March 10, 2021 at "Military Review" an article by the authors Roman Skomorokhov and Alexander Vorontsov was published under the title "Does Russia need a strong fleet?" … True, the authors did not give an answer to the question posed in the title by themselves, suggesting instead to use strategic Tu-160M bombers for strikes against surface targets, which need to start building at a speed of 3-4 to 5 vehicles per year, so that in 10-15 years to have them in the amount of 50 units. Not 49 and not 51, but exactly 50. The same aircraft (as conceived by the authors) should also carry anti-submarine missiles. And, most likely, somehow apply them. According to the authors, such rates are quite real. And even somehow they are not burdensome.
It must be said that the article contains two ideas. One of them is the position of Roman Skomorokhov that Russia needs a small coastal fleet. R. Skomorokhov's position contains nothing new. Earlier, in another article, he already tried to prove the uselessness and uselessness of naval capabilities for Russia, to which he received a detailed and motivated answer from M. Klimov, given in the article "The ability to fight at sea is a necessity for Russia" … And I must say that no reasonable counter-arguments to the theses of M. Klimov on the part of R. Skomorokhov did not follow.
The second idea is A. Vorontsov's idea of using the Tu-160 in military operations at sea. This very extravagant idea, oddly enough, even received supporters.
Well, if so, the new article is still worth some sort of analysis.
Firstly, it contains a number of misconceptions that are very characteristic of our society, which in themselves need to be analyzed, without connection with the creativity about anti-submarine operations of Tu-160 bombers.
Secondly, since the comrades have already mentioned the name of your humble servant, then not to answer, it turns out, it will be somehow ugly.
Let's start.
Erroneous basis
In theoretical constructions, the most important part is the basis - the basic axioms, dogmas on which the theory is based, as well as the internal logic embedded in it. The latter is even more important than dogmas - any theory must be logical. Alas, the respected R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov “caught” the first failure already at this stage - their entire article is based on logical errors. And this is incorrigible.
Let's take an example from the very beginning of the material.
In the section "Geographical Features of Russia", distinguished authors write:
“If the calculation is simplified, this leads to the fact that, having three times the total budget than, say, Turkey, our fleet is 1.6 times weaker locally. If in numbers, then against 6 of our submarines there will be 13 Turkish, and against 1 missile cruiser, 5 frigates and 3 corvettes there will be 16 Turkish URO frigates and 10 corvettes with missile weapons. In general, it is worth separately calculating the total capabilities of the Black Sea fleets of Russia and Turkey.
This calculation is a convention designed to demonstrate the principle itself. And he in no way takes into account a number of factors (which also play against us), for example, such as the presence in our fleet of an additional and very impressive item of expenses for the maintenance and support of the work of atomic strategists.
This state of affairs, to put it mildly, is depressing and makes you think - Is it worth spending money on the fleet at all if these investments represent a movement "against the tide"?
This feature of the geography of Russia is well known to people associated with the navy, but its discussion is often ignored due to the fact that casts doubt on the effectiveness of spending money on the fleet, as well as the place of the fleet in the overall structure of the RF Armed Forcesand, as a consequence, the importance of all the discussed problems of the fleet for the country's defense as a whole.
As you can see, there is a hole behind the folding text, since the reasoning is built according to the scheme:
1. Turkey can have a larger fleet in its "own" region than the Russian Federation, with a smaller naval budget.
2. List of military budgets of different countries in descending table.
3. This is depressing, and our investment in the fleet is "going against the tide."
4. In connection with clauses 1, 2, 3 "the effectiveness of spending money on the fleet as well as the place of the fleet in the general structure of the RF Armed Forces" raises doubts, as does the need to discuss naval problems.
And then about the same.
That is, the arguments given by the authors are not logically connected. The so-called "Imaginary logical connection", moreover, repetitive. Because from the fact that, for financial reasons, it is impossible to ensure equality "in terms of pennants" with this or that country, it does not follow that "the place of the fleet in the general structure of the RF Armed Forces raises doubts."
It just means that you need to have a policy and strategy adequate to the balance of forces. China's navy is larger and stronger than Vietnam's, but that doesn't mean Vietnam doesn't need a navy. Moreover, just its hypothetical absence (taking into account the great "maritime capabilities" of China) for Vietnam would have very negative consequences. We do not differ from Vietnam in this.
