The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa

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The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa
The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa

Video: The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa

Video: The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa
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Liquidation of the Sventsiansky breakthrough

The cavalry played an important role in this operation. In order to facilitate the action of Smirnov's 2nd Army, it was decided to concentrate all the cavalry on its right flank. The 1st Cavalry Corps of Oranovsky (8th and 14th Cavalry Divisions) was sent here on September 6 (19) by a forced march. He was supposed to, following to Molodechno and Krivichi, push back the German cavalry to the west, cover the Vileika-Polotsk railway and restore communication with the 5th Army. In addition, the mass of Russian cavalry hung over the base of the German wedge, showing that it itself could go into the enemy's rear. To strengthen the cavalry grouping, the Tumanov Consolidated Corps (6th and 13th cavalry divisions) was transferred to the subordination of Oranovsky. As a result, an entire cavalry army of 4 cavalry divisions (10 thousand sabers) was actually concentrated on the right flank of the 2nd Army.

Simultaneously with the Oranovsky group, another strong cavalry detachment was formed in the Polotsk direction. The headquarters considered that Potapov's detachment operating in the Polotsk region would not be able to reliably cover the city. Therefore, the 3rd Don Cossack Division was sent to help him from the Southwestern Front. She was dropped off in Polotsk on September 7 (20). The division commander Belozersky-Beloselsky was subordinated to Potapov's detachment. This cavalry group was supposed to reliably cover the approaches in the Drissa-Polotsk sector. The Drissa, Disna area was covered by another cavalry detachment of General Kaznakov.

Thus, the Russian command responded to the breakthrough of the German cavalry by creating a powerful cavalry grouping, which, together with all the detachments, was actually a cavalry army. It was a coup.

From 8 (21) September, the Russian cavalry began to act actively at the junction of the two fronts. Oranovsky's group advanced to the northwest, pushing the enemy's 4th, 1st and 3rd Guards Cavalry Divisions. Detachment Belozersky, moving from Polotsk to the west, threw back the 9th Cavalry Division of the Germans. Kaznakov's cavalry detachment (1st Guards and 5th Cavalry Divisions, Ussuri Cossack Brigade), attacking the southwest, pushed back the Bavarian division. The combined efforts of the Russian cavalry drove the enemy cavalry to the west of Postavy. The cavalry units came into contact with each other and restored communication between the Northern and Western fronts. As a result, the breakthrough of the enemy troops was eliminated.

In order to unite the actions of several cavalry units, it was decided to place them under the command of General Oranovsky. As a result, a cavalry group was created as part of the 1st Cavalry Corps, General Tumanov's Consolidated Corps, Kaznakov's detachment, the 3rd Don Division and Potapov's detachment. In the cavalry army of Oranovsky, there were actually three cavalry corps (8, 5 divisions) with 17 horse batteries (117 guns). The Russian cavalry was supposed to continue the offensive, break through the German front near Sventsiany for a subsequent attack in the rear of the enemy's Dvina grouping or a deeper invasion in the direction of Vilkomir and Ponevezh.

On September 16 (29), Oranovsky's cavalry continued the offensive. At the same time, the 1st Army and 1st Siberian Corps of the 1st Army of the new composition began to move to this sector of the front. By the evening of September 19 (October 1), the infantry changed the cavalry, which was taken to the second echelon. With the arrival of the cavalry of the Oranovsky and 1st Army in the Polotsk direction, the flanks of the Northern and Western Fronts were finally closed. At the same time, the German command regrouped its forces from Dvinsk to the south and from the Viliya River and Lake Naroch to fill the junction between the flanks of the Neman and 10th armies.

As a result, the plan of the German command was completely thwarted. An attempt by the German troops to encircle and destroy the main forces of the 10th Russian army ended in failure. The German troops successfully chose the place of the strike, successfully launched the operation, but could not defeat the Russian troops. The Russian command reacted quickly, skillfully pulled the front troops back, formed from the freed corps first one army (the 2nd new formation), then the second (1st army of the new formation), as well as a cavalry grouping - in fact, the Oranovsky cavalry army. Counterattacks by Russian troops closed the gap between the two Russian fronts. True, the German army was able to occupy new territories. The Russian armies withdrew to the line of the Western Dvina River, Dvinsk, Vileika, Baranovichi, Pinsk. The front has stabilized.

