In the previous articles of the cycle, we examined in detail the main issues of the battle of the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" with the superior forces of the Japanese, so there is not much left for us. We have given a diagram of the damage received by the Varyag before the cruiser passed the traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), that is, until 12.05 in our time, now we will supplement it with the rest.
Recall that before receiving damage, as a result of which control of the cruiser was, most likely, lost, the ship received at least four direct hits - in the stern (behind the support guns), in the right wing of the bridge (midshipman Nirod was killed), in main mars, which, most likely, caused the fire on the quarterdecks (but it is possible that the fire is the result of another, additional hit to the mast above the quarterdecks) and into the starboard bulwark between the first and second pipes. In total, the Varyag was hit by one 203-mm shell (in the stern) and three, possibly four 152-mm shells. It seems to be a little, however, as we have already said, as a result of these hits and fragments of shells that exploded near the ship, the cruiser lost at least, but rather even more than 10-15 people killed alone. This is a lot, if we remember that during the entire time of the Tsushima battle, 10 and 12 people were killed on the Aurora and Oleg, respectively, while the Varyag lost the same number or more in 20 minutes.
The fifth (or sixth?) Hit on the Russian cruiser was recorded at 12.06, almost simultaneously with the hit on the bulwark (this does not contradict Russian reports). Already after lifting the Varyag, on the forecastle of the cruiser in the area, between the front pipe and the bow bridge, on the starboard side, a large hole was found, dimensions 3, 96 * 1, 21 m. Judging by its dimensions, this is the result of a hit of a 203-mm projectile and it was he who caused the injury of V. F. Rudnev and the death and injury of people nearby. The logbook describes the death of two, the staff-bugler and the drummer, who were next to the commander, but, it is not excluded, and even most likely, that in fact there were more deaths. If we look at the diagram given by V. Kataev (most likely, compiled according to the data of R. M. Melnikov, but V. Kataev turned out more clearly.
Then we will see that in the area of the conning tower, in addition to the bugler and drummer, five more crew members were killed during the battle: the quartermaster, the gunner, a sailor of the 1st class and two sailors of the 2nd class. At the same time, the places of their death are just in the zone of destruction of the Japanese projectile. Thus, this hit of a 203-mm projectile from the Asama, in addition to causing problems with the control of the cruiser, killed 2 to 7 people.
The question of the "almost simultaneous" hit of several 152-mm shells in the middle of the Varyag's hull, which was observed from the Asama, remains open. Apparently, the Japanese armored cruiser recorded a hit from the Naniwa, which we described earlier. But it is interesting that at the same time the hit of their shell in the Varyag was recorded on the Takachiho: however, according to the results of the inspection of the Varyag by the Japanese, it can be argued that only three Japanese shells hit the bow of the ship's hull (152-mm in the right wing of the bridge, 203 mm at the wheelhouse and 120-152 mm - in the starboard bulwark). So it is quite possible that Naniwa and Takachiho are claiming the same bulwark hit. However, something else is also possible - the fact is that at some point in time the cruiser received damage to the third pipe located just in the middle of the hull, the time of which is not reflected either in the Russians or in the Japanese reports. Unfortunately, the author of this series of articles could not figure it out, neither when this hit to the "Varyag" happened, nor from any particular side came a shell that hit the cruiser pipe.
During the rise of the Varyag, its hull was examined for various kinds of damage, and the Japanese themselves drew up a diagram of them, given in the monograph by A. V. Polutova. However, by the time it was drawn up, the cruiser's spars and pipes were cut off, so data on their damage was not included in the diagram. Only V. Kataev's diagram remains, and it demonstrates the through penetration of the third chimney, while the maximum damage (torn off sheets of the outer casing) are on the starboard side. But what does this mean? Perhaps the projectile hit the starboard side, exploded, and its fragments (the warhead?) Went through the pipe. It is possible otherwise - that the projectile hit the left side, broke through the outer casing, the inner one, and exploded, thereby knocking out the outer casing skin from the inside. In the opinion of the author of this article, the first option is most likely, but it could have been different. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that "several 152-mm hits in the middle of the hull" that were observed on "Asam", and hits on the cruiser, which "Naniwa" and "Takachiho" recorded themselves represent hits on the starboard bulwark and the third pipe.
