It is unlikely that anyone would argue that the current situation in interethnic relations in the North Caucasus is complicated, perhaps more than ever before. However, few will remember that the origins of countless border disputes, violent conflicts between republics and individual ethnic groups go deep into history. Among the main reasons for the monstrous tension of the notorious Caucasian knot is the deportation of many North Caucasian peoples in the mid-1940s.
Despite the fact that already in the second half of the 1950s, there was a massive return of the repressed Caucasian peoples to their homes, the consequences of those deportations continue to affect all spheres of their lives and their neighbors from among those who were not affected by the deportations. And we are talking not only about direct human losses, but also about moods, about the so-called social consciousness of both the repatriated themselves and their descendants.
All this continues to play a crucial role in the formation of nationalist and even openly Russophobic aspirations in the Caucasus. And, unfortunately, they continue to cover not only the local community, but also the power structures of the local regions - regardless of their status, size and ethnic composition of the population.
However, the then Soviet leadership was outraged not only and not so much by the undisguised anti-Sovietism of the overwhelming part of the Chechens, Ingush, Nogays, Kalmyks, Karachais and Balkars. It could somehow come to terms with this, but almost everyone had to answer for direct cooperation with the Nazi occupiers. It was the active work for the good of the Reich that became the main reason for the then deportations.
Today, few people understand that in the 1940s the fact that deportations, as a rule, were accompanied by a redistribution of administrative borders in the region, could not embarrass anyone by definition. The settling in the "deported" regions of mainly the Russian population (local and from other regions of the RSFSR) and partially of other neighboring ethnic groups was also considered the norm. Thus, they have always tried to dilute the "anti-Russian" contingent, and at the same time significantly increase the share of the population loyal to Moscow.
Subsequently, with the return of thousands of deported local residents, numerous interethnic conflicts took place on this basis, which, as a rule, had to be suppressed by force, about which - a little below. In a broader context, the beginning of a long-term process of forming among the “returnees” themselves, and after them and among their entire environment, an attitude towards the USSR and Russia as the conductors of “Russian imperial colonialism”, only slightly camouflaged under international politics, was actually laid.
It is characteristic that the very formula "Russian imperial colonialism" in the 70s of the last century was pulled literally out of historical oblivion by the head of the Chechen-Ingush editorial office of Radio "Liberty" Sozerko (Sysorko) Malsagov. This native of the Terek region is a man of truly amazing destiny. He managed to fight for the Whites in the Civil War, and in the Polish cavalry already in World War II, managed to escape from Solovki, and in the underground in France he bore the characteristic nickname Kazbek. He may well be called one of the main fighters for the rights of repressed peoples.
From the point of view of Malsagov, the assessment of the consequences of the deportation policy is surprisingly correlated with the current and still existing International Committee for the conduct of the process against the policy of genocide. The committee members, who were created together by the CIA and the intelligence of the Federal Republic of Germany, did not hesitate to voice their position just at the time when there was a thaw in the USSR, and the return process was basically completed:
“For many peoples of the North Caucasus, deportations are an unhealed wound that does not have a statute of limitations. Moreover, the return of these peoples to their historical centers of habitation was not accompanied by compensation for the colossal deportation damage. Most likely, the Soviet leadership will continue to increase social and economic support for the restored national autonomies in order to somehow smooth out the criminal actions of the deportation period. But the national-historical consciousness of the affected peoples will not forget what happened, the only guarantee against a repetition of which is their independence”(1).
The problem of moods and sympathies for the Caucasus has never been easy. However, in terms of the prevailing sympathies among the North Caucasian peoples towards the Nazi occupiers, a certificate from the KGB of the USSR sent to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in February 1956 is very characteristic. Here is just a short excerpt from it:
“… about half of the adult population of Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachais, Nogays and Kalmyks sympathized with the arrival of the invaders. Including more than half of the Red Army deserters of those nationalities who remained in the region. Most of the deserters and a little more than a third of the adult male population representing the same nationalities joined the military, security units and administrative bodies formed by the invaders in the North Caucasus."
Also the help stated that
However, one cannot but admit that long before the deportations, the same Chechens and Ingush were literally pushed into anti-Sovietism by the ambitious, but absolutely naive in national politics, appointees from Moscow - the leaders of the regions. They did this, having carried out, among other things, the notorious collectivization belatedly, but at the same time so hastily and rudely that sometimes in the auls there was simply no one to head the collective farms.
At the same time, the rights of believers were almost universally infringed upon, who were sometimes repressed even for the fact that they allowed themselves to take off their shoes somewhere at the wrong time. It could not help but incite against the Soviet power and the planting of party committees everywhere, as if deliberately consisting of party workers sent by Moscow, who are not the titular nationalities for this or that region.
Is it any wonder that only on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the one and a half pre-war decades, from 1927 to 1941, 12 major armed uprisings took place. According to the most conservative estimates of the competent authorities, over 18 thousand people took part in them. There were just hundreds of minor skirmishes and shootings, literally everyone was shooting everywhere, wherever it was possible to find weapons. Add to this, for a more complete assessment of those very "sentiments and sympathies", the frequent facts of economic sabotage, the concealment of foreign intelligence agents, the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets and literature.
