Having considered in the previous article the situation in which the project of the "big cruiser" "Blucher" was born, we will take a closer look at what the Germans ended up with as a ship.
Artillery
Undoubtedly, the main caliber of the Blucher was a big step forward compared to the artillery of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The Blucher's guns were of the same caliber, but more powerful than those of the previous German armored cruisers. The Scharnhorst was equipped with a 210-mm SK L / 40 C / 01, which fired a 108 kg projectile with an initial speed of 780 m / s. The Scharnhorst turrets had an elevation angle of 30 degrees, which provided a firing range of 87 (according to other sources - 88) kbt. With casemate mounts, the situation was worse, because, all other things being equal, their maximum vertical guidance angle was only 16 degrees, which made it possible to shoot only at 66-67 kbt.
The ammunition load included armor-piercing and high-explosive shells, and with the content of explosives in them, the matter was somewhat confusing. As far as the author could figure out, initially an armor-piercing projectile was relied on the 210-mm SK L / 40, which was a steel blank, i.e. generally not containing explosives and high-explosive, with 2.95 kg of black powder. But later, new projectiles were fired, which had an explosive content of 3.5 kg in armor-piercing and 6.9 kg in high-explosive.
The Blucher SK L / 45 cannons fired the same shells as the Scharnhorst cannons, but gave them a significantly higher muzzle velocity of 900 m / s. Therefore, despite the fact that the angle of elevation of the Blucher turret installations was the same as that of the Scharnhorst (30 degrees), the Blucher's firing range was 103 kbt. The increased muzzle velocity gave the Blucher cannons a "bonus" to armor penetration, in addition, it can be assumed that the control of the Blucher turrets was easier than the casemate and turret 210-mm Scharnhorst guns.
The same was observed for 150-mm guns - six 150-mm SK L / 40 guns were installed on the Scharnhorst, which reported a speed of 800 m / s to a 40 kg projectile, on the Blucher - eight 150-mm SK L / 45, shooting 45, 3 kg shells with an initial speed of 835 m / s. In the years of the 1st World SK L / 40, it received 44, 9 kg (and, it seems, even 51 kg) shells, but, of course, with a corresponding drop in muzzle velocity. The six-inch batteries of both cruisers were located approximately at the same height from the waterline (4, 43-4, 47 m at the Scharnhorst and 4, 25 m at the Blucher), in the range of the Blucher's cannon they were also slightly inferior - having an elevation angle of only 20 hail against 27 hail on the Scharnhorst, they fired at 72.5 kbt, while the Scharnhorst - at 74-75 kbt. As for mine artillery, the Scharnhorst had 18 88-mm SK L / 45 guns, the Blucher carried 16 significantly more powerful 88-mm SK L / 45 guns. But generally speaking, against the destroyers of the pre-war period, both those and others were frankly weak - the real anti-mine artillery of the cruisers was their 150-mm battery.
Thus, against the background of the previous project, Blucher's artillery looks just fine. But if you compare the firepower of the Blucher with the latest armored cruisers built in various countries, the German ship looks like a complete outsider.
The fact is that, with rare exceptions, other powers have come to the type of cruiser, which has 4 guns of 234-305-mm caliber and 8-10 guns of 190-203-mm caliber. And what is a 254-mm artillery system? This is a projectile weight of 225, 2-231 kg at an initial speed of 823 m / s (USA) to 870 m / s (Italy) and even 899 m / s (Russia), which means equal or greater firing range, significantly better armor penetration and much as a more significant high-explosive impact. The armor-piercing 225, 2 kg projectile of "Rurik II" carried about the same amount of explosives as the German 210-mm - 3, 9 kg (more by 14, 7%), but the Russian high-explosive projectile was more than four times higher than the German one in explosive content. - 28.3 kg versus 6.9 kg!
