In Germany, many wanted to know if the new Polish kingdom would become a reliable ally. Only two comrades-in-arms, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von Ludendorff, who did not care who they put under arms, did not have any doubts about this.
But the press expressed its doubts with might and main. So, on November 8, 1916, even the "Kölnische Zeitung", which was actually considered reading for housewives, with undisguised pathos assured that the Germans were alien to the desire to Germanize Poland … But at the same time, the author of the editorial stated that
“… We need confidence that the Poles will not act against us together with the Russians, who still enjoy great sympathy in the country, and that the army that will be created with our help will not go against us.
… Poles don't like Germans. In Warsaw, they by no means welcomed us with open arms, for they imagined their liberation in a different form (1).
In the Prussian Landtag these days a very characteristic confession was heard: "The Poznan Poles did not even observe benevolent neutrality - they refused to open the Hindenburg Museum and ignored the war loan." And finally, on December 3, the Prussian officialdom "Berliner Lokal Anzeiger" admitted:
"The Polish faction of the Reichstag has not yet determined its official attitude to the" proclamation of the Polish kingdom. "Representatives of the faction did not participate in the debate, in secret meetings of the budget commission. The Poles will determine their attitude to the manifesto after an open meeting of the Landtag.
… In any case, the faction does not expect anything from the act that could satisfy the interests of the Prussian Poles (2).
The contradictions between Berlin and Vienna on the Polish question became known very quickly on the other side of the front. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency (PTA) already reported from Stockholm on November 5 (18):
"Germany's open statement about the inclusion of the Polish army in the German troops caused great discontent in Austria-Hungary and in Austrian Poland, as it showed Germany's desire to reign supreme in Poland."
The cruel censorship of newspapers and the few radio stations of the Central Powers could not completely veil tensions on the Polish issue - it was completely impossible to silence Polish deputies in their parliaments. Urgent clarifications were required not only in the Austrian, but also in the German press. On November 4 (17), the central and largest local newspapers, not only in Prussia, but also in other lands of the German Empire, wrote:
The new army, although it will be formed by Germany, but also with the participation of Austrian officers. The Polish legions, which will form the basis of the new army, were part of the Austro-Hungarian forces, and now they are placed at the disposal of the new Polish army by the Austrian emperor.
The latter will not be a German, not an Austro-Hungarian, but a national Polish army. All positions in the command staff are provided for replacement by Polish officers. However, due to the insufficient number of such officers, at first these positions will also be occupied by Austro-Hungarian and German officers. In the meantime, the Polish army will be attached to the German army, but not included in it, in order to provide the Polish organizations with the character of regular troops in the international legal sense.
The position of both governors general, Warsaw and Lublin, in relation to the supreme command of the army and administration is not affected by the formation of the Polish state (3).
At this time, Romania was utterly defeated by the troops of General Mackensen, and the Russian army, saving the hapless ally, had to lengthen the front by another four hundred kilometers. However, the allies, meanwhile, are beginning to win in the Balkans - the Serbs, together with the Russians, took one of the largest cities in Macedonia - the Monastery (modern Bitola). The Italian front, after heavy defeats in the Alps, also managed to restore stability.
Franz Joseph died soon after, and the Central Powers decided to seize the right moment to come up with large-scale peace initiatives and thereby at least temporarily delay the entry of the United States into the war, it seems already inevitable. But these proposals were rejected by the Allies without the slightest delay, but everyone immediately forgot about the Polish question.
It seemed, from the point of view of the military command of the Central Powers, that all obstacles to the "Polish conscription" into the German and Austrian armies had been removed. But all the same, he passed in the former Kingdom with monstrous complications. It was only possible to dream about the 800 thousand who got up under arms, even the 500 thousand whom the Russians managed to call up until they surrendered Poland, it was not possible to mobilize, although the conscripts born in 1895 and 1896 had already grown up.
Even General Ludendorff recognized the difficulties, who until recently with enviable persistence demanded reinforcements from the Kaiser, not at all disdaining Polish ones. Because of this, with the light hand of reporters, the general was considered almost the author of the "Polish Project", but in his memoirs he denies this role. According to him, “by its attitude to the formation of the army, Poland has clearly shown that it is striving only for political speculation in the war” (4).
In Poland itself, among the press, only "Kurjer Novy" assessed the two emperors' manifesto positively, noting that "the false maximalism that is inflated with the aim of belittling and destroying the real booty now created by the state of affairs should not be encouraged."
The harsh comments of the Russian press were not long in coming. Thus, the Cadet "Rech" was inclined to the opinion that "it would be more correct to regard the manifesto of the two emperors as a provocation, striving, along with strengthening the ranks of the armies with a new recruitment, to throw also the seed of analysis.
… "Kurjer Novy" thinks to save its point of view by turning a blind eye to the connection of the German promises with the new military set."
Polish Germanophiles, led by Svintsytsky, insisted on the annexation of Galicia to the newly created kingdom. At the same time, the Austrian Archduke Karl Stefan, who was very popular in Krakow, where he lived for a long time, and who was also successfully married to a representative of the Czartoryski family, was called a candidate for the new Polish throne.
"Kurjer Poznanski" admitted that the Poznan endeavor demonstratively ignored the "Manifesto", at the same time expressing resentment over the granting of autonomy to Galicia, and Poznan only promises of a "new orientation" after the war.
