Dear readers, this is the last article in the series. In it, we will consider the air defense of domestic cruisers of the 26-bis project in comparison with foreign ships, and also answer the question why, with all its merits, the 180-mm B-1-P cannons were never used on Soviet cruisers again.
We have already spoken about the composition of the anti-aircraft artillery of the cruisers like "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky", so we will confine ourselves to a short reminder. According to the project, the long-range anti-aircraft caliber consisted of six 100-mm B-34 guns, but this gun turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to the lack of an electric drive (which is why the guidance speed did not provide effective fire on enemy aircraft), problems with the bolt and rammer, as well as with fuse installer. Due to the bad work of the latter, it was almost impossible to set the correct time (and hence the distance) for the burst of the projectile. In addition, the guns were poorly placed - even one bomb hit in the 100-mm battery could lead to sad consequences. In addition to the B-34, the cruisers of the 26-bis project were equipped with 9 (on the 26-project only 6) 45-mm 21-k mounts - a fairly reliable weapon, which, unfortunately, did not have an automatic mode of firing, which gives the chances of getting into the enemy the plane was not too many, as well as 4 12, 7-mm machine guns. In general, the air defense of the cruisers of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky type at the time of their commissioning should be considered completely unsatisfactory. An exception, perhaps, could be made only for the Pacific "Kalinin" and "Lazar Kaganovich", which instead of 6 relatively useless "hundred parts" B-34 received eight completely reliable 85-mm anti-aircraft guns 90-K.
And what about the anti-aircraft artillery of the cruisers of other naval powers?
First, consider the British cruiser Belfast. The "main" anti-aircraft caliber was represented by twelve 102-mm Mk-XVI cannons in twin deck mounts Mk-XIX.
It was the most widespread and very successful anti-aircraft gun, but … the British managed to spoil everything by placing ammunition stores in front of the bow boiler room, at a great distance from their twelve-gun 102-mm battery. To supply the shells, more than thirty-meter rail tracks had to be laid along the upper deck and special carts had to be invented that would deliver the shells to the guns. This whole structure worked relatively well in the summer and in calm weather, but with any strong excitement, the transportation of the carts was very difficult. Icing completely blocked the supply of ammunition - while escorting northern convoys in the USSR, it was possible to rely only on the fenders of the first shots, where a small stock of shells was stored directly at the guns.
Anti-aircraft guns on the "Belfast" were represented by two eight-barreled 40-mm installations "pom-pom". Many analysts consider them obsolete and of little use against WWII aircraft. Usually, two claims are made to "pom-poms" - a low initial velocity of the projectile and cloth tapes, due to which the machine gun periodically jammed (the standard tape of "pom-poms" was metal, but the cloths left over from the First World War were very often used). Here you can add the considerable weight of the eight-barreled "pom-pom", which, although it allowed manual guidance, made this possibility more theoretical, since the speed of vertical and horizontal guidance turned out to be extremely low. They relied solely on an electro-hydraulic drive, which was reliable, but remained dependent on an external source of energy. When receiving "de-energized" damage, the multi-barreled pom-pom installations turned out to be practically useless, which, perhaps, became fatal for the Prince of Wells in its last battle. At the most crucial moment, the newest British battleship could only fire from 20-mm Oerlikons, which, of course, could not stop the Japanese aircraft.
The list of Belfast anti-aircraft weapons was completed by two four-barreled 12, 7-mm assault rifles, designed according to the same "pom-pom" scheme, and also had a low muzzle velocity.
And yet it should be admitted that the air defense of the British cruiser was superior to those of the Maxim Gorky - in those cases when the 102-mm anti-aircraft guns could shoot, they were much more effective than the domestic B-34 (although the eight 85-mm barrels of the Kalinin were not they were too inferior to them in efficiency), and the "pom-poms", despite all their shortcomings, created a high density of fire, which was so lacking in the domestic 45-mm 21-K. But, nevertheless, the anti-aircraft armament of "Belfast" can hardly be called successful or sufficient, at least for the initial period of the Second World War.
Interestingly, Belfast could be considered the leader of air defense among British cruisers. Other "Towns" and the light cruisers of the "Fiji" type that followed "Belfast" had even weaker anti-aircraft armament: not 12, but only 8 barrels of 102-mm guns (four two-gun mounts), and not eight-barreled, but only four-barreled "pom" -poma ".
