100 years ago, in May 1920, Tukhachevsky's troops tried to destroy the Polish army in Belarus. The May offensive of the Red Army failed, but managed to divert enemy forces from Ukraine.
Polish army in Kiev
At the end of April - the first half of May 1920, the Polish army carried out a successful Kiev operation. The Polish army defeated the red Southwestern Front, on May 6 the Poles entered Kiev. On the same day, on the shoulders of the retreating Reds, Polish troops crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and occupied a bridgehead 15–20 km east of Kiev. On May 9, with emphasized solemnity, with the participation of Pilsudski, the Polish "victory parade" was held in Kiev. By May 16, the front east of Kiev had stabilized. On the southern flank, the rebels allied to the Poles threatened Odessa and Nikolaev.
The offensive of the Polish troops was supported by the Petliurites. According to the Warsaw Pact of April 22, 1920, Poland restored the 1772 borders in Ukraine. Galicia and the western part of Volhynia, with a population of 11 million, remained within Poland. The agreement provided for the inviolability of Polish land ownership in the territory of the future Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). Poland provided military assistance to Petliura in the restoration of Ukrainian statehood. In fact, Pilsudski was creating an "independent" Ukraine as a buffer against Russia. Ukraine was viewed as a market for Polish goods, a raw material and colonial appendage of Poland. According to the Polish marshal, the border of the UPR was supposed to pass only along the Dnieper in the east. Moscow, according to Warsaw, could have gone to the loss of the Kiev region and Podolia, but would not give up the Left-Bank Ukraine and Novorossiya. Petliura did not agree with this idea and insisted on the capture of Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa and Donbass. These areas were the main economic potential of Little Russia, without it independence was impossible.
The defeat of the Red Army in Ukraine was due to several reasons. The Polish command created a significant superiority of forces in the southwest direction. The Polish army had over 140 thousand bayonets and sabers (over 65 thousand directly on the front line), plus thousands of Petliurists, insurgents and bandits in the rear of the Red Army. Also, the Polish army has a significant advantage in weapons: guns, machine guns, armored cars and airplanes. The Reds had about 55 thousand fighters in the Ukrainian direction (15, 5 thousand directly at the front). Part of the forces was diverted to fight the revolt of Galician riflemen, rebels and bandit formations. Soviet troops covered the border with weak barriers, there was no continuous front. The moment for the Polish operation was well chosen.
The main miscalculation of the Soviet high command was that the main blow of the Poles, in alliance with the Latvians, was awaited in the north-west of Belarus. The main forces of the Red Army were located here, new formations from the North Caucasus and Siberia, reinforcements and reserves were sent here. The Soviet command was preparing a powerful counteroffensive in Belarus. However, the Poles in Belarus did not go on the offensive within the time frame indicated by intelligence. The Soviet command calmed down. The enemy's strike in Ukraine was sudden.
Errors of the Polish command
Despite the "Kiev blitzkrieg", the Polish command was unable to realize all their plans. So, the Poles failed to encircle and destroy most of the Kiev group of the Red Army. Polish troops as a whole advanced frontally, this allowed the Red Army, albeit with losses, but successfully retreat beyond the Dnieper.
It is also considered a mistake for Pilsudski to stop a successful offensive in the Kiev direction at the time of the flight of Soviet troops from Kiev, panic and collapse in parts of the 12th Army. Petliura wanted to continue the attack on Chernigov and Poltava, but Pilsudski was against it. In addition, the Polish high command feared that the Red Army would launch an offensive in Belarus and immediately after the victory in Ukraine began to transfer troops to the north. Indeed, there the Western Front under the command of Tukhachevsky launched the May offensive.
After the capture of Kiev, the Polish army showed activity only on the southern flank. The Polish 6th and 2nd armies captured Vinnitsa, Tulchin, Nemyriv, Kazatin, Skvira, Vasilkov, Tripoli and Belaya Tserkov. At the end of May, Polish troops carried out an operation in the southeastern sector of the front and occupied Rzhishchev. As a result, while the Soviet command was restoring the front and transferring the best units from the former Caucasian front, the Poles lost the initiative and went on the defensive.