In other words, the weight of the Blucher's side salvo - eight 210-mm shells with a total mass of 864 kg, albeit insignificantly, but still lost to that of only 254-mm guns in any "254-mm" cruiser, and even "Rurik" with the most light shells (in comparison with the guns of the USA and Italy) had 900, 8 kg. But at the same time in four high-explosive shells "Rurik" was 113, 2 kg of explosive, and in eight 210-mm German - only 55, 2 kg. If we switch to armor-piercing, then the gain in explosives in the side salvo was behind the German cruiser (28 kg versus 15, 6), but we must not forget that the Russian 254-mm shells had much better armor penetration. In other words, the main caliber of the Blucher cannot be considered equal to the 254-mm cannons of Russian, American or Italian cruisers, but the same Rurik, in addition to the 254-mm cannons, had four more 203-mm cannons in the side salvo, each of which it was not too inferior to the 210 mm German gun. The Russian 203-mm projectile was slightly heavier - 112, 2 kg, had a lower muzzle velocity (807 m / s), but at the same time significantly surpassed its German "opponent" in explosive content, having 12, 1 kg in semi-armor-piercing and 15 kg - in a high-explosive shell. Thus, the Rurik's side salvo of four 203-mm and the same number of 254-mm guns had a mass of 1,349.6 kg shells, which was 1.56 times greater than the mass of the Blucher's 210-mm guns onboard salvo. In terms of the content of explosives in a salvo when using armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing 203-mm shells (since no armor-piercing shells were provided for the Russian 203-mm cannons), the mass of explosives in a salvo of "Rurik" was 64 kg, and when using high-explosive shells - 173, 2 kg, against 28 kg and 55, 2 kg for Blucher, respectively.
Here, of course, one can argue that the Blucher in an onboard salvo would also have four 150-mm guns, but then it is worth remembering the ten 120-mm Rurik barrels on each side, which, by the way, had even more firing range than the German "six".
"Blucher" in firepower was inferior not only to "Rurik", but also to the Italian "Pisa". The latter, having rather powerful 254-mm guns, also had 190-mm guns developed in 1908, which were somewhat weaker than the domestic 203-mm, but still were comparable in their capabilities with the 210-mm Blucher guns. "Seven-half-inch" "Pisa" fired 90, 9 kg shells with an initial speed of 864 m / s. What is there! Even the weakest in artillery terms of all the "254-mm" armored cruisers - the American "Tennessee", and that had an advantage over the "Blucher", opposing its four 254-mm guns with a projectile mass of 231 kg in an onboard salvo of its 210-mm guns and at the same time had a double superiority in six-inches. About the Japanese monsters "Ibuki" and "Kurama", with their four 305-mm and four 203-mm in an onboard salvo, there is nothing to say - their superiority in firepower over the German cruiser was absolutely overwhelming.
As for the British Minotaur-class cruisers, their 234-mm guns were remarkable, but still, in terms of their combat capabilities, they “did not reach” the 254-mm guns of the cruisers of the United States, Italy and Russia. Nevertheless, they were obviously superior in combat power to the 210-mm guns of the Germans (172.4 kg projectile with an initial speed of 881 m / s), and in addition, it should be borne in mind that four such guns from the Minotaur in an onboard salvo complemented five 190-mm cannons with excellent characteristics, capable of firing a 90.7 kg projectile with an initial speed of 862 m / s. In general, the "Minotaurs", of course, surpassed the "Blucher" in firepower, although this superiority was not as significant as that of the "Rurik" or "Pisa".
The only one of the "last" armored cruisers of the world of the leading naval powers, which was obviously inferior to the Blucher in artillery power, was the French "Waldeck Rousseau". Yes, it carried 14 main-caliber guns and had an advantage over the Blucher in an onboard salvo for one barrel, but at the same time its old 194-mm cannons fired only 86 kg of shells with a very low muzzle velocity of 770 m / s.
Thus, in terms of firepower, in comparison with other armored cruisers in the world, "Blucher" takes the second to last place of little honor. Its only advantage over other cruisers was the uniformity of the main caliber, which simplified zeroing at long distances, in comparison with two calibers on the cruisers of the USA, England, Italy, etc., but the lag in the quality of artillery systems was so great that this one, beyond any doubt the positive aspect could not be decisive.
As for the fire control system, in this respect, "Blucher" in the German fleet was a real pioneer. He was the first in the German navy to receive a three-legged mast, a centralized fire control system and a central artillery fire control machine. However, all this was installed on the cruiser not during construction, but during later upgrades.
Reservation
To the great joy of all domestic fans of naval history V. Muzhenikov in his monograph "Armored cruisers" Scharnhorst "," Gneisenau "and" Blucher "" gave detailed descriptions of the armoring of these ships. Alas, to our disappointment, the description is so confusing that it is almost impossible to understand the protection system of these three ships, but we will still try to do it.
