FROM THE AUTHOR
My entire working life in peacetime (from 1953 to 1990) was associated with Soviet tank building. At this time, both in our country (in the Warsaw Pact countries) and in our potential adversaries (in the NATO countries), tanks occupied one of the main places in the weapons system of both military blocs.
As a result, the development of tank building in the world went rapidly, almost like during the war. Naturally, in this arms race, each side had its own achievements, and its own miscalculations, and blunders.
The monograph "Tanks (tactics, technology, economics)" * provides some analysis of the state of affairs in the Soviet post-war tank building. This brief analysis alone made it possible to conclude that there were two serious omissions in the domestic tank building industry.
The first is neglect of the economy.
The second is the underestimation of the human factor in the "man - weapon" system.
The monograph provides some specific examples confirming these conclusions. But during my work, I have accumulated materials that allow us to consider individual issues of tank building both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. In life, all these materials were scattered. They were in various articles, reports, reports, both domestic and foreign. Moreover, the sources of the materials were completely different, but they also came to me at different times (sometimes with an interval of several years). So, without further ado, I have been keeping my notes since 1967.
Many of the materials in these records have not lost their relevance today. As a result, the idea was born to try to systematize the available data and publish them in the form of a monograph as a reference material, as "information for thought."
At the same time, one should pay attention to the fact that over the past 25-30 years science and technology have developed especially intensively, and a person has not undergone fundamental changes in his physical and psychological characteristics from the point of view of the possibility of his activity in a tank.
True, a reservation should be made for Russia. As a result of the "perestroika", the physical, moral and psychological level of training of the contingent of possible future tankers dropped sharply. The level of general education has also dropped (there are cases when freshmen in higher educational institutions do not know the multiplication table). In this regard, for the domestic tank building, the issues of optimizing connections in the "man - environment - machine" system are becoming especially acute.
1. A FEW GENERAL QUESTIONS
In order to avoid discrepancies, let us make a reservation right away that the combat characteristics of a tank and the combat effectiveness of a tank are different concepts.
Combat characteristics are the technical characteristics of the tank's weapons and control systems, protection systems, the characteristics of its power plant, transmission and chassis, which are provided provided that the tank's crew is fluent in the techniques of working with these systems, that all systems are correct and in full are serviced and in good condition.
Combat efficiency is a complex concept that characterizes the ability of a tank to perform a combat mission. First of all, this includes the tank itself with its combat characteristics, the tank's crew, taking into account the degree of its combat and technical training (including crew cohesion). And also this concept necessarily includes systems of maintenance and material and technical support, including their effectiveness, taking into account the professionalism of their personnel.
And now let's take it as an axiom: if we have several models of tanks with the same combat characteristics, then the model, the design of which provides the crew with maximum comfort when working in combat conditions, has the potentially greatest combat effectiveness.
I wrote the words "tank" and "comfort" next to it and involuntarily began to think. The reader will probably grin at such a phrase. But let's not rush to conclusions, let's see what engineers I. D. Kudrin, B. M. Borisov and M. N. Tikhonov wrote in 1988 in the VBT branch magazine ye 8. Their article was titled "The influence of habitability on the combat effectiveness of VGM ". Here are some excerpts from this work:
… An increase in the reaction time of a person by 0.1 second (which is verified only by a subtle physiological study) leads to an increase in the probability of an accident among drivers by 10%. Such situations can arise, for example, when the concentration of carbon monoxide in the air increases to 0.1 mg / l (the upper limit of the norm) or at an air temperature of 28 … 30 'C, that is, in fairly normal and, moreover, typical operating conditions of the driver.
… Firing from all types of BMP weapons within 60 seconds in a pressurized environment can lead to 50% poisoning of personnel.
… The air temperature inside the tank does not correspond to the norm in summer when the outside air temperature is above + 19'C, in winter - at a temperature below -20'C. At the same time, high air temperatures in the inhabited compartments are aggravated by high humidity reaching 72 … 100%.
… The specific working conditions of tankers lead to an increase in the level of colds, injuries, diseases of the skin and eyes, to nephritis and cystitis, to diseases of the cardiovascular system, to frostbite. This affects the combat effectiveness of weapons. In particular, the potential of artillery guns is underutilized by up to 40%, certain types of air defense systems in difficult battle conditions - by 20 … 30, tanks - by 30 … 50%.
… To have a significant impact on the design of man-environment-machine systems, it is necessary to use methods of quantitative forecasting of the crew's performance during combat operation of equipment.
… We are talking about the design of operator activities as an integral system with the subsequent development of technical means, and not about the traditional adaptation of man and machine to each other …"
And here is another excerpt from another work. In 1989, DS Ibragimov released the documentary story "Confrontation". In it, he states the following:
"… Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General of Tank Forces Vasily Sergeevich Arkhipov, who fought two wars in a tank, in his memoirs" Time of Tank Attacks "emphasizes the dependence of the success of the battle on the training of tank crews …
Here's what he writes:
12 - 16 hours in a rumbling tank, in the heat and stuffiness, where the air is saturated with powder gas and vapors of a combustible mixture, tire even the most hardy.
Once our doctors conducted an experiment - weighed 40 tankers in turn before and after a 12-hour battle. It turned out that tank commanders lost an average of 2.4 kg during this time, gunners - 2.2 kg each, radio gunners - 1.8 kg each. And most of all are driver mechanics (2, 8 kg) and loaders (3, 1 kg).
Therefore, at bus stops, people fell asleep instantly ….
I think that what has been said is enough to understand why it is necessary today, when solving tank building issues, to solve at the scientific and technical level the issues of comfort in a tank, and in other combat vehicles too.
