In the last article, we examined the situation with the repair and modernization of the existing composition of non-strategic nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy. Today, the atomarines of new projects are next in line: "Ash" and "Husky".
So, the pride of the domestic nuclear submarine fleet is the Project 885 Yasen SSGN. The history of this ship began in 1977, when the USSR decided to start work on the next, 4th generation of non-strategic nuclear submarines. All three Soviet design bureaus dealing with atomarines received the assignment, while Rubin worked on a specialized aircraft carrier killer, continuing the traditions of Project 949A SSGNs (Antey), Lazurit on a ship whose specialization was to be anti-submarine warfare, and "Malachite" - over a multipurpose nuclear submarine. In the future, it was decided to abandon specialization and create a universal submarine. Work on it was concentrated in "Malachite".
It can be assumed that this was the right decision, since it was "Malakhit" that became the developer of the most successful and perfect MAPLs of the USSR "Shchuka" and "Shchuka-B". Usually they write that the design work on the 4th generation boats was somewhat delayed, but this, perhaps, is not entirely true. After all, the beginning of work on them almost coincided with the beginning of the design of the Shchuka-B - in other words, our designers had the opportunity not only to embody their ideas in the most massive series of boats of the 3rd generation, but also to check how they work (the head Shchuka- B "entered service in 1984). And to design a new generation, taking into account the operating experience of the most advanced boats of the previous generation. Domestic shipbuilders had to solve an even more difficult task than the Americans when creating their "Seawulf", because the latter had a fairly clear anti-submarine orientation, but was never designed as an "aircraft carrier killer", and the Soviet boat had to be able to do that too.
The work was completed in the early nineties. On December 21, 1993, the first boat of project 885 - Severodvinsk - was laid down in a solemn atmosphere. What happened next …
Approximately 3 years after the start of construction, in 1996, work on the boat completely stopped. At the beginning of the 2000s, they thought to renew them, but it turned out that over the almost ten years that the ship had spent on the slipway, the project was outdated to a certain extent, and no one can produce part of the equipment due to the collapse of the cooperation chain of the USSR and the death of a number of enterprises, as in near abroad, and in the native Fatherland. As a result, the project was reworked, work at Severodvinsk resumed in 2004, but only in 2011 the Severodvinsk went to sea for factory tests and in 2014 entered service with the Russian Navy.
What kind of ship did the fleet get? A number of publications indicate that "Severodvinsk" did not live up to the expectations assigned to it in terms of low noise and some other characteristics. It is interesting that V. Dorofeev, General Director of the St. Petersburg Marine Engineering Bureau "Malakhit", not only did not refute the shortcomings of Severodvinsk, but, in fact, admitted the existence of problems:
“Let the rumors about Ash's failures remain rumors. Malachite, as the creator of such a complex modern ship as a multipurpose nuclear submarine, certainly knows all its "childhood diseases" and "sores". Those design solutions that require improvement will be implemented during the construction of a series of ships. This is normal practice."
Oddly enough, all of the above does not give reason to consider the 885 project unsuccessful. The thing is that Severodvinsk, by definition, could not make the designers' dreams come true: it was built, as they say, “on its last legs”: the backlog from other unfinished submarines was used in full, both for metal and equipment. And it would be fine if it concerned some internal bulkheads or there buttons on the consoles, but "Severdovsk" did not even receive the power plant it was supposed to do according to the project! Instead of the newest water-water steam generating unit KTP-6-85 with the KTP-6-185SP reactor (sometimes the erroneous name KTP is found), Severodvinsk received only OK-650V with the previous generation VM-11 reactor.
What does this mean in terms of the same low noise? The newest installation meant the installation of the reactor and its first cooling circuit in a single vessel, while large pipelines were removed from the structure of the steam generating installation, their width was reduced from 675 to 40 mm. This was supposed to facilitate natural circulation so much that there was no need for constant operation of circulation pumps, and in fact they are one of the main sources of noise from a nuclear submarine. But, unfortunately, instead of this, Severodvinsk received a power plant similar to the boats of the previous, third generation, and, of course, this could not but affect its noise performance.
Is it worth making a tragedy out of this? According to the author of this article, no, and here's why: already on the boats "Vepr" and "Gepard" ("Akula II" and "Akula III" in NATO terminology), noise levels comparable to those of the American nuclear submarines of the 4th generation, and "Severodvinsk", with all its "congenital" shortcomings, has become a big step forward even in comparison with the last and best representatives of the project 971 "Schuka-B". That is, failure to achieve design characteristics does not make Severodvinsk a failure or a vulnerable ship for the US nuclear submarine. He's worse than he could be, but that doesn't mean he's bad.
