In this series of articles, we will try to assess the state of the current shipbuilding programs of the Russian Federation and try to understand what awaits our navy in the next decade, including in the light of the new state armaments program for 2018-2025.
A year and four months ago, we completed the publication of the cycle "Program of shipbuilding of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition", where we considered the prospects of our naval development. Undoubtedly, even then it was quite clear that the program for the renovation of the Russian Navy was a fiasco and would not be carried out on ships of all classes, with the possible exception of strategic missile submarine cruisers and "mosquito" forces. We also considered the most serious systemic mistakes that were made when trying to revive the domestic fleet within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020. In this series of articles, we will recall them again and see what has been done and what is being done to eradicate them.
Unfortunately, there is no complete information about what will be included in the new GPV 2018-2025, there are only reflections of experts and an interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Korolev, in which he said:
"Also, within the framework of the state armament program, new and modernized ships of the distant sea and ocean zones will continue to enter the Navy. The most massive ship in this segment will be the modernized Project 22350M frigate equipped with high-precision weapons."
In addition, the admiral announced the supply of ships and boats of the near sea zone with improved efficiency and combat capabilities, equipped with high-precision weapons.
As a matter of fact, a little less than a little has been said. But nevertheless, in combination with the information announced in other sources about the construction of our submarine fleet, the repair of ships, etc., the words of the commander-in-chief quite clearly describe the immediate prospects of the Russian Navy.
Let's start with the least problematic part of our shipbuilding program: the submarine nuclear missile fleet.
Until now, the core of our naval component of nuclear forces is comprised of six submarines - Project 667BDRM Dolphin Strategic Missile Submarine Cruisers (SSBNs).
The ships of this project entered service with the USSR Navy in the period 1984 - 1990, and today their age is 27-33 years. This is not as much as it might seem: the lead American SSBN Ohio was transferred to the Navy in 1981, and its withdrawal from the US Navy is scheduled for 2027. Thus, Ohio's service life is 46 years. The next generation of American "city killers" on the project will have a lifespan of 40 years.
Probably, the "wild nineties" to some extent affected the SSBNs of project 667BDRM, but now boats of this type are consistently undergoing repair and modernization. In 2012, the director of Zvezdochka, Nikitin, talked about extending the life of Dolphins to 35 years, that is, until 2019-2025, but most likely they will continue to be used. It is likely that ships of this type will be able to remain in service until at least 2025-2030. Of course, the Dolphins are no longer the height of technical perfection and they are not the quietest submarines in the world. Nevertheless, it was they who became the first truly "invisible" SSBNs in the USSR. According to some reports, the detection range of the Dolphin by means of the American submarine of the Improved Los Angeles type does not exceed 30 km in ideal conditions, which are practically never observed in the Barents Sea. Under normal conditions of northern hydrology, SSBNs of project 667BDRM may be undetected for 15 km, which, of course, greatly increases the survival rate of boats of this type.
"Dolphins" are armed with very sophisticated weapons: ballistic missiles R-29RMU2 "Sineva" and R-29RMU2.1 "Liner" (development completed in 2011). "Liner", being a modification of "Sineva", is the pinnacle of domestic liquid "underwater" rocketry. This missile has an impressive combat power and is capable of carrying up to 10 warheads of individual guidance of 100 kt, (or 4 blocks of 500 kt) at a range of 8300-11500 km, while the deflection radius does not exceed 250 m. themselves SSBN "Dolphin" are a very reliable weapon, a kind of Kalashnikov assault rifle of the sea depths. In 1991, during the operation "Begemot" SSBN K-407 "Novomoskovsk" from a submerged position launched a full ammunition load of R-29RM missiles (modifications of which were "Sineva" and "Liner") with an interval of 14 seconds. The operation ended in complete success, and this was the first time in world history when a submarine used up 16 missiles in one salvo. Prior to that, the record belonged to the project 667A boat "Navaga": it launched two series of four missiles with a small interval between them. American Ohio never fired more than 4 rockets.
In general, Project 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs today represent, although not the most modern, but reliable and formidable weapon capable of ensuring the country's security until the next generation submarine missile carriers are commissioned.