2. WHAT AND HOW WE SEE FROM THE TANK
Traditionally, in tank building, the point of view has taken root that the main combat components of a tank are fire, protection and maneuver. Initially, in the tank schools of different states, there were disputes over what to give preference to: weapons, armor or an engine. T-34 (tank M. I. Koshkin and A. A. Morozov) proved to the whole world that all three named components in the tank are equivalent.
But today I would introduce one more component and put it first - VISIBILITY.
Let's consider the tasks and the nature of the crew's actions on the battlefield only for a single tank (in a platoon, company, battalion, it will be much more difficult).
Let's say the crew received a clear combat mission, the maximum possible intelligence about the enemy, and began to perform the combat mission.
Once on the battlefield, the crew:
firstly, he must see the specific situation with his own eyes;
secondly, he must assess the situation and make a decision on the specific combat actions of his tank at the moment;
thirdly, making the most of the combat characteristics of your tank, apply them in the fight against the enemy;
fourthly, to make sure with your own eyes that this task has been completed, and only after that proceed to the next combat actions.
From what has been said, it is easy to see that if sufficient attention is not paid to the issue of visibility in a particular tank, then the concept of "fire, maneuver and protection" loses its dominant meaning.
In this respect, one of the conclusions of the R&D "Revision", carried out at the Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense back in 1972, is very characteristic.
It reads:
- The results of tactical exercises show that due to the lack of timely receipt of information about targets by the crew, some of the tanks are disabled before they have time to make at least one aimed shot. For the same reason, the flow of shots from a tank company in an offensive is 3.5 rounds / min, while the technical capabilities make it possible to create a stream of shots with an intensity of 30 rounds / min."
A fact from combat practice can be added to the conclusions of the research work.
In October 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict took place. The Arabs were armed only with Soviet tanks, the Israelis - American and British. During the fighting, the Arabs suffered heavy losses in tanks and lost the war. In December 1973, representatives of the GBTU, Generals L. N. L. N. Kartsev was in Egypt. In particular, his report says:
… 0 the transience of hostilities - an example: the 25th separate tank brigade attacked the north on October 15 to join the 2nd Army. The ATGM installations were camouflaged so that no one could see them from the tanks during the whole battle, the tankers fired at random.
0b the successful use of tanks in defense - an example: the T-55 company (11 tanks) of the 21st Panzer Division, while repelling the attacks of Israeli tanks on the 16th Infantry Division, firing at the attacking flank, destroyed 25 M-60 tanks, losing only 2 T-55.
As you can see, the results of research and development are fully confirmed by facts from combat practice.
But this is the quality side of visibility. How to evaluate visibility from a quantitative point of view?
In 1972, tankers in Kubinka conducted special studies in order to find out the conditions of review (observation) from objects of armored vehicles. One table especially attracted my attention in this work. I will cite it in full.
By increasing the average speed of movement from 25 km / h to 35 km / h under the same conditions, the time for processing information coming from a unit of the monitored space is reduced by 1, 4 times"
In this case, the distance of 1500 meters was not chosen as the base by chance. In the 60s - 70s, this distance was optimal for opening fire. In those years, the tanks still lacked rangefinder devices; tank artillery did not yet possess the accuracy, accuracy of combat, and armor penetration necessary to combat small targets (of the "Tank" type) at long ranges.
But in this table, elements of the connection between visibility and the visual capabilities of a person are already objectively laid.
Here is what V. I. Kudrin in his article "The Ergonomic Principle of Increasing the Search Performance of a Tank" (VBT June 3, 1989).
… With a daily march with closed hatches, the detection of tank-hazardous targets is reduced by 40 - 60% …
The person is the integrator and regulator of the tank performance characteristics. The human link remains the most vulnerable and least studied component of the system: up to 30% of failures are caused by the human factor …"
However, the technology went ahead, and at the end of the 90s, on the basis of mathematical modeling, electronic systems appeared that made it possible to somewhat increase the search capabilities of the tank. But here is what V. I. Kudrin says about it:
… The disadvantage of mathematical models is the disregard for the personality of the operator.
… The use of mathematical methods has led to a certain increase in the efficiency of search capabilities due to the "technical" link, and the search characteristics of tankers in the search system remain a "thing in itself".
The properties of the human component of the system are: individual psychological character, temperament, motivation, emotions;
mental: attention, memory, thinking;
visual: exposure and dynamic (with short exposure) visual acuity, oculomotor activity, throughput of the visual analyzer;
professional: possession of technique, special techniques, knowledge of the enemy.
The complex of ophtaelmoergonomic properties is the trigger mechanism for the gunner's activity, which is based on the reception of information, its processing and decision-making.
The output of the system is speed and accuracy. determining the outcome of the battle (underlined by me).
So, in a nutshell, you can designate the relationship between objective and subjective factors in the "visibility" system.
But let's return a little more to our table. In it, the range of 1.5 km is taken as the base, and the maximum is 4 km. At that time, our tank sight had magnifications of 3, 5 "and 8" and field of view angles of 18 'and 9', respectively. With such characteristics, the target could be detected at ranges of 3, 2 - 3, 6 km from the spot and 2, 2 - 2, 4 km on the move, but to determine the target of the "tank ™" type - at ranges of 2, 5 - 3 km from the spot, and only 1, 7 - 1, 8 km on the move.
For reference: on the tanks of NATO countries the sights had a variable magnification from 8 "to 16" and the angles of the field of view from 10 'to 3'. But it must be borne in mind that with an increase in the multiplicity, the light transmission coefficient deteriorates.
