Having considered various options for the development of events, we come to the following possible types of conflicts between NATO and the Russian Federation:
Global nuclear missile - that is, a conflict that begins with the full-scale use of strategic nuclear forces by both sides. Regardless of whether such a conflict will be sudden (say, as a result of an error in the warning systems of a nuclear attack) or it will be preceded by a period of aggravation of relations, the United States, the Russian Federation and Europe will retain a certain military potential even after the use of strategic nuclear forces and will be able to conduct ground-based and air battles, including with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This is due to the fact that today's first strike forces (about 1500-1600 warheads for each side, plus a certain amount of deployed nuclear weapons from England and France) are not enough to completely destroy the economic and military potential of the adversaries.
In such a conflict, the usefulness of US aircraft carriers lies not in direct participation in hostilities, but in the ability to withdraw from the attack of strategic nuclear forces a significant amount of carrier-based aircraft (we are talking about hundreds of aircraft), which, upon arrival in Europe, can be a decisive argument in post-apocalyptic confrontation. In this case, aircraft carriers will turn into air carriers and repair shops, but if it is in this incarnation that they can contribute to winning the war - why not?
The second type of conflict is non-nuclear. It will start with the use of conventional weapons, but it can be argued that any full-scale non-nuclear conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO, in the course of which the parties will not find a diplomatic solution, with a 99.99% probability will develop into a global nuclear missile.
This leads to the fact that scenarios such as, for example, a large-scale non-nuclear invasion of the Russian Federation with the aim of destroying its statehood (or, on the contrary, an "excursion" of the Russian Armed Forces to the English Channel) cannot be undertaken due to the absence of any reasonable goal. If such an attempt is not repelled by conventional weapons, then nuclear weapons will be used, and the invaders will suffer damage that puts the nation on the brink of destruction and multiply exceeds any possible benefits from the war. Consequently, the deliberate unleashing of such a conflict is completely meaningless for either side.
And yet, it is impossible to completely reject the occurrence of a non-nuclear conflict. One of the possible scenarios is a clash between the armed forces of one of the NATO members and the Russian Federation in "hot spots" like Syria, followed by escalation.
Here the following should be taken into account: although human civilization will survive in the event of a global nuclear conflict, it will face so many negative consequences that it will be extremely difficult to "disentangle" them. No country that has entered a nuclear war can count on a world better than the pre-war one - it will turn out to be many times worse for it. Accordingly, it can be expected that in the event of a non-nuclear conflict, the parties involved in it will postpone the use of nuclear weapons to the last, and will use them only when it will be impossible to defend their interests with the help of conventional weapons.
It is absolutely impossible to imagine that a non-nuclear conflict will begin as a result of a deliberate decision and systematic preparation of one of the parties, in the image and likeness of how Hitler prepared, pulling his troops to the Soviet-German border before the invasion of the USSR. But it may well arise unexpectedly for both sides as a result of a tragic accident.
A non-nuclear conflict can begin as a result of someone's mistake or a planned action by one of the parties, confident that no retaliation will follow. An example is the death of a Tu-154 in 2001 from a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile or the destruction of a Su-24 by a Turkish Air Force plane in Syria. In both of these cases, the conflict was settled through diplomatic channels, but it cannot be guaranteed that this will continue to be so.
Thus, for all the impossibility of a pre-planned large-scale non-nuclear conflict, we cannot rule out an accidental clash between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and NATO in a certain hot spot. And if the injured party does not go through a political settlement of the incident, but strikes back, thereby opening large-scale military actions, then in this case a state of war may arise between the Russian Federation and a NATO member country.
Three scenarios are seen as the main scenarios:
1) Military actions will take on a nature limited in time, place and composition of the forces involved (like forcing peace in Georgia), after which a diplomatic solution will be found and peace will reign
2) Military operations will develop into a full-scale non-nuclear conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO, which, nevertheless, will be able to end and conclude an armistice before the full-scale use of strategic nuclear weapons
3) Military actions will develop into a full-scale non-nuclear conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO, which will develop into a global nuclear war.
