So, the rate of fire of the MK-3-180. This issue has been covered many times in almost all sources - but in such a way that it is absolutely impossible to understand anything. From publication to publication, the phrase is quoted:
“The final ship tests of the MK-3-180 took place in the period from July 4 to August 23, 1938. The conclusion of the commission read:“MK-3-180 is to be transferred to service for personnel and for military testing”. The installation was handed over to the ship with a rate of fire of two rounds per minute instead of six according to the project. Artillerymen of "Kirov" were able to start planned combat training with properly working materiel only in 1940 ".
So guess what it all means.
First, the rate of fire of the MK-3-180 was not a constant value and depended on the distance at which it was fired. The point is this: the MK-3-180 guns were loaded at a fixed elevation angle of 6, 5 degrees, and therefore the firing cycle (simplified) looked like this:
1. Make a shot.
2. Lower the guns to the elevation angle equal to 6.5 degrees. (loading angle).
3. Load the guns.
4. Give the guns the vertical aiming angle necessary to defeat the enemy.
5. See item 1.
Obviously, the further the target was located, the greater the vertical aiming angle should be given to the gun and the longer it took. It will be interesting to compare the rate of fire of the Soviet MK-3-180 with the 203-mm turret of the cruiser "Admiral Hipper": the guns of the latter were also charged at a fixed elevation angle of 3 degrees. If the gun fired at a small elevation angle, which did not differ much from the loading angle, the rate of fire reached 4 rds / min, but if the firing was fired at distances close to the limit, then it dropped to 2.5 rds / min.
Accordingly, the very definition of the planned rate of fire of the MK-3-180 is incorrect, since the minimum and maximum rate of fire of the installation should be indicated. We traditionally give 6 shots / min. without specifying at what angle of elevation it is required to achieve such a rate of fire. Or did it happen that this indicator was not specified at the stage of plant design?
And at what loading angles did the MK-3-180 show a rate of fire of 2 rds / min? At the limit or close to the loading angle? In the first case, the achieved result should be considered quite acceptable, because the rate of fire of our installation is almost at the level of the German one, but in the second case it is not good. But the fact is that the tower is a technically complex mechanism, and from this, new tower designs often suffer from "childhood diseases", which can be eliminated in the future. Although sometimes far from immediately - remember the turret installations of the battleships "King George V", which throughout the Second World War gave an average of two-thirds of the shots laid in a salvo (after the war, the shortcomings were corrected).
Were the shortcomings of the MK-3-180 towers fixed (if they were at all, since the rate of fire at the level of 2 rds / min at the maximum elevation angles can hardly be considered a disadvantage)? Again, it is unclear, because the phrase "Kirov's artillerymen were able to start planned combat training with properly working materiel only in 1940." does not specify what exactly this "serviceability" was, and whether an increase in the rate of fire was achieved in comparison with 1938.
In the same way, the author could not find data on how things were with the rate of fire of the turret installations of the cruisers of the 26-bis project. Serious editions like the "Naval artillery of the Russian Navy", written by a team of several captains of the 1st and 2nd rank, under the leadership of the captain, candidate of technical sciences E. M. Vasiliev, alas, are limited to the phrase: "Technical rate of fire - 5, 5 rounds / min ".
Thus, the question of the rate of fire remains open. Still, it should be borne in mind that the first installation for a 180-mm cannon, MK-1-180 for the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, with a design rate of fire of 6 rds / min, demonstrated a practical rate of fire of 4 rds / min, that is was even higher than indicated as of 1938 for the Kirov installation. But the MK-3-180 was designed taking into account the operating experience of the MK-1-180 and with Italian help … Of course, you should always remember that logic is the historian's worst enemy (because historical facts are often illogical), but you can still assume that the practical rate of fire of the MK-3-180 was approximately at the level of the towers of German heavy cruisers, i.e. 2-4 shots / min, depending on the value of the vertical guidance angle.
Interestingly, the practical rate of fire of the 203-mm guns of the Japanese heavy cruisers averaged 3 rounds / min.