Speaking about the table, let's pay attention to the last column, which shows the degree of change in the transparency of the atmosphere depending on the thickness of the air layer. In this case, it can be considered as a purely calculated physical indicator. But in life, the transparency of the atmosphere is a variable quantity, and it mainly depends on meteorological conditions. I remember very well when we carried out factory and state tests of the T-54B tank with the "Cyclone" stabilizer in the autumn-winter period, the distance for firing on the move was 1500 - 1000 m in TTT, there was not a single case that we postponed or postponed shooting the next day for meteorological conditions. But when the Cobra guided armament with a maximum firing range of 4000 m was installed on the T-64 tank and the customer demanded that during the first year of mass production all 100% of the tanks be checked by full-scale shooting at the maximum range, it turned out that the fully assembled tanks took months (they were cases - up to 2 months) stood idle at the test site, waiting for a visibility of 4 km due to meteorological conditions (late autumn, winter, early spring).
There is something to think about.
In support of all that has been said, I will cite data from the magazine "Armee of Defense" (1989, May - June) on the French Leclerc tank. The magazine reports that 65% of the cost of the tank comes from electronics. It is essential to note that the tank's panoramic sight is more expensive than the main engine (14.3% and 11.2%, respectively), the gunner's sight is more expensive than the main armament (5.6% and 4.1%), the fire control system computing device is more expensive than a tower without equipment (1, 9% and 1, 2%, respectively).
These figures allow us to assert that, in technical terms, visibility issues in the tank are gaining an increasing proportion.
3. CANNON OR ROCKET
Simply, quickly and categorically Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev resolved this issue in his time: "Artillery is a cave technique. Give me a rocket!" Almost 40 years have passed since this verdict was issued. Rocket technology has firmly entered the life of the armed forces, but so far it has not been able to replace artillery. At the same time, I believe that the question is: "Do you need a rocket in a tank?" - in the domestic tank building has not been fundamentally resolved until now. In the early 80s, when the rapid development of small-sized missile systems began, the tank building of NATO countries discussed in detail and comprehensively the question: what should be the armament complex of the tank of the future? In order not to retell the essence of this discussion, I will cite a few excerpts from the magazines of that time.
This is what the magazine "International Defense Review", 1972, v 5, no. 1 wrote.
"In World War II, tank battle ranges fluctuated between 800 and 1500 s, and most tank battles took place at ranges from 600 to 1200 m. However, there were several examples when the German Tiger-I" and "Tiger-II" combat vehicles opened fire on enemy tanks at a distance of 3000 m, and hits usually took place from the third shot.
According to British sources, the average combat range of tanks during the war in Kashmir in 1965 was 600 - 1200 m; American General Marshall gives an average range during the Sinai campaign in 1967, equal to 900 - 1100 m. In some cases, for example, in the battles for the Golan Heights, the Israelis fired HESH-type shells from Centurion tanks (high-explosive fragmentation with a flattened head) from a range of 3000 m and incapacitated enemy tanks in the worst case from the third shot after capturing the target in the fork.
As a result of studying the terrain of the Central European zone, it was established that most of the targets will be located at ranges up to 2000 m (50% of all targets - at ranges up to 1000 m, 30% - between 1000 and 2000 m and 20% - over 2000 m).
The study of the terrain in the northern part of West Germany, undertaken by the command of the NATO armed forces, made it possible to conclude that firing would be possible at the following ranges: 1000 - 3000 m - for most targets, 3000 - 4000 m - 8% of targets, 4000 - 5000 m - 4% of goals and over 5000 - 5% of goals.
Based on this, the British and American tank experts concluded: the range of 3000 m can be considered the maximum combat range of a tank and should be considered as the basis for the requirements for a future tank gun (they mentioned an increase in the firing range to 4000 m).
The Americans estimate that the tank that fires first has an 80% higher chance of hitting the enemy tank."
In the journal "International Defense Review", 1973, v 6, no. 6, we find in the article "A new generation of tanks" the following assessments of both the tanks themselves and the complexes of tank weapons.
In general, tanks have never been invulnerable to enemy weapons, but they are less vulnerable and more mobile than many other weapons …
“……….”
Studies carried out in the European Theater of War (TMD) have shown that the frequency of detection and identification of targets at long ranges is relatively low, and at short distances, on the contrary, higher. As a result, the aggregate probability of detecting and identifying targets is almost the same for both advanced fire control guns and missiles. When considering the effectiveness of a weapon in terms of hitting probability, there is little choice between the two forms of tank armament.
In any case, the probability of hitting is not the only criterion by which the effectiveness of weapons systems should be judged. The tank must be destroyed in the shortest possible time in order to reduce the duration of the enemy's retaliatory strike.
“……….”
… the range at which the time of the ATGM hitting becomes less than the cannon hitting time exceeds the range at which the ATGM hitting probability becomes higher than that of the cannon. This fact, combined with the change in the probability of target detection and identification, depending on the range, leads to the conclusion that, on average, the gun is superior to the ATGM in the European and many other theaters (emphasized by me).
“……….”
The difference in rate of fire also casts doubt on the general method for assessing the relative effectiveness of guns and ATGMs, which is based on the probability of being hit by a single shot. There is no doubt that it is possible to fire two or three shots from a cannon in the time required for one shot by an ATGM. Since the cost of a second-generation guided projectile (with an automatic command control system - Yu. K.) is approximately 20 times higher than the cost of a tank cannon projectile, this will also affect the economic efficiency of cannon systems (emphasized by me)."