A non-nuclear conflict is unlikely to last any long - according to the author, no more than one and a half to two months will pass from its beginning to a political settlement, or the nuclear missile Armageddon, and maybe even less. Long pauses like the one that preceded Desert Storm are hardly possible. In the five months of inaction that the multinational forces needed to gather the forces they needed for the war with Iraq, the Russian Federation and NATO will be able to agree three times to a compromise acceptable to all parties.
Randomness and transience are two key features of a possible non-nuclear clash between NATO and the Russian Federation.
Obviously, the goal of both sides in a conflict of this kind will be to force the enemy to peace on the most favorable terms for themselves and before a nuclear war begins. This determines the strategy of the armed forces of both sides, the main task of which will be the fastest elimination of the enemy's military potential deployed against them in order to deprive him of the opportunity to "continue the policy by other means." In essence, the early defeat of the enemy's military grouping will put him in conditions where it is necessary either to accept the political conditions of the opposing side, or to use nuclear weapons, which no one wants.
And to smash the enemy is easier and faster, having superior forces. Accordingly, the pace of the transfer of reinforcements to the conflict area is of paramount importance. And here the US and NATO are not doing well.
Undoubtedly, the total non-nuclear military potential of the United States and NATO is many times greater than that of Russia. The US Air Force (including the Air Force, ILC aviation and carrier-based aviation) is many times superior to the Russian Aerospace Forces in terms of its capabilities. The number of ground forces of the RF Armed Forces is inferior to the number of ground forces of Turkey alone. But the problem is that NATO needs considerable time to concentrate its potential in the right place, and in the event of a sudden, unexpected armed conflict, they will not have such an opportunity.
In the previous article, we compared the forces of the NATO and Russian Air Forces in Europe by 2020 and came to the conclusion that they, these forces, in the event of a sudden conflict and before the relocation of the mass of the US Air Force to Europe, will be quite comparable.
It is quite possible that this is an overly optimistic assessment for the RF Aerospace Forces. It can be assumed that the purchases of aircraft until 2020 will not be as large as the author suggested, and will be reduced or postponed to a later date in the new GPV 2018-2025. In addition, the VKS is not only the material part, but also the pilots, which, thanks to the efforts of Mr. Serdyukov, are now lacking. The destruction of educational institutions, the termination of the recruitment of cadets could not pass in vain, and the scale of this problem, according to the open press, alas, is undefined.
But the Russian Aerospace Forces has a unified command, a powerful component of ground air defense and other advantages listed in the previous article. And this allows us to expect that even with the most negative assessments of the supply of materiel and the number of trained pilots of the Russian Federation, in the event of a sudden start of a conflict, the NATO Air Force will still not have overwhelming air superiority. And it is very important, also because aviation is an excellent way to significantly slow down the delivery of reinforcements to the enemy in the conflict area.
In the previous article, we determined the number of combat-ready aircraft of the European countries of NATO and the Russian Federation by 2020 as approximately 1200 versus 1000, not counting 136 US aircraft at European bases and the air forces of the CSTO countries. But it should be noted that much more modest forces can be sent to the area of the alleged conflict, because both European countries and the Russian Federation will not be able to concentrate their air forces in full force. There are many reasons for this: it is logistics, and the need for air cover in other directions, and for some in NATO, there is also a banal desire to evade a fight, being discouraged by unpreparedness, or by limiting itself to sending symbolic contingents. Therefore, we can probably speak of a confrontation between air groups numbering hundreds (maybe 600-800 on each side, but maybe less), but not thousands (and not even a thousand) aircraft.
What role can US aircraft carriers play in this confrontation? Obviously extremely high.
Suppose that at the time of the outbreak of the conflict, the United States can put into the sea only four aircraft carriers out of ten, two of which are in the Pacific Ocean, and two more are in the Atlantic. What does this mean?
