First, I would like to touch on why the question of such modernization arose at all.
There is a crisis in modern tank building, which, when trying to resolve it by standard means, raises the question of the future of the tank as an independent combat unit.
What problems have arisen in solving this design problem !?
First, the weapons.
When operating tank against tank, modern battles are fought at distances of 1500-2000m and, given the increased armor protection and the use of active armor, the existing caliber of a tank gun is insufficient and the question is about arming the tank with a long-barreled gun, caliber not less than 140mm.
When the tank is acting against the infantry, the battles are in direct contact, at close range and the tank crew simply does not see the attacking enemy.
In addition, the anti-personnel armament of a modern tank is practically limited to a coaxial machine gun and, in some cases, a remotely controlled module with another machine gun on the turret roof.
Such a module, located in a very unfortunate place, is easily hit at distances of direct contact with the enemy and is difficult to stabilize.
Secondly, protection.
The passive defense of the tank approached its limit and began to degenerate into a powerful barbet, capable of protecting the tank from damage only from the direction of its attack, that is, in the frontal projection.
When struck from the side, from above and from behind, a modern tank is quite defenseless and can be destroyed by a wide range of cheap, highly mobile weapons, including infantry weapons.
Active armor saves the situation somewhat, but it, when a certain level of protection is exceeded, either begins to pose a danger to the crew, or sharply complicates and increases the cost of the car.
The third problem is the overview.
During an attack of a tank that provides a breakthrough in the enemy's defense, for a modern, fast-flowing battle, proceeding simultaneously at several different distances, directions and with a constant threat of attack from the upper hemisphere, the observation devices existing in the tank are either insufficient or easily defeated at distances of direct contact with the enemy.
Heavyweight countries are trying to resolve this crisis by creating a "tank of limiting parameters."
A super-expensive tank operating under the continuous cover of aviation, "tank support" vehicles and infantry.
Technically, even the most advanced conceptual samples of such a tank look, to put it mildly, awkward.
This is clearly seen on the example of the concept of a tank proposed by OJSC "Spetsmash".
What immediately catches the eye.
All tank protection is reduced to a frontal projection.
Moreover, the bulk of the protection falls on the crew compartment.
From above, the engine room is quite defenseless; below and behind, judging by the advertising picture, the tank has only bulletproof armor.
The driver, being in the tank, monitors remotely using electronic systems.
The only distinguishable traditional optical device on the driver's hatch, due to the limited downward viewing angle, does not even provide a simple tank driving.
The cannon, of the traditional scheme, due to its high height and irrational shape of the hull dictated by the size of the crew compartment, is located very high, cantilever and with a strongly mixed backward point of application of the recoil force.
Such an arrangement of the gun imposes restrictions on the power of the gun and leads to a strong rocking of the tank when fired or to the complication of recoil devices.
Loading is carried out by moving a unitary cartridge, at least three main long independent movements, which corresponds to the speed of manual loading of tanks, with separate loading, during the Second World War.
Judging by the proportions of the figure, due to the technical limitations described above, the 130-140mm gun was adopted as the gun.
At its core, such tanks are only a battering ram capable of operating against less modern enemy tanks and are devoid of significance as an independent tactical unit.
This path is completely unrealistic for developing countries and leaves them defenseless, despite the presence of a large fleet of vehicles of the T64 or T72 level.
What is the problem with the classic way of modernizing these tanks.
With regard to weapons.
Restrictions imposed by the size of the turret, which does not allow placing a more powerful weapon in it.
The inadmissibility of an increase in the size of the swinging part of the gun, the length of the recoil and the power of the recoil devices limit the possibility of switching to a larger caliber.
In addition, when switching to a larger caliber, the restrictions imposed by the dimensions of the running ring force the use of separate loading.
This limitation can be partially circumvented by using an external turret container, from where the "shot" is delivered.
Such a solution to the problem is fraught with either a sharp increase in the total weight or low security of the container.
Most likely, at the very beginning of the battle, a tank made according to this scheme will remain without ammunition and with a shell-shocked crew.