SSBN project 955 "Borey". These are boats of the next, fourth generation, replacing the Dolphins. Unfortunately, there is not as much data on them as we would like.
The first thing that should be noted: when designing the fourth generation SSBNs, a huge amount of work was done to reduce the noise of the boat and its physical fields. The director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau argued that the noise level of the Borey SSBN is 5 times lower than that of the Shchuka-B multipurpose nuclear submarine and 2 times lower than that of the newest American Virginia. Probably, such an impressive success was achieved also because a water-jet propulsion system was used on a boat for the first time in domestic practice.
Also, the ships of Project 955 received modern hydroacoustic armament: MGK-600B "Irtysh-Amphora-B-055", which is a universal complex that performs not only the standard functions for the SAC (noise and echo direction finding, target classification, hydroacoustic communication), but also measurement thickness of ice, search for polynyas and streaks, detection of torpedoes. Unfortunately, the characteristics of this SAC are unknown, the open press provides the ability to detect targets at a distance of 220-230 km (in other sources - 320 km) and track 30 targets simultaneously. But for analysis, these data are useless, since they cannot be compared with the latest American hydroacoustic systems. There is an opinion that the Irtysh-Amphora is not inferior in its capabilities to the Virginia State Joint Stock Company of the US Navy, but it is unlikely that something can be said for sure.
During the Cold War, American submarines outnumbered Soviet ones in the quality of their sonar systems, despite the fact that our boats still made more noise, and this put the USSR submariners in a very disadvantageous position. But towards the end of the twentieth century, in terms of noise, the Soviet multipurpose nuclear submarines "Shchuka-B" not only reached the level of "Improved Los Angeles", but probably surpassed it. According to some reports, the noise level of "Schuk-B" is intermediate between "Improved Los Angeles" and "Virginia". It is also known that during the creation of the Boreys, their noise was significantly reduced relative to the Shchuk-B, so it cannot be ruled out that in this parameter the Russian Federation achieved parity with the United States, and, perhaps, even took the lead.
As for the SAC, the following should be taken into account. The USSR had a very large submarine fleet, including missile submarines - carriers of heavy anti-ship missiles, which became the "calling card" of the USSR Navy. But, of course, for firing anti-ship missiles at long distances, submarines needed external target designation.
In the USSR, the Legend space reconnaissance and target designation system was created for this, but, unfortunately, for a number of reasons, it did not become an effective tool for issuing control commands to missile submarines. At the same time, the USSR also did not have aircraft carriers with long-range radar detection aircraft based on them, which could solve this issue. The Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designators, built in 1962, were outdated by the 80s and did not guarantee coverage of the surface situation.
In this situation, the idea arose of creating an "underwater AWACS" - a specialized submarine for hydroacoustic patrol and illumination of the underwater environment (with the excellent abbreviation GAD OPO), the main weapon of which will be a super-powerful sonar complex capable of illuminating the underwater situation many times better than the SAC of our serial missile and multipurpose nuclear submarines. In the USSR, the boat GAD OPO was created within the framework of Project 958 "Afalina".
Unfortunately, the Russian Navy never received this boat, although there were rumors that already in the Russian Federation work on this topic was continued, and for the GAD OPO boat, the task was set to confidently monitor the underwater situation at a distance of 600 km. Of course, if such performance characteristics are possible, then the GAD OPO boats will revolutionize naval weapons. In this case, the same aircraft carrier strike groupings will turn out to be "legal prey" for submarine detachments, which include the GAD OPO submarine and a pair of anti-ship missile carriers. But it should be understood that the creation of such powerful SACs is hardly possible so far, especially since their range is very much dependent on hydrological conditions: for example, SACs of submarines are capable of detecting an enemy somewhere in ideal conditions at a distance of 200 km, in the same The Barents Sea may not notice the same enemy for 30 km.
Well, in the case of Project 958 Afalina, only one thing can be said: its hydroacoustic complex was conceived as much more advanced and powerful than the SAC of our Antey and Shchuka-B submarines. But it was on the basis of this complex that the Irtysh-Amphora State Joint Stock Company was created, which is now being installed on the 4th generation nuclear submarines Borey and Ash!