So, the length of the "Blucher" at the waterline was 161.1 m, the maximum - 162 m (there are minor discrepancies in the sources on this matter). From the stem and almost to the very sternpost, the ship was covered by an armored deck located "stepwise" on three levels. For 25.2 m from the stem, the armored deck was located 0.8 m below the waterline, then for 106.8 m - one meter above the waterline, and then, for another 22.8 m - 0.115 m below the waterline … The remaining 7, 2 m were not protected by deck armor. These three decks were interconnected by vertical transverse armored bulkheads, the thickness of which was 80 mm between the middle and aft sections and, probably, the same between the middle and forward sections.
Surprisingly, it is a fact - from the descriptions of Muzhenikov it is completely unclear whether the Blucher had bevels, or whether all three armored decks were horizontal. Most likely, the bevels were nevertheless - after all, they were also present on the previous type of armored cruisers, and on the battle cruisers following the Blucher. At the same time, Muzhenikov writes that the Blücher's booking scheme was similar to the Scharnhorst, with the exception of a slight increase in the thickness of the armor belt. In this case, the middle section of the armored deck, which rose 1 meter above the waterline, turned into bevels descending to the lower edge of the armor belt, located 1, 3 m below the waterline, but unfortunately, there is no clarity with the bow and stern sections of the armored deck. Alas, Muzhenikov also does not report the thickness of the decks and bevels, limiting himself only to the phrase that "the total thickness of the armor plates of the deck flooring in different parts was 50-70 mm." It remains only to guess whether the thickness of the armor was meant only for the armored decks described above, or if 50-70 mm is given as the sum of the thicknesses of the armored, battery and upper decks.
The author of this article had the following impression: the thickness of the "stepped" armored deck and its bevels probably corresponded to those of the Scharnhorst, which were 40-55 mm, and this thickness includes both the armor and the steel deck planking on top of which it was laid …Above the armored deck at "Blucher" there was a battery (on which there were 150-mm guns) deck, and above it was the upper deck. At the same time, the battery deck did not have armor, but its thickness varied from 8 inside the casemate, to 12 mm outside the casemate, and at the location of the 150 mm guns - 16 mm or maybe 20 mm (Muzhenikov writes that in these places the battery deck consisted of three layers, but does not report their thickness, from the context it can be assumed that it was 8 + 4 + 4 or 8 + 4 + 8 mm).
But the upper deck of "Blucher" had a reservation over the casemates of 150-mm guns, but alas, except for the fact of its presence, Muzhenikov does not report anything. However, if we assume that she had a 15-mm layer of armor laid on top of shipbuilding steel (something similar is described by Muzhenikov for "Scharnhorst"), then we get 40-55 mm of armor deck + 15 mm of the upper deck above the casemate of deck armor, which is how as if it corresponds to the 55-70 mm total protection indicated by the Mujenikovs.
The armor belt extended almost along the entire length of the ship, leaving only 6, 3 m unprotected along the waterline in the stern itself, but it was very different in thickness, height and depth under the waterline. The engine and boiler rooms covered 180 mm armor plates, which had a height of 4.5 m (the data may be slightly inaccurate), towering 3, 2 m above the waterline at normal draft and reaching the upper edge to the battery deck. Accordingly, this part of the armor belt went under water by 1, 3 m. Very powerful protection for an armored cruiser, but the armor belt 180 mm thick was wiped only by 79, 2 m (49, 16% of the waterline length), covering only the engine and boiler rooms. From 180 mm of armor plates, only 80 mm of armor belt of lowered height went to the bow and stern - to the stern it rose 2 m above the water, to the bow - by 2.5 m and only at the stem itself (about 7, 2 m from it) rose to 3, 28 m above the water.
The lower edge of all these armor belts was located as follows: from the stem and towards the stern for the first 7, 2 m, it passed 2 m under the waterline, then "increased" to 1, 3 m and continued so throughout the remaining length of the bow 80 mm of the belt and 180 mm belt along its entire length, but further (aft 80 mm belt) gradually rose from 1.3 to 0.75 m under the waterline. Since the 80 mm armor plates in the stern did not reach the sternpost a little, a stern traverse was provided, which had the same 80 mm of armor.