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The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa
The end of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front: the battle for Lutsk and Czartorysk. Operation on the river. Strypa

Commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps Vladimir Aloizievich Oranovsky

End of the 1915 campaign on the Eastern Front

Battle for Lutsk. The Austrian command abandoned further attempts to attack along the valleys of the Vistula and Bug rivers. It shifted its main efforts to Sarny and Lutsk. The forces of the 1st and 4th Austrian armies were regrouped there from the left flank. However, the Austrian troops did not achieve noticeable results.

Autumn operations on the Southwestern Front were also limited and did not lead to significant success for either side. In early September 1915, in the battle at Vishnevets and Dubno, Brusilov's 8th army defeated the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies opposing him.

General Brusilov, repelling the enemy's blow, turned to the Headquarters. He argued that if he was given reinforcements, then the 8th Army would be able to defeat the northern flank of the Austro-Hungarian army. It rested against a forest, and the Austrians had weak cover here. They believed that large-scale hostilities in the area were impossible. This proposal of Brusilov came at the time of the enemy's breakthrough near Sventsyan, when every regiment was on the account. However, Alekseev appreciated this opportunity. If the Austro-Hungarian troops are defeated, the Germans will again have to help them out, divert forces from the main direction. A fresh corps was sent to the 8th Army under the command of General Zayonchkovsky (the future prominent military historian). They decided to strike a blow at Lutsk.

On September 16, our troops launched an offensive. The 30th Corps and the 7th Cavalry Division were advancing on the northern flank, and the 39th Corps, the 4th Iron Division and the 8th Corps on the south. Denikin's iron infantry broke through the front and on September 18 reached Lutsk from the south. The storming of the city began. However, the city was fortified by the Russians even before the war. 2, 5 Austrian divisions with a large amount of artillery settled in Lutsk. Therefore, Denikin's division was greeted with a hurricane of fire. She was able to capture part of the enemy positions, but then she was stopped.

Then, from the north, Zayonchkovsky's 30th corps made its way to the city. However, it was not possible to take the city on the move. Russian troops, breaking through to Lutsk from both sides, took in ticks a significant part of the 4th Austrian army. The Austro-Hungarian command was withdrawing troops from a possible "cauldron", and for this it was necessary to hold the city. The Austrians stubbornly resisted. The attacks of the 30th Corps were repelled. Russian troops have used up their ammunition. There was nothing to respond to the powerful fire of the Austrian artillery. Then Denikin summoned the commanders of the regiments and said: "Our position is peak, there is nothing to do but attack."On September 23, Denikin's troops burst into the city with a surprise attack. Troops of the 30th corps rushed after them. The city was taken.

The victory was significant. Denikin's division alone took 10 thousand prisoners. Several Austrian units, which did not have time to retreat, were surrounded. The Austrians surrendered en masse. The 4th Austrian Army, which was considered the best in the Austro-Hungarian army, suffered a heavy defeat. The northern flank of the Austrian front was in danger of collapse. The Austrian command asked the Germans for help. Falkenhain had to remove one corps from Belarus to help the Austrians.

Russian intelligence discovered the approaching German troops. Brusilov sent the 30th corps, the 4th Iron and 7th cavalry divisions against the Germans. However, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front intervened and ordered to leave Lutsk and retreat to their old positions. At the same time, the troops of Zayonchkovsky and Denikin had to arrange an "ambush" for the Germans from the woods. It was believed that the Germans would be carried away by the pursuit and then the "ambush regiment" would strike from the rear. However, excessive ingenuity led to failure. Brusilov's objections were not taken into account. As soon as our troops began to withdraw, the Austrians perked up and counterattacked. They had to retreat in difficult terrain and with heavy rearguard battles. It was not possible to hide a mass of troops from 4 divisions in the forest. The Germans were not fools and found an "ambush". A tough counter battle began. In bloody battles, the Russian and German troops killed each other, lost up to 40% of the personnel. Weakened, both sides went on the defensive. So, Lutsk remained behind the enemy. The only positive result of the offensive of Brusilov's army was the diversion of German troops from the main direction.