I tried to give the main arguments of NATO military experts in a comparative assessment of the artillery and missile armament of the tank. In this regard, I should probably say how such an analysis was carried out in our country. I remember how in 1962, as a representative of VNIItransmash, I was present at the consideration of the technical project "Object 287" (missile tank developed by KB LKZ). The examination took place at the GBTU at the NTS section. After the lead designer finished his report, questions began. The GRAU colonel raised his hand. He was given the floor.
- I have a question for the speaker. The missile is more effective than an artillery shell at ranges of 3-4 km. There is evidence that in Central Europe, where NATO and SVD troops are concentrated, the terrain at ranges of 3-4 km allows only 5-6% of targets to be detected. Have you considered the use of such a massive, expensive and complex weapon as a tank to perform such limited tasks?
- I'm taking this question off! - a shout from the audience thundered. - And you, Colonel, leave the hall!
Everyone looked back at this command line. It was submitted by the Colonel General, who, apparently, entered the hall during the report. As it turned out, the Colonel General represented the General Staff at the NTS. His command-directive was followed rigorously. After that, only technical issues were discussed in the section.
In addition, I do not know of other cases of discussion of the issue of "gun or rocket" in the practice of domestic tank building or in the domestic press.
As a result, on the main NATO battle tanks, the armament remained cannon, with us it became rocket and cannon. Theoretically, at first glance, our tanks have become more effective in terms of tactics: "if you want, shoot artillery shells from a cannon, if you want - with a rocket."
One can only agree with this theoretically. Arguing in this way, we take into account only the combat characteristics of the weapon and forget about the concept of “combat effectiveness.” I have already referred to V. I. Kudrin (VBT, 1989, No. 3). Considering the issues of ergonomics, he rightly states: “Man is an integrator and the regulator of the tank performance characteristics. Let's try to understand what it is in our particular case.
In the performance characteristics of the guided weapons complex, it is written that at a distance of 4000 m, the missile hits the target with a probability of 98 - 99%. How is this checked? An experienced tank is installed in a combat position. At a distance of 4000 m from it, a target tank is installed so that it is clearly (completely) visible, so that the terrain does not create obstacles in the path of the rocket's flight, and in favorable weather they shoot a rocket. While the missile covers the distance to the target, the shooter-operator, using the control panel, holds the aiming mark of the control device on the target for several seconds.
In theory, in these seconds, the operator can smoke a cigar and drink coffee. In any case, if this is a professional, then he can only worry about the quality performance of his duties. If the first or second missiles hit the target, then his task is completed.
Now let's imagine a real combat situation. On the experience of combat operations of tanks and aircraft in the war in the Middle East in October 1973, "Military equipment and economy" (Org. 2), 1974 No. 9 reported: “During the last war in the Middle East, there was a wide and massive use of tanks, in which both sides suffered heavy losses: from infantry anti-tank weapons - 50%; in tank battles - 30%; from aviation and anti-tank mines - 20%. Most of the tanks were hit by anti-tank weapons at a distance of 2, 5 - 3 km …. "In this situation, our gunner-operator, together with his missile tank, himself turns into target number 1 for all enemy anti-tank weapons. As combat experience shows, in such conditions a lot is changing.
"Collection of translated articles" No. 157, 1975gives the following data:
-The experience of the Second World War has shown that the value of the probability of hitting in battle is greatly reduced in comparison with the probability of hitting in peacetime at the training ground. For the 88-mm cannon RAK 43, with a target size of 2.5x2 m and a distance of 1500 m, the probability of hitting in peacetime was 77%, and in wartime - only 33%."
As you can see, in battle, the "hothouse" probability of hitting a target is halved.
From the above, we can draw a certain conclusion: "The samples of weapons cannot be compared only in terms of their combat characteristics. It is necessary to learn how to determine their combat effectiveness and, on its basis, make the final choice."
Now let's look at this problem from the other side. The political leaders of NATO countries openly declared that the arms race that they unleashed during the Cold War was not the “goal” of the war, but a “means.” The arms race aimed to bleed the economies of the socialist countries. In evaluating new types of weapons, the main thing should be the principle of "cost-effectiveness", because the main front of the struggle in the "cold war" has shifted from the field of military operations to the field of economics.
What have we got from the economic point of view, having developed, adopted and launched into serial production a missile-gun tank? In the fourth year of serial production, the T-64A cannon tank cost 194 thousand rubles, the T-64B missile and gun tank cost 318 thousand rubles. The cost of the tank itself increased by 114 thousand rubles, or 60%, and its combat effectiveness in comparison with a conventional enemy tank increased by 3-4%. At the same time, we still do not take into account that the cost of a rocket shot has increased tenfold compared to an artillery shot. As a result, gunners and operators were taught to shoot missiles from a tank using electronic simulators, and in order to save missiles, a full-scale missile shot on average accounted for one in ten trainees.” But this must also be taken into account when we assess combat effectiveness.
The issues raised in this section are of particular relevance. Experience shows that in tank building, weapon systems and control systems develop most dynamically, and these systems significantly affect the combat effectiveness of a tank. And although they say the Cold War is over, the economic uncertainty in Russia puts the economic component in assessing the combat effectiveness of any constructive innovations even more acutely than during the Cold War years.
4. CREW
Today the dictionary defines the word "crew" as a command, a tank's personnel. During the Great Patriotic War, German tanks T-III, T-IV, T-V, T-VI and T-VIB ("royal tiger") all had a crew of 5 people. The position of the Germans on this issue was clear. There was no clarity in the domestic tank building industry. The T-34-76 medium tank had a crew of 4 people. In January 1944, the T-34-85 began to be produced, its crew was increased to 5 people.
