Cruiser "Voroshilov"
Before proceeding to the description of the armor, the power plant and some of the structural features of the Soviet cruisers, let us devote a few words to the torpedo, aircraft and radar armament of the ships 26 and 26 bis.
All cruisers (with the exception of the Molotov) were equipped with two three-pipe 533-mm torpedo tubes 39-Yu, but the Molotov received more advanced 1-H, developed in 1938-1939. 1-N was distinguished by a slightly higher weight (12 tons versus 11, 2 tons 39-Yu) and one and a half times higher speed of the torpedo exit from the apparatus. All torpedo tubes had individual sighting devices (located on the middle tube), but could be guided by central semi-automatic guidance devices. Unfortunately, the author of this article did not find a detailed description of the scheme of their work.
In general, the torpedo armament of Soviet cruisers can be characterized as fully consistent with their tasks. Unlike, say, Japanese heavy cruisers, no one charged Soviet ships with the obligation to attack enemy cruisers and battleships with torpedoes. Ships of projects 26 and 26 bis were supposed to sink enemy transports with torpedoes after the destruction of the immediate escort of the convoy during short forays into enemy communications, and for this six 533-mm torpedoes, "strong middle peasants", in the world torpedo hierarchy in the presence of sufficiently high-quality control devices shooting was enough. Initially, it was supposed to put another 6 spare torpedoes on Soviet cruisers, but then they refused, and this was the right decision: the concept of using domestic cruisers did not imply long pauses between attacks, and reloading torpedoes at sea was a very nontrivial task. In general, the theoretical benefits of an increase in ammunition did not in any way compensate for the danger of storing additional torpedoes and additional weight, both for ammunition and its means of transportation.
Also, the cruisers had anti-submarine weapons as part of 20 large depth charges BB-1 (containing 135 kg of explosives) and 30 small (25 kg), and shortly before the start of the war (in 1940), both of them received very reliable fuses K- 3, providing a bomb detonation at depths from 10 to 210 m. But then we have another riddle, which is full of the history of the first domestic cruisers.
It is absolutely known that the ships of the project 26 and 26-bis did not have sound-direction-finding or hydroacoustic stations, but they had Arctur sonar communication stations (ZPS) (most likely - Arctur-MU-II). At the same time, some sources (for example - "Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War" by A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin ") indicate that this station:
"Did not allow to determine the distance to submarines and had a short range"
On the other hand, other sources (AA Chernyshev, "Cruisers of the" Maxim Gorky "type) assert that this ZPS could not perform the function of a sound direction-finding device. Who is right? Unfortunately, the author did not find an answer to this question.
Of course, it is not the business of a light cruiser to chase a submarine, for her he is not a hunter, but a prey. Nevertheless, taking into account the small torpedo firing range, equipping the cruiser with depth charges is quite justified - in a number of cases, seeing a periscope nearby, the ship, using its rather large draft, could try to ram the boat (this is how the famous Otto Veddigen's "U-29" died, crushed stem of the battleship "Dreadnought"), and then throw depth charges at it. Therefore, the presence of depth charges on a cruiser is quite justified, even if there is no sound direction finding / hydroacoustic station on it.
But on the other hand, even inferior submarine detection equipment can tell the cruiser that they are about to launch an attack on him, and thereby allow him to avoid death. It goes without saying, of course, it is better to have a powerful GUS, first-class sound direction finders, but all of this is additional weight, which a light cruiser already has (I apologize for the tautology) worth its weight in gold. But for Soviet light cruisers, as you know, the task was to interact with submarines, so the presence of the Arctur ZPS on it is more than justified.
At the same time, the underwater communication is built precisely on sound vibrations, thus, the ZPS receiver, in any case, must pick up some underwater noise. Taking into account the above, it is difficult to imagine that the ZPS is not able to perform the role of a simple sound direction finder. However, this cannot be ruled out.
The anti-mine weapons of the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project were presented by the K-1 paravans. Some authors note the insufficient effectiveness of their action, but this is not so easy to judge. So, on November 29, 1942, the Voroshilov cruiser was blown up by two mines, but this happened at a speed of 12 knots (first detonation) and below (second detonation), while paravans were expected to work efficiently at a ship speed of 14-22 node. And, despite the "abnormal" working conditions, the paravans protected the sides of the cruiser from being touched by mines - both exploded, albeit nearby, but still not near the side, so the damage, although serious, did not threaten the death of the cruiser. Another detonation occurred at the cruiser "Maxim Gorky", and its bow was torn off, but even here not everything is clear. On June 23, 1941, the cruiser entered a minefield, accompanied by three destroyers, moving at a speed of 22 knots, and soon the destroyer "Rage", which was going 8 kbt ahead of the cruiser, was blown up by a mine, losing its bow. After that, "Maxim Gorky" turned around and lay on the opposite course, but after a short time an explosion thundered. At what speed the cruiser hit the mine is not reported.
