In this article, we will summarize this series by collecting and summarizing the data of individual articles together. We present a general, summary table of data on ships and aviation of the Russian Navy: in it we will see a number of the most important reference numbers that will show the dynamics of what is happening with our fleet. But before moving on, in fact, to the numerical data, it is necessary to give some small comments.
The first column is the number of the USSR Navy at the peak of its power - as of 1991. It takes into account the total number of ships on the fleet lists, regardless of their actual state of combat capability.
The second column is the size of the Russian Navy as of 01.01.2016. At the same time, as in the previous case, it takes into account all the ships of the fleet, including those that will never return to its active composition. Thus, the comparison of the first and second columns perfectly demonstrates what the Russian Federation began with at the time of the fall of the USSR and what it came to after a quarter of a century of its existence.
The third column is information about the numerical strength of the Russian Navy as of today, 2018. The fundamental difference between the data in this column and the previous two is that they have been cleared of ships that will never return to the fleet. That is, this column includes ships of the active fleet, as well as those that are under repair or awaiting repair, from which they will return to the fleet, and not go to scrap. But ships that are in reserve or laid up, and those that are only formally listed as being repaired, were not included here. This column is intended to provide an understanding of the actual composition of our Navy.
The fourth column is the forecast for 2030. I would like to note that an optimistic scenario has been taken, which the author does not really believe in, but … let's just say that what we see in this column is the maximum that we can count on.
And finally, the fifth column is the representations of two military professionals, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky on the minimum required composition of the fleet. Recall that these authors advocated the unification of the ship composition: in their opinion, the nuclear submarine fleet should be represented by two types of ships - SSBNs with ballistic missiles and a universal type of torpedo submarine, non-nuclear submarines should also be of the same type. Instead of missile cruisers, destroyers and BODs, multipurpose ships (MCC) should be built, and the coastal fleet should be represented by one type of TFR, etc. Accordingly, we ranked warships according to the classes proposed by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. At the same time, we did not begin to detail the composition of the USSR Navy by types of ships (this is not only difficult, but also overload the table to the top of any measure), but we present such data for the Russian Navy. And here's what we got.
And now - comments. We will not describe in detail the state of each class and type of ships, since we have already done this in the corresponding articles, we will give only a brief reminder.
SSBN
Everything is more or less clear here, by 2030 the number of ships of this type will remain the same as now, but the old Soviet-built ships will be replaced by Borei-A. In principle, this is a completely normal and correct approach, with perhaps one exception - the Ministry of Defense refused to build more advanced Boreyev-Bs in favor of modification A, because Bs do not meet the cost-effectiveness criterion. This decision, in light of the frank weakness of our fleet, as well as the development of ASW and the saturation of the American Navy with multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 4th generation, does not seem reasonable.
Multipurpose nuclear submarines
Even in the most remarkable (and, alas, extremely unlikely) case, in which the current plans for a large modernization of 4 boats of Project 971 and the same number of SSGNs of the Antey type, and even provided that the lead ship of the Husky series will not only be laid down, but also put into operation by 2030, the composition of multipurpose nuclear submarines will continue to decline, while its total number will be half of the minimum value. But another scenario is much more likely, according to which our modernization plans will be thwarted, and the Husky will still be under construction - in this case, it is quite realistic to expect a reduction in multipurpose nuclear submarines in the fleet to 14-15 units. Thus, we can safely predict a further decline in the number of this most important class of warships for us and state the presence of no more than 39-50% of the minimum sufficient number in the fleet by 2030.
Non-nuclear submarines
In principle, there is reason to believe that their number will remain at the current level, but this requires the fulfillment of two conditions. First, the existing program for the construction of six Varshavyankas for the Pacific Fleet will not be sequestered, and after the last two Lada are completed, it will be possible to lay down and put into operation another 6 boats of this or a newer type. Perhaps, there is nothing impossible in this, but alas, a situation is quite likely when we will wait for VNEU for a long time, then recycle a boat for it, or design a new one, then, in 2022, we will lay something “unparalleled in the world”, the construction of which will take years by 10 - and the number of non-nuclear submarines in the fleet will be reduced from today's 22 ships to 15 units. Total -60-85% of the minimum acceptable level.
Aircraft carriers (TAVKR)
Everything is clear here. Even if work on the creation of a new ship of this class is really underway, and the lead aircraft carrier will be laid down until 2030, and this is far from a fact, then it will not have time to enter service before 2030. Thus, in 2030 we are left with only one TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov", which is 25% of the required level. Given the fact that our only TAVKR does not meet the requirements for aircraft carrying ships, voiced by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, in reality this ratio will be even worse.