The disadvantages of "Severodvinsk" stem from poor-quality construction, which means the use of all kinds of "substitutes", and from some obsolescence of the project itself. Nevertheless, "Severodvinsk" was founded in 1993, and, although its project was being finalized in the early 2000s, many years have passed since then, and in any case, the improvements must have been of a compromise nature, because it was a question of redesigning an already partially built ship. …
As far as can be judged, all these shortcomings were corrected on further boats of the series: the Kazan following the Severodvinsk and other ships are created according to the improved project 885M. More modern equipment is installed on these boats, besides, all its nomenclature is produced in the Russian Federation, so there will be no more problems with supplies from neighboring countries. And there is also no doubt that it is the Project 885M submarines that will truly unleash the potential inherent in Project 885. What are the key differences between the Yasenei and the boats of the previous, 3rd generation?
We have already said about the new low-noise power plant, but the list of improvements aimed at reducing the noise of the Ash is much higher. All the most "noisy" units are equipped with an active noise suppression system. Shock absorbers that dampen vibrations and associated noises have been used before, on the same Shchuky-B, but now they have received a different design and have become much more efficient. In addition, in the manufacture of a number of structures, composite materials with damping properties are widely used, which made it possible to reduce noise in a number of ranges up to 10-30 decibels. What does this mean? For example, 30 decibels is the sound of a human whisper or the ticking of a wall clock.
What else? The boat has a one-and-a-half-hull design, which reduces noise compared to a two-hull one. Of course, the case has a more perfect geometry and has an improved coating.
Some time ago, "Severodvinsk" "on the Internet" received a number of attacks for the lack of a water jet. The arguments of the "attackers" are clear, simple and logical. The Americans in their ultra-quiet "Seawulf" and the following "Virginias" use water jets, the same we see on the British "Astute". And since we do not have it and instead of "advanced" technologies we use "primitive" propellers, this means that we are again "lagging behind" and that the noise level of American submarines is unattainable for us.
But how correct are such logical reasoning? The author of this article, unfortunately, is not a shipbuilding engineer and can only guess about this, but the guesses turn out to be very interesting.
First. There is an opinion that with a water jet propeller, everything is not as straightforward as it seems at first glance and that it has less noise only in a very limited range of speeds and depths, while its efficiency is lower and, perhaps, there are still some that are not obvious to a layman limitations.
Second. The water jet was well known in the USSR: on May 17, 1988, the Alrosa, a Project 877B diesel submarine, was laid down, which is a modification of the Halibut with the replacement of the propeller with a water cannon. "Alrosa" is called the quietest boat of the project 877, but neither the subsequent diesel-electric submarines of the project 636 "Varshavyanka" nor the more modern "Lada" got a jet propulsion unit. If the water cannon is so good, why didn't it happen?
Third. The newest SSBNs "Borey" are equipped with a water jet propulsion unit, but on the "Yasen" they are not. Of course, one can recall that the first Borey was laid down in 1996, while the Severodvinsk was laid down in 1993, and it can be assumed that at the time of laying the first ship of Project 885, a water jet did not yet exist. But the fact is that the power plants of projects 955 and 885 are very similar, in fact, at Severodvinsk there is absolutely the same OK-650V as at Borey, and even a slightly more powerful reactor is installed on the modernized 885M. And if the only reason for the abandonment of the water jet propulsion unit on the Asheny is the unavailability of it by the time Severodvinsk was laid down, then who prevented the Kazan from being redesigned, which was laid in 2009 for the water cannon? However, this was not done.
All this testifies to the fact that the rejection of water cannons on Yasen boats is not a forced, but a completely deliberate decision, dictated by any advantages of a propeller just for a multipurpose nuclear submarine. Of course, one can recall that the boats of projects 955 and 885 were developed by various design bureaus and assume a certain secrecy, that they say "the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing." But if a water-jet propeller really had only advantages, then why did the RF Ministry of Defense, understanding its capabilities, not insist on the use of water cannons on the modernized "Ash"? This is both unreasonable and not logical. However, you should always remember that in your homeland, not all processes proceed rationally and logically.
Nevertheless, in view of the above, we cannot unequivocally assert that a water jet is good, and a propeller one is bad, and we state that we have no reason to consider the ships of the project 885 and 885M to be somehow flawed in terms of low noise compared to American 4th generation nuclear submarines. Moreover, the Americans themselves are in no hurry to brag about the superiority of their nuclear submarines over Severodvinsk.
