On August 26, 1914, the German cruiser Magdeburg undertook another raid operation and ran aground off the coast of Odensholm Island off the northern coast of modern Estonia. Soon the enemy ship was captured by Russian sailors from the approaching cruisers Bogatyr and Pallada. The Russians thwarted the evacuation of the Germans and seized the signal books of the German fleet.
Germanic codes were discovered by Russian codebreakers. As a result, the Russian fleet was precisely aware of the composition and actions of the enemy navy. The British received the same huge advantage over the German fleet, to whom the Russians passed the ciphers.
Magdeburg
The light cruiser was laid down in the spring of 1910 and handed over to the Navy in 1912. Displacement 4550 tons, maximum speed - up to 28 knots. The cruiser had an armor belt of up to 60 mm, decent armament - 12 - 105-mm rapid-fire guns, two 500 mm torpedo tubes located below the waterline, as well as anti-aircraft guns. The cruiser carried about 100 mines and devices for their release. The crew consisted of over 350 people. The cruiser was distinguished by good armor and armament, excellent seaworthiness and maneuverability.
The ship was first used by the Torpedo Inspectorate as an experimental ship in the development of torpedo armament, then it was part of the Defense Division of the Baltic Sea coast. On August 2, 1914, the cruisers Augsburg and Magdeburg headed for Libau. At the same time, the Germans already knew that there were no Russian ships and submarines in Libau, warehouses and arsenals were taken out and destroyed. German cruisers laid mines in the Libau roadstead and fired at the port.
In the future, "Magdeburg" acted as part of a detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Mischke. German ships disturbed the coast, fired at lighthouses, signal posts, planted mines, while avoiding collision with the Russian fleet.
The death of the cruiser
On the night of August 25-26, 1914, a German detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Bering, consisting of the cruisers Augsburg and Magdeburg, undertook a raid at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland by three destroyers. At night, in dense fog due to a navigational error, the Magdeburg ran into stones near the northern part of the Odensholm island (Osmussar), about 500 meters from the coast. Three bow compartments were immediately flooded with water. The double bottom of the stern was damaged and filled with water, the ship was banked to the port side. Trying to withdraw, the sailors threw everything they could overboard - ammunition, coal, heavy spare parts, etc. Despite all the efforts of the crew, it was not possible to withdraw from the shallows on their own.
The accident with the German cruiser occurred at the post of the Baltic Fleet communications service, which was located on the island and was connected to the mainland by an underwater telephone cable. Already at 1 hour 40 minutes. In Revel, the first telephone message with information about the incident left the island to the central station of the southern region of the communications service. Further, the post informed the command of all changes in the situation. So, at 2 o'clock. 10 min. the island post reported that a second ship had approached. The Germans lowered the boats and landed on the island, a firefight began. At 3 o'clock. During the night, the officer on duty reported the situation near the island of Odensholm to the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen. As a result, the Russian command learned about the incident almost immediately. Essen ordered destroyers and patrol cruisers to be dispatched to the site as soon as the fog allowed. In the morning, when from the post they saw a cruiser sitting aground, the commander was informed about this. Essen ordered the cruisers to move immediately to Odensholm.
At 7 o'clock. 25 minutes the Russian cruisers Bogatyr and Pallada weighed anchor. A destroyer battalion left with them. However, the destroyers were not lucky. With great difficulty they came out of the skerries in the fog, determining their location by measuring the depths. Considering themselves much west of Odensholm than they actually were, they turned east. As a result, we lost a lot of time in search of the enemy. Later, a message was received about the presence of another German cruiser in the area. Essen sent two more destroyer battalions, the cruisers Oleg and Russia. Then the admiral himself came out on "Rurik".
The German destroyer V-26, which approached the scene of the accident, tried to remove the Magdeburg from the stern. However, he could not take the cruiser off the ground. In the morning, the Magdeburg opened fire from her starboard guns at the lighthouse and the signal station near it. The lighthouse was destroyed. But the radio station survived, and the observers continued to transmit information. Due to the failure of attempts to remove the ship from the aground, the commander of the cruiser Richard Habenicht decided to leave the "Magdeburg" and blow it up. At 9 o'clock. 10 min. charges were laid in the bow and stern of the ship, and the destroyer began to shoot people. The commander of the ship, Captain Habenicht, and his adjutant remained on the ship. The explosion destroyed the bow of the cruiser up to the second tube.