However, there is one more, not entirely clear damage. The fact is that after lifting the cruiser, the presence of another hole in the starboard side was discovered, in addition to those described above. It had a size of 0, 72 * 0, 6 m and was located in the area of the 82nd frame, between the stern bridge and the extreme side gun (No. 9). The Japanese did not observe this hit, but in the Varyag logbook there is an entry: "A shell that passed through the officers' (cabins) was destroyed, the deck was pierced and flour was ignited in the provisioning compartment." However, this record refers to the time after 12.15, when the cruiser was turned to starboard towards the enemy, and could not get hit on the left side. In addition, the provisioning compartment is far enough away from the point of impact (behind the poop guns). At the same time, the "Combat report" of the commander of the "Asama" contains an indication of the hit of a 203-mm shell in the stern, which happened a little earlier, at 12.10: "An 8-inch shell hit the deck behind the aft bridge. A strong fire broke out, the foremast top hung over the starboard side. " However, it is extremely doubtful that the 203-mm projectile would leave behind such a small one, only 0.43 sq. M. hole.
Most likely, this was the case. In the period from 12.00 to 12.05, while the cruiser went to the traverse about. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi), literally in 5 minutes "Varyag", received three or four hits (in the bridge, stern and main mars, probably another shell exploded over the quarterdecks, hitting the rigging) lost 10-15 people killed, after which, having passed the traverse of Phalmido-Yodolmi Island, it began to turn to the right. Here, at 12.06, three or even four shells hit the Russian cruiser almost simultaneously - one 203 mm near the conning tower, and two or three 120-152 mm shells - one in the bulwark, one in the tube and one in the stern, in area of officers' cabins. It was this that was perceived on the Asam as several hits in the middle part of the cruiser hull. As a result, the "Varyag" lost control, and rolled into a U-turn on the rocks about. Yodolmi. But, when the cruiser turned her left side towards the Japanese, she almost immediately (in the interval (06/12/12/10) receives two more direct hits. One of them (120-152-mm projectile) caused the stoker to flood and thereby put an end to on the idea of a breakthrough, and the second - with a 203-mm projectile in the stern, which was mentioned in the "Battle report" of the commander of the "Asama" caused the same fire, and the ignition of flour in the food compartment. Interestingly, the hit that caused the sinking of the stoker during the battle on Japanese ships was not recorded, this damage was discovered already during the ship's lifting operations.
As for further hits (highlighted in blue on the diagram) into the cruiser, with them, apart from the shell that flooded the stoker, everything is more complicated. The fact is that in the stern of the Varyag several damages to the hull were recorded during its ascent:
1.two holes with sizes of 0, 15 by 0, 07 m and 0, 20 by 0, 07 m and next to them 4 small holes;
2. a hole measuring 3, 96 by 6, 4 m on the upper deck on the port side, a fire broke out in the same place;
3. hole on the upper deck measuring 0.75 by 0.67 m.
So - as for the damage according to claim 1, then they most likely arose either as a result of the scattering of fragments (metal structures of the hull) when 203-mm shells hit, or as a result of the detonation of the cruiser's shells under the influence of fire. As for the hole 3, 96 by 6, 4 m, it looks too large for one 203-mm projectile - it is 5, 3 times larger than the hole made by a 203-mm projectile near the conning tower of the Varyag (25, 34 sqm and 4.79 sqm respectively)! Therefore, we can assume that, despite the well-known proverb “a shell does not fall twice into one funnel,” this hole was the result of a successive hit of two 203-mm shells (the first at 12.00 and the second at 12.10). And, finally, the last hole was the result of the hit of another 120-152-mm projectile. Probably, the cruiser received this hit already upon returning to Chemulpo, although, on the other hand, given that it was not recorded in either Japanese or Russian reports, a shell could hit the cruiser at any time of the battle.
Thus, we counted 10 hits to the hull and one to the spars above the quarterdecks, and, most likely, 9 hits to the hull and one to the spars the ship received in the interval from 12.00 to 12.10, that is, in just 10 minutes. The Japanese believe that 11 shells hit the Varyag, according to their other sources - 14.
We have already given the approximate position of the battling ships as of 12.05. Their further maneuvering is not that uninteresting, but almost impossible to reconstruct. We know that Asama turned to Varyag and went to him at about 12.06. Apparently, it was at this time on the Russian ships recorded "destruction of the rear bridge" and "failure of the stern tower" of the Japanese armored cruiser. It can be assumed that the Russian sailors fell victim to optical illusion, mistaking a Japanese salvo through the smoke of the previous one (and / or smoke from the chimneys) for hitting the aft part of the Asama, and then, after the Japanese cruiser turned to Varyag, its aft tower, of course, could no longer act on Russian ships - they were outside the sector of its shelling. But the combination of a "clearly visible" "hit" and a cessation of fire from the aft tower, most likely, became "obvious" evidence of the damage to the Asama by Russian cannons - alas, as we know today, false evidence.