The described booking scheme demonstrates the weakness of the protection of the extremities, because outside the boiler rooms and engine rooms, the onboard protection of the Blucher looks extremely inadequate, no stronger than that of British armored cruisers (80 mm armor belt and 40, maximum - 55 mm bevel, versus 76-102 mm belts with 50 mm bevels from the British), but still this is not entirely true. The fact is that, as far as one can understand the descriptions of Muzhenikov, the 180 mm section of the armor belt was closed with the same 180 mm traverses. But these traverses were located not perpendicular to the side, but obliquely, to the barbets of the bow and stern towers of 210-mm guns, in about the same way as it was on the cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau"
However, it should be borne in mind that the "inclined traverses" of the Scharnhorst passed over the bevels and the armored deck, and, probably, the same thing happened on the Blucher. In this case, there was a vulnerability at a meter level above and below the waterline.
In which "inclined traverses" "Blucher" from enemy hits were not protected, and the cover of the cellars was limited to 80 mm armor belt and 40-55 mm bevels.
On the battery deck (that is, on top of the 180 mm armor belt "Blucher") there was a 51.6-meter casemate for eight 150-mm guns. The armor plates that protected the casemates along the sides had a thickness of 140 mm and rested on the lower, 180 mm plates, so that, in fact, over the aforementioned 51.6 m, the vertical side protection reached the upper deck. From the stern, the casemate was closed with a 140 mm traverse, located perpendicular to the side, but in the bow the traverse was inclined, like the 180 mm citadel, but did not reach the bow tower of the main caliber. As we said above, the floor of the casemate (battery deck) had no protection, but from above the casemate was protected by armor, alas - of an unknown thickness. We assumed that it was 15 mm of armor on the steel armored deck.
The Blucher turrets had frontal and side plates 180 mm thick and an 80 mm rear wall, presumably (alas, Muzhenikov does not write about this directly) the barbet had 180 mm protection. The forward conning tower had 250 mm walls and 80 mm roof, the aft conning tower had 140 and 30 mm, respectively. On the Blucher, for the first time on armored cruisers in Germany, 35 mm anti-torpedo bulkheads were installed, extending from the very bottom to the armored deck.
In general, about the armor protection of the "big cruiser" "Blucher" we can say that it was very moderate. The armored cruisers of Germany were not champions in terms of protection at all, and only on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did they reach the world average. "Blucher" was even better armored, but it cannot be said that its protection somehow stood out against the background of its "classmates".
Whatever one may say, but 180 mm belt + either 45, or 55 mm bevel does not have a fundamental advantage over 152-mm belt and 50 mm bevel of British "Minotaurs", 127 mm armor belt or 102 mm bevel of American "Tennessee". Of all the armored cruisers in the world, perhaps only the Russian "Rurik" with its 152 mm belt and 38 mm bevel was somewhat inferior to the "Blucher", but it should be noted that the Russian defense was much longer than the German one, protecting the extremities along the barbeta of 254-mm towers inclusive. The author knows little about the armor of armored cruisers of the Amalfi class, but it was based on a 203 mm belt, over which a 178 mm upper belt was located for a very considerable length, so it is doubtful that the Italian cruisers were inferior in defense to the Blucher. The Japanese Ibuki had practically the same 178 mm armor belt with 50 mm bevels as the German cruiser, but they also protected more waterline than the 180 mm belt of the Blucher.
German dreadnoughts and battle cruisers of the First World War are deservedly considered the standard of armor protection, such impenetrable floating fortresses - which they have repeatedly proved in battle. But alas, all this does not apply to Blucher. In principle, if the Germans were to find an opportunity to protect the sides of their last "large cruiser" with a 180 mm armor belt, it would probably be possible to say that its protection is somewhat superior to that of other cruisers in the world (with the possible exception of Japanese ones), but That did not happen. And on the whole, the Blucher should be considered a ship protected at the level of its “classmates” - no worse, but, in general, no better than them.
Power plant.
