarize
RTOs are a product of another era, in which naval warfare was fought by methods other than now. Despite the fact that such ships can be successfully used even now (for example, as part of a naval strike group, conducting quick attacks with an exit from the air defense and anti-aircraft defense zone of the order and returning back), both for naval combat and for strikes using winged missiles, it is no longer necessary to have such a class of ships in service. Any required function that RTOs can usefully perform now can be assigned to other, more versatile ships.
Any function that only RTOs can perform is not particularly in demand at the moment, mainly due to the fact that the enemy will not conduct offensive combat operations with surface ships. It will use submarines and aircraft as the main striking force, and carefully protect valuable URO ships from any attack, mainly by deploying them in relatively safe areas of the world's oceans, in the distant sea and ocean zones - precisely to prevent us from attacking them with our existing means. Including RTOs. The range of sea-based cruise missiles carried by URO ships allows them to be used in this way.
There is an argument “for MRK” in the form of a reference to the battle of MRK “Mirage” during the war with Georgia in August 2008. But let's understand that a suicidal attack by Georgian boats would have been repelled in the same way by the corvette 20380, the frigate of Project 11356, and indeed by almost any surface ship with a well-trained crew, except, perhaps, the patrol ships 22160 in the standard configuration (without modular missile weapons) … Well, it turned out that there was an RTO as a "light force". And let us also understand that the very fact that Georgian boats went to sea became possible only thanks to the complete fiasco of the domestic military aviation in that war, including the naval one, which should have been involved in ensuring the passage of ships to the coast of Abkhazia. In the correct version, they simply should not have been allowed to approach our ships at the distance of a rocket salvo.
An era awaits us when incompatible things will be required from the fleet - to increase combat power without a proportional increase in costs. This requires not to scatter scarce financial resources on highly specialized ships, built in essence for one task - an attack by surface ships, which is unlikely to stand up in a war with a serious adversary. Cruise missiles can also be launched from other carriers - from frigates to cars.
In addition, a demographic failure awaits us, which will inevitably affect the replenishment of the naval personnel, since the percentage of people in society who have personal data that allow them to become ship commanders is finite. Fewer people means fewer potential commanders, this is coming soon, and this is another reason not to be scattered.
What ships do we need in the near sea zone? This is a very complex issue that requires a separate analysis, for now we will restrict ourselves to the fact that these should be ships with excellent anti-submarine capabilities, with at least satisfactory air defense, with a cannon capable of using guided projectiles against air targets, and supporting the landing of troops with fire. Ships capable of interacting in one way or another with anti-submarine helicopters (to have a runway and fuel reserves, ASP and RGAB for them, perhaps a plus to all this, the hangar, no matter whether it is full-fledged, like on 20380 or movable). The tasks that will confront us in the BMZ will require just such ships, and not MRKs. This does not mean that these future ships should not have anti-ship missiles, these are just priorities.
What to do with the already built RTOs? Naturally, to leave them in service, moreover, they need to be modernized. If you remember by what rules did the Americans build up their naval power under Reagan?, it is clear that there can be no question of writing off new and at least relatively combat-ready ships. We need a lot of warships, at least some. Any warship increases the tension of the enemy's naval forces, forcing it to waste energy, time and money. Yes, RTOs are conceptually outdated, yes, we no longer need to build ships of this class, but those that exist can still be used effectively.
First, it is necessary to upgrade the weapons on the old men of Project 1234, and on the Sivuchi too. It is necessary to replace the existing launchers with inclined launchers, from which it is possible to launch missiles of the "Caliber" family. Firstly, if it does come to the use of such ships against enemy surface ships, then "Caliber" - one of the most useful options. Secondly, in the correct version, it is necessary to ensure the use of SLCMs from all MRKs for strikes against ground targets. Of course, it is also possible from a car, but the ship has a mobility factor, it allows you to push the launch line very far from the borders of Russia. In a “big” war, this will not play a big role, but in a local conflict somewhere in North Africa, the solution will be quite “appropriate”. There, in the absence of the Russian Federation not only aircraft carriers, but also DMZ warships in significant numbers, even the anti-ship capabilities of MRKs will be in demand. As well as the very fact of having at least some ships.
Is it possible to install such inclined rails on such ships? The installation of 12 TPKs for the Onyx anti-ship missile system, which is larger than the Caliber, at the Nakat MRK of project 1234.7, says that yes, quite, and in large quantities. There are also projects for such modernization.
The second direction of modernization should be the equipping of all existing RTOs with anti-torpedo protection based on the M-15 anti-torpedo, which is now part of the “Packet-NK” complex ammunition. It is necessary that each MRK be equipped with a small-sized GAS capable of detecting torpedoes coming to the ship, and be able to launch anti-torpedoes on a torpedo, even from rechargeable TA, even from a TPK, at least somehow. And the more ammunition of the first stage anti-torpedoes, the better. Naturally, ships must also be equipped with hydroacoustic countermeasures. This will not give them the opportunity to hunt submarines, but this is not required.
Air defense and electronic warfare systems need to be updated, and guided projectiles for firing at air targets must be introduced into the cannon ammunition.
The variant of modernization of RTOs proposed now, associated with the installation on them of a large number of missiles of the "Uranus" complex, is not entirely successful. On the one hand, the rocket proposed for installation as part of such an upgrade is very good and costs less than other options. On the other hand, such modernization limits the functionality of the RTOs to strikes against surface targets and, when a variant of a missile designed to strike against ground targets enters the Navy's arsenal, targets near the coastline. Such modernization makes sense only in the Baltic, where battles between "mosquito fleets" are very likely, as well as battles between surface ships and ground-based missile systems. On the rest of the theater, "Caliber" is preferable.
The modernized RTOs will have to "pull" until the Navy is completely re-equipped with ships of new types, so as not to reduce the number of combat personnel. But it is no longer necessary to build new ones.
The last question is the ships already under construction. All of them also need to be upgraded. Those ships that have already been laid down, and whose hulls are at least 20% formed, must be completed. Even with a power plant based on the M-70 GTE. But those contracts for which no new ships have yet been laid down, or where it is a question of a just welded mortgage section, must be canceled. For the Navy and Defense Ministry it is more profitable to pay a forfeit than to scatter resources on ships invented for a bygone era.
Slowly (taking into account the need to maintain the maximum number of warships in the Navy), but surely, this class of ships should go down in history.