Project 885 received a fundamentally new SJSC "Irtysh-Amphora", created on the basis of a hydroacoustic complex for hydroacoustic patrol boats developed under the Afalina project, as well as a number of auxiliary hydroacoustic stations. According to some data, the capabilities of SJSC "Ash" are quite comparable to those of the American "Virginia". Of course, submarines of this type are equipped with the latest CIUS and communication systems, including (sound?) Underwater: according to some sources, "Ash" is capable of transmitting data under water over a distance of over 100 km.
Project 885 is versatile, including capable of performing the functions of an "aircraft carrier killer", for which it has vertical launchers for 32 "Caliber" or "Onyx" missiles. At the same time, the Yasen is much smaller than the Project 949A Antey SSGN - 8,600 tons of surface displacement versus 14,700 tons, which also gives the ship certain advantages.
In general, the ships of Project 885 should be recognized as extremely successful atomarines in almost all parameters, with the exception of one - cost. The total cost of the contract for the construction of 6 boats of Project 885 was usually estimated at over 200 billion rubles. - 47 billion rubles. for the first "Kazan" and 32.8 billion rubles each. for each subsequent boat, but these figures give rise to certain doubts.
The fact is that back in 2011, Kommersant wrote that after the intervention of Vladimir Putin in Severomorsk, a contract was signed for the construction of Kazan worth 47 billion rubles. and a contract for the construction of 4 boats under the 885M project in the amount of 164 billion rubles. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the text of the note whether the construction of the head Kazan was included in the contract for 4 boats of project 885M, depending on this, the cost of the serial boat is determined as 39-41 billion rubles. But these prices are still in those pre-crisis rubles, and it is clear that after 2014 they rose quite sharply. Taking into account the fact that at the time of publication of Kommersant a dollar was worth about 31 rubles, the cost of the head Kazan can be estimated at 1.51 billion dollars, and serial boats of the project 885 - at 1.25-1.32 billion. dollars. Today, at a dollar price of 57, 7 rubles. it can be assumed that the serial "Ash M", if laid down in 2017, will cost the country, if not 72, 6-76, 3 billion rubles, then very close to this.
Of course, skeptics will point out that it is not worth recalculating the cost of military-industrial complex products in dollars at the current exchange rate, and in some ways they will be right - military pricing is a rather specific thing. But it is worth considering that, for example, the prices in rubles for the "post-crisis" supply of the Su-35 under the second contract (2015) turned out to be one and a half times higher than for the first 48 aircraft (100 billion versus 66 billion), even despite the fact that that the first contract provided for payment not only for aircraft, but also for some work on fine-tuning the machine. But applying the same coefficient "one and a half" we will already get the cost of the serial "Ash M" at the level of 60 billion rubles. as of 2015, but now it is naturally even higher.
It should be understood that the increase in cost applies not only to the newly laid boats Arkhangelsk, Perm and Ulyanovsk, which were laid down in 2015-2017, but also to those ships that are now under construction. It is clear that those works that were carried out before the crisis were paid on the basis of contract prices. But the cost of supplies and work that remains to be done is adjusted for the corresponding inflation rates, and although they usually do not reflect the true rise in prices, they are still very high.
In other words, we can safely say that after 2014, the RF Ministry of Defense faced an explosive rise in prices for nuclear submarines, both under construction and those that still had to be pledged, but less money was allocated for the state armament program than planned. All this casts doubt on even the timely completion of already laid down ships, and hardly allows one to dream of laying new hulls in the period 2018-2025: especially considering that the Russian Federation is going to implement an extremely ambitious (and expensive) modernization program in this period. the third generation atomarin, which we wrote about in the previous article.
In fact, the words of the President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation A. Rakhmanov on the lack of funding for the SSBN "Prince Oleg", as a result of which the launch of the newest strategic missile carrier "left" to the right, serve as "excellent" confirmation of our sad guess.
It can hardly be denied that the completion of the currently laid out buildings (and 5 SSBNs of Project 955A Borey and 6 SSGNs of Project 885M Ash M are in various stages of construction) while carrying out extensive modernization of four Shchuk-B and the same number of 949A "Anteev" is an extremely feasible task both for the domestic budget and for industry, and with a high degree of probability the deadlines for the implementation of these programs will move "to the right."
In addition, funding for R&D efforts to develop a 5th generation nuclear submarine, known as Project Husky, should not be forgotten. What can we say about this submarine?