Shells
Here we can recall the well-known (and mentioned in the previous article of the cycle) statement of A. B. Shirokorad:
“… An armor-piercing projectile contained about 2 kg of explosive, and a high-explosive one - about 7 kg. It is clear that such a shell could not inflict serious damage to an enemy cruiser, not to mention battleships."
But why such pessimism? Recall that foreign 203-mm shells demonstrated the ability to effectively engage ships of the "light cruiser" / "heavy cruiser" classes. Moreover, they turned out to be not so bad even in the battle against battleships!
So, of the four Prince Eugen shells that hit the Prince of Wells battleship in the battle in the Danish Strait, one managed to disable as many as two command rangefinder posts (KDP) of medium artillery (on the left and right sides), and, which got into the stern, although it did not pierce the armor, nevertheless caused flooding, forcing the British to resort to counter-flooding in order to avoid the roll unnecessary for them in battle. The battleship South Dakota fared even worse in the battle of Guadalcanal: it was hit by at least 18 8-inch rounds, but since the Japanese were shooting with armor-piercing, and most of the hits fell on the superstructures, 10 Japanese shells flew away without exploding. Hits of 5 more shells did not cause significant damage, but three others caused flooding of 9 compartments, and in four more compartments water got into fuel tanks. Of course, the 203-mm caliber could not inflict decisive damage on the battleship, but, nevertheless, the eight-inch guns were quite capable of delivering him tangible troubles in battle.
203-mm turret of the cruiser "Prince Eugen"
Now let's compare foreign 203mm shells with domestic 180mm shells. To begin with, let's note a slight contradiction in the sources. Usually, for both B-1-K and B-1-P, a figure of 1.95 kg of explosive (explosive) in an armor-piercing projectile is given without any detail. But, judging by the available data, there were several armor-piercing shells for 180-mm guns: for example, the same A. B. Shirokorad in his monograph "Domestic Coastal Artillery" indicates two different types of armor-piercing shells for 180-mm guns with deep groove: 1.82 kg (drawing No. 2-0840) and 1.95 kg (drawing No. 2-0838). At the same time, there was another round with 2 kg of explosives for 180-mm cannons with fine rifling (drawing no. 257). In this case, all three of the above shells, despite the obvious (albeit insignificant) difference in design, are called armor-piercing shells of the 1928 model of the year.
But A. V. Platonov, in the "Encyclopedia of Soviet Surface Ships 1941-1945", we read that the mass of explosives for an armor-piercing projectile of the 1928 g model is as much as 2.6 kg. Unfortunately, this is most likely a typo: the fact is that Platonov immediately indicates the percentage of explosives in the projectile (2.1%), but 2.1% of 97.5 kg equals (roughly) 2.05 kg, but not 2, 6 kg. Most likely, Shirokorad is right with the cited 1.95 kg, although it cannot be ruled out that there was one more "drawing", that is. a projectile with an explosive content of 2.04-2.05 kg.
Let's compare the mass and content of explosives in the Soviet 180-mm and German 203-mm shells.
We also note that the heavy American 203-mm 152-kg projectile, which the US sailors were quite happy with, had the same 2.3 kg of explosives, and the 118-kg eight-inch shells with which the US Navy entered World War II - and at all 1.7 kg. On the other hand, among the Japanese, the content of explosives in a 203-mm projectile reached 3, 11 kg, and among the Italians - 3, 4 kg. As for high-explosive shells, here the advantage of 203-mm foreign shells over the Soviet is not too great - 8, 2 kg for the Italian and Japanese, 9, 7 for the American and 10 kg for the British. Thus, the content of explosives in the Soviet 180-mm artillery system, although lower, is quite comparable to the 203-mm guns of other world powers, and the relative weakness of the 180-mm armor-piercing projectile was to some extent redeemed by the presence of semi-armor-piercing ammunition, which neither the Japanese had, neither the Italians nor the British, while this particular ammunition could become very "interesting" when firing at enemy cruisers.