Heavy tanks KV had a crew of 5 people, and in 1943 the IS tank began to be produced, its crew was reduced to 4 people. Moreover, there was no fundamentally functional difference in the duties of the crew members of either tank.
Let's try to trace and evaluate the evolution of views on the crew of a tank specifically on the example of domestic medium tanks T-34, T-54 and T-64. In practice, these were the main tanks of the Soviet Army.
T-34-76. Crew of 4 people: tank commander - he is the gunner; driver mechanic; charging; radio operator. Of the 4 crew members, 3 had paired functions: commander-gunner, driver-mechanic and gunner-radio operator. A person could combine these functions as a specialty, but a person could not simultaneously perform them in full, both mentally and physically. But if the driver-mechanic could stop the tank and deal with the elimination of mechanical damage (if it was in his power), if the radio operator, at the request of his commander, could stop firing at manpower from a machine gun (at that time the infantry did not yet have their own anti-tank weapons) and start working on a walkie-talkie, then the tank commander, having discovered an enemy tank or anti-tank gun, was obliged to immediately open artillery fire, striving to defeat the target. For the duration of the duel, the tank itself was without a commander, since at this time the commander turned 100% into a gunner. It's good if it was a line tank. And if it was the tank of a platoon, company or battalion commander, then without the commander the entire unit would be in battle. Here is how it is said about it in Stalin's order No. 325 of October 16, 1942:
"… The commanders of companies and battalions, moving in front of the battle formations, do not have the opportunity to follow the tanks and control the battle of their subunits and turn into ordinary tank commanders, and the units, having no control, lose their orientation and wander around the battlefield, suffering unnecessary losses …" At that time, our losses in tanks were measured not in tens, not in hundreds, but in thousands. As we can see, this question reached the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army not by accident.
T-34-85. Crew of 5 people: tank commander, driver, gunner, loader, radio operator. In this version, the situation with the commander fundamentally changed for the better. In this version, the T-34 participated in the victorious, final stage of the Great Patriotic War.
T-54. Introduced into service in 1946. Crew of 4 people: tank commander - he is a radio operator; driver mechanic; gunner; loader - he is a shooter from an anti-aircraft machine gun. In this version, the situation with the commander at first glance seems normal. But this is only until we figured it out: what does the time of radio communication in battle mean for the unit commander.
Here is what E. A. Morozov wrote in 1980 in his article "The problem of reducing the crew size of the main tank" (VBT, No. 6):
"… A modern tank has about the same number of control elements as on a spaceship (more than 200). Of these, the commander has 40%, so he cannot successfully control both his tank and the unit at the same time. The total amount of information of the battalion commander per day is 420 messages: 33% of them are senior, 22% with subordinates and 44% with interacting units. Exchange of information takes up to 8 hours (2 - 5 minutes per session), or 50% with a 15-hour working day."
To this I must add that in addition to working on the radio, it still had to be monitored, it still had to be serviced.
In this case, it was hardly worth shifting the care of maintaining radio communications onto the commander's shoulders. Of course, this reduced the combat effectiveness of the tank.
T-64. Introduced into service in 1966. Crew of 3 people: tank commander-radio operator, he is also an anti-aircraft machine gun shooter; driver mechanic; gunner - later he was the operator of the ATGM. The design of the tank uses a cannon loading mechanism (MZ), which loads the cannon with both artillery and rocket shots. But if the power part of the loader's work was now performed by a mechanism, then the functions of controlling this mechanism and its maintenance fell on the gunner's stumps.
With such a staff structure of the crew, it is difficult to talk about an increase in the combat effectiveness of the T-64, although its combat characteristics were, according to the estimates of domestic specialists (and the military as well), the highest in the world of tank building. And objectively we can agree with this (in the combat characteristics, we take into account only the quantitative, not the qualitative composition of the crew).
All of the above applies to the tank and its crew in battle. But a significant part of the time the tank is out of the battlefield, where it temporarily turns into a combat vehicle, which must be cleaned, lubricated, refueled, replenished with ammunition, restored the chassis (replacing worn out or damaged road wheels and track tracks), rinsed out clogged air cleaners, clean and lubricate weapons. Here, the boundaries of specialization between tankers are erased, and they simply turn into the crew of a combat vehicle ™. Here, in order to replace a track track or clean a 125-mm cannon, at least 3 people are needed. It is physically very heavy and dirty (in the literal sense of the word) Job.
E. A. Morozov, pondering how to reduce the crew of the tank to 2 people, carried out the timing on the T-64 (crew of 3 people) and received the following data:
So, 9 hours of continuous physically hard work, after which it is necessary to give people the opportunity to wash, eat, rest and gain strength for the next military operation.
Here I can be reproached for paying too much attention to maintenance issues. It may be said that it was not easy for the crew of the T-34 during the war, but after all, he coped with his duties and the T-34 had the highest combat effectiveness. It can be said that the combat characteristics of post-war domestic tanks have been dramatically increased due to: the introduction of stabilization of weapons, the introduction of rangefinders, the introduction of MZ and, finally, due to the introduction of missile weapons.
And with all this, how did we change the working conditions of a person in battle? We have forgotten that "Man is an integrator and regulator of the tank performance characteristics."
Here is what is said about this in the report of the Research Institute-2 "0 results of the research work" Deduction "(February 18, 1972):
"- If we take the load on the T-34 operator-gunner per unit, then in the T-55 and T-62 it increased by 60%, in the T-64 by 70%, in the IT-1 by 270%."
And also in the same report:
- The increase in the number of operations and their complication increase the number of tank armament failures caused by the crew (in the T-55 - 32%, in the T-62 - 64%). At the same time, the technical reliability of the T-62 is higher than the T- 55: for technical failures of the T-62 - 35%; for the T-55 - 68%.