Another example from the text, this time from the section "Soviet experience":
In essence, the idea is understandable and not new - if, say, Turkey closes the strait for us (for example, a coup will take place in Turkey, which has already been attempted, and will come to power … But who knows, who will come?), Then we need to place fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
Such a plan is good, but it implies one piquant moment - it is essentially nothing more than an even greater dispersion of the available forces. That is, "the nose was pulled out, the tail got stuck." They tried to solve the problem of isolation - they aggravated the problem of disunity of forces.
That is, in the introduction that the authors used, namely the build-up of the Navy grouping against Turkey, the transfer of additional forces to the Mediterranean Sea, this aggravates the problem of the disunity of our fleets.
Well, or down to earth.
We have an aggravation with Turkey (again). And we are transferring the repaired Kuznetsov with a normally trained air group to the western part of the Mediterranean (west of Greece, which is hostile to the Turks). "Nakhimov", with systems and weapons brought to a combat-ready state, a pair of BODs to provide air defense in the near zone and anti-aircraft missiles of the compound. And three Project 22350 frigates with "Calibers" to provide air defense, anti-aircraft defense and cruise missile strikes on the coast. They are also joined by Project 11356 Black Sea frigates, also with "Calibers". And on Khmeimim we are deploying an assault naval aviation regiment from the Baltic. Maybe not in full force, Khmeimim is not rubber.
There are four missile boats in Tartus. And on some site - a group of Ka-52K for hunting a Turkish "trifle".
According to the authors, this aggravates the "problem of disunity of forces."
To be honest, it's just not clear what you can answer to this. There is a logically incoherent statement, a set of letters. How can you answer a set of letters?
After all, in fact, in the introductory, in which we build up strength only against Turkey (and the respected authors used this example), the transfer of additional forces to the region leads to the fact that they become more … There is only one point of application of our power, while we ourselves, acting from the periphery of the enemy, “pull apart” his forces in different directions.
Since the forces, for example, of the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, together with the Baltic Aviation Regiment, are ready to fight in such a situation together … On one theater. So what kind of "deepening disunity" are we talking about? This is clearly a logical error. If the forces come together, then they do not separate, no.
Elsewhere, the authors write:
One of the most common mistakes in preparing for war is the application of concepts that have dominated the past, without regard to modern realities.
This is often the fault of authors who traditionally cover naval topics.
Thus, the authors commented on the need to fight for the first salvo.
The question of the advantages of the first missile salvo is disclosed in the article “The reality of missile salvos. A Little About Military Superiority, which is highly recommended reading. There is also some mat. apparatus that allows you to delve deeper into the issue.
Authors R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov call the fight for the first salvo an "old concept" and point out that following it is unacceptable.
Alas, there is no other concept in the world. Moreover, the "salvo model" underlying it fully describes the struggle of aviation against surface ships. Since both aircraft and ships are at war with each other with missile volleys.
There is no other mat. apparatus. There is no other concept: neither in the USA, nor here, nor among the Chinese.
This is not an "old concept" but a current one. It's like a requirement to combine front sight and rear sight when shooting from an open sight - well, there is no other concept of shooting, and it cannot be with such scopes. Or you can compare it to an attempt to permanently abolish the rifle chain as an infantry battle formation. And what, she is old, more than a century and a half to her? But there is no other battle formation for the open area, although everything did not fit like a wedge, of course.
Further, the authors write:
In the above screenshot we are talking about a "sea battle".
The fact is that at the current level of development of aviation and missile weapons in the conditions of the geographic characteristics of Russia, the concept of "sea battle" ceases to exist as something independent.
Which requires proof, right?
In August 2008, for example, we had a clash between our detachment of Black Sea Fleet warships and Georgian boats. They failed to destroy a single one, but at least they were driven back to the base, where they were eliminated by the paratroopers. Elementary logic demands to ensure that the next "Georgian boats" do not leave in the same circumstances. From the point of view of the authors, however, the geographic features of Russia nullify naval combat as "something independent." What does it mean? Why is there such a discrepancy with reality?
Alas, the authors' proofs of their theses are also not very good. Using, so to speak, "alternative" logic, the authors naturally obtain conclusions that do not touch reality at all.
Erroneous judgments and outright lies
Let's go back to the beginning.
To simplify the calculation, this leads to the fact that, having three times the total budget than, say, Turkey, our fleet is 1.6 times weaker locally.
