Troubles. 1919 year. Makhno's partisan war to destroy the rear of the White Army had a noticeable impact on the course of the war and helped the Red Army repel the offensive of Denikin's troops on Moscow.
The people and the white government
As noted earlier ("Why did the White Army lose"), the fundamental reason for the defeat of the White movement was the "white project" itself - bourgeois-liberal, pro-Western. The Westernizing Februaryists, having overturned Tsar Nicholas II, destroyed the autocracy and the empire, created the Provisional Republican Government, tried to make Russia a part of the "civilized world", Europe. However, their actions became a detonator of unrest. The "whites" have lost power. To return it, they, with the participation of Western "partners", unleashed a civil war. Their victory meant the rule of capitalism and the bourgeois-liberal order. This was contrary to the deep interests of the Russian civilization and the people.
This led to all the other reasons, contradictions and problems that led White to defeat. Robberies and requisitions were commonplace for all combatants, causing hatred of the population, reducing the social base of the White movement. Looting was especially characteristic of the Cossacks and mountain units. Donets Mamontov, having carried out a successful raid on the rear of the Southern Front in August - September 1919, returned with huge carts and loaded with various goods. Then most of the Cossacks went home to take their spoils and celebrate. The chairman of the Terek circle, Gubarev, who fought himself, reported: “Of course, it’s not worth sending out uniforms. They've changed their clothes ten times already. The Cossack returns from the campaign loaded so that neither he nor the horse can be seen. And the next day he goes on a hike again in one torn Circassian coat. Some of the commanders looked at such outrages with their eyes closed. In particular, when Yekaterinoslav was captured, the Cossacks Shkuro and Irmanov took a good walk around the city.
There were also objective factors for robberies - poor supplies, the absence of a developed and permanent rear, a normally functioning monetary system. The troops often "fed" from the population, as in the Middle Ages, switched to "self-supply". The troops were followed by whole echelons or carts, which the regiments loaded with "their" property and goods. In reserve. The hope of getting something from the rear was weak. The Denikinites were unable to organize a normal monetary system, as a result, the troops did not receive salaries for two or three months. Therefore, instead of buying the necessary products, the White Guards often resorted to requisitions or outright robberies. Moreover, the war raised criminal, dark elements from the social bottom. They were in both the White and Red armies. It is clear that the white command tried to fight these phenomena, which very quickly turned regular units into bandit formations. Harsh laws and related orders were issued at all levels. The crimes were investigated by emergency commissions. However, it was not possible to stop this evil in the chaos of the turmoil.
The rear Denikin administration was weak. There were no cadres, usually not the best people went to the local administration, those who wanted to avoid the front line, or were unsuitable for combat service. Officers were also appointed, but usually from the old, crippled, left without a post. For them, civil administration was new, they had to delve into, or rely on helpers. There were many idlers, dark personalities, speculators, businessmen who used the troubles for personal gain. As a result, the Denikin administration was unable to solve the problem of establishing law and order in the rear.
The Denikin government was unable to resolve the land issue, to carry out an agrarian reform. Agrarian laws were developed: they planned to strengthen small and medium-sized farms at the expense of state and landlord lands. In each locality, they were going to introduce the maximum of the land plot, which remained in the hands of the previous owner, the surplus was transferred to the land-poor. However, the Kolchak government, which was subordinate to the Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (an advisory body in the field of legislation and supreme management under the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army), postponed the solution of this issue. A temporary Kolchak law came into force, which ordered that prior to the Constituent Assembly retain land ownership for the previous owners. This led to the fact that the former owners, returning to the territory occupied by whites, began to demand the return of land, livestock, equipment, and compensation for losses. Only by the autumn of 1919, the Special Conference returned to this question, but did not manage to bring the matter to the end. The issue of land ownership and, in general, property rights was a key issue for the masters of the White movement. It is clear that this also did not add popularity to the White Guards among the broad popular masses. The peasants have already de facto decided the land issue in their favor.