Incomplete reliability of tanks reduces their efficiency by 16%."
We can give more examples of how, in pursuit of high combat characteristics in domestic tank building, due to gross neglect of the human factor, they simultaneously reduced the combat effectiveness of tanks.
I will give one more example, which, in my opinion, is of fundamental importance for the tank forces. This is an order from the times of the Great Patriotic War. It is short, I will quote it in full.
Order
on the appointment of command personnel for medium and heavy tanks
No. 0400 October 9, 1941
To increase the combat effectiveness of tank forces, their better combat use in cooperation with other types of troops, appoint:
1. As commanders of medium tanks * junior lieutenants and lieutenants.
2. As platoon commanders of medium tanks * senior lieutenants.
3. On the posts of company commanders of KV tanks - captains - majors.
4. On the posts of commanders of medium tank companies * - captains.
5. As commanders of battalions of heavy and medium tanks * - majors, lieutenant colonels.
The head of the financial department of the Red Army to make the appropriate changes to the salaries.
* The words - medium tanks - are inscribed by I. Stapin in red pencil instead of "T-34 tanks".
People's Commissar for Defense
I. Stalin
This order is an example of how a bloody war taught our Supreme High Command to understand the importance of the human factor in armored vehicles and the importance of man in increasing the combat effectiveness of a tank.
But the war ended, and its lessons began to be forgotten. New post-war tanks became more and more complex in technical terms. So, if in mass production on January 1, 1946, the labor intensity of the T-34 was 3203 standard hours, then the labor intensity of the T-55 (as of January 1, 1968) was 5723 standard hours, the labor intensity of the T-62 (as of January 1, 1968.) was 5855 standard hours and the labor intensity of the T-64 (as of January 1, 1968) was 22564 standard hours. At the same time, compared to the T-34, the crew of the T-55 and T-62 was one person less (4 people instead of 5 on the T-34) and, which especially negatively affected the combat effectiveness of these tanks, the position of a tank commander from the officer category was transferred again to the rank of sergeant. On the T-64, the crew was reduced altogether to 3 people, and at the same time, the position of the company's deputy technical officer was abolished in the tank units, and the position of political officer was introduced to the vacant place in the staffing table. As a result, the future tank commander underwent combat training for six months in training units along with the rest of the crew. On the consequences of such decisions of tankers VNIItransmash in 1988 in his report on research "Study of the main directions of development of TCS to armored vehicles" (code "Contents-3") wrote:
“… On the one hand, the constant high-quality renewal of equipment and the short service life of the mass contingents of personnel, on the other hand, significantly complicate the tasks of combat training.
The peculiarity of the process of training soldiers and junior commanders is that within six months of yesterday's schoolchildren, who often do not know Russian well, in training units, it is required to train soldiers who wield modern weapons.
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According to the conclusion of psychologists, the level of organization and technical equipment of the educational process in educational units … significantly lag behind the level of complexity of the objects under study. According to the generalization of the results of the survey of graduates of the training center, they are prepared for the operation of facilities at best by 30 - 40% (emphasized by me), ready only for its most superficial operation, without detailed knowledge of its systems and complexes."
The data of the research work carried out confirm:
"… that the combat effectiveness of a tank can vary by an order of magnitude, depending on the level of training and training of the crew."
In conclusion:
"Taking into account the low consumption rates of the resource and ammunition, due to their high cost, the number of crews training on combat training vehicles for 2 years of service is so small that the formation and consolidation of stable combat skills is not ensured, and the implementation of the combat qualities of vehicles by the crew on average does not exceed 60% "(underlined by me).
Summarizing all that has been said, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. It is advisable to have a tank crew of 4 people: a tank commander (he is also a platoon, or company, or battalion commander), a gunner-operator, a driver-mechanic, a loader.
2. It is advisable to have a loading mechanism in the design of the tank. At the same time, the functions of the loader should include control and maintenance of the loading mechanism, work on a walkie-talkie and firing an anti-aircraft machine gun.
3. The commander of the tank must be an officer with a secondary military-technical education.
4. The level of combat and technical training of the crew must ensure the implementation of at least 90% of the combat qualities of the vehicle in conditions as close as possible to the combat situation.
The latter requirement is most fully possible to implement when switching to a professional army. With a conscript contingent, it will be much more difficult to implement point 4 and, most importantly, after demobilization, in civilian life, a person will quickly lose specific skills and knowledge of a tanker and, therefore, in the event of mobilization, he will be professionally unsuitable for effective use in a modern tank.
Fundamental issues related to the tank's crew require a cardinal solution.
To send into battle a modern complex machine, knowing in advance that its crew does not have the necessary knowledge and skills to control it, means deliberately dooming both equipment and people to death.
5. MECHANIC DRIVER AND TANK
There is one person in the tank crew who is physically and organically connected to the vehicle (tank). We almost never think about the last form of communication, and it is very important for such a machine as a tank. I did not think about it either, although I myself had the right to drive a car and a motorcycle, I had some practice of driving T-34 and T-54. A case drew my attention to this issue. If memory serves, it happened in 1970. Once I got a call from the BTV Academy and was invited to come to them and see the simulator of a driver-mechanic, developed by a group of specialists and young associate officers of the academy. What I saw exceeded all my expectations. In a huge box on a concrete foundation, extending 4 meters into the ground, a full-size metal model of the bow of the tank was mounted. Inside the mock-up, the workplace of the T-54 driver was assembled entirely from serial assemblies and parts. In the horizontal plane, the mock-up was mounted on two powerful hinges and could swing in a vertical plane around the calculated center of gravity of the simulated tank. Swinging was carried out using powerful hydraulic cylinders. A platform with a special cinema installation was erected behind the model. There was a movie screen ahead. On one side of the model there was a properly equipped instructor's cabin, on the other - cabinets with control equipment. Communication between the trainee and the instructor was carried out using a tank intercom. The power supply was connected. In general, the stand represented a complex construction and engineering structure.