The cruiser "Maxim Gorky" with a torn off bow
In addition to paravans, all cruisers were equipped with demagnetizing devices installed after the start of the war, and, judging by the available data, their effectiveness is beyond doubt - the same "Kirov" has repeatedly found itself in areas where other ships that did not have demagnetization systems were blown up by bottom mines. "Kirov" was blown up only when its demagnetizing device was turned off.
The aircraft armament according to the project was represented by a catapult and two spotter aircraft, which were also supposed to perform reconnaissance functions. The ships of Project 26 received two KOR-1 aircraft, despite the fact that these aircraft, in general, failed the tests. Despite the more or less decent flight characteristics, the seaplanes demonstrated extremely low seaworthiness, but no others were available, therefore … But the cruisers of the 26-bis project received the newest KOR-2, however, already during the war. With the catapults, it turned out to be a continuous patchwork - the domestic ZK-1 could not be produced on time, which is why the Project 26 cruisers received the K-12 catapults purchased in Germany. In terms of their performance characteristics, they fully corresponded to domestic ones, but had a lower mass (21 tons versus 27). On the first pair of cruisers of the 26-bis project - "Maxim Gorky" and "Molotov", they installed domestic ZK-1, but during the war, the Molotov had it replaced with a more modern ZK-1a, but the Baltic cruisers (Maxim Gorky and "Kirov"), the catapults were dismantled to strengthen the anti-aircraft weapons. The Pacific cruisers "Kaganovich" and "Kalinin" did not receive catapults when commissioned; after the war, ZK-2b were installed on them.
Performance characteristics of Soviet aircraft KOR-1 and KOR-2 according to A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin "Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War"
The opinion, which was repeatedly encountered both in a number of sources and on the Internet, that aviation weapons were not needed by cruisers such as Kirov and Maxim Gorky, for all the logic, the author still does not consider to be correct. For example, competent aerial reconnaissance and adjustment of the fire of the cruiser "Kirov" during the shelling of the Finnish battery on Russare Island, which took place on December 1, 1939, could well have ensured the suppression of this battery of 254-mm guns, moreover, from distances inaccessible to its fire. The cruiser Kirov simply did not have any other way to destroy it. You can also recall the shooting of the Black Sea cruiser "Voroshilov" on September 19, 1941 at the accumulations of Nazi troops in the villages of Alekseevka, Khorly and Skadovsk, located on the outskirts of Perekop. Then for firing from a distance of 200 kbt (Alekseevka), 148 kbt (Khorly) and 101 kbt (Skadovsk), the MBR-2 aircraft was used, which served as a spotter.
On the contrary, it can be argued that professional crews of spotter aircraft, who perfectly know the peculiarities of the firing of naval artillery and are able to adjust the fire, could play a huge role in shelling enemy troops out of line of sight. With regard to purely naval operations, air correction of fire on a moving target is extremely difficult (although there were such cases during the Second World War), but the usefulness of reconnaissance aircraft is unquestionable. The disappearance of ejection aviation from the post-war cruisers of Western countries is associated with a large number of aircraft carriers, which were able to provide aerial reconnaissance better than the seaplanes of the cruisers.
Radar weapons - when designing the first domestic cruisers, its installation was not planned for the reason that in those years the USSR was not yet engaged in radar. The first ship station "Redut-K" was created only in 1940, and was tested on the cruiser "Molotov", which is why the latter became the only Soviet cruiser to receive a radar before the war. But during the war years, the cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis received radars for various purposes.
Reservation
The armor protection of the Soviet cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis was structurally very simple, especially compared to the Italian cruisers. However, in this case, “just” is not at all synonymous with “bad”.
