After the successful attack on Sheffield on May 4, 1982, and until May 20, when the British began the landing operation, there was a pause in the fighting. Not that they stopped altogether, but both sides did not seek a decisive battle, limiting themselves to a minor "bite" of the enemy. British planes constantly did something - they fired a little at unarmed ships, carried out air patrols, but without intercepting anyone, they bombed various objects in the Falkland Islands without causing any significant damage … Harriers”of the British, this period could have been omitted, but what happened between May 5-20 illustrates well what perversions the fleet is forced to go, which does not have adequate carrier-based aircraft at its disposal.
For three days, May 5-7, nothing special happened either at sea or in the air. After the sinking of the Belgrano, the British atomarines received permission to engage in free hunting and set off after the main forces of the Argentine fleet to the continental coast. Nothing good came of this - within the range of land-based planes and helicopters, the Argentines put together a good anti-aircraft defense. As a result, the British did not find anyone, but on May 5 one of their submarines was discovered and attacked by Argentine aviation, however, to no avail. The next day, May 6, London recalled the submarines, assigning them patrol areas near the Falkland Islands. On the same day, the British lost 2 Sea Harriers, which probably collided in the air, and on May 7 the Argentines resumed supplying the islands by air - the Hercules S-130 (call sign - Tiger) delivered cargo and an air defense unit with missiles SAM-7. At the same time, Argentine scouts discovered two ship groups of the British, and the route of one of them passed within the range of attack aircraft, but the disgusting weather did not allow them to take advantage of this chance.
The revival came on May 8, when the San Luis lurking near the Falklands discovered a target located about 2,700 meters from the Argentine submarine and moving at a speed of 8 knots. The San Luis could not identify the target, but attacked it with an Mk 37 anti-submarine torpedo. Six seconds later, the acoustics recorded a metal strike on metal, but there was no explosion, and the contact was lost. What was it?
Perhaps the Argentine acoustics just imagined all this, it happens. Suffice it to recall that the frigate "Yarmouth", trying to help the downed "Sheffield", 9 (NINE) times heard the noise of torpedo propellers, although in fact there were no torpedoes and could not have been. But it is possible that the Argentines nevertheless fired at a real target and hit the Splendit nuclear submarine. The British, of course, do not confirm anything of this kind, but there is information that after this incident, Splendit immediately left the area of hostilities and went to Great Britain, and there were no other ships or vessels in the area of attack of the San Luis. If the attack really took place, then we can say that the Argentine submariners have touched a tremendous success, because the destruction of "Splendit" would be an excellent response to the death of "Belgrano". Alas, poor-quality weapons let the Argentines down again. Or is it all about the small distance, why the torpedo did not have time to charge?
In general, May 8 gave one more mystery to lovers of naval history, but in addition to the San Luis attack, something interesting happened. It was on this day that the destroyer "Coventry" and the frigate "Broadsward" received an amazing order: they were charged with the duty of ensuring an air blockade of the Falkland Islands.
On the one hand, the attempt to organize an air blockade by the forces of the naval patrol looks at least strange, if not absurd. Indeed, for this, the ships had to approach as close as possible to the coast, from where their radars would control the airspace over the Port Stanley airfield, and the Sea Dart missiles could shoot down cargo planes if they showed up there. But in this case, the British detachment will inevitably be found, and found in the reach of the Argentine continental aviation. So what, the British willingly asked for a repetition of the story with "Sheffield"? How could the command of the 317th task force come up with such a suicidal tactic?
But in fact, the British did not have any choice - except to curtail the operation and, without a heart, go home. The fighting on May 1-4 convinced the British that they could not control the airspace over the Falklands, or even over their own formation. The hopes placed on VTOL air patrols and ship radar patrols, which included destroyers with their powerful radars and long-range Sea Dart air defense systems, did not materialize, and the British did not have any other means of air control. And what could be done here?
After the attack on Sheffield, the British command fell into the most unbridled palliatives. To what degree of despair the commanders reached, is evidenced by one single fact - the plan of sending British reconnaissance groups to the continent was seriously discussed, so that they, hiding in the areas of Argentine air bases, visually observed the takeoff of combat aircraft and radioed about it to the ships. Fortunately, this idea did not come to fruition. Probably, someone nevertheless remembered that stationary observers with walkie-talkies were successfully identified and destroyed during the Second World War, and since then radio engineering has stepped far ahead. Then the command of the 317th task force attracted … submarines to conduct aerial reconnaissance.