As a result, the Bolsheviks won the information war against the White movement quite easily. Even realizing the mighty power of such weapons as propaganda, the White Guards did not know how to use it effectively. The Bolsheviks massively and professionally processed not only their rear and front, but also the white rear. In Siberia, in the South of Russia, in the Russian North, there were massive uprisings everywhere in the rear of the whites. At the same time, in Central Russia, while the struggle with the White Army was going on, it was relatively quiet. The peasants deserted in droves and from the Red Army, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, but they hated the whites more. It was a historical memory. With the White Guards went to the peasants "master", who was traditionally hated since the days of serfdom, whose estate was burned back in 1917, after February, when the peasant war began. Lands, cattle and other goodness were divided or destroyed. With the "master" walked "Cossacks-whips" - a scarecrow for the peasants, at all times pacified peasant revolts, stealing entire villages.
Thus, the Denikinites had to fight not only against the Red Army, but entire armies in the rear. Denikin had to keep troops to keep the North Caucasus, to fight the highlanders, the army of the emir Uzun-Khadzhi, various "green" bandai, atamans and fathers, Petliura and Makhnovists, who have popular support in Novorossiya and Little Russia. The forces yielding to the Red Army had to be distributed along different fronts and directions.
War of the city and the countryside
Throughout Russia, there was a war not only between whites and reds, but also a struggle between power (any power) and the Russian countryside. Nowadays, many do not even know that at that time Russia was a peasant country. An endless peasant sea and islets of urban civilization. 85% of the inhabitants of the empire are villagers. At the same time, many workers were children of peasants, or only came from the countryside (workers in the first generation). February 1917 led to a terrible catastrophe - the state collapsed. The last state bonds were destroyed - the autocracy and the army. The chatter of the temporary liberals, "democracy" and "freedom" in their understanding meant nothing for the peasants.
The village has made a decision: Enough to endure the power on your neck. From now on, the peasants did not want to serve in the army, pay taxes, comply with the laws adopted in cities, pay exorbitant prices for manufactured goods and give bread for next to nothing. The peasant world came out against any power and state in general. Everywhere peasants divided state and landlord lands, created self-defense units, fought first with one power, then with another. The partisan peasants first fought fiercely with the Whites, and then, when the Reds defeated, they also opposed the Soviet regime.
Both whites and reds forced the peasants to supply food to their cities and armies. They acted in the same way: they introduced food appropriation, formed food detachments (specially detached units from the whites), took away grain, cattle, etc. by force. At the same time, the industry in the country stopped. The city, as before in peacetime, could not give the village manufactured goods in exchange for provisions. They had to take by force until the Bolsheviks could win, and at the very least, they started up the industry. This provoked the fiercest resistance of the village. In turn, the whites destroyed entire villages, declaring them "bandit nests", shot hostages - relatives of the "bandits". In Kolchak's Siberia, the troops acted against the people as against the most cruel enemy: mass shootings, executions, burning of recalcitrant villages, confiscations and indemnities. The Reds also acted when the most merciless crushed the peasant freemen (like Antonov-Ovseenko and Tukhachevsky in the Tambov region). True, unlike the Whites, the Reds acted with great success and yet were able to suppress the peasant element, which, if it won, could kill the Russian civilization and the people.
Free Farmers Project
The peasant world has put forward its project for the future of Russia - the world of the people's freemen, free farmers. The village opposed any government and state. This was the people's response to the Westernization of Russia by the Romanovs, which went against the people and mostly at their expense. When the autocracy collapsed, the village immediately began its war. And after October, when the two authorities - white and red, came together in a fierce battle with each other, the village did everything to destroy the state altogether and establish a new life in conditions of complete disintegration.
The Russian peasantry put forward its own unique project for the future - the utopian ideal of life for free farmers, peasant communities. The peasants took ownership of the land and cultivated it on the basis of the neighboring community. The peasants paid a terrible price for this utopia. The peasant war and its suppression became, apparently, the most terrible page of the Russian Troubles. However, if the village could win up, it would definitely lead to the death of civilization and the people. In the industrial XX century. a peasant world with guns and carts would not have stood against the armies of industrialized countries with tanks, aircraft and artillery. Russia would become a victim of neighboring predators - Japan, Poland, Finland, England, USA, etc.
Makhno's war
The rich Little Russian peasantry, which was already accustomed to "freedom", did not need power. Therefore, almost immediately after the defeat of the Reds in Little Russia and Novorossiya, and the establishment of power by the Denikinites, a new wave of peasant war began there. It began from the time of February, the Central Rada, and continued under the Austro-German occupation, the hetman, Petliura and the Soviets. One of the brightest leaders that peasant Russia gave to the world was Nestor Ivanovich Makhno.