The developers of the stand also faced serious questions in the field of cinematography. Here, synchronously with the specific image of the tank track, it was necessary to record geometrically precisely its profile, and also to do a lot that was not in ordinary cinema.
I will not go into details, I will only note that, in addition to simulating real physical loads on the working bodies used by the driver, the work of the stand was accompanied by an imitation of real noises that took place in the conditions of the tank.
What he saw evoked a feeling of deep respect for the specialists who managed to create such a stand, and testified to the serious material capabilities of the BTV Academy at that time. The tankers had something to be proud of. There was no doubt that such a stand would be able to qualitatively improve the training of driver mechanics and sharply reduce the consumption of the motor resources of tanks in the combat training park. It was necessary to take measures to organize work on stands in industry. At that time, the deputy was responsible for armored vehicles in the Ministry of Defense Industry. Minister Joseph Yakovlevich Kotin.
I called him. Kotin did not have to explain much, he understood everything and accepted it for execution at a glance, without demanding any official instructions. The ministry issued an order instructing the Murom plant to create a design bureau for tank simulators and production facilities for the production of such simulators. This was done later.
But the main reason for which I remembered this whole story happened after I finished getting to know the stand. One of the participants in the demonstration of the work of the stand approached me, introduced himself as an associate of the academy and told the following. They (the creators of the stand) came to the conclusion that, in addition to the fact that the stand is a simulator for developing certain skills in a person to control a machine, it is also a device that allows one to quantitatively investigate the organic connections that arise between a man and a machine in the process of their joint work. Devices were connected to the stand control system, which, with an accuracy of a fraction of a second, made it possible to measure the appearance of alarming video information on the movie screen, the response time of a person to it and the response time of the corresponding mechanisms. On the basis of these data, tests and standards were developed to assess their performance on the simulator with estimates on a 5-point scale. From Kubinka, a group of young soldiers who were undergoing a training course for driver mechanics were invited and tested on a stand. Those who received grades "5", "4" and "3" were allowed to work. Losers were not allowed to work at the stand, as one of them received a serious spinal injury there. After training at the stand, the soldiers were returned to Kubinka, where they continued their studies on real tanks of the combat training park. At the end of the training, all the soldiers, without exception, who showed low results at the stand (grade "3"), according to the results of their studies, despite all the training, they could not get a grade higher than three in driving.
Even before this information from the adjunct, I understood how much training and experience of a person are for the correct and competent control of the machine. But only now I began to think about the fact that with the increase in the mass of the tank and the growth of its dynamics, the accuracy and speed of the driver's action acquire special importance.
Today's tanks, with a mass of more than 50 tons and a speed of more than 70 km / h, require a person to perform operations to control such a machine in just a few fractions of a second. But not every person is capable of this, which was confirmed by the experience of the BTV Academy.
And in real life we observe that one person, if he sees a falling sandwich, will catch it on the fly; the other will only move when the sandwich is already on the floor.
Today, when I hear reports of accidents on the roads and it is reported that the "BMV" car collided with the "Ford" car because the driver lost control of the controls, then I understand that the person who took over the "BMV" car naturally had high-speed reaction, which did not correspond to the dynamic parameters of the "BMV" car, such a person could not be given the right to drive just such a machine.
Apparently, the time has come to introduce the appropriate certification for the candidates selected for the tank driver mechanics.
In principle, tankers have long been forced to pay attention to the operational characteristics of the tank, depending on the state of the driver. So, in 1975, the VBT magazine, No. 2 in the article "Influence of the time of the visual-motor reaction of the driver on the quality of control of the tank" wrote:
"… T-64A two-day march in winter conditions, as a result of fatigue, the idle time of the temporal-motor reaction increased by 38% by the end of the first day, by 64% by the end of the second (0, 87 sec, 1, 13 and 1, 44 sec Taking this into account, the permissible distance at 30 km / h (8.3 m / sec) is 30 m; 35 km / h (9.7 m / sec) - 50 m; 40 km / h (11.1 m / sec) - 75 m and at 50 km / h (13.8 m / sec) - 150 m ";
In the same 1975, in the VBT magazine, No. 4, GI Golovachev in his article "Modeling the process of movement of tank columns" gave the following data:
"… As experience shows, an increase in the speed of movement of single tanks does not increase the speed of movement of the columns."
And gave a graph:
And further. In the VBT journal, No. 2 for 1978, F. P. Shpak in the article "Influence of the processes" braking - acceleration "on the mobility of the VGM during the march" provides data that with an increase in the specific power from 10 to 20 hp / t Vav grows by 80%; from 20 to 30 hp / t - increases by 10 - 12%.
It is easy to see that in all these cases, purely technical, at first glance, the parameters directly depend on the "idle time of the visual-motor reaction" (as writes VBT, No. 2 for 1975) of a person. And if we want to further increase the value of these parameters in the future, then we need to study human capabilities more deeply and more seriously and try to use them more reasonably.
Unfortunately, to this day, our military tankers and tank builders talk about the dynamic capabilities of the vehicle only from the point of view of technology, showing either illiteracy in matters of the dependence of the dynamics of the tank on human abilities, or inexcusably neglecting the human factor in general.