How this was implemented remains a mystery, the British do not particularly expand on this. Probably, surface patrols of nuclear submarines were carried out in areas close to continental air bases in the hope that passive radio reconnaissance stations or watchkeepers would be able to detect Argentine aircraft taking off. The author of the article cannot say for sure, but it is possible that the attack of the British submarine by Argentinean ASW aircraft, which took place on May 5, is a consequence of such a "brilliant" strategy. Be that as it may, the idea obviously did not justify itself, and they gave up on it.
All this, of course, is an oxymoron, but still one should not blame Rear Admiral Woodworth for unprofessionalism. Such accusations should be made against those who sent English sailors to the edge of geography with means unsuitable for modern naval warfare. The admiral was simply trying to find some way out and win the war with what was at his disposal.
Realizing that extravagant tactics would not lead to success, the British tried to look at the problem from the other side. The main task of the fleet was to support the amphibious operation, but in order to land the landing it was required to provide air defense for the amphibious group and the landing sites. There was no particular hope for the Sea Harriers, so there were warships. Consequently, it was necessary to come up with the best tactics for using them, which would allow destroyers and frigates with a chance of success to fight the Argentine aviation. And, of course, it is imperative to test these tactics in practice before the start of the landing operation, because if the tactics suddenly fail during the landing, the ocean around the Falklands will turn red with the blood of the British marines.
Despite the Sheffield fiasco, the British continued to view the Type 42 destroyers and their Sea Dart missile systems as powerful air defense systems, and in this they were right. The presence of anti-aircraft missiles capable of attacking targets at a distance of tens of kilometers drove Argentine aircraft to the very crests of the waves, which seriously limited their combat capabilities. The only problem was that, being able to drive the Argentines to low heights, type 42 destroyers could not fight them there - if suddenly planes (or missiles) surfaced over the horizon, then the Sea Dart air defense system could not "work out" on them, since it was not intended to intercept low-flying targets. During the recent attack of the Super Etandarov, the destroyer Glasgow still managed to prepare its Sea Dart for firing, but its fire control radar was unable to “keep” the target - the radar saw both Ekoset anti-ship missiles, but in “blinking mode ", I.e. they kept disappearing from the screen and then reappearing. Because of this, the British equipment could not ensure the guidance of the Sea Dart missiles at the target.
But the newest, adopted in 1979, the Sea Wolfe air defense system was quite capable of withstanding a low-flying threat. Created to replace the Sea Cat air defense system, this complex was created to intercept anti-ship missiles, was distinguished by a short reaction time and a very high probability of hitting a target. According to Rear Admiral Woodworth's recollections, the Sea Wolf missiles successfully hit 4.5-inch (114-mm) shells during tests. Great hopes were pinned on this complex, so the carriers of the Sea Wolf, the frigates Brodsward and Brilliant, were usually placed in the immediate protection of British aircraft carriers. Of course, the Sea Wolf was a typical short-range air defense system, whose missiles flew only 6 kilometers in a straight line, but when paired with the Sea Dart air defense system, it could create (at least theoretically) a powerful and echeloned air defense. And so the British decided to combine the powerful radars and the long-range Sea Dart air defense system of the Project 42 destroyer with the latest Sea Wolf air defense systems of the Broadsward-class frigates - and see what happens. The whole operation was at stake, because in the event of a fiasco, Rear Admiral Woodworth was going to cancel the landing. This would be a terrible blow to the prestige of the British, but still not as dire as if the British amphibious forces were defeated by the Argentine Air Force.
And how could the effectiveness of the Sea Dart & Sea Wolf combination be tested without exposing the ships to Argentine pilots? No way. And the first pair, the Broadsward and Coventry, were ordered to go to the Port Stanley area.
On the other hand, the admiral tried to minimize the risks: on May 8, the weather was very bad for flights, and the Argentines did not show the ability to organize massive air strikes anyway. In addition, Sea Harriers were dispatched to the Falklands area. In other words, Rear Admiral Woodworth provided the Coventry and Broadsward crews with the maximum quality of air defense in conditions when Argentine aviation was difficult to fly.