As for the American light cruiser Brooklyn, her anti-aircraft armament, when she entered service, did not cause anything at all but a sad smile. It was based on a battery of eight single-gun 127-mm guns, but this was not at all the famous 127-mm cannon, which is generally recognized as the most successful anti-aircraft gun of the Second World War (only the last two ships of the series received such guns). The barrel length of the Brooklyn antiaircraft guns was only 25 calibers. The Americans are reluctant to talk about the shortcomings of their weapons, but it is extremely doubtful that this artillery system has at least some acceptable accuracy and accuracy. In the future, the United States increased the barrel length by one and a half times, bringing it to 38 calibers.
As for the anti-aircraft guns, the Brooklyn project was to receive four quadruple 28-mm submachine guns. However, due to delays in the development of these weapons when they were handed over to the fleet, the cruisers did not have them: as a result, at the time of commissioning, the Brooklyn's anti-aircraft weapons were limited to eight 127/25 cannons and the same number of 12, 7-mm machine guns. In this form, their air defense was hardly superior to the Maxim Gorky, but still, within a year after commissioning, most of the cruisers received their standard 28-mm mounts. And then another problem arose: the assault rifles turned out to be very unsuccessful ("Chicago pianos") - regular jamming, vibration, reducing the accuracy of fire, smoke, interfering with aiming … In fact, these installations were only suitable for conducting barrage fire.
Thus, it can be stated that in its "acceptance" form, the Brooklyn did not surpass the domestic cruisers of the 26-bis project in air defense (and, perhaps, they were inferior to the Kalinin), but the subsequent bringing their anti-aircraft weapons to the standard number did not presented the American cruiser with an overwhelming advantage. And, in any case, the anti-aircraft artillery of the light cruiser "Brooklyn" was categorically insufficient to provide air defense against the aircraft of the Second World War.
The Japanese cruiser "Mogami", being one and a half times larger than the "Maxim Gorky", but upon delivery to the fleet carried the most moderate anti-aircraft weapons - four two-gun 127-mm mounts, four coaxial 25-mm assault rifles and four 13-mm machine guns. The 127-mm guns of the Japanese were extremely successful and were not much inferior to their American 127-mm / 38 counterparts, the 25-mm assault rifles were also not bad, but due to their small caliber they had an insufficient effective range of fire. In fact, it was a "last chance" weapon, like the 20-mm Oerlikons, and therefore their effectiveness in the course of the war in the Pacific Ocean was by no means amazing. And besides, there were only 8 barrels … In general, it is possible to diagnose the superiority of the Japanese cruiser, first of all, due to the first-class 127-mm guns, but in general its air defense is also very weak.
French heavy cruiser Algerie. A dozen quite good 100mm guns in six twin mounts were complemented by just four 37mm semi-automatic cannons. How "good" things were with such artillery among the French is evidenced by the fact that four guns for "Algeri" were made by three different manufacturers, and they were installed on machines of two types. In general, in terms of their fighting qualities, the French 37-mm approximately corresponded to the domestic 45-mm 21-K - the same 20 rounds per minute, the same primitive sights … The situation was somewhat improved by four quad 13, 2-mm machine guns - they were quite good and of high quality "Cars", but still no machine guns could provide acceptable air defense due to the low power of the cartridge - even the 20-mm "Erlikon" was considered the last line of defense. Thus, the air defense "Algeri" was superior to that of the Soviet cruiser, but again insignificantly and, like the above cruisers, it did not meet modern requirements. Not that the French did not understand the usefulness of 37-40 mm anti-aircraft guns, they tried to create a 37-mm automatic cannon, but the development of such a machine took a long time.
"Admiral Hipper" … a heavy cruiser with the best air defense of all the ships listed above. A dozen powerful 105-mm anti-aircraft guns, which the Germans not only managed to stabilize in three planes, but also to ensure their guidance from the fire control posts. In fact, the calculations only had to load the guns and fire, and at the beginning of the Second World War, the German 105-mm SK C / 33, as well as the control of their fire, represented the pinnacle of engineering. What, however, cannot be said about six 37-mm two-gun mounts - surprisingly, the Germans could not create an automatic 37-mm cannon, so this artillery system was only semi-automatic (each projectile was loaded manually). On the other hand, an attempt was made to stabilize the installation, but unlike the 105-mm, it was unsuccessful. The power drives turned out to be unreliable, and with manual guidance, a very heavy installation had a horizontal and vertical guidance speed of only 3-4 degrees, i.e. even worse than the domestic 100-mm B-34. As a result, surprising as it may seem, the Germans, having spent a lot of time and effort, created a high-tech and heavy installation, which, in terms of its combat qualities, was not too superior to the domestic 45-mm 21-K semi-automatic machines.