"Chiyoda" followed "Asama" until 12.18, after which, having problems with the power plant, fell behind. "Naniwa" and the next "Niitaka" completed the circulation and also turned to the "Varyag". Only the third pair of Japanese cruisers: "Takachiho" and "Akashi" did not immediately go to the "Varyag", but turned on the opposite course, moving in the direction of about. Harido, and only later, having made a circulation, turned towards Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). What “Varyag” was doing at that time, we have already analyzed many times in the articles of our cycle, and there is no point in repeating. Having evaded meeting the island, the Varyag returned to the fairway and moved to Chemulpo - at 12.40 the Japanese ships pursuing the Russian ships ceased fire, and at 13.00-13.15 the Varyag dropped anchor about one and a half cables from the British cruiser Talbot.
I would like to note that after receiving the damage described above, the desire of V. F. Rudnev, at least for a while, to withdraw the ship from the battle looks more than justified, and the point is not only in the semi-underwater hole through which the stoker was flooded. Almost a great danger to the cruiser was caused by a fire in its aft part, or rather, in the provisioning compartment, where flour was burning. The danger of such a fire is usually completely underestimated, and completely in vain. The fact is that the combination of flour dust, oxygen and open fire, under certain circumstances, creates "magnificent" volumetric explosions
An "interesting" case took place in Benin in 2016. There, due to a violation of the waste disposal technology, the spoiled flour was not completely burned, and its (apparently smoldering) remains were thrown into a landfill. The enterprising local population rushed to collect flour, hoping to "get hold of the gratis", and at this time an explosion thundered. The result is 100 dead and 200 injured. In general, up to 400-500 explosions occur at grain processing facilities in the world per year.
But back to the Russian ships. The return of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" would not be so interesting if it were not for one bike that went for a walk on the Internet with the light hand of N. Chornovil. According to him, the cruiser "Varyag", wanting to get out of the battle, managed to develop a speed of 20 knots or even more: of course, at least some impartial analysis of the battle shows that the "Varyag" did not develop any such "super speed" on the way to Chemulpo …
The assertion that the Varyag is supposedly running away at full speed comes from speculations on the battle scheme, because, unfortunately, we do not know the exact position of the cruiser at any time after 12.05, when it passed the traverse of Pkhalmido (Yodolmi) Island and before 13.00 (according to the logbook of the gunboat "Koreets") or 13.15 (according to the logbook "Varyag") when the latter anchored, returning to the Chemulpo raid.
What do we know?
The battle report of the Asama commander, Yashiro Rokuro testifies:
“At 12.45 (12.10 our time) an 8-inch shell hit the deck behind the aft bridge. A strong fire broke out, the foremast topmast hung over the starboard side. The Varyag immediately turned, increased its speed and took cover behind the Pkhalmido Island in order to get out of the fire and began to extinguish the fires. At this time, the "Korean" left to the north of Phalmido Island and continued to fire."
Apparently, this describes the moment when the "Varyag" had already "backed off" from the island and made a move, turning to the right - since the turn "to the island" practically left the cruiser without a move, and then it also backed up, then the resumption of movement was apparently seen on the Asama as an increase in speed. Then, at some point, the "Varyag" hid from the "Asama" behind the island, while the "Korean" could still fire at the enemy.
Thus, the following scheme for maneuvering Russian ships suggests itself
This scheme is quite consistent with the report of the commander of "Akasi": "At 12.50 (12.15) the Russian ships, having made a circulation, lay on the opposite course and began to retreat to Chemulpo."
Further, Yashiro Rokuro writes: “At 13.15 (12.40 Russian time) the enemy approached the Chemulpo anchorage and stood between the ships of foreign states. I have ceased fire. The fact that the Japanese ceased fire at 12.40 is confirmed by the Varyag logbook:
“12.40 When the cruiser approached the anchorage and when the Japanese fire became dangerous for foreign ships, they stopped it and the two cruisers pursuing us returned to the squadron left behind the island“Yo-dol-mi””.