Another mistake of the Polish high command was the assessment of the mood of the West Russian population in the "liberated territories". The "Liberators" were greeted with caution and without joy. The union of Poland and the UPR also did not please anyone. If at the beginning the Poles and Petliurites were greeted coldly, then two weeks later they were already hated. The point was that the Poles and the forces supporting them acted as occupiers. The requisitions of the Polish troops reminded the Little Russians of the most difficult times of the Hetmanate, the Austro-German occupation. The Polish commandants took away bread, sugar, livestock, fodder, and brutally drowned any attempts at disobedience in blood. The Ukrainian peasants "liberated" from the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks received an even more brutal Polish military regime.
Of course, Petliura and the leadership of the UPR protested, tried to reach out to Pilsudski, the Polish government, the Seim, the military command, but there was no point. The Polish lords simply ignored all the protests. Pilsudski also deceived in the formation of a large Ukrainian army. Mobilization was allowed only in a few districts, although they were promised throughout Volhynia, Podolia and Kiev region. By mid-May 1920, the Ukrainian army had only 20 thousand soldiers with 37 guns. The divisions were closer in number to the regiments. The UPR army was subordinate to the command of the Polish 6th Army, for a month it got bogged down in battles near Yampol and was unable to develop an offensive on Odessa. Also, no new Ukrainian local authorities were formed. Petliura appointed the chief commissar of the UPR, the commissar of Kiev, the commissars of the counties, but they did not decide anything. All power was with the Polish military. Only in Kamenets-Podolsk, Mogilev-Podolsk, Vinnitsa and the surrounding area was there a semblance of the Ukrainian government. Vinnitsa became the capital of the UPR, Pilsudski did not allow to move it to Kiev.
Starting the war, the Polish-Ukrainian leadership counted on broad popular support, a large-scale peasant and insurrectionary war in the rear of the Red Army. These calculations were only partially justified. In the south of the Kiev region, in the north of the Kherson region, in Polesie and Zaporozhye, there were indeed strong insurgent detachments. However, they did not bring much help to the Poles and Petliurites. They acted in a chaotic, disorganized manner, avoiding clashes and regular units of the Reds.
On the Belarusian direction
Meanwhile, the Red Army tried to defeat the Poles on the Western Front. The new front commander, Tukhachevsky (replaced Gittis), an ambitious protege of Trotsky, was going to defeat the troops of the Polish North-Eastern Front of General Sheptytsky and provide assistance to the Soviet troops of the South-Western Front. The Soviet command planned to defeat the Poles in the Warsaw direction, push them from the north to the Pinsk swamps and destroy them.
The Western Front included: Northern Group of Forces (two rifle divisions and a brigade) under the command of E. Sergeev; 15th Army of A. Cork (7 rifle and cavalry divisions); 16th Army of N. Sollogub (4 rifle divisions). Already during the offensive, two more divisions joined the front. All the commanders were experienced military leaders, they served as officers in the Russian imperial army. The number of Soviet troops numbered about 80 thousand bayonets and sabers, over 450 guns, over 1900 machine guns, 15 armored trains and 67 aircraft.
Soviet troops had superiority over the enemy. The Polish North-Eastern Front at the beginning of the operation included the 1st Army (3 infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade) and the 4th Army (4 infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade). In total there are more than 57.5 thousand bayonets and sabers, about 340 guns, over 1400 machine guns, 10 armored trains and 46 airplanes.
The main blow was delivered by the 15th army of Cork in the general direction of Vilna, it was supposed to defeat the 1st Polish army and throw it back into the Pinsk swamps. The offensive of the Cork army was supported by Sergeev's Northern group, which struck at the flank and rear of the Polish army. Sollogub's 16th Soviet Army launched an auxiliary attack on Minsk to divert the attention and forces of the Polish 4th Army. The offensive required a regrouping of troops from the center to the right flank of the front, which they did not manage to complete by the beginning of the operation. Also, they did not have time to transfer reserves in time and the offensive began without them.
