The beginning of hostilities
After the failure of negotiations in Prague and the announcement of the end of the armistice, a moratorium on crossing the demarcation line and the start of hostilities was to be observed within six days. However, the Silesian army under the command of the Prussian general Blucher violated this condition. The Prussian general declared that the time had come to end the political buffoonery, and on August 14, 1813, invaded the neutral territories around Breslau. He wanted to seize the harvest gathered by the peasants so that the enemy would not get it.
The movement of Blucher's troops was unexpected for the French command and distracted them from the Russian-Prussian columns under the command of Barclay de Tolly, who were moving to Bohemia to join the Austrian troops under the command of Schwarzenberg. Blucher's decisiveness led Napoleon to believe that these were the main forces of the enemy, and he moved on the Silesian army. Blucher, whose significant part of the troops consisted of the Landwehr (militia), according to the Trachenberg plan, immediately withdrew the troops on August 21. He retreated from the Beaver River to the Katsbakh River, trying not to get involved in major battles. At this time, the Bohemian army, suddenly for the enemy, moved to Dresden through the Ore Mountains, threatening the rear of the main French army. Dresden was covered only by the forces of the corps of Marshal Saint-Cyr. Napoleon was forced to throw troops from Silesia back to his most important stronghold. Against Blucher, he left a strong screen under the leadership of MacDonald.
Simultaneously with the movement of Napoleon's army, 70 thousand. the army under the command of Marshal Oudinot moved to Berlin. Oudinot was to be supported by the French garrisons from Magdeburg and Hamburg. The French emperor, after the end of the armistice, was obsessed with the idea of taking the Prussian capital. He believed that after the capture of the Berlin by the French, Prussia would be forced to surrender.
The balance of forces in the Berlin direction
Under the leadership of Nicolas Charles Oudinot there were three corps. The 4th corps was commanded by divisional general Henri Gassien Bertrand (13-20 thousand soldiers), the formation was made up of Germans and Italians. The 7th corps was led by divisional general Jean-Louis-Ebenezer Rainier (20-27 thousand), it consisted of a French division and Saxon units. The 12th corps was commanded by Oudinot himself (20-24 thousand). The group also included cavalry under the command of Jean-Tom Arrigue de Casanova (9 thousand) and artillery, numbering 216 guns. The total number of the group consisted of 70 thousand people (according to the data of the Duke of Rovigo and AI Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky - 80 thousand soldiers). In addition, Oudinot had to support Marshal Davout from Hamburg (30 - 35 thousand French and Danes) and General J. B. Girard (10 - 12 thousand) from Magdeburg on the Elbe. I must say that in the group of Oudinot there were many unfired soldiers, recruits. Napoleon, after the crushing defeat of Prussia in 1806, treated the Prussians with contempt. However, he did not take into account that the shame of the battle of Jena and Auerstedt, mobilizes the Prussian army.
Oudinot was an experienced commander who was not afraid of the enemy - at the Berezina he was wounded for the twentieth time. In the battle of Berezina, he covered the retreat of the remnants of the Great Army. In the Battle of Bautzen, Napoleon assigned him to attack the right wing of the allied army and the marshal led it with the perseverance necessary for success. However, during the attack on Berlin, he did not show his usual determination. The heterogeneous composition of the troops raised doubts in him, and there was no trust in the command staff. Rainier was offended that his peers received the marshal's baton and showed obstinacy, self-will. Bertrand was better known for his engineering knowledge than his military exploits.
Oudinot launched an offensive against the Prussian capital, moving from Dame through Trebin and Mitenwalde. The troops of Davout and Girard could go to the rear of the Northern army of Bernadotte and cut the path of retreat to Berlin. According to Napoleon's plan, all three groups of troops were to unite into one army, capture Berlin, lift the siege of fortresses along the Oder, defeat the Northern Army and force Prussia to surrender.
The northern army, under the command of the future king of Sweden and former French commander Bernadotte, was also diverse in ethnic composition, like Oudinot's troops. It included Prussian, Russian, Swedish troops, small contingents of small German states and even an English detachment. The most powerful contingent was represented by the Prussians: two Prussian corps - the 3rd corps under the command of Lieutenant General Friedrich von Bülow (41 thousand soldiers with 102 guns), and the 4th corps under the command of Lieutenant General Boguslav Tauenzin Count von Wittenberg (39 thousand. man, 56 guns). In addition, the Prussian corps were reinforced by Russian Cossack regiments. In the Russian corps under the command of Lieutenant General Ferdinand Fedorovich Vintsingerode there were about 30 thousand people and 96 guns. The Swedish corps under the command of K. L. Stedinga had in its composition 20-24 thousand people with 62 guns. The rest of the troops entered the consolidated corps under the command of Lieutenant General Ludwig von Walmoden-Gimborn (was in the Russian service). In the consolidated corps there were 22 thousand soldiers with 53 guns. In total, under the command of Bernadotte there were about 150 thousand people with 369 guns, but part of the forces was in separate detachments and garrisons scattered across Prussia. Therefore, the balance of forces was approximately equal. The question was who would be able to concentrate more troops on the battlefield. In this Bernadotte had the advantage. The main forces of the Northern Army (94 thousand soldiers with 272 guns) defended the Berlin area. In the center at Ghenersdorf was the 3rd corps of Bülow, on the left flank at Blankefeld - the 4th corps of Tauenzin von Wittenberg, on the right flank, at Rhulsdorf and Gütergortsz - the Swedish troops.