In the period from 10 to 11 o'clock, Russian ships appeared in the fog. These were the cruisers Pallada and Bogatyr. The Germans on the torpedo boat mistook the Bogatyr for a destroyer and opened fire. The cruiser "Magdeburg", despite the destroyed nose, also fired. The Russian cruisers responded. During the battle, the fog thickened so much that it was impossible to direct the guns at the sights, and the gunners fired simply in the direction of the enemy. It was impossible to tell which of the dark silhouettes was a lighthouse and which was a German cruiser. The Germans responded actively, but because of the fog, the shells fell down with undershoots or flights. "Bogatyr" fired mainly at the "Magdeburg", and then transferred the fire to the destroyer, which began to leave. The German destroyer fired two self-propelled mines at the Bogatyr, then one more. The Russian ship was able to evade. The Pallada opened fire later and also fired at the Magdeburg. The German cruiser was badly damaged. Around 12 noon. the flag was lowered on the German cruiser. The entire battle lasted only about 20 minutes and the sides ceased fire at a distance of about 20 cables. The Russian cruisers did not pursue the departing German destroyer. According to German data, 17 people died on the cruiser Magdeburg and the destroyer, 17 were wounded and 75 were missing. The cruiser commander, two officers and 54 sailors were captured. The rest of the crew escaped on the destroyer.
Russian cruisers nearly damaged their destroyers. At 11 o'clock. 40 minutes two destroyers appeared under the command of the head of the communications service A. N. Nepenin, who were in full swing on the cruiser. According to the reports of the cruisers, the first one released a mine. The cruisers opened fire, but after four volleys they noticed that the destroyers were their own. These were the destroyers Lieutenant Burakov and Ryaniy. According to reports from the destroyers, the cruisers opened fire first, after which the Burakov fired two mines without identifying their ships. Fortunately, no one was hurt. The tragedy that could have happened due to the confusion with the ships leaving (the destroyers did not know about the departure of their cruisers) and heavy fog did not happen.
The mystery of the German ship
Having landed on the cruiser, the Russians discovered that it was the Magdeburg. Several sailors and the captain were captured here. The rest of the cruiser crew were captured on the island, where they sailed (many drowned). The German cruiser was badly damaged: from the explosion of the ammunition cellar, the bow was destroyed, the first pipe and foremast were missing. The muzzle of one gun was torn off from our shells, the telegraph network was torn off, the pipes were damaged. But all the mechanisms in the stern were intact.
Thus, the undoubted mistake of the Germans, who presumptuously walked at high speed into a heavy fog, and the operational actions of our fleet deprived Germany of a valuable new light cruiser. The loss for the Germans was absurd, offensive, but small on the scale of the great war. It seemed that it was possible to put an end to this. You never know the ships for one reason or another perished and will perish in the war. But it turned out that it is too early to put an end to this story.
Secret documents were found at the Magdeburg, which was left in a hurry by the team. Our sailors discovered a signal book and a large number of various documents of the German navy, including secret ones. About three hundred books alone (statutes, manuals, technical descriptions, forms, etc.) were seized. But the basis of this "collection", of course, was the "Signal Book" of the German Navy (two copies at once). Also, the Russian ransomware was given clean and draft logs of semaphore and radiotelegraph communications (including a wartime radiotelegraph log), peacetime ciphers, secret maps of the Baltic Sea squares and other documents on enemy radio communications. In addition, they found other useful documents: orders and instructions of the command, chiefs of sea stations; descriptions and instructions for the maintenance of the ship; cruiser form; machine, maneuvering and work magazines; documents on engines, etc.
In the communications service and the headquarters of the commander of the Baltic Fleet, work began on breaking the naval code of Germany. In October 1914, thanks to the efforts of Senior Lieutenant I. I. Thus, Russian intelligence broke the German ciphers. At the beginning of 1915, a separate special-purpose radio station (RON) was created as part of the communications service. She was engaged in radio interception and decryption of the information received. In order to preserve secrecy, any mention of signal books was removed from the documents of the Baltic Fleet. The Germans were given to understand that the Magdeburg team managed to destroy secret documents and they can be calm. Later, the Germans and Turks (they used the Germanic cipher) changed their cipher several times without touching its system, but each time it was solved by Russian codebreakers.
When problems arose with decrypting German radio messages, one of the leading decryptors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vetterlein (Popov), with the help of several naval officers from the communications service, recreated the German cipher key with the algorithm for changing it. Every day at zero o'clock the Germans put into operation a new key, after an hour and a half the first decryptions were already on the table of the head of the communications service. This allowed the Russians to know about the strength and location of the enemy. Until the very Brest Peace, Russian specialists deciphered all German radiograms.
The second copy of the signal book was handed over to the allies - the British and the French. As a result, the British gained a great advantage over the German fleet. The British were engaged in decryption by the so-called. "Room 40" - the decryption center of the Admiralty. Room 40 was directed by Alfred Ewing. Civilian and naval specialists worked in the center. The operation of "room 40" was highly classified. In the navy and in the press, successful interceptions of German ships were usually attributed to luck and intelligence work. The Germans suspected that the British were reading their ciphers. They changed the keys to the ciphers more than once, but Ewing's decryptors solved them. In 1916, when the Germans completely changed the codes, the British were lucky to get them again. As a result, throughout the war, any movements of the German fleet were monitored and almost always known to the British command. The British also read the correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry, in particular, with the ambassador to Mexico and agents in the United States, which made it possible to carry out a number of successful operations against Germany. Thus, the ciphers from the cruiser Magdeburg influenced the development of hostilities at sea and the outcome of the entire war.