If in numbers, then against 6 of our submarines there will be 13 Turkish, and against 1 missile cruiser, 5 frigates and 3 corvettes there will be 16 Turkish URO frigates and 10 corvettes with missile weapons.
In general, it is worth separately calculating the total capabilities of the Black Sea fleets of Russia and Turkey.
Let's ask questions.
1. Is the ratio of the number of ships identical to their real combat power?
This question is really difficult. For example, in the case of completing tasks to combat submarines, the answer will be "more or less the same." But in the battle of the surface forces with each other, the winning of the first salvo and the total missile salvo of the ships participating in this become immeasurably more important. The salvo equations show well that in a modern war, even the weaker side can ensure the complete destruction of the strongest with zero casualties, simply by winning the first salvo and not “showing” its location in front of the enemy.
That is, the answer, in the case of comparing the potential of the surface forces from the point of view of fighting each other, is no, it is not identical.
Moreover, theoretically, we have a chance to get a force multiplier - a naval assault aviation regiment, which is part of the Black Sea Fleet. Above the combat readiness of this regiment, in theory, it is necessary to work properly. But, if this is done, then the correlation of surface forces, precisely from the point of view of the struggle between surface forces, becomes simply meaningless. Since the total missile salvo of the Black Sea Fleet with an air regiment in any battle will be several times higher than that of any surface forces conceivable for Turkey. And then there are the Baltic pilots.
So why did the respected authors do their calculations? What do they show?
2. Will the Turkish Navy fight "on two fronts"? After all, we have forces in the Mediterranean too. Why weren't they counted? Because they are not with the Black Sea Fleet? So what? Maybe then the ratio should be different in the event of a war?
These, of course, are not the only mistakes made by respected authors.
So, describing the possible consequences of attacks by cruise missiles and other weapons on our naval bases, the esteemed authors stubbornly proceed from the assumption that in any case our fleet will, like sheep in a slaughterhouse, stand in bases. Although in reality this is not the case even now.
In addition, twitching is evident. Also, unfortunately, found in the text. For example, the article shows the unpunished destruction of our Black Sea bases by Turkish cruise missiles.
Of course, the Roketsan SOM missiles are very dangerous. But with a properly organized air defense, with the proper work of reconnaissance and aerospace forces, the strike will not turn out as deadly as R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov are trying to show.
Yes, we will have some losses. And the Turks will run out of cruise missiles. This country simply does not have enough of them. They will be able to get some objects in the Black Sea region, but only a few objects. Then they will have to fight with other weapons.
In fact, out of touch with the number of missiles, ships can be put out to sea in advance, and planes can be relocated to the rear. Intelligence must work properly so that no one will arrange a new "June 22" for us. You need to strive for this, and not fall into horror.
There are also mistakes due to a fundamental misunderstanding of what naval power is.
For example:
Take, for example, the regional state of Japan or Turkey. The sphere of interests of Japan is the Kuriles, they do not care about the Russian Black Sea Fleet anyway. The Turks, on the other hand, are interested in the hydrocarbon deposits near Cyprus, and they do not care much about what is happening in the east of Russia. Therefore, the question of the complete destruction of the enemy's fleet for regional states is not on the agenda from the outset.
There is a lack of understanding of “how it works”, which is, unfortunately, frequent in our “continental” power, continental thinking, so to speak.
What do we have in reality?
Here's what - this diagram shows where Japan gets most of its oil from.
The question is where it will lead bringing before the Japanese decision-makers, that at the first aggravation of the military situation around the Kuriles, tankers with Japanese oil from the Persian Gulf will no longer enter Japan? Temporarily, of course.
Will it ease tensions or, conversely, provoke Japan to attack?
Fleets are a global force, they influence the situation globally. "Tirpitz" influenced the battles at Stalingrad and Rostov, everyone remembers that, right?
But we have a PMTO in the Red Sea, there can be four ships on it and the same number in rotation in the Persian Gulf and nearby
Maybe the Japanese will ask the US to intervene?
Maybe yes.
Only it is not a fact that the latter will immediately and with all their might get into this conflict. They did not fight for Georgia, for Ukraine, against us for their terrorists in Syria. And there are doubts that they will rush headlong into the battle for the Japanese Kuril Islands.
We have several bases with American hostages in Syria, which we, in general, can attack without taking responsibility. "Calibers" from "Warsaw" and "Thundering" get Alaska. True, they are not yet at the Pacific Fleet. The Ministry of Defense is holding the "Thundering" for the next naval parade, apparently. But they will be there anyway. And soon.