The basis of the armor was an extended citadel, 121 meters long (64.5% of the hull length) and covering the boiler rooms and engine rooms, as well as the ammunition cellars. The height of the armor belt was very impressive (for a cruiser) - 3.4 meters. At "Kirov" and "Voroshilov" the citadel was a kind of box in which the walls (armored belt and traverse) were covered by deck armor, and in all places the thickness of the armor plates was the same - 50 mm. And the same, 50-mm, protection was received by the turrets of the main caliber and their barbets. In addition, the conning tower (150 mm), the steering and tiller compartment (20 mm), guidance posts for torpedo tubes (14 mm), KDP (8 mm), stabilized guidance posts and shields of 100 mm B-34 guns (7 mm).
The cruisers of the 26-bis project had absolutely the same booking scheme, but at the same time, in some places the armor became thicker - the armor belt, traverses, frontal plates, roofs and barbets of 180-mm towers no longer received 50-mm, but 70-mm armor, steering and tiller compartment - 30 mm instead of 20 mm, otherwise the thickness of the armor corresponded to cruisers of the "Kirov" type.
It is interesting to compare the booking systems of domestic cruisers with their Italian "ancestor"
The first thing that catches your eye is that the Italian's defense is much more difficult. But did that make her more effective? Let's look at the possible trajectories of defeat.
Trajectories 1 and 2 are the fall of air bombs. Here, at the Soviet cruiser, the ammunition will meet the 50-mm armored deck, but at the Italian cruisers - only 35 and 30 mm, respectively. At the same time, such important compartments as boiler rooms and engine rooms and ammunition storage rooms are covered by the Italians with only 35 mm armor (trajectory 1), and the cruiser of the 26-bis project has 50 mm. Closer to the sides, the situation is slightly better - although there the deck armor of the Italians is reduced to 30 mm (trajectory 2), but if a bomb, having penetrated the thin armor, explodes in the hull of an Italian ship, between it and the same boiler rooms there will be a 35 mm armor bulkhead, and the fragments, going down, they will meet horizontally stacked 20 mm armor plates. Here, the cruiser of Project 26-bis and Eugenio di Savoia obtains approximate parity - it is more difficult to penetrate the domestic armored deck, but if the bomb breaks through it, then the consequences of an explosion inside the hull will be more dangerous than that of the “Italian”, because the internal armored bulkheads have There is no “Maxim Gorky”. A projectile hitting an Italian cruiser along trajectory 3 will first encounter 20 mm side armor and then 35 mm decks, and here Eugenio di Savoia again loses to the Soviet cruiser - Maxim Gorky is protected here with 18 mm side steel (though not armored) and 50 mm armored deck. The situation is again evened out if the projectile hits the Eugenio di Savoia in the 30 mm deck between the main armor belt and the armor bulkhead - in this case, after the breakdown of the 20 mm side and 30 mm deck, the projectile will still have to overcome 35 mm of vertical protection, which in total is approximately equivalent to 18 mm side and 50 mm armored deck "Maxim Gorky". But below the Italian is better protected - a projectile hitting his 70 mm armor belt, even if penetrated, will have to break the 35 mm armor bulkhead behind it, while the Soviet cruiser has nothing behind the same 70 mm armor belt (trajectory 5 for the Italian and for Soviet cruisers). But the barbets "Eugenio di Savoia" are worse protected - having where 70 mm of barbet armor (trajectory 6), where 60 mm (trajectory 7), where - 20 mm board + 50 mm barbet (trajectory 8), the "Italian" is somewhat weaker than the Soviet cruiser where enemy shells will encounter 70 mm (trajectory 6 and 7) and 18 mm plating + 70 mm barbet (trajectory 8). The towers themselves … it's hard to tell. On the one hand, the Italians' frontal plate was thicker (90 mm versus 70 mm), but the walls and roof were only 30 mm versus the Soviet 50 mm. It is equally difficult to say how the Italians were right in "smearing" the armor throughout their tower-like superstructure - yes, they protected it all with anti-fragmentation armor, but the conning tower had only 100 mm against the 150 mm of the Soviet cruiser. It is completely unclear why, having spent so much effort on armoring the sides, the Italians did not similarly protect the traverse, where they limited themselves to only 50 mm of armor (for Soviet cruisers - 70 mm). It is as natural for a light cruiser to fight in retreat or to overtake an enemy as it is for a battleship to stand in line. Another drawback of the Italian cruiser was the lack of any protection for the steering and tiller sections, but I must say that the Maxim Gorky was not all right with this - only 30 mm armor. Which is especially strange, given that the Soviet cruisers according to the project had some trim on the nose - an increase in the thickness of the steering and tiller armor to the same 50 mm would provide them with much more serious protection, the displacement would add a little and at the same time would reduce the trim on the nose.