Also, cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type received ten single-barreled 20-mm assault rifles, but it is rather difficult to comment on their combat qualities. The fact is that the Germans at one time abandoned the licensed production of magnificent 20-mm "Erlikons", preferring them Rheinmetall crafts of the same caliber. As a result, the fleet received a 20-mm single-barreled S / 30 submachine gun, which has half the rate of fire than the Oerlikon, but which required the calculation of as many as 5 people (single Oerlikon - 2 people). The assault rifle was designed so irrationally that the double-barreled installation subsequently created had the same weight as the single-barreled C / 30.
However, in 1938, the German assault rifle underwent modernization (according to some sources, it consisted in copying a number of design solutions of the Erlikon), as a result of which it received the name C / 38 and turned into a very formidable weapon, and its four-barreled version of the Fierling became a celebrity. … It is also known that the C / 30 was installed on the lead cruiser, but the author of this article does not know what was installed on the last ships of the series.
In any case, it can be stated that the German heavy cruiser is the only one of all the ships listed above, whose air defense had an overwhelming superiority over the cruisers of the Maxim Gorky class. But, surprisingly, even the anti-aircraft armament of the Admiral Hipper turned out to be insufficient to reliably protect the ship from air threats and required an "addition".
Based on the foregoing, the following conclusion can be drawn. The standard anti-aircraft armament of the cruiser Maxim Gorky, which he received upon commissioning, did not meet the requirements of the late 1930s and could not provide acceptable protection for the cruiser from modern air attack weapons. But absolutely the same can be said about any other cruiser in the world, except, perhaps, "Admiral Hipper", and even then - with certain reservations. At the same time, the anti-aircraft artillery of the "Maxim Gorky" was inferior to foreign cruisers not so much in the number of barrels as "thanks" to the ugly quality of the 100-mm gun mounts B-34. Nevertheless, we have to admit that the Maxim Gorky in this parameter turned out to be almost the worst ship among its contemporaries - but it must also be borne in mind that the superiority of British, American and French ships was not overwhelming, or even significant. Foreign cruisers received more or less decent air defense already in the course of military upgrades, but the armament of the domestic ships of the 26 and 26-bis project also did not remain unchanged.
For example, the same "Belfast" even in May 1944 had the same 6 * 2 102-mm, 2 * 8 40-mm "pom-pom" as well as 18 20-mm "Oerlikon" barrels (ten single-gun and four two-gun installations). "Maxim Gorky", from which they removed 45-mm semiautomatic devices, but installed 17 single-gun 37-mm 70-k mounts and two four-barreled 12, 7-mm Vickers machine guns, looks much more advantageous. Pacific ships (with their 8 * 1 85-mm and up to 21 37-mm 70-K barrels) are out of the question - their air defense capabilities were obviously superior to British light cruisers. In fact, the English "Towns" received more or less decent air defense only at the very end of the war, when "Birmingham" and "Sheffield" each received four quad 40-mm "Bofors", but - due to the removal of one turret of the main caliber. The French "Algerie", for obvious reasons, has not been modernized, so a comparison with it will not make sense - it is clear that it is weaker. American cruisers … having received 4 "Chicago pianos" each, they certainly were in no way superior to the "Maxim Gorky" with its bunch of 37-mm barrels. Their time came after the second stage of modernization, when in December 1942 a standard was set for American light cruisers: four quadruple and four twin Bofors plus Oerlikons, the number of which on other ships could reach 28 barrels. In this form, the Brooklyn had an unconditional superiority not only over the Maxim Gorky, but also over any light cruiser in the world. Still, it should be borne in mind that the modernization did not take place immediately and not suddenly - for example, the same "Brooklyn" received 4 * 4 "Bofors" and 14 single-barreled 20-mm "Erlikons" in May 1943, and the next "replenishment" Air defense took place only in May 1945. Nevertheless, the combination of high-quality artillery with first-class fire control, of course, eventually lifted the air defense of American cruisers to a height unattainable for other powers.
The modernization of the air defense of the Japanese "Mogami" was reduced to an increase in 25-mm barrels to 28-38 barrels, but it cannot be said that this seriously increased the combat capabilities of the cruiser, in this respect, "Mogami" even after the "updates" even surpassed the British "Towns", that is insignificant.