Yes, the "Thundering" has "dead" air defense. But he can launch a rocket from the UKSK. Not so simple. And the Americans cannot fail to understand this. This does not guarantee anything for us. But, alas, no one will give any guarantees to the Japanese either.
So the Black Sea Fleet is quite “about Japan”. Very much "about Japan". R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov were very seriously mistaken in this case too.
By the way, a question to the authors, which is cheaper: to build 50 Tu-160Ms or to drive the Grigorovich and Essen to the Persian Gulf and wave handkerchiefs to Japanese tanker captains from the bridge even before it all started? Interesting question, huh? Otherwise, the authors are concerned about the economy …
It's worth remembering the cost here.
So, at Soviet prices (with penny kerosene), airplanes really looked much preferable to ships. (For example, at the "cost of 1 anti-ship missile in a salvo of the fleet"). Until they started flying. But after that, the aircraft operating cost meter “spun” much faster than that of ships.
But, let's imagine that Japan sent its ships to the Persian Gulf. Their fleet is larger than all our fleets put together. You can dispatch a squadron without any problems, there are supply transports, and the preparation is excellent.
What then?
And then we build up our forces faster than they do. Thanks to the same Black Sea Fleet as well. And we will have to fight in relatively equal conditions - right now we do not have an aircraft carrier, they also do not. At the same time, we can agree with the Iranians on the passage of the "Air Force" Tu-95s through their airspace, at least for reconnaissance. They will not be able to attack Japanese ships, but they will definitely be useful as a means of reconnaissance.
And the Japanese will not have their own aviation there. They will have to secretly negotiate with someone. With those who are not afraid to receive "Calibres" at oil terminals (with the excuse that they were the Houthis). Or to their bases in Iraq (on behalf of the local Shiites). And these prospects may well be. And communicated to the right people.
And some "baton" or "Severodvinsk" can bypass Africa and, somewhere along the way, break away from American tracking. Even with the help of surface ships of the same SF. And there is a missile salvo, which no one can ignore either.
In general, everything is much more complicated with this fleet than the authors think.
Not with the fleet, of course, either.
R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov write this:
It is clear that the only direction where one could at least draw this notorious 1000 km line is the direction of the Northern Fleet. But here, too, everything is not so luxurious.
The thing is that Norway is a NATO member. And you shouldn't consider it as a peaceful and independent country. During the Cold War, it was in Norway, under the protection of American special forces, that the warehouses of nuclear weapons were located. American. And the distance from its borders to Murmansk and Severomorsk is just over 100 km.
This is their commentary on the issue of combat missions of our aviation in the Barents and Norwegian Seas and on a possible strike from the Norwegian territory.
And again we, like rabbits in front of a boa constrictor, are waiting for a sudden blow, our ships are at the piers, there is no choice, our destiny is to get on the snatch.
In reality, northern Norway is a rather sparsely populated area with extremely sparse vegetation, well observed from space, if necessary, or by aerial reconnaissance along the border, without invading the airspace.
There is only one serious road, it is impossible to hide the transfer of troops along it. And also, with the presence of a minimal amphibious force, you can cut off the entire part of Norway east of the Varanger Fjord, and destroy any troops that will be there. And they will not hold Spitsbergen, and the "Bastions" on Bear will appear much faster than the Naval Strike Missile batteries.
And if you land in Varanger Fjord, then from there the Iskanders will finish off to Narvik. And the loss of Narvik is the loss of half of Norway immediately.
So our planes will quite fly "past" Norway for aerial reconnaissance and for strikes, if anything. There would be someone to fly. Now, thanks to the efforts of a number of brilliant strategists, there is no one in the Ministry of Defense. But it won't always be that way.
Of course, there is a danger from Norway. They talk about it at least flights of American bombers B-1B Lancer from the Norwegian air base … They really pose a threat to the same submarine bases.
And it was not for nothing that M. Klimov, in one of his articles, called for the restoration of the base in Gremikha and the redeployment of part of the forces of the Northern Fleet there, especially underwater ones. This problem really exists. But it should be dealt with rationally, dispersing forces and ensuring their continuous presence on the high seas, and not getting carried away by projection.
In general, respected authors should reconsider their "operational views" - they are far from what can or will be done in reality. Infinitely far away.
Unfortunately, the authors have sunk to outright lies.