In addition, with such a design, to complete the loading process, the tank's gun, which weighs about two tons, must take a strictly defined vertical position, which sharply reduces the rate of fire and imposes additional requirements on the stabilization and vertical guidance mechanisms.
When using such a design solution, even a 130mm gun with a length of 50-55 calibers will protrude beyond the hull projection by 2.5-3 meters, sharply reducing the vehicle's maneuverability and creating the threat of "sticking".
A very typical example of such a tank is the "Object 195"
Moreover, this concept is not the modernization of outdated tanks already in service, but a deep modernization of the project itself, for the release of a new, much more complex and expensive vehicle.
What is further striking about this machine is the increased load on the track and outer support rollers when cornering and the reduced maneuverability due to the lengthening of the undercarriage.
With regard to protection.
For T64 and T72 class tanks, the standard modernization options are practically exhausted by weight restrictions.
Going along the path of technological complication of active protection and the use of reactive, the cost of which begins to approach the cost of the tank itself, with a clear decrease in reliability and maintainability, seems to be a very dubious idea.
Review problem
Today, on the tank, which in battle will have to be under continuous enemy fire, they are trying to install optical devices protruding by half a meter, which are not inferior: in complexity, cost and aperture size - to the optics of an average planetarium.
As a result of this, rapid-fire 22-30mm cannons and snipers with anti-material rifles become a dangerous enemy, with which it will be very difficult for the tank to fight.
That is, we again come to a situation characteristic of the beginning of the Second World War.
A very interesting paradox emerged.
On the one hand, in quantitative terms, developing countries outnumber possible aggressors in terms of the country's tank fleet, but qualitatively, especially when using the linear tactics, tank versus tank that is imposed on them, in conditions of an absolute advantage of the attacking side in the air, they are completely inferior to them.
On the other hand, the aggressor, as a rule, put into service such high-tech and expensive combat vehicles that its economy no longer allows the rapid production or radical modernization of a significant number of such vehicles with extreme technical parameters.
Moreover, due to their conceptual features, such vehicles as the Abrams, Leopard and Merkava are inherently linear tanks that are not capable of independently counteracting infantry that have undergone special training, that is, they are not able to act in isolation from support forces or make deep raids with small tactical in groups.
Why am I focusing on "… act in isolation from support forces and carry out deep raids with small tactical teams …".
This is the second paradox of the wars that the aggressor countries have waged over the past decades.
While their opponent passively adhered to the linear tactics imposed on him, he was definitely losing.
As an example - the main tank battles of the Iraqi company.
As soon as the opposition began at the level of mobile groups, the aggressor lost, who was not ready to fight with separate, poorly interacting groups, for whom his command structure was simply not designed, both due to the mentality of the soldiers and his concept of modern war.
As an example - Afghanistan and the Israeli-Lebanese war.
An interesting situation arises.
If there is a hypothetical opportunity to modernize the existing fleet of T64 and T72 tanks so that they, while retaining their inherent high mobility, begin to surpass the machines of the potential aggressor in armament and degree of protection, at the same time gaining the opportunity for effective actions by small tactical groups at the platoon or company level, then the heavyweight countries, which have invested huge sums in the development and adoption of super-expensive tanks of "extreme parameters", immediately turn out to be untenable in land operations.
So, the possibility of upgrading T64 and T72 tanks.
What is required of such modernized machines !?
The ability to maintain the high maneuverability and long range inherent in prototype tanks - that is, the modernization should go: without increasing the weight of the vehicle; without reducing the fuel supply; without changing the engine type and reducing the combat stowage.
The protection of these tanks should ensure the preservation of their combat effectiveness when shells from enemy shock tanks hit the frontal projection at a distance of 1500 meters.
The armament of hypothetical modernized tanks should confidently hit the main enemy tanks at a distance of at least 2000 meters.
A small tactical group, as part of a platoon of such tanks and support vehicles, must have the ability to conduct raids in the deep rear of the enemy to a depth of 300 km, that is, the tactical group must have a supply of fuel and ammunition 1.5-2 times higher than the one accepted today. day the staffing rate.
Such a tactical group should be capable of autonomously countering enemy attack aircraft and anti-tank helicopters.