Thus, nothing gives us reason to blame domestic 180-mm shells for insufficient power. But they also had another, very important advantage: all types of domestic shells had the same weight - 97.5 kg. The fact is that shells of different weights have completely different ballistics. And here, for example, the situation - an Italian cruiser is zeroing in with high-explosive shells - this is more convenient, because high-explosive shells explode when hitting the water, and hits on an enemy ship are clearly visible. At the same time, sighting with armor-piercing shells is certainly possible, but the water columns from their fall will be less visible (especially if the enemy is between the shooting ship and the sun). In addition, direct hits of an armor-piercing projectile are often not visible: that is why it is armor-piercing in order to break through the armor and explode inside the ship. At the same time, if such a projectile does not hit the armor, it will fly away altogether, breaking through an unarmored side or superstructure right through, and even if it can "raise" a splash of sufficient height, it only misinforms the chief artilleryman - he can count such a fall as flight.
And therefore the Italian cruiser fires high-explosive shells. But the goal is covered! Let's say this is a well-armored cruiser like the French "Algerie", and it is rather difficult to inflict significant damage on it with land mines. Can an Italian cruiser switch to armor-piercing shells?
In theory, it can, but in practice it will be another headache for an artilleryman. Because the Italians' high-explosive shell weighed 110.57 kg, while the armor-piercing shell weighed 125.3 kg. The ballistics of the projectiles are different, the flight time to the target is also different, the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance of the guns with the same target parameters are again different! And the automatic firing machine did all the calculations for high-explosive shells … In general, an experienced artilleryman will probably cope with all this, quickly changing the input data for the automation, which calculates the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, etc. But this, of course, will distract him from his main task - constant monitoring of the target and adjustments of fire.
But for the chief artilleryman of a Soviet cruiser, when changing a high-explosive ammunition to either semi-armor-piercing or high-explosive, there are no difficulties: all the shells have the same weight, their ballistics are the same. In essence, nothing prevents a Soviet cruiser from firing simultaneously armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing guns from part of the guns, if it is suddenly considered that such a "vinaigrette" contributes to the speediest target destruction. It is clear that this is not possible for shells with different weights.
Fire control devices (PUS)
Surprisingly, but true: work on the creation of domestic CCPs in the USSR began in 1925. By this time, the Naval Forces of the Red Army had three battleships of the "Sevastopol" type with very advanced (by the standards of the First World War) fire control systems. In the Russian Empire, the Geisler system of the 1911 model was created, but at that time it no longer fully met the requirements of the sailors. This was not a secret for the developers, and they improved their system further, but the admirals considered that the risk of failure was too high, and as a safety net, they purchased Pollen's devices, capable of independently calculating the course angle and distance to the target according to the initially entered parameters of the movement of their ship and enemy. A number of sources write that the Geisler system and the Pollen device duplicated each other, with the Pollen device being the main one. After some research, the author of this article believes that this is not the case, and that Pollen's device supplemented the Geisler system, providing it with data that previously the artillery officer had to read on his own.
Be that as it may, but already for the 20s, the CCD of our dreadnoughts could no longer be considered modern, and in 1925 the development of new CCDs called the "direct course automatic" (APCN) began, but work on it proceeded rather slowly. For acquaintance with the advanced foreign experience the machine of the course angle and distance (AKUR) of the British company "Vickers" and the schemes of synchronous transmission of the machine gun of the American company "Sperry" were purchased. In general, it turned out that the British AKURs are lighter than ours, but at the same time give an excessively large error when firing, but the products of the Sperry company were recognized as inferior to a similar system developed by the domestic Electropribor. As a result, in 1929, new launchers for battleships were assembled from their own developments and modernized British AKUR. All of this work has certainly given our designers an excellent experience.
But the fire control system for battleships is one thing, but for lighter ships, other devices were required, so the USSR in 1931 purchased in Italy (the Galileo company) fire control devices for the Leningrad leaders. But in order to understand the further development of events, it is necessary to pay a little attention to the then existing methods of adjusting the fire:
1. Method of measured deviations. It consisted in determining the distance from the ship to the bursts of falling shells. This method could be implemented in practice in two ways, depending on the equipment of the command rangefinder post (KDP).
In the first case, the latter was equipped with one rangefinder (which measured the distance to the target ship) and a special device - a scartometer, which made it possible to measure the distance from the target to the bursts of shells.