In ship power engineering, the Germans displayed amazing traditionalism - not only the first, but even the second series of their dreadnoughts (type "Helgoland") carried steam engines and coal boilers instead of turbines and oil fuel. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that some of the best (if not the best) steam engines in the world were created in Germany. As for coal, then, firstly, in those years no one had yet risked building large warships, whose power plants would run entirely on oil. But there were also more weighty reasons: firstly, the Germans considered coal pits to be an important element of protecting the ship, and secondly, there were enough coal mines in Germany, but with oil fields everything was much worse. In the event of a war, the "oil" fleet of Germany could rely only on previously accumulated oil reserves, which could only be replenished with supplies from outside, and where could they come from under the conditions of the British blockade?
"Blucher" received three steam engines, steam for which was provided by 18 boilers (12 - high capacity and 6 - low). The rated power of the power plant was 32,000 hp; under the contract, the cruiser was supposed to develop 24.8 knots. On tests, the cars were boosted, having achieved a record 43,262 hp. At the same time "Blucher" developed 25, 835 knots. In general, despite the use of, in general, already obsolete steam engines, the power plant "Blucher" deserves only praise. She effectively worked not only on the measured mile, but also in the course of day-to-day operation - it is interesting that the Blucher, operating in conjunction with the Hochseeflotte battle cruisers, always kept up the speed set for it, but the Von der Tann sometimes lagged behind. Normal fuel supply is 900 tons, full 2510 tons (according to other sources - 2,206 tons). "Blucher", unlike "Scharnhorst" and "Gneseienau", was not considered a cruiser of the colonial service, but had a cruising range even greater than them - 6,600 miles at 12 knots or 3,520 miles at 18 knots. The Scharnhorst, according to various sources, had a cruising range of 5,120 - 6,500 miles at 12 knots.
It can be stated that on both sides of the North Sea they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to increase the speed of the "large" cruisers to 25 knots, and in this (and, alas, the only one) Blucher was not inferior to the newest British Invincibles. And speed is the only parameter in which the German cruiser had an advantage over the last armored cruisers of other powers. The most powerfully armed Japanese "Ibuki" and the following domestic "Rurik" developed about 21 knots, "Tennessee" - 22 knots, English "Minotaurs" - 22, 5-23 knots, "Waldeck Russo" - 23 knots, Italian cruisers of the type "Amalfi" ("Pisa") gave 23, 6-23, 47 knots, but, of course, no one came close to the phenomenal 25.8 knots of Blucher.
So, what do we have in the bottom line?
The general logic of the development of naval technology and, to a certain extent, the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, led to the appearance of the last generation of armored cruisers. Such were the "Tennessee" in the United States (in fairness - the first "Tennessee" was actually laid down in 1903, so, although the American cruiser was not the best, but it was the first, so much is forgivable for him) "Warrior "And" Minotaur "in England," Pisa "in Italy," Waldeck Russo "in France," Tsukuba "and" Ibuki "in Japan and" Rurik "in Russia.
Germany has managed to be late for this round of the world cruising race. While all countries were laying down their cruisers, Germany began to build the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which looked great against the background of some Iwate or Good Hope, but were completely uncompetitive to the same Minotaur or "Pisa". The Germans were the last to start building their "last generation" armored cruiser. Regardless of where to consider the beginning of the creation of "Blucher", from the date of laying (1907) or from the date of the beginning of preparation of the slipway for construction (the earliest - autumn 1906), "Blucher" was truly the last, because other powers laid their armored cruisers in 1903-1905.
In these conditions, the proverb “harnesses slowly, but drives fast” comes to mind, because since the Germans started construction so late, they had the opportunity to design, if not the best, then at least one of the best last armored cruisers in the world. Instead, the building berth of the state shipyard in Kiel gave birth to something extremely strange.
Among other armored cruisers in the world, "Blucher" received the highest speed, armor protection "slightly above average", and almost the weakest artillery. Usually "Blucher" is perceived as a ship with weakened artillery, but stronger armor than that of its "opponents", which results from a comparison of the thickness of the main armor belts - 180 mm for Blucher versus 127-152 mm for most other cruisers. But even in this case, for some reason, usually no one remembers the 178 mm armor belt of Japanese and 203 mm of armor of Italian cruisers.
In fact, given that:
1) Vertical booking should be taken into account together with the bevels of the armored deck, and in this case the difference between 50 mm bevel + 152 mm belt of British cruisers and approximately 50 mm bevel and 180 mm of Blucher's armor is minimal.