Nothing
The fact is that today for this boat there is only a certain basic concept, which, perhaps, in the near future will be approved by the Russian Navy. And if it is approved, and not returned for revision, it will become the basis for the development of basic tactical and technical requirements for the future submarine. Then the designers, having received these requirements, will assess the key parameters of the mechanisms and equipment of the new nuclear submarine, and will give requests to the organizations-developers of the corresponding units and devices. Those, having carried out preliminary design work, will assess the feasibility of the terms of reference, calculate the approximate parameters of future products and present the results of their work to the head developer. After that, he will try to draw up a draft design … and find out that "the stone flower does not come out," after which he will begin to reconcile the tactical and technical characteristics given to him with the representatives of the Navy, and then everything will start anew … And only after the draft design is drawn up and approved, the time will come for a technical project, and then - working documentation. These are years and years and years. It can only be recalled that work on the boats of the 4th generation began in 1977, and the Severodvinsk was laid down only in 1993, i.e. after 16 years from the beginning of work!
On the other hand, it should be understood that work on the 5th generation boats did not begin today or yesterday, the first mentions of it appeared back in 2013. Nevertheless, it will be very optimistic to believe that we will be able to lay a submarine of this type in the next five years - most likely it will be about the fact that within the framework of the GPV 2018-2025, we will lay the lead ship closer to 2025. It is not without reason that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (for today, already ex-Commander-in-Chief) V. Chirkov spoke about the serial production of the Husky after 2030
So, for today we have absolutely nothing to say about what the new submarine will be like. But we can probably tell what it won't be.
The fact is that, according to a number of sources, "Husky" will become a universal atomic, capable of replacing both the multipurpose "Ash" and the strategic "Borei". This is a clear journalistic mistake that arose from a misunderstanding of the words of the head of the USC A. Rakhmanov:
"This will be a boat that will be unified - strategic and multipurpose in a number of its key elements."
Hence, apparently, there were guesses that a submarine of the same project would become an SSBN and a SSGN, it is enough to decide during construction what kind of missile compartment to "embed" into it - with cruise missiles, or with intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, it is obvious that nothing of the kind follows from A. Rakhmanov's phrase. And the general director of the St. Petersburg Maritime Bureau of Mechanical Engineering "Malakhit" in his interview directly denied this point of view:
“Modern strategic and multipurpose nuclear submarines have many similar electronic weapons systems, communications, and the same mechanical elements. Seriality and universalization of the systems facilitates both the training of personnel and the operation of ships. But, on the other hand, there are objective indicators that will not allow taking a multipurpose submarine and placing ballistic missiles on it. A multipurpose ship implies higher maneuverability than a strategist, lower noise at high speeds. Today there are weighty arguments that call into question the possibility of an absolute universalization of submarines by type of weapon”.
Thus, Russian designers are faced with the task of maximizing the unification of strategic and multipurpose nuclear submarines, and this approach will undoubtedly save significant funds already at the R&D stage, since there will be no need to develop units for the same purpose for each type of boat. And the production of similar units will reduce their cost due to economies of scale, and it will be much easier for the fleet to service the reduced range of equipment. By the way, A. Rakhmanov also spoke about this.
“The USC is faced with the task of achieving maximum uniformity in order to“get the best price offer for the Ministry of Defense”.
So "Husky" is to become a multipurpose submarine, although, of course, it is very good that its development initially takes into account the possibility of unification with SSBNs of the future.
* * *
And now the next article of the cycle is coming to an end. "And what is so sad about her?" - another reader will ask. “The Russian Navy will be replenished with the newest and most modern submarines, so we should rejoice in this! And that there are not so many of them as we would like, so we do not need to catch up with America … After all, if a serious conflict suddenly occurs, the question will no longer be in the number of submarines, because the strategic nuclear shield will be used!"
That is so, but we must never forget that the Soviet, and now the Russian navy is itself part of the nuclear triad. Let's count a little.
Currently, there are 11 SSBNs in the operating fleet (that is, on the move, and not in repair, reserve or dumping). The first-born of Project 955 "Yuri Dolgoruky", as well as 5 boats of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", are on watch in the Northern Fleet. In the Far East, three old Project 667BDR Kalmar SSBNs are ready for staff reductions: Podolsk, Ryazan, and St. George the Victorious, as well as two newest Boreas: Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh …
Each of our SSBNs carries 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for a total of 176 ICBMs. Counting 4 warheads for each missile, we get 704 warheads. According to the START-3 treaty, the Russian Federation (like the United States) has the right to keep deployed 1,550 warheads. It is easy to calculate that the number deployed on submarines is 45.4%. Almost half of our strategic nuclear forces!