In the second case, the KDP was equipped with two rangefinders, one of which measured the distance to the target, and the second - the distance to the bursts. The distance from the target to the bursts was determined in this case by subtracting the readings of one rangefinder from the readings of the other.
2. Method of measured ranges (when the rangefinder measured the distance to its own bursts and compared with the distance to the target, calculated by the central automatic fire).
3. By observing the signs of the fall (fork). In this case, the flight or undershoot was simply recorded with the introduction of appropriate corrections. In fact, for this method of shooting, the KDP was not needed at all, binoculars were enough.
So, the Italian CCPs were focused on the method of measured deviations according to the first option, i.e. Italian KDP were equipped with one rangefinder and a scartometer. At the same time, the central firing machine was not intended to carry out calculations in the event of zeroing in by observing falling signs. Not that such a zeroing was completely impossible, but for a number of reasons it was very difficult. At the same time, the brainchild of Galileo's company could not even “cheat” the method of measured distances. In addition, the Italians did not have devices for controlling shooting at night or in poor visibility.
Soviet experts considered such approaches to fire control to be flawed. And the first thing that distinguished the Soviet approach from the Italian was the KDP device.
If we use the method of measured deviations for zeroing, then theoretically, of course, there is no difference whether to measure the distance to the target ship and to the bursts (for which at least two rangefinders are needed), or to measure the distance to the ship and the distance between it and the bursts (for which you need one rangefinder and a scartometer). But in practice, determining the exact distance to the enemy even before the opening of fire is very important, since it allows you to give the firing machine accurate initial data and creates the prerequisites for the fastest possible coverage of the target. But an optical rangefinder is a very peculiar device that requires very high qualifications and perfect vision from the person controlling it. Therefore, even during the First World War, they tried to measure the distance to the enemy with all rangefinders that were on the ship and which were able to see the target, and then the chief artilleryman discarded deliberately incorrect values at his discretion, and took the average value from the rest. The same requirements were put forward by the "Charter of the artillery service on the ships of the RKKF".
Accordingly, the more rangefinders capable of measuring the distance to the target, the better. That is why the control tower of our modernized battleships of the "Sevastopol" type was equipped with two rangefinders each. Before the start of the battle, they could control the distance to the enemy ship, and during the battle, one measured the distance to the target, the second - to bursts. But the KDP of German, British and, as far as the author managed to figure out, American and Japanese cruisers, had only one rangefinder each. Of course, it should be borne in mind that the same Japanese cruisers had a lot of rangefinders and, in addition to those located in the control tower, many cruisers also carried additional rangefinders in the towers. But, for example, the German cruisers of the "Admiral Hipper" type, although they carried one rangefinder in the control room, but the control room themselves they had three.
But nevertheless, these additional rangefinders and KDP, as a rule, were located relatively low above sea level, respectively, their use at long ranges was difficult. The cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis also had additional rangefinders, both openly standing and located in each tower, but, unfortunately, they had only one control tower: the sailors wanted a second, but it was removed for reasons of weight saving.
But this only control tower was unique in its kind: it housed THREE rangefinders. One determined the distance to the target, the second - before bursts, and the third could duplicate the first or second, which gave the Soviet cruiser significant advantages over not only the Italian, but also with any other foreign ship of the same class.
However, the improvement of the Italian CCP was not limited to rangefinders. Soviet sailors and developers were not at all satisfied with the work of the central automatic firing machine (CAS), which the Italians called "Central", namely its "adherence" to the only method of zeroing based on measured deviations. Yes, this method was considered the most advanced, but in some cases, the method of measured ranges turned out to be useful. As for the method of observing the signs of falling, it was hardly worth using it while the KDP is intact, but anything can happen in battle. A situation is quite possible when the KDP is destroyed and can no longer provide data for the first two zeroing methods. In this case, zeroing in with a “fork” will be the only way to inflict damage on the enemy, if, of course, the central firing machine is capable of effectively “calculating” it. Therefore, when designing the CCP for the latest cruisers, the following requirements were set.
The central firing machine must be capable of:
1. "Calculate" all three types of zeroing with equal efficiency.