The experiment began: on the night of May 8-9, the British indicated their presence, the frigate Alacriti fired at the coast near Port Stanley, and the frigate Diamond went to the entrance to the Falklands Strait, hoping to catch Argentine supply transports there. … By morning, both of these ships had retreated to the main force, but the Coventry and the Broadsward approached Port Stanley. At the same time, the Sea Harriers developed a vigorous activity, flying both to cover the British ships and to bomb the Port Stanley airfield. All this did not give much effect, but on one of these flights the Sea Harriers discovered the Narwhal - a 350-ton Argentine trawler used as an auxiliary reconnaissance ship. He did not carry weapons, so it was not difficult to defeat him - after refusing to go into the drift, the ship was first fired upon, then helicopters landed a British landing on it … The Argentines, believing that the British had sunk the Narwhal, sent an army Puma helicopter to rescue the crew, and then SAM "Sea Dart" "Coventry" said its weighty word - 40 minutes after takeoff, the helicopter was destroyed. However, the Argentine aviation never appeared.
On the night of May 9-10, 24 hours after the start of patrols, Coventry and Broadsward retreated, and their place was taken by the next pair, consisting of the destroyer Glasgow and the frigate Brilliant. Rear Admiral Woodworth believed that the experiment needed to be completed, and he was absolutely right in this, but now he had to make another extremely difficult decision.
The lack of a full-fledged aircraft carrier was a huge problem for the British, but far from the only one. The best landing site, in the opinion of the British, was in the Falklands Strait, where a very narrow fairway led, which would have been so easy to block with minefields … Of course, several minesweepers would easily solve this issue, but Rear Admiral Woodworth did not have minesweepers. And the admiral had no right to send amphibious assault ships packed with people to where, perhaps, the "horned death" was waiting in the wings. Circumstances did not leave him a choice - he had to send one of his ships so that he, on his own "skin", was convinced that there were no mines. Or … in their presence.
Woodworth could not send a ship with the Sea Darts or the Sea Wolves to death - the success of the future operation depended on them. And to send a large destroyer of the "County" type with a crew of 471 people - too. A small ship should have been sent, which could be easily replaced … The choice fell on the frigate "Alakriti".
The admiral could not directly issue such an order, but he described this episode without cuts in his memoirs:
“Now I had a difficult mission to invite Captain 2nd Rank Christopher Craig to contact and say:“I would like you to go and see if you can drown after being blown up by a mine in the Falklands Strait”…… But I didn’t do anything like that, but just called Captain 2nd Rank Craig on a private channel and said, “Uh … Christopher, I would like you to sail around East Falkland tonight, circling it from the south and then across the Falklands Strait past the Cape Fanning to the north, where you will meet Arrow. I also told him to go through the strait with a lot of noise, firing several shells of light in order to scare the Argentines, and added: “If you see anything moving, then sink it. But leave the strait with the expectation to return before dawn, get away from the coast before they can fly.”After a short pause, he replied:
- Hmmm, admiral, I suppose you want me to enter and exit the northern entrance of the strait several times, and to make a few zigzags?
“Oh,” I said, feigning surprise and feeling two inches taller, “why are you asking this?
“I suppose you want me to find out if there are any mines there,” he said calmly.
I don't remember exactly what I said, I only remember how I felt. I noticed that this would be quite helpful. With great dignity, Christopher replied, "Very well, sir," and left to prepare his ship and crew for possible destruction as best as possible."
The Alakriti went into the night. For a ship of 2750 tons of standard displacement, a collision with a mine, even during the Second World War, is fraught with rapid death, and the darkness of the night also guaranteed a minimum of 175 survivors from the crew …
(pictured - the same type "Alakriti" frigate "Amazon")
Interestingly, in the vast majority of reviews of the Falklands Conflict, this episode is silent. Due to the inability of Great Britain to ensure the presence of minesweepers in the conflict zone, 175 people were forced to risk their own lives, but … the history is written by the winners, so why not retouch some, albeit heroic, but inconvenient aspects?