It is difficult to say who it came from: from A. Vorontsov or from R. Skomorokhov. Perhaps one of them will be able to clarify this issue.
Quote:
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to pour in huge sums, as Timokhin and Klimov want.
Neither Timokhin nor Klimov ever proposed to "pour huge sums" into the fleet. On the contrary, most of our articles on military-economic topics are just devoted to how the cost of the fleet is relative to today's level, without losing combat effectiveness. Or how to increase combat effectiveness at approximately current costs without significantly increasing them
The only exception is a hypothetical light aircraft carrier. But even for it, funds can be found by reducing useless programs, and not by significantly increasing budgets.
It is a great pity that the authors have resorted to such discussion methods. However, it is simply impossible to leave this accusation without comment.
Hopefully, in the future, they won't go back to that again. In the end, it is much better not to lose a reputation than to restore it later
But back to the analysis of the article. To its final part.
A blow to reality
Let's get back to the main message of the article.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to pour in huge sums, as Timokhin and Klimov want. Build four fleets, each of which will be able to withstand regional representatives of the same NATO bloc? In modern realities it will take 60–70 years, if not more.
To build about 50 Tu-160M units at an accelerated pace and equip them with anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles - this task is still within our reach. And it will take 10-15 years.
And the fleet in this form will be able to solve the tasks of protecting the shores of Russia. It is not even worth dreaming about any "distant shores" there. But even their own shores will have to be protected under the reliable umbrella of strategic aviation.
In addition to the already analyzed false thesis about "pouring" money into the Navy, it is postulated that, firstly, we need 60–70 years to build a fleet capable of resisting the United States and NATO. And secondly, that instead of this, you can quickly build 50 Tu-160M, modernized for the use of anti-ship missiles and PLR. Say, we are quite capable of doing this in 10-15 years.
I would like to draw the attention of respected authors to reality.
Let's start with "confronting the US and NATO." Let's ask R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov a few questions.
For example, what is “resist”?
Does that mean "to fight"? But, for example, if somehow the American measures of protection against a sudden nuclear strike are bypassed (we will not fantasize on this topic for now) and a successful first nuclear strike is delivered, then even our current fleet, using strategic nuclear weapons, may well “resist”.
Or maybe “confront” is something else?
In fact, this is a matter of political goals. In the 70s, several times smaller than the US Navy, the Soviet fleet completely resisted the Americans. And successfully.
In the 80s, the many times more powerful Soviet fleet, on which huge amounts of money were spent, could no longer resist the Americans. An adequate strategy, for which the enemy is not ready, beats his superiority in pennants and even in a volley. In everything. And if we are interested in the topic of "confront", then we need to start with goals.
We want what? Destroy the USA? To incline them towards peaceful coexistence? Fall in love with yourself?
From here, the tasks of the fleet will be prescribed. And from them everything else, including the type of ships and the number.
These things are, of course, easy to understand. Just not all.
But as soon as we reach the "umbrella of strategic aviation", then everything becomes clear to anyone.
So, the fleet is expensive. We will not master it. We need 50 modernized bombers.
How much does the Tu-160M cost?
According to media reports 15 billion rubles apiece.
In addition, on January 25, 2018, a state contract was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Tupolev company for the supply of the first batch of Tu-160M strategic bombers - it provides for the creation of 10 aircraft worth 15 billion rubles each.
Thus, 50 aircraft is (excluding inflation from 2018) 750 billion rubles.
We, however, need a modernized aircraft.
First, it must carry anti-ship missiles. And this means that the avionics of the aircraft must form and transmit on board the missile control center according to the airborne radar of the aircraft. Or according to target data coming from an external source.
Today the Tu-160 does not have such a system, and there is no ready-made complex that could be installed on it.
How long does it usually take to create such systems?
About six years. And a lot of billions.
But the authors also want to use anti-submarine missiles with the Tu-160M!
It changes everything.
The fact is that the PLR is such a guided missile, in which, instead of a warhead, either a nuclear charge on a parachute or an anti-submarine torpedo. In the latter case, the torpedo needs to enter data to defeat the maneuvering and evading submarines, for the development of which the search and aiming system (PPS) of the aircraft must receive the elements of target movement (EDC, this is the same as the MPC, the parameters of the target movement in the surface fleet, for submarines Is the course, speed, depth).
For this, firstly, the aircraft must have the same sighting and search system as an anti-submarine aircraft. And secondly, it must be able to deploy sonar buoys.