Depending on where the conflict began (the southern, Black Sea region, or the northern region closer to the Baltic Sea), a pair of US aircraft carriers, having loaded up to 90 quite modern F / A-18E / F Superhornet on their decks, is able to move forward to the Mediterranean Sea or to the coast of Norway. From there, some of the aircraft will fly to land airfields, while the other part will be able to operate directly from the aircraft carriers themselves. How far? Well, for example, an aircraft carrier strike force (AUS), which went to the Swedish Gothenburg, may well attack from their decks both St. Petersburg and Minsk (less than 1,100 km), subject to refueling, which will not be difficult to organize from the territory of Norway or Poland. Well, despite the fact that Sweden will allow the use of its airspace, of course.
At the same time, the AUS itself remains practically invulnerable, since in addition to its own forces and means, it is covered by a whole network of ground and air means of detecting an air attack, by ships of the German and Polish navies from the Baltic Sea, and expect an attack from the Norwegian Sea … Raise strategic missile carriers, go north, make a big detour around Norway and, following its coast, fly over the North Sea? And then attack without fighter cover? This, even for a second-rate action movie, would probably be too much. And what else? It is too far for coastal defense missile systems, and there are still problems with target designation. Baltic Fleet? Now it is too insignificant to hope to break through with sufficient forces at the range of weapons application to the AUS. Northern Fleet? Alas, it was a completely non-trivial task to bring nuclear submarines to the North Sea under the USSR, and today, in the event of a conflict, our few nuclear submarines will be extremely needed in order to provide at least some cover for strategic missile submarines, in case the conflict is all will develop into a nuclear one. And this is a more important task than the elimination of the ADS, therefore it is extremely doubtful that the Northern Fleet will direct anything towards the Atlantic at all.
The situation is similar from the southern direction - for example, in the event of a conflict with Turkey, nothing prevents the AUS, included in the US 6th Fleet, to move into the Aegean Sea. Even without climbing into the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, maneuvering somewhere in the Izmir region, the AUS can attack almost the entire Black Sea with carrier-based aircraft and LRASM anti-ship missiles. From Izmir to Sevastopol in a straight line - less than 900 km … Again, there is a situation in which the aircraft carriers themselves have almost absolute protection, since they can only be attacked through the territory of Turkey, covered by numerous fighters and, more importantly, numerous detection radars air targets. For the Su-30 and Tu-22M3 in the Crimea, the AUS in the Aegean Sea is a completely unattainable target. In fact, only the Russian Mediterranean squadron can provide some kind of opposition to the AUS, but let's face it - the times of the 5th OPESK, when the USSR on a permanent basis had up to 30 surface ships and 15 submarines, not counting transports and support ships, are long gone. And those one and a half ships that we can afford today in the Mediterranean Sea now can only show that they know how to die with dignity.
As for the Pacific Ocean, here the AUS of a pair of aircraft carriers with escort ships can use hit-and-run tactics, delivering unexpected strikes from a long distance to our coastal targets. They obviously will not inflict too much damage, but they will require a serious diversion of aviation forces for the air defense of the Far East. Obviously, in order to give a battle to the AUS of two aircraft carriers with good chances of success, it is necessary to have at least two regiments of fighter aviation and a regiment (or better, two, but nowhere to take) missile carriers, not counting the aircraft to cover Vladivostok, Komsomolsk-na- Amur, Kamchatka … In essence, the presence of American AUS on our Far Eastern borders is justified by the fact that they will draw on large forces of the Aerospace Forces to counter aircraft carriers. Neither the Pacific Fleet (now reduced to nominal values) nor coastal missile systems will be able to resist the ADS on their own, without the support of land-based aviation.