MCC
Generally speaking, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky saw this ship as a destroyer with a standard displacement of 6,000 tons with missile weapons housed in the UVP. Frigates with a displacement of 3,500 - 4,500 tons, in their opinion, the Russian Navy is not needed: nevertheless, today we are building them and it would be most reasonable to place them in this "class" of ships.
As you can see from the table, if everything goes well, then by 2030 we will be able to maintain the total number of ships at the current level. But this is only if by 2030 we will be able not only to commission 3 frigates of Project 22350, in addition to the "Gorshkov", but also build a couple of the same, or newer Project 22350M. And if by some miracle we manage to keep the number of BOD projects 1155 / 1155.1 at the level of 7 ships.
But even in this case, instead of the minimum required 32 ships, we will have only 20, of which 7 BODs will be completely outdated both in terms of weapons and ship systems, and in terms of the resource of mechanisms, and 7 frigates of project 22350 and 11356 will be much weaker than ships, "Designed" by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. The two modernized TARKRs, however, will be much stronger, but it is obvious that this advantage will not be able to compensate for the qualitative lag of 14 other ships. It is possible, in principle, to count on the fact that by 2030 not 5 frigates of project 22350 / 22350M will have time to enter service, but a greater number of them, but you need to understand that there is practically no chance of keeping all the BODs of project 1155 in the fleet - by 2030 d the resources of their power plants will be depleted, and there is nothing to change them for - the situation with the joked "Admiral Panteleev" will repeat itself. Thus, the hope for an increase in the number of frigates, alas, is more than offset by the risks of entering the "eternal reserve" of the Project 1155 BOD.
In general, it can be argued that some shifts in the structure of the ship composition relative to the planned figures are possible, but the total number of rocket and artillery ships capable of operating in the ocean will, at best, be about 62% of the minimum required requirement. And you need to understand that in fact the specified percentage does not show the real state of affairs - V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky determined the need for such ships based on the aircraft carrier structure of the fleet - that is, in their view, the tasks of destroying air and surface targets would be undertaken by carrier-based aircraft, and the MCC is needed mainly to give stability to "floating airfields." But we do not expect new aircraft carriers until 2030, and in order to try to solve the same problems, the MCC needs a much larger number of them than is indicated by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. In other words, by 2030 we would have an MCC of 62% of the minimum requirement if we have aircraft carriers, and since we do not have them, then this percentage automatically becomes much lower.
TFR
Their total number for 2030 is calculated on the basis of the assumptions that we will be able to:
1. To put into operation all corvettes that are being built today and at least four more ships of project 20386 or another project;
2. Let's increase the series of patrol ships of Project 22160 from 6 to 12 ships.
As for corvettes, it is hardly possible to expect more - of course, both 8 and 10 keels can lay them, but taking into account the fact that ships of this class are being built in our country within 5-7 years, one can hardly expect that they will enter in operation until 2030 more than four. Something can change for the better unless the laying of the project 20380 corvettes, more or less worked out in construction, is resumed, but it is hardly possible to count on this - the fleet did not like these ships. But the laying of six more ships of the project 22160 is quite possible.
In general, the situation seems to be not bad - although the total number of ships in the near sea zone will be reduced from 38 to 31, but this will amount to almost 75% of the minimum requirement according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. But this is only if we forget that the patrol ships of Project 22160 do not at all meet the requirements that respected authors put forward to the TFR. Dear A. Timokhin wrote more about the absurdities of project 22160 in his article “Suitcases without handles. The Navy is buying a series of useless ships,”and we also gave these ships the most negative assessment. In short, project 22160 is practically inapplicable in a conflict of any significant intensity, its limit is police operations like the arrest of Ukrainian armored boats, but for these purposes it would be possible to design a better ship. In other words, although in the column corresponding to the class "TFR" in the understanding of V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, we counted 31 ships, but 12 of them are listed in them only formally, for the simple reason that they do not fit into our classification, but it was necessary to carry them somewhere. At the same time, project 22160 is completely incapable of performing the functions of the TFR in the near sea zone. With this amendment, the composition of our TFR by 2030 is 19 ships, or 45% of the minimum required.