It should also be noted that Bernadotte enjoyed great prestige in the Allied forces. The commander-in-chief of the Northern Army was valued as a former associate of Napoleon. It was believed that he was the author of a general plan of action for all allied armies. However, despite the goodwill of public opinion, the position of the Swedish commander was very difficult. The northern army was not homogeneous, it consisted of various national contingents. Bernadotte had to leave the troops to defend Berlin, watch the enemy troops in Hamburg and Lubeck and the French garrisons in the rear on the Oder River (in Stetin, Glogau and Kustrin), while conducting offensive operations, crossing the Elbe. In addition, the Swedish corps was inferior to the Prussian and Russian troops in combat experience, tactical skill and equipment. The Russian corps of Vintzingerode consisted of experienced soldiers with high morale. The Bülow corps, which had already won victories at Halle and Lucau, was also distinguished by its high combat capability. From the very beginning, a conflict arose between Bernadotte and the Prussian commanders. The crown prince came into conflict with Bülow and irritated the Prussians by the fact that the coast of the Swedish troops and gave preference to the Russian troops over the Prussians. As a result, Bülow and Tauenzin, commanding the troops covering Berlin, considered themselves in the right to act independently, which caused the commander's dissatisfaction.
A dispute arose between Bernadotte and the Prussian generals over the actions of the Northern Army. On August 5 (17), a military meeting was held, where the commander invited Bülow to state his vision for the upcoming campaign. Bülow, like other Prussian generals, proposed to move to Saxony, since the Brandenburg possessions were exhausted by the stagnation of troops. Swedish generals supported this opinion. However, Bernadotte considered the offensive to be dangerous.
Friedrich Wilhelm von Bülow (1755 - 1816).
Battle
Heavy rains washed out the roads, and Oudinot was forced to split his group. All three buildings went along different roads. The 7th Corps (Saxon) and the cavalry marched in the center towards Gross-Beeren. On the left wing, the 12th corps moved to Ahrensdorf, on the right - the 4th corps to Blankenfeld. On August 10 (22), 1813, the French corps came into contact with the Prussians, the Prussian corps, without accepting the battle, retreated north towards Berlin and took more advantageous positions. Bülow's 3rd corps blocked the road to Berlin outside the village of Gross-Beeren (18 km south of the center of the Prussian capital), and Tauenzin's 4th corps closed the road near the village of Blankenfeld. The Wintzingerode corps was at Huthergots, the Swedes at Rhulsdorf.
The appearance of the French army in one small passage from Berlin, caused great fears in Prussia. Bernadotte called the commanders for a meeting. The commander of the Northern Army said that it was necessary to fight. The question is where? But he expressed his doubts about the success, speaking about the heterogeneity of the troops, a significant number of non-fired Prussian militias, about the possibility of the appearance of the main enemy forces led by Napoleon. Bernadotte initially wanted to withdraw the troops behind the Spree and sacrifice Berlin. When Bülow expressed the general opinion of the Prussian generals that it was impossible to concede Berlin under any circumstances, the prince said: “But what is Berlin? Town! Bülow replied that the Prussians would rather all fall in arms than retreat for Berlin.
On August 11 (23), Oudinot attacked the Prussian positions with the forces of the 4th and 7th corps. The 12th corps did not participate in the battle; it covered the left flank. The French commander-in-chief expected other enemy corps to appear on this side. In addition, he believed that on this day there would be no decisive battle. The Prussian corps of Tauenzin entered into a firefight with the enemy at 10 o'clock. On this, the fighting near the village of Blankenfeld was limited. Tauenzin's corps of the regular troops had only the 5th reserve regiment, all the rest of the infantry and cavalry were composed of the landwehr (militia). However, the nature of the terrain contributed to the defense of the corps: at Blankenfeld, the position of the corps was located between the swamp and the lake.