Well, or more simply - we must also stuff the Novella into the Tu-160M (there is no other PPS in the country), and also ensure the dropping of the buoys.
Modern non-acoustic detection means give aircraft the ability to detect a boat at depth without dropping buoys. This, of course, does not apply to our aircraft. As for the American and Japanese, in the future - the Chinese. But we could do it too.
But it is impossible to measure the EDC using the data of such means. So, "show the target to the torpedo" too. She, the torpedo, does not understand the words. She needs to set each parameter before starting. Or is it just a blank and that's it. Even when this torpedo is on the rocket.
Further, since we do not have anti-submarine torpedoes on board, but missiles, we need to fly away from the target. At the minimum launch range. And from there …
Or you have to work with two Tu-160Ms. One is in the search version of the download, the second is in the shock one. Or two - in search and shock. It turns out to be a great money saving!
It is difficult to say how much it will cost to develop a fundamentally new avionics for the Tu-160, test it, ensure the use of buoys, etc. And "under it" you need missiles (especially anti-submarine airborne ones), crew members (one pilot or navigator with the rank of lieutenant - many tens of millions of rubles for training), bases for these aircraft …
It is easy to imagine how much the costs will increase by the time the last board is delivered.
In principle, we can safely talk about a trillion rubles.
Is it a lot or a little?
Let's estimate.
One aircraft carrier with a displacement of 40–45 kT is 370–400 billion.
Corvette with a rational composition of radio-technical weapons and weapons - 18.
Specialized naval base strike aircraft in the Su-34 glider, with crew training - about 3 billion. The maximum is 4.
Reconstruction of the city of Sochi "for the Olympics" - about 500.
With this money, you can fight in Syria for about 15-20 years.
Or build a subway in seven or eight cities.
Amusingly, the authors are not confused by these numbers. They believe that by pouring that kind of money into a highly dubious project, they can save money on the fleet. Which brings us back to the beginning of the article, to the questions of logic.
And this is not counting the fact that the Tu-160 cannot be used in anti-ship operations even when it is upgraded into an anti-ship missile carrier. It is impossible or pointless
There are two practical algorithms for using anti-ship missiles from aircraft against ships. The first is with the target capture of the missile seeker while still on the carrier.
This is how our MRA was supposed to work. The aircraft reach a range that allows them to detect an enemy order with their radars, starting from the data of the previously completed reconnaissance and strike group, other reconnaissance data, signals from their own radar. The crews, using the aircraft equipment, issue the control system to the rocket for the already observed and classified (identified) target.
The advantage of this method is that the crew understands (well, or thinks they understand) where they are sending the rocket. The downside is that all this requires action deep inside the enemy's air defense zone - which was the reason for the high estimated losses of MPA in such sorties.
Theoretically, another option is possible - a ship-like launch. According to data from reconnaissance equipment, for example, a reconnaissance aircraft. When the missile is launched into the anticipated target (or calculated) location, and the target is captured by the seeker already on the route. The crew of the aircraft itself does not observe the target.
This is how LRASM is applied.
The first variant of combat use involves the entrance of the Tu-160M hundreds of kilometers into the depth of the enemy's defense, filled with interceptors and missile ships.
And how will he survive after that?
After all, this "Su" can perform sharp anti-aircraft maneuvers, go to the water, hiding under the radio horizon. And there are many of them, one missile defense system cannot dump all. A huge plane can't do that.
When creating missiles and reconnaissance and target designation systems capable of providing the second option, the question arises, why shouldn't these anti-ship missiles simply be dropped from the retrofitted Il-76?
Why overpay for the Tu-160?
The authors want to save money. The cruising speed of a subsonic transporter or striker is slightly lower. Survivability in impact on surface targets is the same.
Why then the Tu-160M?
Authors R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov do not give answers to such questions.
And the questions themselves are not raised. And, apparently, they do not know that they can be delivered.
But they offer an expense of 750 billion (and in fact, one and a half - two times more).
But you need to save on the fleet.
At the same time, the authors did not understand the fact that in a naval war, aircraft and ships complement each other and together form a single system, even after reading and using the article for citation “Naval Warfare for Beginners. Interaction between surface ships and strike aircraft … By using, but not trying to understand. After all, pictures with a beautiful white plane are much easier to understand …
Operational-tactical survival task
So does Russia need a strong fleet?