Small surface ships and boats
Oddly enough, the situation here is both better and worse than shown in the table. At the beginning of 2016, the Russian Navy included 39 small missile ships and boats of various projects, the serial construction of which began (and in most cases ended) during the Soviet era. So, at present, these ships, which for the most part are rapidly losing their combat significance, are quite successfully replaced by the Buyan-M "river-sea" MRK (12 units in service and under construction) and a series of newest "Karakurt" project 22800 - the last ones were put into operation, 18 units are being built and contracted. Thus, 39 outdated ships are already being replaced by 30 completely modern MRKs, and this is far from the limit. It can be assumed that against the background of failures in the construction of larger surface warships, the series of "Karakurt" will be increased to 24 or even 30 units - we put the last figure in the table, it is quite possible to commission such a number of RTOs by 2030. Although, of course, it is far from a fact that in addition to 18 "Karakurt", which should replenish the fleet, an additional, and even such a large-scale series will be contracted.
Nevertheless, as we can see, the total number of RTOs and combat boats will decrease, and by 2030 will not reach the 60 units planned by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. However, here it must be taken into account that the respected authors meant the construction of very small ships, up to 60 tons in displacement, although they assumed they would be equipped with the same anti-ship missiles. Buyany-M and Karakurt are much larger and more efficient, so it can be stated that the "mosquito fleet" is the only component of our Navy, which, in terms of its numbers and combat capability, fully meets its tasks. Another question is that the usefulness of RTOs in modern conditions is under a very big question … It is not for nothing that V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, planning the construction of 25-60 ton boats, assumed, in fact, the construction of river rather than sea boat forces.
Minesweepers
As we said earlier, the state of the mine-sweeping forces of the Russian Navy is catastrophic. Moreover, this applies to both their numerical strength and equipment - both are completely inadequate. But first things first.
So, at the beginning of 2016, there were 66 minesweepers in the Russian Navy, and by now the fleet has been replenished with the newest ship of this class "Alexander Obukhov" no article. Accordingly, we can assume that the total number of minesweepers in our fleet today is 67 units. However, 31 of them are raid minesweepers, which are completely outdated and can only fight with ordinary anchor mines, which is completely insufficient today. In essence, we can say that their combat value is zero. All these ships are of old construction, and none of them will survive until 2030, but even today they are completely useless, so you can safely ignore them. I must say that V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, obviously, assumed that in the displacement of a raid minesweeper it was no longer possible to create a ship capable of fighting the modern mine threat and did not plan to further build ships of this subclass.
This is followed by the basic minesweepers, of which we currently have 23 pieces, including the already mentioned "Alexander Obukhov". Here, however, it should be noted a cunning trick of our Ministry of Defense - ships of this type (project 12700) have recently been considered not basic, but sea minesweepers. However, the perch, named pike, does not cease to be a perch because of this - although the project 12700 was created with a claim to action at sea, the output still turned out to be a basic one, but not a sea minesweeper. At the same time, the ship did not receive the French anti-mine systems with which it was planned to equip it, and the domestic analogue of Alexandrite-ISPUM has not yet been created, and it seems that it will add to the endless list of domestic failures of military development. As a result, of modern anti-mine weapons, Obukhov has only unmanned boats, which, moreover, he can only drag with him in tow, and somewhere in the sea he can only work in the old fashioned way - with towed trawls. Well, the remaining 22 domestic minesweepers of this subclass have never carried anything else.
In general, the situation with the basic minesweepers is awful - Project 12700 Alexandritas are expensive, but they do not have modern mine countermeasures equipment, and therefore their mass construction, which has been repeatedly announced by various officials, has not been deployed, and according to the latest data, it will not be deployed, most likely, the series will be limited to 8 cases, or even fewer of them. Thus, by 2030, taking into account the natural loss in basic minesweepers, we will not be able to keep their number at the current level. By 2030, approximately 15 will remain - less than 47% of the required amount in these ships according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. But what is the use of numbers, if, apparently, they will not have the opportunity to deal with the modern mine threat?
As for sea minesweepers, here we are doing the best, because out of 13 ships of this class, as many as 2 (in words - TWO) ships used KIU (complex mine finders), that is, the equipment is more modern than towed trawls ! True, it was far from the most modern, inferior in a number of parameters to its Western counterpart, but it was! Alas, it was later removed from one minesweeper. So today the Russian Navy has as much as one ship capable of fighting the modern mine threat - it is the minesweeper "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin".
So, in connection with physical aging, one should expect that out of the 13 available today MTShch by 2030 will remain in service 3. Where, then, did 8 more ships of a new project appear?
Alas - solely from the author's gigantic optimism. The fact is that there was a rumor about the development of a new minesweeper for the Navy, which is being carried out by the Almaz Central Design Bureau, and it can be assumed that this is precisely the MTShch. And if the developers do not once again begin to reinvent the wheel from scratch, if the creators of mine-sweeping complexes can still offer normal complexes for these ships, then perhaps we will still be able to build eight such ships by 2030. Or, perhaps, they will still be able to provide such complexes for the Alexandrites, and then their series will be increased.