In general, it can be stated that in terms of the vertical armor of the hull, the Eugenio di Savoia was somewhat superior to the 26-bis project, but in terms of artillery armor and horizontal protection, it was inferior to it. At the same time, due to weak traverses, the Italian cruiser is less protected than the Soviet one for fighting on sharp bow and stern corners. The overall level of protection of ships can be considered comparable.
A little remark. Reading domestic sources, you come to the conclusion that the protection of Soviet cruisers was completely insufficient, "cardboard". A classic example is the statement of A. A. Chernyshev, made by him in the monograph "Cruisers of the type" Maxim Gorky ":
“Compared to most foreign light cruisers, the booking was insufficient, although on the ships of the 26-bis project it was somewhat strengthened - according to calculations, it provided protection against 152-mm artillery in the range of 97-122 kbt (17, 7-22, 4 km),the fire of the enemy's 203-mm guns was dangerous for our cruisers at all distances"
It would seem that you can argue here? Armor penetration formulas have been known for a long time and everywhere, you cannot argue with them. But … here's what to keep in mind.
The fact is that any formula for armor penetration, in addition to the caliber, also operates with the weight of the projectile and its velocity “on the armor”, ie. at the moment of contact of the projectile with the armor. And this speed directly depends on the initial speed of the projectile. Accordingly, the results of calculating "zones of invulnerability" or "zones of free maneuvering" for any ship will directly depend on which gun was taken in the calculation. Because it is quite obvious that the armor penetration of the German SK C / 34, which fires a 122 kg projectile with an initial speed of 925 m / s, will differ significantly from the American Mark 9, which sends 118 kg of a projectile in flight at a speed of 853 m / s.
Of course, it would be most reasonable when calculating armor penetration to focus on the guns of their potential opponents, but this raises a number of problems. First, there are always several potential enemies, and they have different guns. Secondly, usually countries do not talk about the performance characteristics of their guns. For example, comparing the capabilities of the dreadnought battleships of the "Empress Maria" type and the dreadnoughts that were built for the Turks in England, domestic developers made a big mistake in the qualities of the British 343-mm cannons. They believed that the armor-piercing shell of such a gun would weigh 567 kg, while in fact the British shell weighed 635 kg.
Therefore, very often, when calculating the armor penetration of the country, they used either data from their own guns of the required caliber, or some idea of which guns will be in service with other countries. Therefore, the calculations of the invulnerability zones without specifying the performance characteristics of the weapon for which they were designed will do nothing for the reader who wants to understand the resistance of the protection of a particular ship.
And here's a simple example. Domestic developers for their calculations adopted such a powerful 152-mm gun that it could penetrate the 70 mm armor belt of the Soviet cruiser at all distances, up to 97 kbt or almost 18 km (it is unclear why A. A. Chernyshev writes about 17.7 km. 97 kbt * 185, 2 m = 17 964, 4 m). But the Italians, calculating the zones of invulnerability for their cruisers, came to the conclusion that the outer 70 mm armor belt "Eugenio di Savoia" protects, already starting from 75.6 kbt (14 km). Moreover, according to the Italians, at a distance of 14 km, a 70 mm armor belt could be pierced only when a projectile hit at an angle of 0, i.e. completely perpendicular to the plate, which is practically impossible (at such a distance, the projectile falls at a certain angle, so there must be a very strong rolling, capable of "deploying" the armor belt perpendicular to its trajectory). More or less reliably, the Eugenio di Savoia armor belt began to break through only (approximately) at 65 kbt (12 km), where a 152-mm projectile could penetrate such armor at an angle of 28 degrees to the normal. But this, again, in a kind of dueling situation, when ships are fighting like battleships, turning sideways towards each other, but if, for example, the fight is at a 45-degree course angle, then to defeat 70 mm armor plate, according to Italian calculations, should have approached less than 48 kbt (less than 9 km).
Why is there such a difference in calculations? It can be assumed that Soviet developers, gravitating towards super-powerful guns, believed that guns in the West were no worse, and calculated armor penetration based on the completely monstrous masses of shells and their initial velocities for 152-mm guns. At the same time, the Italians, most likely, were guided by the factual data of their own six-inches.