However, the Russian cruiser noted that the Japanese ceased fire not when the Varyag stood "between the ships of foreign states", but when the Japanese fire became dangerous for foreign stationary vehicles, which, generally speaking, is quite logical. It is inconceivable that the Japanese would continue to fire at the Russian cruiser when it found itself in close proximity to foreign ships. In addition, if all of a sudden it turned out to be true, then it is completely incomprehensible how the Varyag, having reached its place at 12.40, managed to anchor only at 13.00 (if the logbook of Koreytsa is right) or even at 13.15 (what the watchkeeper writes about magazine "Varyaga")?
True, the "Korean" indicates that the Japanese stopped the fire not at 12.40, but at 12.45, but there could have been a mistake. In the Varyag logbook it is noted that the Russian cruiser stopped firing 5 minutes later than the Japanese, at 12.45 - perhaps, seeing the Varyag firing on the Koreyets, they considered that the Japanese cruisers continued to respond to him, although in reality this was not the case.
Thus, the following reconstruction suggests itself - at 12.15 the Varyag was already walking along the fairway to the Chemulpo raid, at 14.40, on the way to the raid, the Japanese ceased fire and, at 12.45, apparently, at the entrance to the raid or a little later, it ceases fire and "Varyag". At 13.00 "Varyag" approaches the parking lot, at 13.00-13.15 it gives up anchor. Thus, 6 miles from about. Yodolmi before the raid (rather, even a little less, since at 12.15 the cruiser was already beyond the island), the Varyag passed at 12 knots - taking into account the oncoming current of about 2.5 knots, its speed did not exceed 14.5 knots, but rather was even less. Of course, the cruiser did not develop any 17, 18 or even 20 knots.
As a matter of fact, if you ignore the Russian reports, declaring them false, and also completely abandon common sense, believing that the Asama ceased fire on the Varyag only when it anchored next to the Talbot, then, indeed, it is possible “substantiate "that approximately 6-6, 5 miles from about. Pkhalmido flew to the anchorage at the Varyag roadstead in 20 minutes or even less. However, supporters of this version somehow forgot about the gunboat "Koreets".
Well, let's say everyone is lying, and the Varyag really could fly across the Chemulpo waters at a speed of 20 knots. Good. But the gunboat "Koreets" could not do this in any way! Its maximum speed on tests was 13, 7 knots, but the average was, of course, lower, and there is no evidence that on January 27, 1904, that is, approximately 17, 5 years after its acceptance tests "Korean »Could develop great speed. On the contrary, a minimal idea of the realities of the steam fleet of those years tells us that, most likely, the speed of the Koreyets was even lower than the 13.5 knots "according to the passport" set for it.
But no one has yet undertaken to refute the fact that the "Korean" turned around and went to the Chemulpo fairway almost simultaneously with the "Varyag". And if the cruiser really gave 18-20 knots, then it is obvious that the gunboat was far behind - with a speed difference of 4, 5-6, 5 knots in 20 minutes, the lag would be 1, 5-2, 17 miles. Let's say that this is exactly what happened: but in this case, the Japanese cruisers had no reason to cease fire at 12.40. They would simply transfer it from the Varyag to the Korean and continue to shoot further!
In other words, ignoring some reports and tearing phrases out of context from others, it is technically possible to imagine a situation in which the Varyag fled to the Chemulpo raid at a speed of 20 knots and even more. But in this case it is completely unclear how the Koreets kept up with the fast cruiser. And if he still lagged behind, then why did the Japanese ships not transfer fire to him? At the Varyag, it turns out, they shot almost until that moment of anchoring, and the Korean was released, although he obviously did not even have time to enter the raid?
In fact, on the Varyag, after V. F. Rudnev decided to withdraw from the battle, gave no more than 13, 5-14 knots, that is, not much more than the maximum that the gunboat could still develop, and if the Koreets lagged behind the Varyag, it was not at all much, so both Russian ships came to the raid almost simultaneously, at about 12.45-12.55.