Consequently, it can be assumed that the characteristics of the Irtysh-Amphora are much higher than those of the Soviet submarines of the 3rd generation. At the same time, the newest American "Virginias" in the part of the State Aircraft Corporation became, so to speak, a "step in place" - having created the magnificent (but also insanely expensive) nuclear-powered ships "Sea Wolf", the Americans subsequently wanted a cheaper one, even somewhat less perfect weapon. As a result, the Virginias received the same AN / BQQ-10 SJC that was on the Sea Wolves, despite the fact that the Virginias used lightweight side sonar antennas. On the whole, of course, there is no doubt that the Americans are improving their SACs, but they have not yet come up with something fundamentally new.
According to the statements of our shipbuilders, Irtysh-Amphora is not inferior in its capabilities to the USS Virginia. It is difficult to say whether this is true or not, but it is very similar to the fact that SSBNs of the Borey type are quite comparable with the latest American nuclear-powered ships in terms of noise and detection range.
It should be borne in mind that SSBNs of this type are constantly being improved. The first three boats, laid down in 1996, 2004 and 2006, were built according to the 955 project, but the next five hulls are created according to the new, modernized Borey-A project. This is not surprising at all, because the 955 project was created in the last century and today we can create more advanced boats. But, besides this, information appeared in the press about the development of "Borey-B" and it is possible that the next (and last) two boats of this series will be built according to an even more improved project.
It can be assumed (although this is not a fact) that the first boats of the 955 project did not show in full what the sailors expected to see from them, due to their construction during the timelessness of the 90s and early 2000s. So, for example, it is known that when creating Yuri Dolgoruky, Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh, hull structures from unfinished boats of the Shchuka-B and Antey types were used, it can be assumed that some of the equipment turned out to be wrong, which is required for the project. But in any case, it should be expected that boats of this type will be much more perfect than their predecessors, Project 667BDRM Dolphin SSBNs, and the subsequent Borei-A and Borei-B will fully reveal the potential inherent in the project.
However, no matter how good the submarine is, in itself it is just a platform for the weapons placed on it. SSBNs of project 955 received a fundamentally new weapon for our fleet, solid-propellant ballistic missiles R-30 "Bulava". Before Boreyev, all SSBNs of the USSR carried liquid-fueled missiles.
In fact, it is impossible to talk about any global advantage of solid-propellant missiles over "liquid-propellant" missiles, it would be more correct to say that both have their own advantages and disadvantages. So, for example, liquid-propellant rockets have a high momentum and allow a longer flight range or throw weight. But at the same time, a number of advantages of solid-propellant missiles make them preferable for deployment on submarines.
First, solid-propellant missiles are smaller than liquid-propellant ones, and this is certainly very important for a submarine. Second, solid-propellant rockets are significantly safer in storage. Liquid propellant is extremely toxic and, if physically damaged, the missile's hull is a threat to the submarine's crew. Sadly, everything happens at sea, including collisions between ships and vessels, so it is impossible to guarantee the absence of such damage. Thirdly, the acceleration section of a solid-propellant missile is smaller than that of a liquid-propellant one, and this makes it difficult to defeat a ballistic missile taking off - it is difficult to imagine, of course, that an American destroyer will be in the launch area of our ICBMs, but … And, finally, fourthly, the point is that solid-propellant missiles are launched from SSBNs by the so-called "dry start", when powder gases simply throw ICBMs onto the surface, and there the rocket engines are already turned on. At the same time, liquid-propellant rockets, due to the lower strength of the structure, cannot be launched in this way, for them a "wet start" is provided, when the rocket shaft is filled with seawater and only then is launched. The problem is that the filling of missile silos with water is accompanied by a strong noise, respectively, SSBNs with liquid-propellant missiles strongly unmask themselves immediately before the salvo, which, of course, should be avoided by all means.
Therefore, strategically, the idea of switching to solid-propellant missiles for our fleet should be considered correct. The only question is how successful such a transition turned out to be in practice.
Bulava missiles have probably become the most criticized weapon system in the entire post-Soviet period. By and large, there were two main complaints against them, but what kind!
1. The Bulava missiles in their performance characteristics are much inferior to the Trident II ballistic missile in service with the US Navy.