German cruisers also did not receive a large increase in anti-aircraft weapons - the same "Admiral Hipper" in addition to the existing weapons received four quad 20-mm "Fierling" by May 1942. But the value of 20-mm machine guns in comparison with 37-40-mm was small, so a little later the cruiser "exchanged" three "Fierling" and two of its 37-mm semi-automatic "twin" for only six single-gun 40-mm "Bofors".
In general, it can be argued that, having a very weak air defense when entering service, cruisers of types 26 and 26-bis in the course of military modernizations to a certain extent overcame this shortcoming and their anti-aircraft armament became relatively adequate, among their contemporaries in this parameter they are especially did not stand out either for the better or for the worse - the only exception is the American cruisers, whose air defense in the second half of the war leads by a huge margin from the ships of other powers.
And finally, the last question. Why, after the 26-bis cruisers, the Soviet navy never used the 180 mm caliber again?
In order to answer it, let us recall three combat episodes, and the first of them is the battle between the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and the British destroyer Gloworm, which took place during the Germans' Operation Exercises on the Weser.
Then "Gloworm" was unlucky to stumble upon the German destroyers, consistently (but to no avail) meeting with "Hans Ludemann", and then with "Brand von Arnim", the latter summoning help, which was to be provided by "Admiral Hipper". The weather was frankly unimportant, strong excitement and poor visibility led to the fact that the German heavy cruiser was able to identify the Gloworm with only 45 kbt and immediately opened fire on it. "Hipper" fired only from bow guns, as she did not want to expose her side to a torpedo salvo of a British destroyer, so the ships were approaching.
The Englishman immediately fired a torpedo salvo from one torpedo tube and set the smoke screen. Before he took cover behind her, the German cruiser managed to make only five volleys, then, relying on the radar data and the visible mast, the bow 203-mm turrets fired two more volleys. But there was only one hit - on the third volley, an eight-inch shell hit the Gloworm's superstructure, thereby interrupting the transmission of the radio message about the detection of the German cruiser. However, the destroyer did not receive significant damage. Moreover, the British rushed into battle. Suddenly jumping out from behind the smoke screen, the Gloworm fired two torpedoes from the second craft and opened fire, with one of its shells finding its target. In response, "Hipper" fired an eighth volley, which gave one or two hits, in addition, opened fire with its 105-mm anti-aircraft guns and "Gloworm", now decently damaged, again disappeared behind the smoke screen. But his heroic commander tried his luck again - jumping out of the smoke no further than 3,000 meters from the German cruiser, Gloworm attacked the Hipper for the third time with torpedoes - but again unsuccessfully, despite the bad weather, the torpedoes were clearly visible, therefore that they walked almost on the surface, and "Hipper" managed to dodge them. The British destroyer could no longer threaten him, he ran out of torpedoes and therefore the commander of the heavy cruiser decided to cut through the smoke screen in order to finally deal with the Briton who had bored him. But I miscalculated a little, being no further than 800 m from the latter.
Everything that could shoot at the Gloworm was firing, not excluding 20-mm machine guns, but, nevertheless, the British destroyer managed to ram the Hipper. This did not cause too serious damage to the heavy cruiser and did not save the British ship from death, but the fact remains - despite the best among all the cruisers in the world, fire control devices and first-class 203-mm cannons, the German cruiser could not quickly deal with the destroyer "shortly". and even allowed a ram.
The second battle - "New Year", or rather that episode of it, in which two British light cruisers unexpectedly jumped out German destroyers. The distance between the opponents was some 20 cables, while the British opened fire from the forward 152-mm turrets and, realizing that they were extremely vulnerable to a torpedo salvo, went directly to the enemy, hoping to ram the latter. But about three minutes later, the commander of the British detachment, Burnet, commanded Captain Clark, the commander of the cruiser Jamaica:
"Turn, now there is no point in spoiling your stem"
By this time, the British cruisers were no more than a mile from the German destroyer, and if she had the possibility of a torpedo attack, she could easily "catch" the British on the turn. But he no longer had such an opportunity, because by that time he was beaten to the extreme and completely lost his combat capability.