Of course, the British sailors carried out the command of the commander with absolute precision. "Alakriti" entered the Falklands Strait, and not only followed the fairway to the Strait of San Carlos, but also resembled it on tacks (that is, in a zigzag) in order to be sure there were no mines. And so that the Argentines would not guess anything like that, they fired at the transport found in the Strait of San Carlos (which subsequently sank). In order not to be exposed in the morning under the attack of the Argentine aviation, "Alakriti" left the strait in the dark and, having met with the waiting "Arrow", returned to the main forces.
The brave men are lucky - both frigates ran into the ubiquitous Argentine submarine "San Luis". The British walked between the boat and the shore, the position for a torpedo strike was ideal, but … the fire control system on the boat was out of order. Then the commander of the "San Luis" personally calculated the torpedo triangle and fired a two-torpedo salvo from a distance of less than 3 miles. The result … is natural for Argentine weapons. One torpedo did not come out of the torpedo tube at all, while the second two and a half minutes later cut off the telecontrol cable and went into the milk. Due to the high speed of the frigates, it was no longer possible to repeat the attack, and the British escaped mortal danger without even noticing it. One can imagine what feelings were experienced, of course, by the brave and skillful, but unlucky Argentine submariners, whose legitimate prey escaped their hands for the third time. Regular failures of the San Luis equipment led to the fact that the only submarine no longer took part in the hostilities - after the incident described above, the submarine returned to Mar del Plata and stood there for repairs.
May 11 began with shelling of the coast of Glasgow and Brilliant, and ended with the anti-aircraft artillery covering the Condor airbase drove off a pair of Sea Harriers, who were unsuccessfully trying to bomb its airfield. But the Argentines got tired of enduring British ships "near the capital of the Falklands", and on May 12, a major air operation began to destroy them.
The first wave was to consist of 8 Skyhawks from the Rio Gallegos airbase and 6 Daggers from the Rio Grande, and two “flying tankers” were allocated for refueling these aircraft. The second wave of the same number (8 Skyhawks, 6 Daggers) from the San Julian airbase was supposed to build on the success. These were impressive forces, but in order to confuse the British, another 30 auxiliary aircraft of various types were sent to the Falkland Islands zone (this information is mentioned only in one source and seems somewhat doubtful. It is likely that the Argentines did indeed send some the number of aircraft, but three dozen? !!). Their task was to confuse the British and distract their air patrols. At the same time, some Argentine aircraft (such as the Liar Jet) almost did not risk anything - surpassing the Sea Harriers in speed, they could always break away from the latter.
The British found the first four Skyhawks 18 miles from their ships, and when they approached up to 15 miles, the Sea Dart operators were ready to open fire, but … In the battle, the main enemy of the British was not Argentine aircraft, but their own software.
The fire controller presses the launch button for a series of missiles, which complies with the rules for firing at a group target. Both missiles are already on the guides, but the microswitch on one of them is out of order, as a result, the computer does not see the missile and reports: "Malfunction on the left rail!"This is unpleasant, but not fatal - after all, everything is in order on the right rail and you can fire at attacking planes by launching missiles from it, but … the computer has already entered the command "Launch of a series of missiles" and now it does not want to shoot one missile at any, and you cannot undo a previously given command. So, because of the "wise" software, the British lost their air defense system at the moment when it was most needed. Glasgow opened the attack from its 114-mm gun mount.
However, two "Sea Wolf" air defense systems of "Brilliant" said their weighty word - 2 "Skyhawks" were shot down by them during the attack, the third, rushing to perform an anti-missile maneuver, hit a wave with its wing and crashed into the ocean. It was at this moment that the Glasgow gun mount was stuck, and the destroyer remained completely defenseless against enemy aircraft. The fourth Skyhawk attacked the destroyer, but its bombs did not hit anywhere, although one of them ricocheted off the water and flew over Glasgow. This last Skyhawk returned to base unharmed.