Russia needs a fleet that matches the threats and foreign policy challenges it faces.
It will be interesting to end this material as follows. Without continuing the analysis of the shortcomings and shortcomings of the material of R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov, it is better to outline a problem that may arise in front of our country this way in 2030. And the readers themselves will be able to fantasize about how the Tu-160M will help us solve it.
So, in 2030, the Navy degraded completely. We have parades, celebrations, pretentious calls of the remaining units to foreign ports, there are no effective naval forces. There are several Poseidon carriers in the GUGI. Rumor has it that the Poseidons themselves will also appear soon. The commanders-in-chief are still changing every two or three years. "Borei" continue to go to military service, but without support. And their commanders, as in Soviet times, do not particularly try to report on something that looks like the presence of a foreign submarine somewhere nearby. This does not correspond to the doctrine of the greatness of Russia and is seen as the first step towards betrayal.
Civilians are prohibited from discussing such things on the basis of the new article of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Insult to the honor of the Armed Forces." Critical journalists are forced to remain silent.
Anti-torpedoes never appeared in the fleet, there is no anti-torpedo protection in the fleet, the last anti-submarine aircraft is stationed in St. Petersburg and flies only to the Main Naval Parade. But the "young fleet" was created in a pair with the "youth army", with blue berets instead of red ones. The Main Temple of the Navy was built in Vladivostok. Questions about the fact that there is already one main church (Nikolsky Cathedral) in Kronstadt were carefully hushed up by the press. The temple turned out to be beautiful. The media and press applaud the development of our fleet and its greatness. Greatness is everywhere, on TV and in newspapers, on radio and on the Internet. Nobody can question him anymore. Greatness is beyond doubt.
It was hinted on TV that the Zircon-2 hypersonic missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers already exists and has been put into service. True, no one has seen her yet. But it is known that there will immediately be a container launcher for it. A series of medium missile ships (SRK) is being built, which are an enlarged MRK for two 3S-14 launchers. True, the ship does not have air defense and anti-aircraft defense, but, according to media reports, it can sink an aircraft carrier. The Pacific Fleet receives a series of Project 22160M patrol ships. These ships are distinguished by their speed increased to 23 knots.
In the meantime, the US has a breakdown in the global trading system in dollars. The oil dollar and similar cycles in other areas of world trade no longer work the way they used to. World trade is increasingly going under China. Africa trades in yuan. And the United States can no longer maintain a negative trade balance of trillion dollars, as it has for many years in a row. And this is a disaster, a freebie in ¼ of the annual federal budget cannot disappear without really grave consequences. This cannot be allowed.
Something needs to be done with China, but what? It is integrated into the Western economy. If it is defeated, then the West itself will be in trouble. He must be forced to surrender and driven back into the stall of the dollar trade. But how? He has a Russian support behind him. As a military ally, Russia is no longer "very good." But the Chinese, firstly, are calm about their rear. Secondly, they know that if something happens, then because of Russia, they will not be able to completely block them. Weapons of some of the Russian Federation can also throw. True, not marine. Well, at least so.
But what if this rotten support was knocked out? It is indicative to grind it into powder. And then call the Chairman of the CPC and make an offer that cannot be refused? Yes, Russia is a nuclear power, it has a full-fledged early warning system. But there is one vulnerability that the Russians, obsessed with their "continental" and "land", seem to have forgotten.
In March 2030, the Columbia SSBN enters its next "routine" combat service. But it does not go to the North Atlantic. The boat makes a hidden passage to Gibraltar and then enters the Mediterranean. There, at the appointed time, its commander must receive an order for further action. The team is nervous. Farmer kids in Kentucky and Oklahoma hate this deployment. He smells like a graveyard. And besides, they, Americans, used to think of themselves as good guys. But no one rebelles, everyone follows orders. In the end, they took the oath. And in the Pentagon, probably, they are not fools. And where to go from the submarine? No choice…
In mid-March, Columbia takes up a combat position west of the Ionian Islands. Now the fate of this boat is connected with two points in which none of its crew has ever been. And now it won't be. The first is the Engels airbase in the Saratov region of Russia, the home of the Tu-95, Tu-160 and Tu-160M bombers. The second is the village of Svetly, located not very far from it, and the 60th missile division of the Strategic Missile Forces. From "Columbia" to this place about 2340 kilometers.