2) The 180 mm section of the belt at the Blucher was very short and covered only the engine rooms and boiler rooms.
It can be confidently asserted that the Blucher's armor did not have any noticeable advantage even over cruisers with 152 mm armor belts.
Usually "Blucher" is reproached for the fact that, being officially laid down a year after the start of the construction of the "Invincibles", he could not resist them. But suppose for a second that a miracle happened and the battlecruiser class was never born. What tasks the Kaiserlichmarine could solve the "big" cruiser "Blucher"?
As we said earlier, the Germans saw two tasks for their cruisers - colonial service (for which the Fürst Bismarck, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were built) and reconnaissance for battleship squadrons (for which all other German armored cruisers were created). Did it make sense to send "Blucher" to the ocean communications of England? Obviously not, because the British "hunters" obviously outnumbered him in weapons. True, the Blucher was faster, but if you rely on speed, wouldn't it have been easier for the same money to build several high-speed light cruisers? A heavy raider makes sense when it is capable of destroying a "hunter", but what is the point of an armored cruiser, which is initially weaker than its "beaters"? Thus, we see that Blucher is not at all optimal for ocean raids.
Service with the squadron? Alas, it's still sadder here. The fact is that already in 1906 it was obvious to everyone, including in Germany, that battleships were becoming a thing of the past, and in the future, squadrons of dreadnoughts would become foaming seas. But could the Blucher serve as a scout with such a squadron?
In abstract terms, yes, I could. Somewhere in the Pacific Ocean, in good weather and with excellent visibility, where you can track the movement of the enemy squadron, being 12 miles or further away from it, and without being exposed to the fire of the new rulers of the seas. In this case, the high speed of the Blucher would allow him to maintain the required distance and observe the enemy without being exposed to the blow.
But even in this case, the Blucher design is far from optimal, because enemy scouts with their own squadron are usually not welcome and they would probably want to drive it away. In this case, any cruiser with 254-mm cannons received a great advantage over the Blucher - such a cruiser could effectively hit a German ship from a greater distance than the Blucher's 210-mm cannon allowed. As a result, the commander of the German "large" cruiser had a "rich" choice - either to continue observation, fighting at an unfavorable distance for his ship, or to get close to the enemy cruiser and come under fire from the dreadnought's heavy cannons, or to retreat altogether, disrupting the execution of the combat mission …
But the ship is not built for combat in a spherical vacuum. The "field of fate" for the Kaiserlichmarine was to be the North Sea with its bad weather and fogs. In these conditions, the scout with the squadron always risked unexpectedly stumbling upon the leading enemy dreadnoughts, finding them six or seven miles away. In this case, the salvation was to hide in the fog as quickly as possible, or whatever else would limit visibility. But the dreadnoughts were much more powerful than the old battleships and even in the shortest time they could turn a fast scout into a flaming wreck. Therefore, the "big" German cruiser, performing the reconnaissance task for the squadron, needed very good armor protection, which could allow it to survive short-term contact with the 305-mm guns of the British dreadnoughts. However, as we can see, "Blucher" had nothing of the kind.
Now suppose that the author nevertheless made a mistake in his postulates, and the Germans designed the Blucher in response to misinformation that the Invincibles were supposedly the same Dreadnoughts, but only with 234-mm artillery. But let's remember the armor protection of the Invincibes.
Their extended 152 mm armor belt, which protected the side up to the bow and end towers of the main caliber, provided very good protection with a 50 mm bevel and 64 mm protection of the cellars, and the author of this article will not dare to assert that the "scanty" 180 mm armor belt of the Blucher defended the German ship is better - rather, we can say that the protection of the Invincible and Blucher is approximately equal. But at the same time, if the Invincible had 8 234-mm guns in an onboard salvo, it would be much stronger than the Blucher - and these ships would be equal in speed.
The construction of the Blucher was a mistake of the German fleet, but not because it could not withstand the Invincibles (or rather, not only for this reason), but because even in their absence, in terms of the aggregate of its combat qualities, it remained weaker than other armored cruisers in the world and did not could somehow effectively carry out the tasks assigned in the German fleet to this class of ships.
The end follows!
Previous articles in the series:
Errors of German shipbuilding. Large cruiser "Blucher"