After some five minutes, the second four Skyhawks appeared. The Glasgow artillery system had been unlocked by that time, but the Diamond was asked to crush the fire - it turns out that 114-mm shells, reflected on the LMS radars, prevented the Sea Wolfe missiles from targeting. And in vain, because this time the British air defense system was not up to par, although the reasons are not clear. On the one hand, the Argentine pilots immediately drew conclusions and attacked the ships, performing an anti-missile maneuver: they walked, chaotically changing course and altitude. But the British argue that just at the moment of the Skyhawk attack they had to … restart the suddenly "frozen" fire control program. And this is clearly not fiction - the British immediately contacted the representatives of the Sea Wolf manufacturer, especially since one of its representatives was just present at the Diamond in order to eliminate the “hiccups of the Sea Wolf homing system” (as he put it about this episode Rear Admiral Woodworth). Be that as it may, not a single Skyhawk of the second wave was shot down, but all four were able to go on the attack. This time "Glasgow" did not escape the impact - the bomb penetrates the side at the midship level about a meter above the waterline, pierces the ship through and through and flies away without exploding. Nevertheless, this blow put the ship on the brink of destruction - two turbines were out of order, the only electric generator (there was a second one, but it broke earlier) was badly damaged, so the ship lost its speed for some time and lost electricity. Fortunately, everything was restored quickly enough. But 15 minutes after the second attack, the Brilliant radar saw a third wave of Argentine aircraft, but they did not attack. The British decided that their pilots were afraid to attack because of the death of the first wave of aircraft. But in fact, no third wave existed - out of 6 "Daggers" of the first wave, three malfunctions were found, so the command canceled the departure of all six, and the Argentines did not raise the second wave (8 "Skyhawks" and 6 "Daggers"). since the British ships had already retreated from the islands. Most likely, the "Diamond" saw the very auxiliary aircraft that were aimed at distracting British air patrols.
Needless to say, that day the Sea Harriers were unable to detect (let alone intercept) a single Argentine aircraft? This air operation of the Argentines against British ships ended far less successfully than the previous one (the Sheffield attack), they could not destroy the Glasgow, the ship was returned to service by the crew just a few days later. But for this rather modest success, the Argentines paid off with 4 Skyhawks - two of them were shot down by the Sea Wolves of the Diamond, the third crashed on the water, and the fourth, the one that managed to effectively bomb the Glasgow, was shot down by the super-vigilant anti-aircraft gunners of the Falkland islands, which again could not distinguish their plane from the enemy.
Rear Admiral Woodworth was quite satisfied with the results of the battle. He rightly believed that if the Sea Dart had not broken down at the most inopportune moment, his missiles could shoot down 1-2 enemy aircraft, which would probably completely disrupt the attack of the first wave and could affect the results of the second. And if it were not for the reboot of the Sea Wolf fire control program at the most inopportune moment, then only horns and legs could remain from the second wave as well.
So, the principal decision to land was made, but now the commander of the 317th task force was worried about the Argentine auxiliary airfield "Kildin" on Pebble Island. The islet was small, but it was only 10 miles from the throat of Falkland Bay, and a dozen stormtroopers based there could strike at the landing Marines. The consideration is quite fair, since at the time of landing, the troops are extremely vulnerable, and even light aircraft could well cause a fair amount of damage.
What was "Kildin" like? Two unpaved runways of 700 meters each, 11 open planes (5 light attack aircraft "Pukara" and 6 antediluvian screw "Mentors", yes, the same ones, weighing about 2 tons and a speed of 400 km / h), several technical buildings appointments and a platoon of infantry. Whether this airfield had at least some kind of air defense, sources do not report, but it is possible that several anti-aircraft guns were still available. Although it is doubtful - the Argentines considered this airfield as an auxiliary, but since the British Sea Harriers still did not pay attention to it, they believed that the British knew nothing about the Kildin, and did not seem to take measures to strengthen its defenses. In any case, "Kildin" was not just an easy, but an extremely easy target, even by the standards of the Second World War. For modern aircraft, the destruction of such an "air base" should not have been any problem at all.
The British explored various possibilities for destroying the Kildin. Shelling with naval artillery or a massive air raid was considered, but both of these options were deemed inappropriate - due to the risk of losses and low efficiency. In other words, the British considered their "Sea Harriers" unable to cope with the most elementary ground target! How so?