Is it possible to carry out such an upgrade !?
I think so, if we move away from some of the stereotypes generally accepted in the design of tanks.
Such a modernized machine appears to me in the form of two mechanically and energetically independent modules, each performing its own, complementing one - the other, the task.
The first module is a gun, remotely controlled, unmanned platform, highly resistant to damaging factors.
The main purpose of such a module is to ensure the efficient operation of a 140mm cannon with a barrel length of at least 50 calibers.
The second module is a control and support vehicle, also based on the prototype tank.
The control module operates at a distance of 300-500 meters from the gun module, without exposing itself to the direct attack of enemy tanks, therefore, it may have weaker booking.
Its main purpose is to assess the tactical situation and control the gun module; suppressing enemy infantry on the flanks and providing air defense.
What does the rejection of the crew in the gun module give !?
First, significant weight savings.
Refusal from lining up armor; equipment for ensuring the thermal regime and gas composition - gives a weight saving of about a ton.
The absence of a crew allows you to increase the power of active protection.
Since there is no requirement for compliance with the rules of ergonomics and the formation of a habitable volume inside the tank, the height of the hull can be reduced by about 200 mm, the shape of the hull can be optimized and at the same time additional volumes can be allocated for fuel and ammunition.
Such a decrease in silhouette, combined with the absence of a full-fledged turret, will give an additional weight reserve of at least three tons.
Assessment of the tactical situation and the choice of a target from a separate, moving behind the manned module allows you to reduce the optical devices of the gun module to sight cameras, operator control cameras and a target designator point capture system.
The guidance system of the gun module is synchronized in azimuth with the gunner's device of the control module and the aiming of the gun can be carried out both using a television camera and using the laser designator of the commander of the control module.
How constructive can such a weapon module look like !?
The picture shows a gun module based on the T64 tank.
Due to the absence of a manned compartment, the height of the hull is reduced by 200 mm, and, due to the wedge-shaped form of the hull, the height of the most affected frontal projection of the hull is reduced to 86 cm.
In place of the driver's mechanic, an additional fuel tank integrated into the body is made in the form of a sealed compartment, divided into sealed sections.
A hardware compartment with evacuated containers of electronic equipment is located behind the fuel tank.
The evacuation of containers protects the electronics from shock and acoustic waves, shock loads, as well as when powerful active protection units are triggered.
Vacuuming is carried out in a continuous way, using a low-power vacuum pump.
The turning angle of the tank turret, which does not need to conduct a circular fire to protect itself from the attacking infantry, is limited to 80-90 *, which made it possible to reduce the running ring to two arcs, reducing the weight and eliminating its protrusion beyond the projection of the vehicle body.
On the pursuit, above the recoil module (it is not indicated in the figure), a conical semi-tower is installed, the main purpose of which is to protect the aiming mechanism, recoil module and the docking unit of the loading mechanism.
The gun is installed in an armored capsule and shifted back, outside the running ring, forming a developed, swinging aft niche.
In none of the operating modes the gun barrel extends beyond the generatrix of the front, inclined part of the track, which significantly reduces the risk of the robotic module "sticking".
The normal position of the implement is the "maximum back" position.
Why is not the barrel of the gun installed on the recoil module, but a set consisting of a conical semi-tower, a targeting mechanism, an armored capsule and the gun itself, with breech mechanisms !?
To use the standard 120mm gun recoil devices, maintain the weight balance and reduce the 140mm gun rollback to an acceptable level, a shot organization scheme was used that was not previously used for tanks.
This scheme is based on a technical solution that was quite widespread in the 19th century for powerful fortress guns, in which the recoil devices, which take over the rollback of the entire gun together with the gun carriage, were located horizontally, motionless on the turntable and did not depend on the elevation angle.
The use of such a scheme for firing a shot, together with the rollout of the entire movable part forward, will reduce the rollback of the 140mm gun to the level laid down for this type of chassis.
Having received the command to fire, the automatic equipment of the gun, synchronously with the execution of the shot, "rolls forward" the entire movable part of the gun complex, having a weight of approximately 5-6 tons.