2. The Bulava missile has an extremely low technical reliability.
On the first point, I would like to note that the characteristics of the Bulava remain classified to this day, and the data provided by open sources may be inaccurate. For example, for quite a long time it was assumed that the maximum range of the Bulava did not exceed 8,000 km, and this was a reason for criticism, because the Trident II D5 flew at 11,300 km. But then, during the next tests, the Bulava slightly denied open sources, hitting targets more than 9,000 km from the launch point. At the same time, according to some sources, Trident II D5 has a range of over 11 thousand km. only in the "minimum configuration", and, for example, a load of 8 warheads can be delivered no further than 7,800 km. And we must not forget that the American missile has a much greater weight - 59.1 tons versus 36.8 tons of the Bulava.
Comparing the Bulava and the Trident missiles, one must not forget that the Americans have been developing solid-fuel missiles for submarines for a very long time, and for us this is a relatively new business. It would be strange to expect to immediately create something "unparalleled in the world" and "superior to opponents in all respects." It is more than likely that in a number of parameters the Bulava is indeed inferior to the Trident II D5. But any weapon should be assessed not from the position of "the best in the world or completely unusable", but according to the ability to perform the task for which it was created. The tactical and technical characteristics of the R-30 Bulava allow it to ensure the defeat of many targets on the territory of the United States, and the latest technologies for overcoming missile defense, including maneuvering warheads, make them an extremely difficult target for American anti-missiles.
As for the technical reliability of the Bulava, it became the subject of wide public discussion as a result of a series of unsuccessful missile launches.
The first two launches took place normally (the very first "throw" launch of the weight and size model is not taken into account), but after that three launches in a row in 2006 were unsuccessful. The developers took a short time-out, after which one launch in 2007 and two launches in 2008 were successful. All those interested breathed a sigh of relief when suddenly the ninth (end of 2008), tenth and eleventh launches (2009) turned out to be emergency.
And it was then that a tsunami of criticism of the project arose. And, it should be noted, there were all reasons for this: out of eleven launches, six turned out to be emergency! Since then, the P-30 Bulava has been labeled in the public mind as a "missile that does not fly against the wind."
But it should be understood that the tests of the Bulava did not end there. After the last series of failures, 16 more launches were carried out, of which only one was unsuccessful. Thus, a total of 27 launches were made, of which 7 were unsuccessful, or almost 26%. Bulava launch statistics are even better than missile tests for our "supergiants", Project 941 Akula submarine cruisers. Of the first 17 launches of the R-39 rocket, more than half were failed (according to some sources - 9), but of the next 13 launches, only two were unsuccessful. Thus, 11 out of 30 launches were unsuccessful, or almost 37%.
But with all this, the R-39 missile subsequently became a reliable weapon, which was confirmed in 1998, when our Typhoon SSBN fired a full ammunition in one salvo - all 20 R-39 missiles. The launch took place normally, despite the fact that, according to the author's data, missiles with an expired shelf life were used.
It must be said that the results of the Bulava tests are not too different from those of the American Trident II D5. Of the 28 launches of the American missile, one was declared "uncredited", four - emergency, one - partially successful. In total, it turns out that at least five launches were unsuccessful. In our R-30, the ratio is slightly worse, but given the conditions under which the enterprises - the creators of the Bulava worked after the “wild 90s” and the scanty funding of the state defense order before the 2011-2020 GPV, one could hardly expect more …
Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the Bulava has nevertheless become a formidable and reliable weapon, to match its carriers - Project 955 Borey SSBNs.
In general, it should be stated that the Russian Federation has completely succeeded in the planned replacement of submarine missile carriers with ships of a new generation. Three Project 955 SSBNs are already in service, and the completion of the construction of five ships laid down for Project 955A is expected in the period from 2018 to 2020. And even if we assume that these terms will in fact be significantly shifted to the right, say, until 2025, there is still no doubt that the eight newest ships will enter service long before the last boats of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin" leave the operating fleet. And if we assume that the remaining 2 ships (probably already under Project 955B) will be laid down by 2020, then all ten.
If only the same could be said about other ships of the Russian Navy!..