2. Have a firing scheme with the participation of a spotter aircraft (the Italians did not provide this).
In addition, there were other requirements. For example, the Italian MSA did not give acceptable accuracy in assessing the lateral movement of the target, and this, of course, required correction. Of course, in addition to the courses / speeds of their own ship and the target ship, the Soviet CCDs took into account many other parameters: the shooting of the barrels, the direction and strength of the wind, pressure, air temperature and "other parameters", as many sources write. By "other", according to the author's ideas, we mean at least the temperature of the powder in the charges (the GES "Geisler and K" sample of 1911 was also taken into account) and the humidity of the air.
In addition to the KDP and TsAS-s, there were other innovations: for example, fire control devices were introduced into the CCD at night and in conditions of poor visibility. Thus, in terms of the totality of the parameters of the CCP of the cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis, they were in no way inferior to the best world analogues. It is interesting that V. Kofman in his monograph “Princes of the Kriegsmarine. Heavy cruisers of the Third Reich writes:
"Not all battleships of other countries could boast such a complex fire control scheme, not to mention cruisers."
It should be noted that the fire control systems of our cruisers ("Molniya" for project 26 and "Molniya-ATs" for project 26-bis) had quite serious differences between themselves: the fire control systems of the cruisers of project 26, "Kirov" and "Voroshilov", were still worse than the PUS cruisers of the 26-bis project. It turned out like this: simultaneously with the development of TsAS-1 (central firing machine - 1) with the parameters described above, it was decided to create TsAS-2 - a lightweight and simplified analogue of TsAS-1 for destroyers. A number of simplifications were adopted for him. So, for example, only the method of measured deviations was supported, there were no firing algorithms with the participation of a spotter aircraft. In general, TsAS-2 turned out to be very close to the original Italian version. Unfortunately, as of 1937, TsAS-1 was not yet ready, and therefore TsAS-2 was installed on both project 26 cruisers, but the 26-bis cruisers received a more advanced TsAS-1.
A small note: the statements that the PUS of Soviet ships did not have the ability to generate data for firing at ultra-long distances at an invisible target are not entirely true. According to them, only the "Kirov" and "Voroshilov" launchers could not "work" with (and even then with big reservations), but the subsequent cruisers just had such an opportunity.
In addition to the more advanced central firing machine, the Molniya-ATs launcher had other advantages for the Maxim Gorky-class cruisers. Thus, the control system of the Kirov-class cruisers gave corrections only for rolling (which was compensated by a change in the vertical aiming angle), but for the Maxim Gorky-class cruisers - both onboard and pitching.
But it is not easy to correctly compare the CCP of Soviet cruisers with the Italian "ancestors" - "Raimondo Montecuccoli", "Eugenio di Savoia" and the following "Giuseppe Garibaldi".
"Muzio Attendolo", summer-autumn 1940
All of them had one control tower, but if for the ships of the project 26 it was located 26 meters above the water, for 26 bis at 20 m (A. V. Platonov gives even larger values - 28, 5 m and 23 m, respectively), then Italian cruisers have about 20 m. At the same time, the Soviet KDP was equipped with three rangefinders with a six-meter base (the larger the base, the more accurate the measurements), the Italian - two rangefinders with a five-meter base, and one of them was used as a scartometer. The author of this article could not find out whether it was possible to use the rangefinder-scartometer simultaneously with the second rangefinder to determine the range to the target, but even if it was possible, three 6-meter rangefinders are noticeably better than two 5-meter ones. As a central firing machine, the Italians did not use the "Central" of their own design, but the English RM1 of the "Barr & Strud" company - unfortunately, no exact data on its characteristics were found on the network either. It can be assumed that at best this device corresponds to the domestic TsAS-1, but this is somewhat doubtful, since the British desperately saved on everything between the world wars and the cruisers received only the bare minimum. For example, the PUS of cruisers of the "Linder" class could carry out zeroing only in the oldest way - by observing signs of falling.
Soviet fire control devices at night and in conditions of poor visibility were probably more perfect than the Italian ones, since they had (albeit a simple) calculating device that allowed not only to issue initial target designation, but also to give the turrets adjustments based on the results of firing. But similar Italian devices, according to the data available to the author, consisted only of a sighting device and did not have a means of communication and calculating devices.