Despite the fact that the manifesto of the two emperors was immediately called "an impudent challenge," Russia was in no hurry to answer, confining itself to the usual references to the grand-ducal "Appeal-1914" and the statement of Prime Minister Goremykin. It seems that after the Central Powers made very frank hints about the possibility of a separate peace with Russia specifically, all warnings from intelligence and diplomats were simply not taken into account. But Brusilov, whose troops still had some way out to the Poles, called for giving them at least no less than what the Austrians and Germans offered (5).
And yet, it was impossible to remain silent, especially in light of the rather complicated relations with the allies, and taking into account the increasingly active claims of a number of representatives of the highest circles of Russia for mastering the straits. According to the custom of that time, Duma members were especially active in their speeches.
So, Vasily Shulgin at a meeting on October 25 (November 7) 1916 noted:
If we have data that clearly show that the Polish people accepted the Polish kingdom from the hands of Austria and Germany willingly and without protest, if the Poles give them the required army without protest, then of course, in this case they will not even have the right to count on autonomy. With the new kingdom will have to act in accordance with the rules of war.
If the allies, and in particular Russia, will have in their hands equally solid data that the Poles have submitted only to violence, then, of course, the Poles have the right to insist on the implementation of the appeal of the Grand Duke. We cannot demand from the Poles living in occupied Poland a vivid expression of their anti-German feelings, but the Poles living outside Poland can loudly protest against this violence of the conscience of their people.
And the Poles inside Poland itself can find means to emphasize their attitude to the independence imposed on them. They can delay the elections to the Sejm, demand the postponement of recruitment until the construction of the Polish state, that is, demand that this recruitment be made after the convocation of the Sejm, the election of the king and the appointment of the government.
… The most sad thing for the Poles would be if they escaped with silence."
A week later (November 1/14), the chairman of the extreme right faction S. V. Levashov found it necessary to remind that the monarchist parties consider
“the mistaken view that the Russian government should have prevented the act of our enemies by issuing its own act, resolving the Polish question.
The idea that Russian citizens, the Poles, in order to fulfill their duty to their homeland, need some preliminary, firmly fixed promises by the Russian government, is insulting, in our opinion, for all Poles."
It became clear that the time had come for someone to speak on behalf of the government. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs A. D. Protopopov, speaking at six o'clock in the evening in the State Council on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers, said that he, “as before and now, stands on the exact meaning of the Appeal of the Supreme Commander and the statement made in 1915 by Prime Minister I. L. Goremykin, stands all the more firmly because the blood of both peoples is shed on the same field of honor and for one sacred deed to achieve the integrity of the Russian state, which has been encroached on by a cruel enemy who does not know the slightest freedom and no justice."
When it came to talking about the Poles in the northwestern regions, some suggested taking an extremely tough position: "The military authorities can apply the same measures to them that were applied to the German colonists." Finally, the first direct indications of what the authorities of the Russian Empire were going to do with respect to Poland appeared in a government message in connection with the "appeal of two emperors" dated November 2/15, 1916:
“The German and Austro-Hungarian governments, taking advantage of the temporary occupation of a part of Russian territory by their troops, proclaimed the separation of the Polish regions from the Russian Empire and the formation of an independent state from them. At the same time, our enemies have the obvious goal of recruiting in Russian Poland to replenish their armies.
The imperial government sees in this act of Germany and Austria-Hungary a new gross violation by our enemies of the basic principles of international law, which prohibit forcing the population of regions temporarily occupied by military force to raise arms against their own fatherland. It recognizes the said act as invalid.
On the essence of the Polish question, Russia has already twice said its word since the beginning of the war. Her intentions include the formation of an integral Poland from all Polish lands with the granting of it, at the end of the war, the right to freely build its national, cultural and economic life on the basis of autonomy, under the sovereign scepter of the Russian sovereigns and while maintaining a single statehood.
This decision of our august sovereign remains adamant (6).
So, Poland was once again actually guaranteed autonomy, albeit limited. But already in the order for the army and navy of December 12, 1916 No.signed by Emperor Nicholas II, it was quite unambiguously stated that among the tasks of Russia brought about by the war was "the creation of a free Poland from all three of its now scattered regions" (7). After that, everyone was waiting for the continuation - a more weighty and more concrete "royal word". They did not wait - Rasputin was killed in St. Petersburg, after which the sovereign again became "not up to the Poles."
In the meantime, in secrecy, albeit at the suggestion of the Russians, France began to form Polish national military units - its version of the "Polish legions". Subsequently, as part of the allied armed forces, they fought much more conscientiously than in the Russian imperial army, and in the armies of the other two emperors too. But about them - in the following publications.
Notes (edit)
1. "Kölnische Zeitung", 8 November 1916.
2. Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 3 December 1916.
3. Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 17 November 1916; Vorwärts, 18 November 1916; Vossische Zeitung, 18 November 1916.
4. E. Ludendorff. My memories of the war 1914-1918 M. 1924, vol. 2, p. 57.
5. From a secret letter from the commander-in-chief of the armies of the southwestern front A. A. Brusilov addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M. V. Alekseeva dated June 16, 1916, Russian-Polish relations during the World War, Moscow, 1926, p. 113.
6. Yu. Klyuchnikov and A. Sabanin. International politics of modern times in treaties, notes and declarations, M. 1926, part II, p. 5.
7. RGIA, F.1276, Op.10. D.73, L.1 ob.