In light of the above, we understand how deeply mistaken are those who consider US aircraft carriers as conceptually outdated targets for Russian anti-ship missiles. Consider the "anti-aircraft" argumentation:
Aircraft carriers carry too few aircraft to have a significant impact on the fight of the air force
This is true only in conditions when there is time for the concentration of the air force. But in the most probable scenario of the conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO (surprise!) This time will not exist. And then the appearance at the initial stages of the conflict of a pair of aircraft carriers carrying 180 combat aircraft plus support and information support aircraft, provided with everything necessary (ammunition, fuel), can have a decisive influence on air battles. Simply because, when 500 domestic aircraft are fighting against 700 NATO aircraft, the addition of 180 aircraft in favor of NATO may be decisive.
The movement of aircraft carriers is easily controlled by means of space reconnaissance and over-the-horizon radars, and then they can be easily destroyed with cruise missiles
In fact, the only space system that allows targeting anti-ship missiles existed in the USSR ("Legend"), but we lost it due to its high cost and the inability to maintain the orbital constellation of satellites at the minimum sufficient level. But it should be understood that even in its best years, the "Legend" was not a "wunderwaffe" and by and large was a good (but very expensive) space reconnaissance system (but not target designation). Alas, to this day there are enough people who are confident that 4 satellites of the new Liana system (of which two are not fully operational) are capable of providing our ships with target designation at any time and anywhere in the world ocean. The author is not going to argue with this point of view (especially since the real capabilities of satellites are still classified), but reminds that in all modern conflicts NATO's standard practice was the first "blinding" strike, depriving the enemy of his means of controlling the situation. And there is no doubt that in the event of the outbreak of war, our ZGRLS, which are large stationary objects, as well as reconnaissance satellites (we are trying to track the trajectory of enemy military satellites, and we and the United States from the moment of launch) will be attacked and, most likely, will be destroyed.
In addition, among people far from military equipment, there is a lack of understanding that the anti-ship Kalibr missiles have a much shorter range than cruise missiles designed to destroy stationary targets. This is a dogma, and not only for us. The same USA, having adapted the Tomahawk cruise missile for use as an anti-ship missile, received a drop in range from 2500 km to 550 km (according to other sources - 450-600 km). Therefore, scenarios according to which enemy AUSs are lying in the ocean from satellites in real time, then they are taken to accompany the ZGRLS and drowned by "Calibers" launched from the coast at a distance of 2,000 km from our coastline, despite all their attractiveness, fall into the category unscientific fiction.
A modern nuclear submarine is capable of single-handedly destroying the AUG. 10 AUG - 10 Premier League, checkmate, Yankees!
The most interesting thing is that there is not so little truth in this statement. A modern nuclear submarine is indeed an extremely formidable weapon that, under certain conditions and with great luck, is capable of destroying an enemy aircraft carrier following in the protection of surface and submarine ships.
The only problem is that nothing comes for free. The cost of a modern serial nuclear submarine of project 885M ("Yasen-M") in 2011 was determined at 32.8 billion rubles, which at the then exchange rate exceeded one billion dollars. True, there is information that even this price did not reflect the cost of its manufacture and was subsequently increased to 48 billion rubles. for a serial boat, i.e. amounted to approximately 1.5 billion dollars per ship. The Russian Federation could not afford the massive construction of such submarines, limiting itself to a series of 7 hulls, and today there is only one “Severodvinsk” in service.
The rest of the multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy are old ships from the times of the USSR, but the problem is not even that - they knew how to build boats in the USSR, and the very same "Shchuki-B" are still a formidable enemy for any nuclear submarine in the world. The problem is their technical condition.
Of the 27 nuclear submarines (so for simplicity we will call the APKRKR and MAPL), which are part of the Navy:
4 boats - in reserve
3 boats - pending repair
8 boats - under repair and modernization
12 boats are in service.
At the same time, the US Navy's submarine fleet includes 51 multipurpose nuclear submarines. Of course, a certain number of them are also being repaired, but it is quite obvious that, in percentage terms, the share of American nuclear submarines in service is significantly higher than ours. And this means that, having a payroll ratio of almost 2 American boats to one of ours, in the event of a conflict, we will have 3-3, 5 (if not more) US multipurpose nuclear submarines against one of our boats. Of course, the situation can be slightly improved by the presence of a certain number of diesel boats - until we remember the submarines of the European NATO countries.