The synchronization of the rollout is carried out so that the moment the projectile leaves the barrel coincides with the point, after the passage of which, the inertia of the moving parts moving forward could extinguish the excess part of the recoil energy of the shot.
This arrangement of the shot can also significantly reduce the overturning moment characteristic of tanks with a rearward-shifted cannon.
A tank cannon is a weapon in which loading is carried out not by moving the "shot" forward, into the breech, integrated with the barrel, but by moving backward, into a swinging charging chamber, made like a barrel chamber of a revolving cannon.
In the process of loading, the chamber can move back and deviate to the loading line.
The rear of the chamber is locked with a wedge gate; locking the front part with a floating conical washer similar to that used in revolving cannons.
Since the module is completely uninhabited and the chamber is separated from the "shots" prepared for loading, a slight breakthrough of gases through the seals is not decisive.
It is possible that there is a possibility of upgrading the existing barrel of a 120mm tank gun to 130mm by replacing the "liner" and revising the breech.
When using "shots" having a front sealing ring, with a combustible sleeve or using a liquid propellant, it is possible to organize the barrel locking with a more compact (for this scheme) piston lock, which simultaneously serves as a moving device for the chamber.
The use of this scheme for organizing the shot requires purging the chamber with compressed air, but, at the same time, it allows the author of the article to implement the proposal of the author of the article on filling the chamber with light gas under high pressure before firing, in order to change the internal ballistics of the barrel.
Such a change in ballistics, due to the stratification of the specific gravity of the propellant combustion products along the barrel length, makes it possible to increase the muzzle velocity, including due to the more efficient use of barrel elongation.
The effect is that at the same temperature, the expansion rate of a light gas is much higher than the expansion rate of high molecular weight combustion products of propellants and, accordingly, the speed of the projectile is determined by a rapidly expanding light gas, such as highly heat-conducting helium.
Unfortunately, the answer to the question of how realistic and rational it is to use it in a tank gun can only be based on the results of full-scale tests.
The second module, complementing the remotely controlled cannon module, is the control and support vehicle, also made on the basis of the prototype tank.
Oddly enough, such vehicles, which have a good overview, powerful anti-personnel weapons and are capable of providing cover for a group from an air attack, not only exist, but, as far as I know, have already passed military tests.
These are "tank support combat vehicles"
These vehicles have sufficient anti-personnel weapons, and are also capable of providing cover from air attacks.
Made on the basis of the same tank as the gun module, they have approximately adequate armor and maneuverability.
It is very important that these vehicles are well equipped with observing instruments.
The main improvement that will be required is the replacement of the onboard mortars with automatic, guided mortars, capable of purposefully building a cloaking screen not only around the group of vehicles, but also in the form of an umbrella above the group that is transparent only in a narrow optical range.
Such an umbrella, making it difficult for the enemy to target airborne weapons operating in the infrared and radio ranges, will not interfere with the control module, the guidance system of which mainly uses optics of the visible range.
A mobile group consisting of two gun modules, two control modules and a technical support vehicle is the most optimal for making breakthroughs deep into the territory captured by the enemy.
If one of the control machines fails, its functions to a limited extent can be taken over by the technical support machine.
The technical support vehicle, operating under the cover of the strike group, is also carried out on the basis of the main tank, by replacing the heavily armored nose with a lightly armored section with an additional road roller.
The support vehicle carries additional fuel and ammunition for the main vehicles.
In place of the tower, as a weapon, an artillery module with small-caliber rapid-fire cannons and two small-sized surface-to-air missiles was installed.
There is a container with an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and several mortars for launching disposable parachute or balloon cameras.
Such a mobile group is capable of operating completely autonomously for a day or for several days with limited autonomy, receiving fuel and ammunition from independent sources.
Considering that the countries under the threat of external aggression are armed with a large number of fully functional T64 and T72 tanks, their modernization according to the proposed scheme will dramatically change the balance of forces in the event of ground operations.
In some cases, the very presence of mobile units organized on their basis may force the aggressor country to abandon the ground operation in view of the excessiveness of the alleged losses.