A few words about the firing accuracy of Japanese cruisers. The consumption of shells of Japanese cruisers, together with the distances of the battle, let's look at the table compiled by A. V. Polutov
Considering that "Varyag" received 3 hits with 203-mm shells and 8 - with a caliber of 120-152-mm, we have a hit percentage of 11, 11% 203-mm and 3, 16% 120-152-mm. It is very difficult to calculate the percentage of hits for individual ships, since, apart from 203-mm shells, it is unclear from which particular ship this or that hit was made. But if we assume that the Japanese "Battle Reports" are not mistaken, and that "Naniwa" and "Takachiho" achieved one hit each, and the rest - the result of shooting "Asama", it turns out that the six-inch "Asama" showed 5, 82%, "Naniwa" - 7, 14%, "Takachiho" - 10% accuracy. Nevertheless, this is highly doubtful, because the number of spent shells of the last two cruisers is extremely small, and the Takachiho was also almost the farthest from the Varyag. As we saw above, the Varyag received almost all of its hits in just 10 minutes, and here it is rather difficult to single out the hit of its own projectile. It can be assumed that all hits on the Varyag were achieved from the Asama, in this case the accuracy of its 152-mm guns was 7.77%.
Noteworthy is the abnormally high firing accuracy of the Japanese armored cruiser. On the same day, the main forces of the Japanese fleet entered into an approximately 40-minute battle with the Russian squadron near Port Arthur - having spent 1,139 152-203-mm shells, the Japanese achieved 22 hits maximum, which is no more than 1, 93%. What is the reason for such an accurate shooting by the Asama's gunners?
Unfortunately, the author does not have an answer to this question, but there is some assumption, a hypothesis. The fact is that "Asama" for a long time could not aim at the "Varyag" - having opened fire at 11.45 Russian time, it achieves the first hit only a quarter of an hour later, at 12.00. Generally speaking, this is far from the best result - the Varyag is sailing along the fairway, the position of which is known, its speed is frankly low, and nevertheless, “bang, bang, and past”. Let's remember that 6 lead ships Z. P. Rozhestvensky in Tsushima, in much worse weather conditions, they were able to hit the Japanese ships with 25 shells, of which 19 hit the Mikasa, the flagship of H. Togo.
However, then on "Asam" they nevertheless shot, and then they planted an average of a shell every minute. Why is that? The unsuccessful maneuver of the Varyag, here, perhaps, did not even play a special role, because, as we can see, the bulk of the hits nevertheless fell on the starboard side of the cruiser, that is, even before the Varyag made a U-turn. island ", turning to the enemy's left side.
Perhaps the sharply increased accuracy of the Japanese artillerymen is due to the fact that the Varyag approached about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), whose position in space was well known - as a result of this, the Japanese rangefinders and artillerymen received an excellent reference point. This hypothesis is also confirmed by the fact that later, when the Varyag retreated from the island, returning to the fairway, the armored cruiser Asama, although it continued pursuit and fired, apparently did not achieve more direct hits. That is, an interesting picture is observed - the Japanese did not get into the Varyag in clear water, but as soon as he approached about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), how their fire acquired a deadly accuracy, which the Japanese armored cruisers, most likely, in no episode of the Russian-Japanese war had already achieved. But for some reason this superprecision was immediately lost, as soon as the "Varyag" again moved away from the island.
As for the Russian cruiser, having spent about 160 152-mm and 50 75-mm shells, most likely, she did not achieve hits on the Japanese ships. "Korean" fired 22 203-mm, 27 152-mm and 3 75-mm projectiles at Japanese ships, also, alas, unsuccessfully. Theoretically speaking, we can assume that one or two shells did hit the Japanese - it is possible that if such hits did not harm the Japanese, the latter did not reflect them in their reports, but there is no evidence that from the Varyag really did not hit someone. As for the "sunk" Japanese destroyer, it remains to quote the report of the commander of the 14th destroyer detachment, captain of the 3rd rank Sakurai Kitimaru, or rather that part of it that was directly related to the battle:
“At 12.25 (11.50), seeing that the battle flag was raised on the Naniwa, he ordered to deploy the torpedo tubes at 10 degrees. in the nose (with the exception of torpedo tubes No. 3) and prepare them for firing. At 12.26 (11.51) "Varyag" opened fire, and each ship of our detachment began to return fire. "Chidori", "Hayabusa", "Manzuru", being at the aft heading angles from the side of the non-firing side of the "Naniwa" at a distance of 500-600 m, walked in a parallel course, waiting for a convenient moment to attack. At 13.20 (12.45) the enemy ships again took refuge in the anchorage. At 13.25 (12.50) I saw that the battle flags were lowered."
Thus, all three Japanese destroyers participating in that battle followed the Naniva for almost the entire battle and did not make any attempts to approach the Russian ships - therefore, the Varyag did not have the opportunity to sink one of them, or at least cause damage.