In other words, under water we will be confronted by an enemy many times superior to us in numbers, but it would be fine only in numbers … It will be strange to hope that the quality of the equipment of the newest "Virginias" does not exceed the same "Shchuk-B". In fact, Severodvinsk can probably “play” on equal terms with the Virginias and the Sea Wolves, but there is only one, and there are 18 American nuclear submarines of the indicated types.
At the same time, for the Russian Federation in the event of a conflict with NATO, the task of extreme importance will be to cover SSBNs with intercontinental nuclear missiles on board. About 700 warheads are deployed on them, which is more than 40% of their total number, ready for immediate use, and their preservation is strategically important. So it will not be a mistake to assume that the main forces of our atomicins will be deployed to cover the patrol areas of strategic missile submarines - on the eve of Armageddon, this is a much more important task than the pursuit of aircraft carriers. It may well be that 3-4 of our nuclear submarines will still dare to send into the ocean, but seriously count on the fact that a pair of Anteev 949A of the Northern Fleet is able to pass the Norwegian Sea to the Northern Fleet and there, using exclusively their own detection means, to identify the location of the AUS and strike him … Of course, miracles happen, but you cannot build a strategy on them. Well, aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea with the beginning of the conflict become completely inaccessible to our nuclear submarines, because in wartime they will not pass through Gibraltar. Unless, fortunately, one of the "Antaeus" will be on duty in Mediterranean. But even there, the chances of successful actions of a single ship tend to zero.
The saddest thing is that in the medium term, the situation for us will only get worse. Of course, by 2030 we will finish building the Yaseni, but the next ones, the Husky, will be commissioned after 2030, and by that time most of our submarine fleet, the legacy of the USSR, will exceed 40 years of age. Perhaps in the future we will be able to improve somewhat, having 14-16 newest nuclear submarines in service, not counting those undergoing repairs, but this will not fundamentally change the situation.
Aircraft carriers are floating coffins, one missile in the flight deck is enough and that's it - the ship is out of action.
Even if that were the case, how could one reach him with this rocket? Neither our surface ship nor our submarine can move to an aircraft carrier operating in the North or Mediterranean Sea, except perhaps a lucky break. And aviation is also not an assistant here - how to attack the AUS near Izmir, or the entrance to the Dardanelles? Well, they gathered in the Crimea a detachment of forces of the regiment of three, and then what? If the Turkish air defense aviation does not stop them, then it will pinch them so that there will be no forces left for any AUS, and the losses will be prohibitive, because some of the damaged vehicles will not be able to reach them back across the sea.
Aviation is undoubtedly a formidable enemy of an aircraft carrier. Perhaps the most formidable. But not in the case when she needs to fly many hundreds of kilometers, wade through air defenses through enemy territory, and only then try to attack a ship warrant, warned in advance and ready for defense, bristling with fighters and anti-aircraft missiles.
As for our Far Eastern borders, everything is both more complicated and simpler with them. It's easier, because between us and the enemy there is only sea water, and in this case both nuclear submarines and aviation have a dramatic increase in the chances of successfully countering the ADS. It is more difficult in the sense that in the Far East the Americans do not need some kind of victory, but they just need to draw off part of the forces of the Aerospace Forces, so the tactics of "hit-and-run" are suitable for them, and it is much more difficult to counteract it.than to strike a blow at the AUS operating in a specific place.
In view of the above, it can be stated that the US nuclear aircraft carriers remain relevant today, and are capable of exerting, if not decisive, then a very serious impact on the outcome of both the global nuclear missile and non-nuclear conflicts between the Russian Federation and NATO.
Thank you for the attention!
End.
Previous articles in the series:
Russia against NATO. Tactical air force balance
Russia against NATO. Preconditions for the conflict
Russia against NATO. The role of aircraft carriers in a nuclear conflict