Makhno, after a break with the Bolsheviks and a summer defeat from the Whites, withdrew his partisan detachments to the west and by the beginning of September 1919 approached Uman. Here he concluded a temporary alliance with the Petliurites and occupied the front against the Whites. Petliura provided a base and rest area, places for the sick and wounded, and ammunition supplies. Makhno recovered from defeat, his troops rested, replenished the ranks at the expense of the Red Army men fleeing from the White Army. The Petlyuraites, who were dissatisfied with the attempts of the Petliura command to restore at least some order (Makhno had a partisan freeman), began to actively go over to Batka. Also, the Makhnovists successfully plundered numerous carts of the defeated Southern group of the Reds (in the Odessa region), Soviet institutions and refugees, which walked parallel to the front from south to north. So the Makhnovists significantly replenished their reserves, captured a large number of horses and carts. Thus, they ensured themselves further operations, gained mobility.
The role of the main striking force, the carts, has especially grown. This is a horse-drawn spring cart with a heavy machine gun pointing backwards in the direction of travel. 2-4 horses were harnessed to the cart, the crew - 2-3 people (driver, machine gunner and his assistant). The cart was used both for transporting infantry and in combat. At the same time, the general speed of the detachment's movement corresponded to the speed of the trotting cavalry. Makhno's detachments easily covered up to 100 km a day for several days in a row. Most often, carts were used to transport infantry and a machine gun with a crew and ammunition. When approaching the place of battle, the crew removed the machine gun from the cart and put it in position. Shooting directly from the cart was provided in exceptional cases, since in this case the horses fell under enemy fire.
With Petlyura, Makhno was not on the way. Batka did not support the idea of an “independent Ukraine”. It was not possible to seize control over the Petliurites. In addition, the pressure of the White Guards increased, which threatened a final defeat. The Makhnovists could not withstand a frontal battle with the Whites. Makhno decided to break through to his native place. On September 12 (25), 1919, he unexpectedly raised his troops and went to a breakthrough, to the east, against the whites, having stationed his main forces near the village of Peregonovka. Two regiments of General Slashchev, not expecting an attack, were defeated, and the Makhnovists moved towards the Dnieper. The rebels moved very quickly, the infantry was put on carts and carts, tired horses were exchanged for fresh ones from the peasants.
The successes of the Makhnovists and the counteroffensive of the Denikinites
On September 22 (October 5), the Makhnovists were at the Dnieper, and knocking down the weak white screens, hastily put forward to defend the crossings, crossed the river. Makhno returned to the Left Bank Little Russia, took Aleksandrovsk (Zaporozhye) and on September 24 (October 7) was in Gulyai-Pole, having covered about 600 versts in 11 days. Soon the Makhnovshchina spread over a vast territory. Denikin noted in his memoirs: “At the beginning of October, the insurgents ended up in Melitopol, Berdyansk, where they blew up artillery depots, and Mariupol, 100 versts from Headquarters (Taganrog). The rebels approached Sinelnikovo and threatened Volnovakha, our artillery base … Accidental units - local garrisons, reserve battalions, detachments of the State Guard, initially set up against Makhno, were easily defeated by his large bands. The situation was becoming formidable and required exceptional measures. In order to suppress the uprising, it was necessary, despite the serious situation of the front, to remove units from it and use all reserves. … This uprising, which took on such a wide scale, upset our rear and weakened the front in the most difficult time for him."
Under the command of Makhno there was a whole army - 40-50 thousand people. Its numbers constantly fluctuated, depending on current operations, victories or failures. In almost every village there were detachments that were subordinate to Makhno's headquarters or acted independently, but on his behalf. They gathered in larger detachments, disintegrated, reunited. The core of the Makhnovist army consisted of about 5 thousand soldiers. They were desperate thugs living one day, violent freemen and adventurers, anarchists, former sailors and deserters from various armies, outright bandits. They often changed - died in battles, from disease, drank themselves, but in their place there were immediately new lovers of "free" life. Peasant regiments were also formed, the number of which reached 10-15 thousand people during major operations. In secret warehouses and caches in the villages, they hid a lot of weapons, up to cannons and machine guns, ammunition. If necessary, it was possible to immediately raise and arm significant forces. Moreover, the peasants themselves considered themselves to be real Makhnovists, despised the "regular" bandits, and, on occasion, destroyed them like mad dogs. But the authority of the father was iron.