Chartoryisk … Almost along the entire front, a positional defense was built with 2-3 fortified strips, each with 3-4 trenches with machine-gun nests, dugouts and wire obstacles. But in Polesie, a "window" remained between the Southwestern and Western fronts. German troops, standing against Brusilov's 8th Army near Lutsk, decided to take a more advantageous position and in October advanced north along the river. Styr and occupied the town of Czartorysk.

Brusilov, fearing a blow to his right flank, decided to strike at the enemy. Just at this time, reinforcements arrived - the 40th corps. He suggested that the front command allocate additional forces to him and conduct a serious operation, defeat the left flank of the Austro-German front, and break through to Kovel. However, the front commander Ivanov did not believe in the success of such an offensive and did not give reserves. At this time, he feared that the enemy would break through to Kiev and would have to be abandoned. Things got to the point that, 300 km from the front, on the Dnieper, large-scale work was underway to create fortifications.

Therefore, Brusilov decided to carry out a limited operation, to drive the Germans out of the Kolka and Czartorysk region, to improve their positions before the onset of winter. On October 16, our troops launched an offensive. The 30th Corps tried to break through to Kolki. But here the battles were going on in September and the enemy was well strengthened. It was not possible to break through the defenses. But to the north, near Czartorysk, the Germans had not yet had time to thoroughly fortify themselves. Voronin's 40th corps managed to secretly advance through forests and swamps. The attack was not expected. The Russians suddenly broke through the Styr River and attacked the enemy. They broke through the enemy's defenses, deepened 20 km and took Czartorysk on October 18.

Denikin's 4th division rushed into the enemy rear. The Austrians and Germans came to their senses and began to transfer reinforcements to the place of breakthrough. But Brusilov had no reserves, there was nothing to build on his success. The Austrians threw 15 regiments against Denikin's 4 regiments. While advancing, the Russian regiments broke away from each other and were in a semi-encirclement. The regiment commander Markov reported by telephone: “A very original situation. I am fighting on all four sides. It's so hard that it's even fun! However, Denikin was able to collect the scattered parts and withdraw the troops back. German and Austrian troops tried for some time to recapture Czartorysk, but to no avail. Both sides went on the defensive.

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Commander of the 8th Army Aleksey Alekseevich Brusilov

December offensive of the Southwestern Front

The last operation of the 1915 campaign was the December offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front. This offensive was undertaken in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Serbia, whose army at that time was engaged in unequal battles with Austrian, German and Bulgarian troops. In order to support Serbia in November, a new 7th Army was formed under the command of General Shcherbachev (4, 5 infantry and 1 cavalry corps).

There were several options for helping Serbia: by invading Bulgaria through Romania; a joint offensive, as proposed by the Russian Headquarters, to Budapest, 10 Russian corps through the Carpathians and 10 Anglo-French corps through Thessaloniki; landing of troops on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast; a strong blow from the left flank of the Southwestern Front, in order to pull the Austro-Germans here and alleviate the situation of the Serbs. The first option was rejected, since the Romanians refused to let Russian troops pass through their territory, and did not want to push Romania into the camp of the Central Powers. The second option was rejected by the allies. The third option did not like the naval command: the landing operation in late autumn, with the presence of German naval forces in the Black Sea and without a naval base in Constance, was an extremely risky step.

There is only one last option left. The 7th Army was transferred to the Trembovlya-Chortkov area in December. Shcherbachev's army was supposed to attack the enemy with the assistance of the neighboring - 11th Lechitsky (right) and 9th Sakharov (left) - armies on the river. Strypa, developing his breakthrough in the north and northwest directions. From the side of the Central Powers, the new German army of Bothmer and the 7th Austrian Pflyantser held the defense in this sector. In general, the Austro-German troops were slightly weaker than the Russian forces that attacked them.