Alas, even the most optimistic forecasts do not allow us to count on reaching the lower threshold for the number of mine-sweeping forces according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky - instead of 44 BTShch and MTShch, we will have only 26 such ships in 2030, or less than 60% of the minimum requirement.
Landing ships
With them, everything is quite simple. Of the 19 large landing ships of two types that we currently have, and provided that by 2030 all ships whose age has reached 45 years will leave the system, only 8 ships of the project 775 will remain. not counting small landing boats) is a series of two ships of the "Ivan Gren" type, one of which has recently been commissioned, and the second is under construction, in a high degree of readiness and is expected by the fleet next year, 2019. series of 6 such ships, but then it was reduced to two.
As we all remember, the Russian Navy was to receive 4 Mistral-class UDCs, two of which were to be built in France, but at the last moment the French refused to give us the finished ships. This, most likely, was the reason for a certain stupor in the renovation of the domestic amphibious fleet - Russia is quite capable of continuing the construction of a large landing ship of the "Ivan Gren" type, but the sailors prefer the UDC. The latter are significantly, almost five times larger than the Ivanov Grenov, and it is completely unknown when it will be possible to start creating them, and taking into account the domestic long-term construction, one can hardly expect that at least one such ship will enter service by 2030. at the same time, in connection with the landslide reduction in the number of large landing ships in the next decade, the possibility of laying one or two large landing ships under the Ivan Gren project is not excluded, but the further this decision is postponed, the less chances that the ships will have time to get into service until 2030 d. Most likely, if the decision is made, they will lay some "Improved Ivan Gren", which will still need to be designed, and which will be very different from the original, then we will build it for a long time … Thus, the hope is, that the number of our amphibious fleet as of 2030 will be slightly higher than that indicated in the table, but it is not too large. And in any case, if we manage to ensure the presence of 12 or even 14 large landing ships by 2030, then under no circumstances will we have the basis of the amphibious fleet - four universal amphibious assault ships.
Naval aviation
Here the situation is as negative as in the ship composition of the fleet. Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to predict the deliveries of aircraft to the fleet than to the ship composition, and the data for 2030 are either not predictable at all, or predictable, but with very large reservations or assumptions.
To date, the MA of the Russian Navy has 119 bombers, interceptor fighters and multifunctional fighters, including deck-based ones. If the rates of delivery of aircraft of the indicated classes are slightly increased from the current ones, then, taking into account the write-off of machines that have exhausted their service life, their number by 2030 will be about 154 units. (for more details see the article "Naval aviation of the Russian Navy. Current state and prospects. Part 3"). V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky believed that the total number of such aircraft in the Russian Navy should have been at least 500 units, which included 200 carrier-based aircraft: the calculation was very simple, it was assumed that for a successful defense we would need 75% of the aviation that could oppose from the sea is our enemy.
I would like to specifically clarify that we are talking about multifunctional fighters, and not about the aircraft of the naval missile-carrying aviation (MRA). The fact is that V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky believed that the Russian Federation would not be able to afford the construction and maintenance of an MPA of sufficient strength to successfully destroy enemy aircraft carrier strike groups. Therefore, in their opinion, naval aviation primarily needs fighters to combat air attack weapons. Not to try to destroy the AUG, but to knock out a significant part of its carrier-based aircraft, thereby lowering its combat stability and forcing it to retreat - this is what V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky.
One can argue about their concept of using the air forces of the fleet, but one thing cannot be doubted - the country really does not have the ability to maintain a large MPA. Now the MRA has been completely abolished, but even if we take into account the Tu-22M3 naval aviation, which must undergo modernization and will be equipped with modern anti-ship missile weapons, this will increase the number of the latter by only 30 aircraft.
And you need to understand that the fact that we do not have 4 aircraft carriers is not a reason for reducing the total number of aircraft according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky - we will need them in any case, regardless of whether they are deck-based or land-based. Nevertheless, as we can see, the demand for naval tactical aircraft is currently satisfied by less than 25%, and in the future - hardly 30% of the required values.