It is also interesting that, according to Italian calculations, a 203-mm projectile penetrated the 70 mm armor belt and the 35 mm bulkhead "Eugenio di Savoia" behind it, when the projectile deviated from the normal by 26 degrees already from a distance of almost 107 kbt (20,000 m). Of course, the Soviet 180-mm B-1-P gun had a slightly lower armor penetration, but it can be argued that at a distance of 14-15 km, the vertical protection of the Italian cruiser will be quite permeable for domestic 97.5 kg shells. And this is where we come to understand the value of 180-mm artillery for a light cruiser - while Maxim Gorky at a distance of 75-80 kbt (that is, a decisive battle distance, at which a fairly high percentage of hits should be expected) will be feel almost invulnerable, because neither its side, nor the deck, nor the barbets can be penetrated by 152-mm Italian shells, the larger Eugenio di Savoia (standard displacement 8,750 tons versus 8,177 tons of Maxim Gorky) has no no protection from the 180 mm shells of the Soviet cruiser.
Bow towers MK-3-180. Cruiser, alas, not identified
If we remember that the speeds of the cruisers, in general, are comparable, then the Italian cruiser will not be able to impose favorable combat distances for it, and attempts to escape, or, on the contrary, to approach the Soviet cruiser will only lead to the fact that the "Italian" will substitute their fire completely "cardboard" for 180-mm guns of the traverse.
How accurate are the Italian armor penetration calculations? It is rather difficult to say, but the battle of the German pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" at La Plata became an indirect confirmation of the fact that it was the Italian and not the Soviet calculations that were correct. In it, English six-inch semi-armor-piercing shells SRVS (Common Pointed, Ballistic Cap - semi-armor-piercing with a light tip to improve ballistics) hit the side 75-80 mm plates of the German main-caliber turrets three times (moreover, two hits were achieved from a distance of about 54 KB), but the German armor was pierced was not. But Exeter's 203-mm cannons demonstrated very high armor penetration - a semi-armor-piercing British shell of a similar design penetrated the 100 mm armor plate of the German raider and the 40 mm steel bulkhead behind it from a distance of about 80 kbt. And this speaks of the high quality of the British SRVS shells and their ability to penetrate armor.
As for the reliability of horizontal protection, we can safely say that 30 mm of booking was not enough. It is known that 250 kg of bombs pierced the 30 mm deck armor of Admiral Hipper-class cruisers with a gap under the armored deck, and the fall of such a bomb from a height of 800 m to 20 mm bevel of the Voroshilov cruiser (and an explosion on the armor) led to the formation of a hole in armor with an area of 2, 5 sq.m. At the same time, the 50 mm deck armor of the cruiser "Kirov" protected the ship from direct hits from 5 bombs. One of them, hitting the forecastle deck, exploded in the command cabin, the second, also hitting the forecastle, hit the armored deck, but did not explode - this happened during an air raid on September 23, 1941. Three more bombs hit the ship in the aft superstructure on April 24, 1942 d during Operation Getz von Berlichingen, and the cruiser was very badly damaged - the ammunition supplied to the guns caught fire, they were thrown overboard, but 100-mm and 37-mm shells exploded, and sometimes in the hands of sailors. However, the deck was not pierced. Unfortunately, it is now impossible to reliably establish the caliber of the bombs that hit the cruiser. There is no information at all about those that got into the forecastle, but for those that caused severe destruction in the stern, various sources indicate the mass of both 50 kg, and 100 kg and 250 kg. It is hardly possible to establish the truth here, but it should be remembered that for the Germans aerial bombs weighing 50 kg and 250 kg were typical. At the same time, the same three hits in the stern of the cruiser "Kirov" were achieved not as a result of an accidental raid, but in the course of a targeted operation to destroy large ships of the Baltic Fleet - it is extremely doubtful that aircraft for attacking such targets were equipped with only 50 kg of ammunition. On the other hand, this cannot be completely ruled out - perhaps some of the aircraft were equipped with 50 kg bombs to suppress the positions of ground anti-aircraft artillery.
Power plant.
All cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis had two-shaft boiler-turbine installations, consisting of two main turbo-gear units (GTZA) and six powerful boilers located in the middle of the hull according to the same scheme (from the bow to the stern):
1) Three boiler compartments (one boiler in each)
2) Engine room (GTZA on the starboard propeller shaft)
3) Three more boiler compartments
4) Engine room (GTZA on the propeller shaft of the left side)
An Italian-made power plant was installed on the head cruiser Kirov, and on all subsequent cruisers - domestic ones called TV-7, which are Italian installations with some modernization. The rated power of one GTZA was supposed to be 55,000 hp, with the afterburner - 63,250 hp. - i.e. a cruiser with two GTZA had 110,000 hp. rated power of machines and 126,500 hp. when forcing boilers. Noteworthy is the fact that the Italian chassis of "Kirov" was able to develop only 113,500 hp, while the domestic TV-7 showed 126,900 hp. ("Kalinin"), and 129,750 hp ("Maxim Gorky"), despite the fact that domestic boilers turned out to be even more economical than Italian ones.
It is interesting that the Italian cruisers, being larger, nevertheless showed greater speed in acceptance tests than the Soviet ones. But this is, rather, a rebuke to the Italian shipbuilders, rather than their merit. The same cruiser "Kirov", having developed during trials with a power of 113,500 hp. speed of 35, 94 knots, reached the gauge line in an "honest" displacement of 8,742 tons, while its normal displacement (even taking into account the construction overload) should have been 8590 tons. And the Italians brought their ships to the measuring line simply enchantingly over-lightened, not just almost without fuel, but also with many mechanisms not yet installed. For example, the same "Raimondo Montecuccoli" with a normal displacement of 8,875 tons went for testing, having only 7,020 tons, ie. 1855 lighter than it was supposed to! And, of course, it developed 38.72 knots for 126,099 hp, why can't we develop something.
I must say that in both the Italian and Soviet navies, this power plant has proven itself from the best side. As a rule, and with rare exceptions, in everyday operation, ships cannot show the speed they demonstrated on a measured mile, usually it is a knot or two lower. For example, the same American “Iowas”, having 33 knots according to the reference book, usually went no more than 30-31 knots. This is understandable and understandable - the speed of full speed according to the book is usually calculated for the design normal displacement, and they try to carry out the tests by unloading the ships to the design weight. But in everyday life, ships "live" overloaded (here both the construction overload and the weight of the equipment obtained during the upgrades), moreover, they try to carry with them not 50% of the maximum fuel (as it should be with a normal displacement), but more …
Unlike the previous "Condottieri", on tests, which gave under 40 and over 40 knots, but in daily operation barely able to develop 30-32 knots, ships of the Raimondo Montecuccoli and Duca d'Aosta types during the war could confidently hold 33-34 knots, thus becoming one of the fastest Italian light cruisers - not in words, but in deeds. And the same can be said about Soviet cruisers.
Despite the fact that in some sources for some reason it is asserted that "Molotov" in a combat situation could not develop more than 28 knots, the same A. A. Chernyshev reports that in December 1941, 15 wagons of ammunition (this is already about 900 tons of "excess" weight), guns and mortars (in an unknown quantity), as well as 1200 people of personal the composition of the division. The cruiser weighed anchor and went to Sevastopol, while:
"At the crossing the speed reached 32 knots"
And this despite the fact that during this transition the ship clearly did not force the mechanisms - why would he do this? In addition, there are many other cases - for example, after the shelling of German troops near Perekop in September 1941, the Voroshilov cruiser returned to the base at a speed of 32 knots. So where did the 28 knots for the Molotov come from then? The only thing that comes to mind: on the night of January 21-22, 1942, the strongest nord-ost (the so-called bora) fell on the Molotov at the pier, as a result of which the cruiser was hit hard against the pier, which caused significant damage. Almost all of them were corrected by the forces of the repair plant in Tuapse, but due to the lack of capacity, it was impossible to correct the bent stem, which caused a loss of speed by 2-3 knots. True, the stem was subsequently repaired, but for some time the cruiser received speed limits. In addition, another "nuisance" happened to the Molotov - its stern was torn off by a torpedo, there was no time to build a new one, so the ship was "attached" to the stern of the unfinished cruiser Frunze. But, of course, the contours of the new stern differed from the theoretical drawing of the cruisers of the 26-bis project, which could affect the full speed of the Molotov. Again, A. A. Chernyshev points out that, according to the test results, the "newly fed" cruiser did not have a loss of speed (but, alas, does not indicate what speed the ship demonstrated during the tests).
Subsequently, GTZA TV-7 (at least with some modifications and upgrades) was installed on the project 68 "Chapaev" and 68-bis "Sverdlov" cruisers, where they also demonstrated outstanding power and reliability in operation.
But the Italian-Soviet power plants had one more extremely important advantage …
To be continued..