The front command did not believe in the success of the operation. The front did not transfer front reserves to the 7th Army - 2 corps. What if the enemy will reflect the blow and go over to the counteroffensive? The 11th and 8th Armies were instructed not to take active action until the 7th Army achieved visible success. And only to make demonstrations with artillery and search for scouts. At the same time, they were ordered to take care of the shells. Brusilov argued again, said that such a demonstration would do nothing, offered to deliver an auxiliary blow, to really distract the enemy. However, he was banned.

The commander of the 7th Russian army acted in a standard manner. In the 25 km section of the offensive, he deployed his 3 corps, giving the flank corps 10 km for attack, and the middle corps, which delivered the main attack, a section of 5 km, leaving the fourth corps in reserve. The Austro-German command had 4-5 Austro-German divisions against the 7th Russian army, which occupied well-fortified positions. That is, the forces were approximately equal. The attacking Russian troops had no advantages.

However, the Austrians did not notice the preparation of the Russian troops. It was believed that there would be no active battles in winter. On December 27, 3 corps of the 9th Army delivered an auxiliary blow, but did not achieve success. On December 29, 3 corps of the 7th Army went on the offensive. Within three days, they took three lines of fortifications, advanced 20-25 km, reached the line of the Strypa River.

But the offensive took place under the most disgusting climatic conditions: sleet, mud and off-road conditions. Ammunition was scarce, and the artillery soon fell silent. Snow drifts did not allow ammunition to be brought up. The guns got bogged down in the mud. The soldiers had to walk up to their waist in sleet and mud. The army had no reserves to develop the offensive. The Austro-German command, not seeing the threat from the 11th and 8th armies, pulled up the troops to the place of the planned breakthrough, began to build a new defense. Brusilov reported this to Ivanov, offered to attack before it was too late. But he was again refused.

Meanwhile, fierce oncoming battles were already going on on Stryp. Austro-German troops counterattacked. The heights passed from hand to hand several times, the soldiers converged in hand-to-hand combat. The Austro-German troops, like the Russians, could not pull up the artillery, which gave them an advantage, due to the lack of roads. Both sides suffered huge losses. Under such conditions Alekseev stopped this aimless operation on January 26.

The front on Strypa stabilized, and there was a long lull. Serbia could not be helped. Russian troops lost 50 thousand people. Germans and Austrians are about the same. The front command blamed Shcherbachev for the failure. Shcherbachev blamed the front commander Ivanov and the headquarters.

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Commander of the 7th Army Dmitry G. Shcherbachev

Brief summary

The 1915 campaign on the Russian front led to the collapse of the Central Powers' plan to withdraw Russia from the war. The successes of the Austro-German troops in a number of operations did not change anything in the strategic position of the Central Powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary were increasingly experiencing a shortage of raw materials. The war dragged on and in this situation Germany was doomed, since it was in a blockade and did not have the vast expanses and resources of Russia, the colonial empires of England and France. Germany was unable to win a victorious campaign and expand the circle of allies - at the expense of Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. Italy opposed Austria. Romania chose to remain neutral. Only Bulgaria sided with Germany and Austria.

The great retreat is over. In five months, our troops lost Galicia, Poland, Lithuania, the west of Belarus and the south of Latvia. There were two main reasons for the defeat of the Russian army. First, the Russian military-political leadership failed to properly prepare the country, armed forces, economy and people for a major war of attrition. Secondly, England and France consistently implemented a strategy of waging war with Germany "to the last Russian soldier." Russia in 1915 had to fight a powerful enemy one-on-one. The British and French did nothing to help the ally. Their troops on the Western Front were almost inactive. Only in the autumn did the Western allies launch an offensive in Artois and Champagne, which did not change the strategic situation. This allowed the German command to conduct offensive operations against the Russian army for a long time and to transfer reinforcements from the West to the Eastern Front.

The Russian army, which took over and withstood the concentrated attacks of the Austro-German army, provided England and France with a strategic temporary respite necessary for the accumulation of forces and means, the transfer of countries and armed forces to the "rails" of a protracted war, which ultimately predetermined the victory of the Entente.

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