Rainier's 7th Corps was more active. The Saxons entered the battle at 16 o'clock and on the move took the village of Gross-Beeren by storm, knocking out the Prussian battalion from there. However, they did not move further, it started raining heavily, the Saxons considered that the battle on that day was over. Rainier did not know that the Prussian corps was located at a distance of less than two versts from him. In addition, the Saxon corps was in a strong position: on the left flank there should have been the 12th corps and Arriga's cavalry, on the right - a swampy lowland and a moat.
Bülow did not think the fight was over. He knew that an entire enemy corps was attacking Tauenzin and decided to take advantage of the disunity of the enemy forces. Bülow wanted to crush the enemy center, forcing the flanks to retreat. He moved the 3rd and 6th brigades of Prince L. of Hesse-Homburg and K. Kraft to Gross-Beeren, reinforcing them with the 4th brigade of G. Tyumen. Simultaneously, L. Borstel's brigade moved around the enemy's right flank. The troops greeted the news of the attack with joy.
The scheme of the battle at Gross-Beeren 11 (23) August 1813
After shelling the enemy camp, the Prussian troops launched a counteroffensive. For the Saxons, this attack came as a surprise. The first to break into the village was Kraft's brigade. But the Saxons repulsed the attack. With a repeated bayonet attack, the Prussian infantry drove the enemy out of Gross-Beeren. Many Saxons were exterminated with bayonets and rifle butts, and drowned. Zara's Saxon division was overturned. Zar himself, trying to defend the artillery, rushed with two battalions to meet the Prussian troops, but was defeated. He himself was almost taken prisoner, received several wounds. The cavalry began to pursue the fleeing Saxons. The Saxon Lancers tried to defend their infantry, but after several successful attacks, they were defeated by the Pomeranian Cavalry Regiment. Rainier tried to rectify the situation with the help of the French division of Durutte, which was in the second line, but it was already involved in a general retreat. Later, the Saxons accused the French division of General P. F. Dyurutta, whose soldiers fled without taking part in the battle, hiding in the forest. In addition, the Saxons expressed their distrust of Oudinot, who was in no hurry to send the forces of the 12th corps to them. At 8 o'clock in the evening, the battle ended. Rainier's corps was defeated and retreated.
The Saxon corps was saved from complete defeat by the infantry division of General A. Guillemino and the cavalry division of General F. Fournier, expelled by Oudinot. Bertrand, learning of Rainier's defeat, withdrew his troops from Blankenfeld. At this time, in the evening, the Russian and Swedish corps under the command of Bernadotte entered the left flank of Oudinot's grouping. Oudinot did not accept the battle and withdrew the troops. The Swedish crown prince was in no hurry to take advantage of the success of Bülow's corps and defeat the entire group of Oudinot. On August 24, the troops rested, they set out only the next day and moved in small transitions. Therefore, Oudinot withdrew the troops without haste.
The victory of the Prussian corps caused a patriotic upsurge in Prussia. Berlin was defended. The townspeople were delighted with Bülow and the Prussian military. The morale of the Northern Army increased greatly.
K. Röchling. Battle of Gross-Beeren on 23 August 1813
Conclusion
Other French units were unable to provide assistance to Oudinot. Girard's detachment was defeated on August 27 at Belzig by the Prussian Landwehr and the Russian detachment under the command of Chernyshev. The French lost 3,500 men and 8 guns. Davout, learning about the defeat of other forces, retreated to Hamburg, from where he no longer appeared.
Oudinot's grouping in the battle at Großberen lost 4 thousand people (2, 2 thousand killed and wounded, 1, 8 thousand prisoners) and 26 guns. The losses of the Prussian troops amounted to about 2 thousand people. A significant number of captured weapons were captured, they were thrown while fleeing. This made it possible to improve the armament of the Prussian Landwehr units. The main losses fell on the Saxon units of the Rainier corps. This increased the irritation of the Saxon officers, who had previously thought about going over to the side of Napoleon's opponents. In addition, Saxony was exhausted by the location of a huge French army there during the armistice. The discontent of the Saxons with the French was also manifested in the fact that almost all the captives of Saxon origin, captured in the battle at Großberen, went over to the side of the allied forces. The French, in spite of the courageous resistance of the Saxons in the battle of Großberen, blamed them for the failure of the offensive.
Napoleon was unhappy with Oudinot's actions. His particular irritation was caused by the fact that Oudinot had withdrawn his troops to Witenberg, and not to Torgau. As a result, his grouping was removed from the reserves in Dresden, the disunity of the French troops increased. Planning to strike Berlin again, the French emperor replaced Oudinot with Marshal Ney and promised to strengthen his grouping.
Memorial tower in honor of the victory of the Prussian troops at Großberen in 1813.