The Polish command knew about the preparation of the Red Army for the offensive. The 4th Polish Army was preparing a counterattack on Zhlobin and Mogilev. The 1st Army was to support the offensive on the northern flank. They planned to transfer reinforcements from Poland and Ukraine.
Battle
On May 14, 1920, the Northern Group unexpectedly for the enemy transferred its strike group (rifle brigade) to the left bank of the Western Dvina. However, her advance was stopped by Polish reserves. It was not possible to strengthen the group, since one division covered the border with Latvia, and the other did not have time to deploy. But the Poles did not succeed in pushing back the Soviet troops beyond the Western Dvina. The Reds repulsed all enemy attacks and waited for the 15th Army's right flank to approach.
On May 14, Cork's army successfully broke through the defenses of two Polish divisions. Only the left flank of the army (the 29th division) could not immediately penetrate the enemy defenses, here the Poles even counterattacked. In addition, on the southern flank of the army, the terrain was more difficult to move. On May 15, the Southern Group (5th, 29th and 56th Infantry Divisions) was formed on the left flank of the army. On May 17, the front command changed the direction of the offensive of the Kork army from north-west to south-west, in the direction of Molodechno. The northern group now had to advance to the northwest. During the five days of the offensive, the 15th Army advanced 40–80 km in depth and 110 km in width. However, the Poles managed to avoid the encirclement and organize a systematic withdrawal.
On May 19, the Cork army continued its offensive. The southern group crossed the Berezina. The army reserve (6th division) began to move in the direction of the main attack. From that time on, the Northern Group and individual groups of the 15th Army began to advance in diverging directions. The northern group advanced on Braslav, the 15th Army's right flank on Postavy, the center on Molodechno, and the South group on Zembin. Large gaps formed between the groups, and there were no reinforcements and reserves to fill them. The rear of the Cork army fell far behind, the advanced units lost supplies, and the army headquarters began to lose control. The movement of the troops slowed down.
On May 19, two divisions of the 16th Army successfully crossed the Berezina and captured a bridgehead on the western bank. However, the attack by Sollogub's army was delivered 80 km south of the 15th Army's left flank, which greatly weakened the influence of this attack on the development of the entire operation. In addition, the 16th Army could not establish cooperation with the 15th Army. The 8th division of the Sollogub army took the settlement of Igumen and by May 24 advanced 60 km in depth. However, then the Poles counterattacked and on May 27 the troops of the 16th Army withdrew beyond the Berezina. At the same time, Polish troops drove out parts of the 16th Army beyond the Berezina, which were advancing in the Borisov area.
The Polish command successfully pulled back the troops and avoided defeat. At the same time, forces were transferred from other directions, from Poland and Ukraine, and a counteroffensive was being prepared. From Poland they transferred 1, 5 divisions, from Little Russia - 2, 5 divisions, created a Reserve Army from them. The Poles formed shock groups in the Sventsiansky, Molodechno, Zembinsky directions against the 15th Soviet army. On May 23-24, Polish troops began to move, began to wedge into the location of the Soviet army, which, during the May offensive, advanced 110-130 km. By the end of May 1920, the Poles stopped the Russians and began to press the 15th Army. On June 2, the Poles were able to break into the rear of the Cork army and almost drove it into the "cauldron". Soviet troops, showing stubborn resistance, began to withdraw, giving up a significant part of the previously occupied territory. The Red Army withdrew 60-100 km east. By June 8, 1920, the situation had stabilized, both sides went on the defensive.
Thus, Tukhachevsky's armies were unable to build on their initial success, blockade and destroy the enemy's Belarusian grouping. The Poles successfully withdrew and regrouped the troops, transferred reinforcements, reserves and successfully counterattacked. Soviet troops withdrew to their original positions. The reasons for the failure were the mistakes of the high and front command, poor preparation of the operation - the second echelon and reserves for the development of the first success were absent or did not have time to arrive at the beginning of the battle, communications and logistic support. However, the Western Front was able to pull back the Polish divisions and eased the position of the Soviet troops in Ukraine, which carried out a successful Kiev operation.