Italian developers quite interestingly solved the issue of duplicating their own CCPs. It is common knowledge that cruisers like "Montecuccoli" and "Eugenio di Savoia" had 4 main caliber turrets. At the same time, the extreme bow (No. 1) and aft (No. 4) were ordinary towers, not even equipped with a rangefinder, but the elevated towers No. 2 and 3 had not only a rangefinder, but also a simple automatic firing each. At the same time, the post of the second artillery officer was even equipped in tower number 2. Thus, in the event of a failure of the KDP or TsAS, the cruiser did not lose centralized fire control as long as towers 2 or 3 were "alive". However, on Soviet cruisers, each of the three main-caliber towers had both its own rangefinder and an automatic firing machine. It is difficult to say how much this is a significant advantage, because the towers are still not too high above the water and the view from them is relatively small. For example, in the battle at Pantelleria, the Italian cruisers fired according to the KDP data, but the range finders of the towers did not see the enemy. In any case, even if this advantage was small, it still remained with the Soviet ships.
In general, the main caliber of cruisers of type 26 and 26-bis can be stated as follows:
1. The 180-mm B-1-P cannons were a very formidable weapon, the combat capabilities of which were close to the 203-mm artillery systems of the world's heavy cruisers.
2. The fire control system of the Soviet cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project had only one significant drawback - one KDP (although, by the way, many Italian, British and Japanese cruisers had such a drawback). The rest of the domestic main caliber fire control system was at the level of the best world samples.
3. Soviet PUSs are by no means a copy of the acquired Italian LMS, while the Italian and Soviet cruisers had completely different PUSs.
Thus, it would not be a mistake to say that the main caliber of the Soviet cruisers was a success. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about the rest of the artillery of the ships of projects 26 and 26-bis.
Ranged anti-aircraft caliber (ZKDB) represented six single-gun 100 mm B-34 cannons. I must say that the design bureau of the "Bolshevik" plant, while designing this artillery system in 1936, "swung" very widely. While, for example, the British 102-mm QF Mark XVI gun, developed two years earlier, accelerated a 15.88-kg projectile to a speed of 811 m / s, the Soviet B-34 was supposed to fire a 15.6-kg projectile with an initial speed of 900 m / s. This was supposed to give our gun a record firing range of 22 km and a ceiling of 15 km, but, on the other hand, increased its weight and recoil momentum. Therefore, it was assumed (and quite rightly) that such an installation would not be able to aim normally manually: the vertical and horizontal aiming speed would be lower than low, and the gunners would not have time to aim at flying planes. Accordingly, the aiming of the gun at the target was to be carried out by electric drives (synchronous power transmission or MSSP), which, according to the project, provided a vertical guidance speed of 20 deg / s and horizontal guidance - 25 deg / s. These are excellent indicators, and had they been achieved … but the MSSP for the B-34 was never developed before the war, and without it, the vertical and horizontal guidance rates did not reach 7 degrees / sec (although according to the project on manual control they should have been 12 degree / sec). It can only be recalled that the Italians did not consider their anti-aircraft "twin", 100-mm "Minisini" with its vertical and horizontal speed of 10 degrees In the event, they sought to replace these installations with 37-mm assault rifles.
The scanty aiming speed deprived the B-34 of any anti-aircraft value, but the absence of the MSSP is just one of the many disadvantages of this weapon. The idea of a pneumatic rammer of projectiles, capable of loading a gun at any elevation angle, was excellent, and, probably, could provide a design rate of fire of 15 rds / min., But the existing rammer could not cope with its task, so it was necessary to load it manually. At the same time, at angles close to the limit, the projectile spontaneously fell out of the breech … but if you still managed to shoot, the shutter did not always open automatically, so you also had to open it manually. The disgusting work of the fuse installer finally killed the B-34 as an anti-aircraft gun. As you know, at that time no radar fuses existed yet, so the anti-aircraft projectiles were supplied with a remote fuse, which was triggered after the projectile had flown a certain distance. To install a remote fuse, it was necessary to rotate a special metal ring of the projectile by a certain number of degrees (corresponding to the desired range), for which, in fact, a device called the "distance setter" was needed. But, unfortunately, he worked very badly on the B-34, so the correct distance could only be set by chance.