A ballistic missile can be sent to a target along a so-called "low" or "flat" trajectory, that is, not along a ballistic curve. The rocket in such a flight flies much lower, solely due to the speed and thrust, with some assistance in the lifting force on the body. A significant part of its trajectory during such a flight is OUT. With such a launch, the accuracy of delivery of warheads to the target decreases. The range is also reduced, and at times.
But still it is more than 2000 kilometers. But the time it takes for the missiles to reach the target along such a trajectory is very short. The Columbia's salvo will cover the 60th Missile Division and the base in Engels about three times faster than the Russian counter-strike team. No early warning system will help them, they simply will not have time to react, the flight time of the Columbia missiles is less than 10 minutes. But the volleys from a single "Columbia" were "feeble".
Four missiles on Svetly, 10 warheads each. Then re-enter the initial starting conditions, differentiate. Four missiles again …
The commander was sure that he was sent simply to scare the Russians - such volleys of four missiles might not have time to cover the missile division. But after a while the officer of the watch who replaced him reported that the acoustics had spotted an old Ohio-class Wyoming boat at a great distance to the west. And then he understood everything …
By March 20, three American SSBNs were deployed in the Mediterranean to attack the 60th Missile Division and Engels Air Base. Four more - to strike at the remaining formations of the 27th Guards Missile Army from the Barents Sea. The distance from where to Yoshkar-Ola, Teikovo and Kozelsk was much less than from Mediterranean to Svetly and Engels.
Two more SSBNs from Barentsukha were supposed to work for the 42nd division in Svobodny. Three - for the Orenburg divisions. The need to fire at four missiles was compensated by the fact that several boats fired at any target. And the spread of blocks along the course and combat path was seriously compensated by high-precision fuses on the W76-2 warhead. In no case did the flight time of the salvo exceed 10 minutes. And when the 27th Missile Army (Teikovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Kozelsk) was hit, it was even less.
Calculations showed that the Russians were seriously (at least five minutes late) late with giving the command to retaliate.
The rest of the SSBNs were concentrated in the Pacific Ocean. There is a launch corridor in which (when missiles are launched from the Gulf of Alaska) they pass below the radar field of the Russian early warning radars. When launched a little "to the side", they still fall into this field. But it's too late.
When hitting the formations of the 33rd Guards Missile Army (Irkutsk, Gvardeisky, Solnechny, Sibirskiy), the time between the entry of warheads into the radar field and their detonation was less than five minutes …
It all came down to whether the Virginias would be able to destroy two Boreas in time for combat service - one in the north and one in the Sea of Okhotsk. Given the completely absent Russian anti-submarine defense, this did not seem to be a problem.
It remained to cover the Russian submarines in the bases and the Ukrainka airbase. The bases were destroyed by strategic aviation strikes, which were synchronized in time with the attack of submarines. And the Ukrainian woman was "given" ICBMs - there were not enough submarines for her. And the bombers could not work out on it quickly and suddenly. ICBMs were in time, as the Russians did not know how to get out of a nuclear strike in 15–20 minutes, like the Americans.
On March 23, 2030, the Columbia, whose commander had already read the combat order by this time, floated up for a communication session.
The order to strike at the appointed time, received earlier, was confirmed …
Perhaps we can stop there.
Readers are invited to fantasize about how such a story could end.
Think about what can be done to make such a strike impossible?
Think about when it would be necessary to start taking the actions necessary to prevent this strike from taking place? And what forces and means are needed to prevent it?
And to return to the question asked by R. Skomorokhov and A. Vorontsov. Does Russia need a strong fleet?
Which one then?
What should he be able to do?
Is the "old concept" of disrupting a nuclear missile strike from ocean areas relevant to us or not?
Maybe not? Perhaps, as the authors wrote, "it is unacceptable to follow it"?
Maybe Russia should still act "Vorontsov-style"? And yet to start cutting a series of naval Tu-160Ms for a trillion rubles? Will he help in the situation described above?
And the coastal fleet?
Corvettes?
Maybe it's time for us to start thinking how we should, and not chasing chimeras? And make it a rule to understand the issue at least at the everyday level, before speaking out?
And then the operational-tactical problem of ten years ago at that time will one day turn out to be real and absolutely unsolvable. After all, politicians in 2030 will be those students who today read "Military Review".
Well, how can they go wrong with the vision of the future? Will they follow an initially wrong idea? Will they make a logical mistake?
And then there will be simply no one to argue about the necessity and uselessness of the fleet.