The whites could not resist such a powerful uprising, a whole army, which was supported by all the local peasantry. All the main forces were at the front against the Reds. The White Guard garrisons in the cities were extremely small, several platoons or companies. Plus reserve battalions. The state guard (militia) had just begun to form and was small in number. All these units were easily crushed by the large gangs of Makhno. Therefore, in a short time, the Makhnovists captured a large area. Artillery depots were located in Berdyansk, so the garrison was strong. However, the Makhnovists organized an uprising, the rebels struck at the whites from the rear. The Denikinites were defeated. The insurgents blew up the warehouses.
When the cities were captured, the picture of the general war between the city and the countryside was very clearly drawn. For the rebels, hundreds, thousands of local peasants rushed into the cities on carts. They took out everything that they could take from shops, institutions and houses, weapons, ammunition, equipment. The mobilized peasants were disbanded, government offices and army warehouses were robbed and burned. The captured officers and officials were killed.
Thus, literally in 2-3 weeks the Makhnovists crushed the rear of Denikin's army in Novorossiya. The local administration was killed or fled, economic and civil life was destroyed. Soon the Makhnovists took Mariupol, threatened Taganrog, where Denikin's headquarters were, Sinelnikov and Volnovakha. Despite the extremely difficult battles with the Red Army, the white command had to urgently withdraw troops from the front and transfer them to the rear. In the Volnovakha area, a group of General Revishin was formed: Tersk and Chechen cavalry divisions, a cavalry brigade, 3 infantry regiments and 3 reserve battalions. On October 26, 1919, the whites went over to the offensive. At the same time, from the south, from the Schilling grouping, Denikin turned against Makhno Slashchev's corps (13th and 34th divisions), which had previously been planned to be sent to the Moscow direction. Slashchev acted from the west, from Znamenka, and from the south, from Nikolaev, suppressing the uprising on the right bank of the Dnieper.
Stubborn battles went on for a month. At first, Makhno stubbornly held on to the Berdyansk - Gulyai-Pole - Sinelnikovo line. The Makhnovists tried to hold the blow, but the White Guards pushed them towards the Dnieper. Finally, their front collapsed under the blows of the white cavalry, many prominent assistants and commanders of Makhno perished. Ordinary soldiers scattered across the villages. Pressing against the Dnieper, the rebels tried to retreat through the Nikopol and Kichkassk crossings. But there were already parts of Slashchev that had come up from the west. Many Makhnovists were killed. But the dad himself with the core of the army left again. He crossed over to the right bank of the Dnieper in advance, as soon as Revishin's troops launched an offensive. And suddenly Yekaterinoslav attacked. In the city itself, the Makhnovists, disguised as peasants on their way to the market, raised a commotion. The Whites fled across the railway bridge across the Dnieper. Makhno blew up the bridge and prepared for the defense of the provincial city.
By the end of November 1919, the groups of Revishin and Slashchev cleared the lower reaches of the Dnieper from the rebels. On December 8, Slashchev went to storm Yekaterinoslav. Makhno did not become heroic and broke through the highway to Nikopol. But as soon as the Whites occupied the city, the Makhnovists suddenly returned and attacked the city. With an unexpected blow, the rebels captured the railway station, where the headquarters of the 3rd Army Corps was located. The situation was critical. Slashchev showed courage and determination, personally led his convoy with bayonets and threw back the enemy. The attack was repulsed and the Makhnovists retreated again. However, the victors were besieged. The Makhnovists tried twice more to take the city, but they were thrown back. Then Makhno switched to the usual partisan tactics: raids by small parties in one or another place, actions on communications, with strong pressure, the Makhnovist detachments immediately disintegrated and "disappeared." Slashchev himself had a rich school of mobile warfare, in the Shkuro detachment, in the Crimea, but he could not defeat the peasant leader. He took over a lot from the Makhnovists, in particular, the carts.
Thus, with great difficulty and diverting forces from the main front, the whites were able to temporarily extinguish the fire of the Makhnovshchina. The main uprising was suppressed, but the struggle against Makhno continued and became protracted.