In the series of articles "Russia against NATO" we have already touched upon the sufficiency of our nuclear missile shield and came to the conclusion that 1,500 warheads will not be enough for the immediate total destruction of the United States. Accordingly, we cannot afford to lose deployed warheads - our SSBNs must be reliably protected. The USSR solved this problem by ensuring naval domination in the Okhotsk and northern seas adjacent to the territory of the USSR, where the SSBNs were to be deployed. In order to break into these Soviet "Bastions", the Americans developed a 4th generation nuclear submarine capable of independently operating in the zones of dominance of the USSR Navy.
Alas, the "Bastions" of the Soviet Union have long been a thing of the past. Admiral Vladimir Komoedov, former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, talks about how the search for submarines of a potential enemy is being conducted today:
“Imagine that you are sitting at a table. The table is the patrol area. And anti-submarine aircraft methodically scatter buoys over it. There may or may not be enemy boats in this area. But it is imperative to check. This patrol involves not only aircraft, but also the surface forces of the ship's search and strike group, helicopters with sonars, and even satellites. We have devices capable of viewing the water column at a certain depth from orbit. Thus, the underwater threat is confronted by diverse forces, but under a single command. The commander of the group has his own headquarters, which "conducts" searches on the map. He has connections with ships and planes. Patrols take place regularly. We call this work maintaining a favorable operational regime in the fleet's areas of responsibility."
It is clear that the speed of the check directly depends on the order of forces that the fleet is able to allocate for this, but where are these forces today? Both the naval aviation and the surface forces of the fleet have long been not in the best shape, their number has decreased several times since the times of the USSR, but the threats to our SSBNs, perhaps, have only increased - as of 2017, the US Navy has 18 multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 4th generation …
During World War II, Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham, whom the British considered "second after Nelson", noted that: "the correct way to fight the air is in the air" (meaning that to protect against bombers, the fleet should have acquired fighters) - and was absolutely right. Today V. Komoedov says:
“Still, the main task of anti-submarine aviation is to detect the target and let others know about it. H No one can handle a submarine better than another submarine. The USA understands this too”.
During World War II, submarines could conduct anti-submarine warfare unless by accident, if the enemy was set up. But modern atomarines are such a formidable and dangerous enemy that only other “gladiators of the depths” can fight them effectively. At present, multipurpose nuclear submarines are the most important element of anti-submarine defense, which neither surface ships nor aircraft can replace. Of course, there is no need to rush from one extreme to another and declare the ASW surface and air forces obsolete, that would be a monstrous mistake. But it is impossible to hope that they will replace the nuclear submarine.
Well, and … Well, God forbid, of course - it has begun. The Pacific Fleet is withdrawing its SSBNs into the Sea of Okhotsk to hide there, awaiting orders for Armageddon. Aircraft are lifted into the air, satellites are working, a few corvettes are leaving the berths, and we are identifying enemy submarines. And then what?
To cover FIVE strategic missile submarines and counter enemy nuclear submarines, the Pacific Fleet today has 1 (in words - ONE) multipurpose nuclear submarine. We are talking about "Kuzbass", a ship of the "Shchuka-B" type. And, frankly, our "Improved Shark" "Virginia" is far from equal.
And the Pacific Fleet has nothing else. Of course, if you really support it, you can try to use the 949A Antei type anti-submarine SSGNs … but, firstly, we have as many as two of them in the Pacific Fleet, which does not solve the problem in any way, and secondly, they will not be as effective in anti-submarine warfare as the Shchuk-B. But against the "Seawulfs" and "Virginias" and "pike" opportunities are already far from enough.
In the Northern Fleet, things are a little better - there we have anti-submarine warfare can be conducted by "Severodvinsk", 3 submarine submarines of the Shchuka-B type, 1 submarine submarine of the Shchuka type (671RTM (K)) and a couple of Kondors - to cover SIX SSBNs we can use as many as SEVEN multipurpose atomarins! And a couple more "Anteyevs" are in reserve. It seems to be not so bad, if only to forget that of the seven ships mentioned, only Severodvinsk and, probably, Gepard can fight on equal terms with the Virginias. And by the way, why are we only counting Virginias? After all, there are also British "Astyuts" …
The problem is not that we have fewer nuclear submarines than our potential enemy. The problem is that, having concentrated almost half of the deployed strategic nuclear potential on submarine missile carriers, we are unable to reliably cover the areas of their deployment - for this we absolutely do not have enough nuclear submarine hunters. And, no matter how good the six atomarines of Project 885 are, they will not fundamentally improve the situation, which means that in the next ten to fifteen years, our SSBNs will have to rely mainly on themselves.
But maybe the situation can somehow be corrected by non-nuclear submarines?
Previous articles in the series:
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future (part 2)
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future