Today, the whole world has gone around the photo of the "flying" domestic T-90 tank. When I look at her, the question involuntarily arises:
-How is it more correct to say: "the driver of the T-90 tank" or "the pilot-driver of the T-90 tank"?
6. TANK CARE
It is equally criminal to send a tank with a crew into battle, which is able to use the combat characteristics of the vehicle only by 50%, or to send into battle a qualified crew on a tank, which, according to its technical condition, can provide only 50% of the combat characteristics inherent in its design, is equally criminal. Therefore, in peacetime, the service for combat training of personnel and the service for maintaining the technical combat readiness of combat vehicles should be built in such a way as to ensure the maximum combat readiness of both of them (even more so in war). We have already seen that the service for training tankers in the Soviet Army was poorly organized. The same can be said for the logistics service.
Here is what V. P. Novikov, V. P. Sokolov and A. S. Shumilov reported in the article "Standard and actual costs of operating BTT" (VBT, No. 2, 1991):
… according to data obtained in the course of controlled military operation in parts of a number of military districts (Leningrad, Kiev and others), the actual total average annual operating costs of the T-72A and T-80B increased by 3 and 4 times, respectively, compared to the operating costs tank T-55.
… The actual costs for medium repairs are 25 - 40% less, and for the current one - 70 - 80% more than the corresponding standard costs.
Causes:
1) failure to complete average repairs in full (shortcomings in planning the supply of repair bodies with spare parts and materials), which leads to an increase in the number of failures and, for this reason, an increase in the number of current repairs;
2) the proportion of complex failures on samples with a complex design increases (the T-64A has a complexity coefficient of 0.79, and the T-80B has a coefficient of 0.86);
3) violation of the rules and modes of operation of the samples (insufficient training of crews and the complication of the design of the sample)."
Yu. K. Gusev, T. V. Pikturno and A. S. Razvalov in the article "Increasing the efficiency of the tank maintenance system" (VBT, No. 2, 1988):
Analysis of the range of failures of serial tanks showed that 30 - 40% of them could be prevented with a rational organization of maintenance.
The equality of the component losses in the total downtime for maintenance (that is, the equality of the duration of the UTS proper and the time of accompanying repairs) occurs for the T-80B after 100 km, for the T-64B - 200 km, and for the T-72B - 350 km."
The latter conclusion is of interest for evaluating the design of the tank from the point of view of operation. As you can see, Tagil residents surpassed Leningraders by 3, 5 times and Kharkiv residents by this parameter by 1, 75 times.
It should also be noted that in NATO countries much more attention is paid to maintaining the technical combat readiness of tanks. It is characteristic that when considering the problem of the number of the main battle tank, the issues of material and technical support by military specialists are practically put in the first place.
Here is what the magazine "Armor", No. 4, 1988, wrote about this in the article "Some considerations regarding the reduction of the tank's crew":
“The Western press is increasingly expressing an opinion about the possibility of reducing the crew of a tank. The reason for this is the advances made in the field of technology, and especially in the development of an automatic loader.
The United States, England, France and West Germany are currently investigating the possibility of reducing the tank's crew. Preliminary results comparing crews of four and three have led to the following conclusions:
- The crew of a three-man tank with the use of additional equipment and with a different placement of crew members inside can ensure the operation of the system for 72 hours of combat, and at the same time the level of the combat effectiveness of the tank will not differ significantly from the level of the combat effectiveness of a tank with a crew of four.
“In addition to the automatic loader, other equipment will be required to provide a three-man crew with the same vehicle maintenance as a four-man tank crew.
“Three crew members are not enough during logistics operations (emphasized by me).
- Tanks with a crew of three are generally more sensitive to the stress of the battle, less able to make up for losses and have a greater load in the event of a tank damage compared to tanks with a crew of four. This is especially true during prolonged operations.
The issue of reducing the crew of a tank should be considered in all aspects and especially in the aspects of combat effectiveness, saving manpower and cost savings. The preference is given to the consideration of the impact of the reduction of the crew on its combat effectiveness. The decrease in combat effectiveness is unacceptable (emphasized by me).
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The decision to reduce the number of crew members is not an easy decision and should not be tied directly to the availability of an automatic charger.
To reduce the number of crew members, it is necessary to make improvements on the tank, which will inevitably lead to problems in maintenance, safety and logistics."
In the domestic tank building, maintenance issues were completely within the competence of the military, therefore, at the stage of development and creation of new models, the designers practically dropped out of sight. In this regard, it seems advisable to introduce a special section "Maintaining technical combat readiness" in the development of TTT for the creation of new models, and the requirements of this section should be considered optional for a start. This procedure will force both the customer and the developer to work out in advance and deeper an issue that is of fundamental importance for the combat effectiveness of the tank.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this work is to draw the attention of tankers and tank builders to the problems that were traditionally considered secondary in the domestic tank building industry, but in fact actually directly influenced the combat effectiveness of the tank.
The apparent age of the materials presented in the work may today affect individual digital values, but not the fundamental essence of the problems raised.
This work is food for thought.
And further. I have in my hands the book "The Fleet Commander" - materials about the life and work of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. The book contains the statements of N. G. Kuznetsov from manuscripts of works, notebooks and books. I will quote three of his statements:
1. "Military people do not have the right to be taken by surprise. No matter how unexpected this or that turn of events may look, it is impossible for it to be taken by surprise, you need to be ready for it. With high readiness, surprise loses its force."
2. "High organization is the key to victory."
3. "I wrote books to draw conclusions."
These words contain the essence and meaning of both this and all my previous books.
March - September 2000
Moscow