With PLO aviation, everything is no less complicated - today it seems that the numerical lag from the minimum required number is not so significant, 50 aircraft instead of 70, but you need to understand that even such "rarities" as the Be-12 are included in our calculation. At the same time V. P. Kuzin in V. I. Nikolsky, of course, talked about modern PLO aircraft, which we have, and then with a stretch, can be considered only the Il-38N with the Novella complex, and we have exactly 8 of them today. Until 2030, another 20 aircraft must undergo modernization (more precisely, they will go through it much earlier), but then everything is covered with a darkness of obscurity, because the stocks of old IL-38 that could be modernized will be exhausted on this, and God forbid that they were not less. But there is no information about the creation of new PLO aircraft, unless at the level of some general wishes - and as practice shows, with such a start, it would be extremely naive to expect the fleet to receive new aircraft of this class in the next 10-12 years.
It is still easier with tankers - there are no specialized aircraft of this type in the fleet, and there were no plans for their appearance. There is no data on auxiliary aircraft. As for the helicopters, it should be borne in mind - their fleet is rapidly aging physically, and the efforts of aircraft manufacturers today are mainly aimed at modernizing existing machines, although there are some plans to update anti-submarine helicopters. Thus, it is hardly possible to count on an increase in the number of helicopters - it would be good at least to stay at the current level.
Coastal troops of the Russian Navy
Unfortunately, the data available to the author are very heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to comparable figures. However, I would like to make one important observation: considering the coastal missile and artillery troops of the Russian Navy on their current state and the near future, we noted that in their capabilities they not only are not inferior, but significantly surpass the BRAV of the USSR Navy - first of all, for by re-equipping with the latest missile systems. However, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky made a somewhat reasonable assumption that, in its current form, BRAV would not be able to perform the functions assigned to it.
Dear authors rightly doubt that in the event of a large-scale war, NATO countries will conduct large-scale amphibious operations on our territory - such a possibility is rather in the nature of a hypothetical threat. On the other hand, the BRAV missile systems are unlikely to be able to withstand the US AUG, even if the latter are within their reach. The logic of V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky is that the launch of a limited number of anti-ship missiles in the zone of dominance of the enemy air wing will not be successful, and if this dominance is destroyed, then the AUG will leave without waiting for "goodies" from the BRAV. One cannot but agree that there is a certain logic in these arguments, but nevertheless such a judgment looks overly categorical. AUG, of course, is a tough nut to crack, but it is not invincible and may well be destroyed if it is possible to collect the necessary outfit of forces for this. In the event that the AUG enters the reach of the BRAV, then its missiles, of course, will play their role, complementing the air, submarine and other forces that we can gather to destroy it. They also understand this in America, therefore, most likely, they will simply not introduce squadrons of surface ships into the radius of reach of the BRAV missiles.
EGUNPO
The unified state system of illumination of the surface and underwater situation (UGSSPO) was supposed to be a system of naval reconnaissance and target designation for surface and underwater targets, which would provide us with a zone of continuous control in our coastal (and not very coastal) waters. This system, which made it possible to reveal the movement of enemy warships at a distance of 1000-2000 km from our coastline, could largely compensate for the insufficient number of ships and aircraft of the Navy. Alas, so far the only more or less working component of it remains over-the-horizon radars - the rest (in particular, the means of monitoring the underwater situation) are in their infancy and there is no hope that by 2030 we will have in the Barents or Okhotsk seas something similar to the American SOSUS.
The conclusions from the above are completely disappointing.
On the one hand, approaching the matter formally, the Russian Navy still holds the position of the second-strongest fleet in the world, immediately following the United States, although China is strongly “stepping on the heels” and, possibly, by 2030, it will still achieve superiority over the Russian Navy. However, given the fact that the Russian fleet is forced to split its forces between four separate theaters, it is, unfortunately, unable to solve its main tasks in any of them.
The key task of the Russian Navy is to provide massive nuclear missile retaliation in the event of a surprise attack on our country with the use of nuclear weapons. Alas, neither today nor in 2030 the fleet can guarantee the solution of this task. In essence, all we have for this is SSBNs and ballistic missiles on them. But their withdrawal from bases and deployment in patrol areas will be extremely difficult. We do not have mine-sweeping forces capable of ensuring the safety of SSBNs when leaving the bases. We do not have a sufficient number of modern nuclear and diesel submarines, surface ships, anti-submarine aircraft capable of countering dozens of enemy atomarines who will seek and try to destroy our SSBNs. We do not have sufficient land and deck-based naval aviation to provide air supremacy and prevent enemy patrol aircraft from pursuing our submarines. The same, alas, applies to the capabilities of our fleet to repel a non-nuclear attack by NATO squadrons. And it's not even sad that we have reached this state, but that in the foreseeable future this state of affairs will remain unchanged, and the current plans for re-equipping the fleet will not ensure its ability to effectively solve even its most important tasks.