Everything seems to be clear - "Varyag" and "Koreets" were unable to inflict any significant damage on the enemy. Nevertheless, there are several oddities of explanation for which the author of this article does not have - we will consider them a little later, in the next article, since there is simply no room left for this.
And, finally, the loss of the Varyag crew.
According to the cruiser's logbook, during the battle on January 27, 1904, the Varyag lost 31 people killed, 27 seriously wounded, 58 less seriously wounded, and a total of 116 people, of which 58 were either killed or seriously wounded. Later, in a report to the Head of the Naval Ministry, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev indicated that 31 people were killed, 88 more or less seriously wounded (three officers and 85 lower ranks), as well as 100 slightly wounded people who did not report their wounds immediately after the battle. How realistic is this estimate of losses, and how to understand “less seriously” or “more or less seriously” injured?
Let us turn to the article by T. Austin (in modern transcription - T. Austin), an English naval doctor, who, among his other colleagues, climbed onto the deck of the Varyag in order to help Russian sailors wounded in the battle. He is a foreigner, an eyewitness, a representative of a nation that was completely averse to Russians in that war. I was not noticed in discrediting ties with Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, in which our revisionists like to reproach the commanders of the French and Italian cruisers.
The first thing I would like to say is the version about the twenty-minute flight of "Varyag" from Fr. Phalmido to the anchorage at the roadstead is not confirmed by T. Austin. He writes: "Half an hour after the end of the battle, the Varyag returned to the Chemulpo raid with a roll to the left and with a burning stern." Isn't it a noticeable resemblance to the logbook of the Russian cruiser, which indicates that the battle ended at 12.45, and the ship anchored at 13.15? But we read further:
“Of the people employed in the lower part of the ship, no one was wounded, but out of 150 workers at the top, 40 were killed on the spot, and 68 were wounded … … The bandaging of the wounded continued without interruption from 1 hour 30 minutes to 3:45; for more than two hours, both doctors from the Varyag and three from neutral ships provided first aid, examined the wounds, removing foreign bodies from them that could be easily reached; the wounds were cleaned, the damaged parts were bandaged; in addition, stimulants were given and subcutaneous sprays of morphine were given. Thus, about 60 wounded passed, the rest appeared to the doctors only later. Nothing was done except for first aid, but there was no way to do anything either."
Let's try to translate it from "medical" into Russian. 5 doctors, within 2 hours 15 minutes were able to somehow treat the wounds of only "about 60" victims in the battle. Even if there are 60 of them, there are 12 patients for each doctor - in total, it took 11.5 minutes for each, and this was only for the provision of not at all comprehensive, but the very first, emergency care!
It is quite obvious that this was not about scratches.
But one must also understand that the Russian doctors of the Varyag did not stay idle during the battle and when they returned to the Chemulpo raid - they brought in the wounded and worked with them even before their foreign colleagues boarded the cruiser. In addition, T. Austin notes that some of the wounded did not even have time to provide first aid on the Varyag, and it was provided after the evacuation of Russian crews to foreign hospitals.
In view of the above, the information of V. F. Rudnev, if not absolutely reliable, then extremely close to the truth. This begs the assertion that 85-88 people indicated by the wounded, the overwhelming majority could no longer fulfill their official duties. And taking into account the 31 people killed during the battle, we can state that the data on the failure of 45% of the personnel, the military commands of which were located on the upper deck, compiled by R. M. Melnikov are quite reliable.
Without a doubt, the Varyag cruiser received not so many direct hits. Nevertheless, even leaving controversial information about the failure of artillery (as we analyzed earlier, there is no reason not to believe V. F. Received heavy damage to the hull (roll to the left side up to 10 degrees, fires) and suffered heavy losses in personnel, completely excluding further attempts to break through.
Yes, the main damage "Varyag" received literally within 15, but rather even 10 minutes (from 12.00 to 12.10). But the rest of the time, shells exploded near its sides, showering the ship with fragments that killed and injured Russian sailors. Considering all of the above, the famous painting by Pyotr Timofeevich Maltsev "The gunmen of the Varyag are fighting" does not at all look like an excessive artistic exaggeration - in the opinion of the author of this article, this is approximately how it was.
In conclusion of this article, I would like to quote the words of the ship's doctor "Talbot", T. Austin, who, as we said above, is difficult to suspect of secret sympathy for the crew of the Russian cruiser:
“It’s not me and not here that we should talk about the amazing courage with which the Russians behaved both during and after the battle, I can only say that their courage helped significantly in transporting and using the wounded.”