B-34, designed in 1936 and submitted for testing in 1937, successively failed the tests of 1937, 1938 and 1939, and in 1940 it was nevertheless put into service "with subsequent elimination of shortcomings", but in the same 1940, it was discontinued. Nevertheless, she entered service with the first four Soviet cruisers, and only the Pacific ships were spared from her, having received 8 quite adequate single-gun 85-mm anti-aircraft guns 90-K ("Kalinin" entered service with eight 76-mm mounts 34-K). Not that 90-K or 34-K were the pinnacle of anti-aircraft artillery, but at least it was quite possible to shoot at planes (and sometimes even hit) with them.
85-mm mount 85-K
Anti-aircraft "machine guns" were represented by single-gun 45-mm installations 21-K. The history of the appearance of this weapon is very dramatic. The naval forces of the Red Army perfectly understood the need for small-caliber rapid-firing assault rifles for the fleet and were very much counting on the 20-mm and 37-mm assault rifles of the German company Rheinmetall, acquired in 1930, the prototypes of which, along with the documentation for their manufacture, were transferred to the plant No. which, according to the then plans, were going to concentrate the production of anti-aircraft artillery systems for the fleet and for the army. However, for three years of work, it was not possible to manufacture a single active 20-mm machine gun (2-K) or 37-mm machine gun (4-K).
Many authors (incl. A. B. Shirokorad) are accused of this failure of the plant's design bureau. But in fairness, it must be said that in Germany itself, these 20-mm and 37-mm machine guns were never brought to mind. Moreover, even at the beginning of World War II, when Rheinmetall was the largest supplier of this caliber assault rifle to the German fleet, no one would call its products very successful.
And in the USSR, exhausted with attempts to bring the incomplete and realizing that the fleet needed at least some small-caliber artillery system, and urgently, they offered to install a 45-mm 19-K anti-aircraft gun on the anti-aircraft machine. So 21-K was born. The installation turned out to be quite reliable, but it had two fundamental drawbacks: the 45-mm projectile did not have a remote fuse, so that an enemy plane could only be shot down by a direct hit, but the absence of an automatic fire mode left such a hit with a minimum chance.
Probably, only 12.7-mm DShK machine guns best suited their purpose, but the problem was that even 20-mm "Oerlikons" in the general air defense of ships were considered something like a weapon of last chance: the energy of a 20-mm projectile is still was not high for a serious battle with an air enemy. What can we say about the much weaker 12, 7-mm cartridge!
It is sad to state this, but at the time of the commissioning of the air defense of the cruisers of the project 26 and the first pair of 26-bis, it was a nominal value. The situation somewhat improved with the appearance of the 37-mm 70-K assault rifles, which were a slightly worse version of the famous Swedish 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, and … one can only regret how the opportunity was missed to establish the production of the best small-caliber anti-aircraft guns for the fleet of those years.
The fact is that the USSR acquired a 40-mm Bofors and used it to create a land-based 37-mm 61-K assault rifle. One of the reasons that the Swedish machine gun was not adopted in its original form was the desire to save money on the production of shells by reducing their caliber by 3 mm. Given the enormous need of the army for such artillery systems, such considerations can be considered reasonable. But for the fleet, which needed a significantly smaller number of such machines, but the cost of the ships they protected was colossal, it would be much more reasonable to supply more powerful Bofors. But, unfortunately, instead it was decided to make an anti-aircraft machine gun for the fleet based on the land 61-K.
However, 70-K could not be called unsuccessful. Despite some shortcomings, it fully met the air defense requirements of those times, and in the course of upgrades, the ships of projects 26 and 26 bis received from 10 to 19 such assault rifles.
We will consider in more detail the air defense capabilities of our cruisers when comparing the ships of the project 26 and 26-bis with foreign cruisers, and in the next article of the cycle we will consider the booking, hull and main mechanisms of the first domestic cruisers.