When the war came to the Caucasus, already in January 1942 in Checheno-Ingushetia, under the auspices of the Abwehr and his Turkish colleagues (MITT), the anti-Soviet Party of the Caucasian Brothers was created. It brought together representatives of 11 peoples of the region, with the notorious exception of Russians and Russian-speaking. The political declaration of this "party" proclaimed "the achievement of national independence, the fight against Bolshevik barbarism, atheism and Russian despotism." In June 1942, this group was renamed with the participation of the German occupation authorities into the "National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers". Apparently, there was no longer any need to hide or somehow camouflage the direct connection with the NSDAP.
Another large anti-Soviet group on the territory of Chechen-Ingushetia was the "Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Organization" created by the Abwehr in November 1941. Under the leadership of Mayrbek Sheripov, the former director of the Lespromsovet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and the first deputy head of the Planning Commission of the republic. Of course, before that - a member of the CPSU (b).
Revealing and repressions against Soviet cadres, intelligence officers and underground workers, demonstrative actions of "intimidation", unbridled xenophobia, and especially Russophobia, compulsion to "voluntary" collection of valuables for German troops, etc. - business cards of the activities of both groups. In the spring of 1943, it was planned to unite them into a regional "Gorsko-Chechen administration" under the control of the intelligence services of Germany and Turkey. However, the historic victory at Stalingrad soon led to the defeat of the invaders in the North Caucasus as well.
It is characteristic that throughout the entire period of the partial occupation of the Caucasus, as indeed after that, Berlin and Ankara (although Turkey did not enter the war) extremely actively competed for decisive influence in any puppet, but primarily in Muslim or pro-Muslim groups both in the North Caucasus and in the Crimea. They even tried to influence the national autonomies of the Volga region, although in reality they only reached out to Kalmykia, as you know, Buddhist.
One way or another, but the aforementioned events and facts led to the decision of Moscow to deport the Chechens and Ingush as part of the operation "Lentil" on February 23-25, 1944. Although, taking into account the well-known ethno-confessional and psychological specifics of the Chechens and Ingush, it would be more expedient to thoroughly investigate the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the war period. Moreover, keeping in mind the creation of an anti-Russian underground in Chechnya immediately after the partial resettlement of the followers of Imam Shamil to other regions of Russia (in 1858-1862). But the Kremlin then preferred a "global" approach …
During the operation, about 650 thousand Chechens and Ingush were evicted. During the eviction, transportation of the deported - 177 trains of freight cars - and in the first years after it (1944-1946), about 100 thousand Chechens and almost 23 thousand Ingush were killed - every fourth of both peoples. Over 80 thousand servicemen took part in this operation.
Instead of the dual Chechen-Ingush autonomy, the Grozny region was created (1944-1956) with the inclusion in it of a number of regions of the former Kalmykia and several regions of Northern Dagestan, which ensured a direct access of this region to the Caspian Sea. A number of areas of the former Chechen-Ingushetia were then transferred to Dagestan and North Ossetia. And, although most of them later, in 1957-1961, were returned to the restored Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, other areas remaining in Dagestan (Aukhovsky) and North Ossetia (Prigorodny) are still in conflict. The first is between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, the second is between Chechnya and Dagestan.
At the same time, the Russian and Russian-speaking national element was massively "introduced" into the Grozny region. This almost immediately led to a whole series of interethnic clashes, most of the conflicts happened already in the late 50s. Meanwhile, the post-Stalinist leadership of the country and the completely renewed local authorities for some reason believed that it was quite possible to moderate the political and psychological consequences of deportation through the so-called sequestration. Sequestration of the rights and opportunities of local peoples, as well as by increasing the very number of Russians and Russian-speaking in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
As a result, tensions only grew, and already at the end of August 1958, military suppression of mass demonstrations was required in Grozny. However, it was not the actions of the Ingush or Chechens that were suppressed. It was decided to harshly suppress the demonstrators of Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity, who dared to protest against their socio-economic and housing discrimination in comparison with the returning and returning Chechens and Ingush.
Hundreds of demonstrators, blocking the building of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee of the CPSU, demanded that the party officials come out to them and explain from them the policy in this region. But in vain: after several warnings, the troops were ordered to shoot to kill, and the "suppression" took place. More than 50 people died and went missing because of the use of military force in Grozny.
But the reason for the Russian demonstration was, as they say, literally on the surface. After all, in connection with the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, Chechens and Ingushs began to be registered in town apartments and rural houses of Russians and Ukrainians in the region for no reason other than the very fact of their “return”. In addition, the latter were suddenly dismissed from their jobs and employed on worse conditions, including in other regions of the USSR, and in return, they were given vacated jobs to Chechens and Ingush.
Excesses of the same direction in Chechen-Ingushetia, albeit with a lesser degree of confrontation, when there were no troops, also occurred in 1963, 1973 and 1983. The workers and engineers of Russian nationality, of whom there were the majority here, demanded equal pay for their labor with the Chechens and Ingush and the same living conditions with them. The requirements had to be satisfied at least partially.
Note:
1. "Free Caucasus" // Munich-London. 1961. No. 7.