And finally, the third battle - "Friday the 13th", which took place on November 13, 1942, when two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and two American air defense cruisers, supported by 8 destroyers, tried to block the path of two Japanese battle cruisers (Kirishima and Hiei "), The light cruiser" Nagara "and 14 destroyers. This fight, which turned into a night dump at pistol distances, is described in many sources, and we will not repeat, but pay attention to the actions of the Helena-class Brooklyn-class light cruiser. At the very beginning of the battle, the Japanese destroyer Ikazuchi found herself in an extremely advantageous position for a torpedo attack by the American formation - but in just two minutes she received at least four 152-mm shells from Helena and was forced to withdraw from the battle. In the second episode, the destroyer went out on the beaten flagship of Admiral Callahan, the heavy cruiser San Francisco (which received 15 (!) Hits alone with 356-mm shells - and this is not counting the hail of 127-mm shells that hit the cruiser much more). Amatsukadze. I got out, but after three minutes of fire contact with "Helena" the ship was no longer able to be controlled, its bow superstructure, artillery director and command posts were destroyed, 43 people died. The Japanese destroyer survived literally by a miracle, appearing in the form of two other destroyers flying the flag of the rising sun, which were also driven off by Helena from San Francisco - but the need to transfer fire to the newly appeared ships allowed the Amatsukaze to avoid certain death. Shortly before that, in the (night) battle at Cape Esperance, the Japanese destroyer Fubuki was under fire from the 152-mm and 127-mm Helena cannons. A minute and a half of the battle was enough for the Japanese ship to lose its combat capability.
From all of the above (and described in the previous articles of the cycle), the following conclusion suggests itself - of course, the 203-mm caliber is better suited for "showdown" between cruisers, but when you need to protect your own squadron from the "encroachments" of enemy destroyers, then six-inch guns are preferred. And now let's take a brief look at the history of the creation of the Soviet light cruisers following the 26 bis - we are talking about the ships of Project 68 "Chapaev".
In May 1936 (when the light cruisers of Project 26 "Kirov" and "Voroshilov" were already under construction), the Council of Labor and Defense under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to build a "Big Fleet". In accordance with it, heavy ships, including battleships, were to be built for the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets, the original plans provided for the construction of 24 (!) Battleships until 1947. Accordingly, the theory of "small naval war" (described in the first article of this cycle) could only live until the time when the Soviet Navy received heavy ships in sufficient quantities.
The approaches to the construction and use of the fleet have changed dramatically. If earlier the stake was placed on a combined (or concentrated) strike in coastal areas, during which light forces of the fleet and coastal aviation aircraft, preferably with the support of coastal artillery, attacked heavy enemy ships, now tactics (albeit not immediately) shifted towards the classic squadron battle. And it was quite obvious that the tasks of the light cruisers of the "Big Fleet" would have significant differences from those that were set for the ships of projects 26 and 26-bis.
Therefore, already in 1936, a new term appeared: "light cruiser of escort squadron", the tasks of which were defined as:
1) reconnaissance and patrol;
2) a battle with light enemy forces accompanied by a squadron;
3) support for attacks by own destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats;
4) operations on enemy sea lanes and raiding operations on its coast and ports;
5) mine laying of active minefields in enemy waters.
At the same time, "a battle with light forces accompanied by a squadron" assumed the protection of their own heavy ships from enemy destroyers, torpedo boats and other torpedo boats, which set high requirements for the rate of fire of the main caliber guns.
In other words, the ability to achieve a quick victory over a ship of its class was no longer required and could not be considered a key function for a domestic light cruiser. Much more important for him was the ability to effectively repel the attacks of enemy destroyers, and in addition, they needed more powerful armor than before, in order to successfully "take the blow" of the enemy's light forces artillery at the "pistol" distances of night battles. The speed, close to the capabilities of the destroyers, also lost its meaning - why? It was enough to have it at the level of the light cruisers of a potential enemy, well, maybe a little more.
The light cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" represented an almost ideal fusion of tactical and technical characteristics for performing the tasks set before them by the leadership of the Red Army's naval forces within the framework of the theory of small naval war prevailing at that time. But this theory was nothing more than a palliative of real naval power based on heavy warships. Therefore, as soon as the leadership of the country considered that the industry of the USSR had reached a level that made it possible to start building a full-fledged navy, the "Big Fleet", the theory of a small naval war was over. From now on, the tasks of Soviet light cruisers became different, and 180-mm guns, no matter how good they were, no longer found a place on ships of this class.
Now the Soviet navy needed classic light cruisers. But this is a completely different story….
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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In addition to the above, in the preparation of this series of articles, the original texts of maritime agreements and other documents were used.