The problem of the Sea Harriers was that they were completely unable to fight ground-based air defense on their own. The reason was, again, in the absence of specialized aircraft aboard British VTOL aircraft carriers. As Vietnam and a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts have shown, aviation is quite capable of fighting even with a powerful and echeloned ground air defense with good chances of victory, but this requires first identifying the location of enemy air defense systems, and then carrying out an operation to destroy them by suppressing them with electronic the fight and destruction of anti-radar and cruise missiles. Even if the location of the air defense of some target, say, an airfield, is not revealed, it is still possible to strike at it by sending a small demonstration group to “attack” and thereby forcing the air defense to “turn on” and then attack them. And if the strike group is covered by electronic warfare aircraft, ready to "jam" enemy radars, and some of the strike aircraft are ready to "work" with anti-radar missiles and other high-precision means, then the chances of success will be quite high (although the risk of running into losses is also).
The Argentine air defense of the Falkland Islands cannot be called any serious. But the lack of reconnaissance aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft and the inability of the Sea Harriers to use anti-radar missiles led to the fact that even a few rapid-fire cannons (controlled by a simple radar) presented an insoluble problem for them. As a result, the British were forced to approach the target at low altitudes, then, about 5 km before the target, climb sharply, drop bombs and leave. Such tactics made it possible to avoid entering the zone of artillery fire, but the accuracy of the bombing, of course, turned out to be negligible. Thus, the striking power of the British carrier-based aircraft was near-zero.
As a result, the British special forces SAS had to destroy the Argentine aviation. On May 14, a group of three British ships (including the aircraft carrier Hermes) moved towards Pebble Island, and the attack began on the night of May 14-15. This raid is usually viewed as a great success for the British Special Operations Forces, but let's be objective. Yes, a sabotage detachment of 45 people, supported by the artillery of the destroyer "Glamorgan", managed to block a platoon (30 soldiers and an officer) of the Argentine infantry, disable all 11 aircraft, blow up the fuel depot, mine the runway and other structures. And retreat, making do with just two lightly wounded. There can be no complaints about the SAS soldiers - they performed absolutely all the tasks of the operation perfectly. But I can't get rid of the obsessive thought that if in place of the British were the special forces of the USSR, which, like the British, had one and a half times superiority in numbers, surprise, and even artillery support from the ship, then … well, the island would probably have survived. But at least something alive on it is very unlikely.
The departure of British ships on 15 May was covered by planes from the Invincible, which attacked Port Stanley airfield three times (at 12:30, 15:47 and 16:26) in order to prevent the Argentine aircraft from taking off, which could have detected an English ship group at the exit. In this case, "Skyhawks" and "Daggers" from the continental airfields, would have a good chance of retaliation. It is difficult to say how effective the bombing of the British was. As before, the bombs dropped from a high altitude could not disable the Argentine airfield, but still, the Pukara Malvinas Squadron did not make any sorties that day and the British ships were not attacked - so, quite likely, for the first time since the 1st In May, the Sea Harriers managed to do something really useful.
The success of this operation prompted the British to try to destroy the SAS forces and the most terrible enemy of the British ships - attack aircraft "Super Etandar" along with stocks of "Exocet" missiles at the Rio Grande continental airbase. For this, on May 16, the aircraft carrier Invincible, having made a dash, came close to the territorial waters of Argentina. But this time the sabotage operation failed - a helicopter with special forces was spotted 20 km from the target, as a result, the British decided to interrupt the operation and land the helicopter in Chile, which they did. At the same time, the helicopter was destroyed, its pilots surrendered to the Chilean authorities, and the special forces, of course, did not capitulate, and a few days later they were evacuated by a submarine from Tierra del Fuego.
In general, after the attack on the ill-fated Sheffield and before the British landing on May 21, the Sea Harriers were not successful. In the asset of the British carrier-based aviation can be recorded only participation in the destruction of "Narwhal" and two more ships, "Rio Caracan", "Baia Buen Suceso". It has already been said about "Narwhal" above. The Rio Caracana was attacked on May 16, and despite the bombing and fire from 30-mm cannons, the ship remained afloat and was brought to Fox Bay, where it sank a few days later. The effectiveness of the Sea Harriers does not boggle the imagination at all, since such a target (single and unarmed transport) was destroyed by the carrier-based aircraft of the Second World War in a matter of minutes. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that the Rio Caracana was carrying cargo to the Falkland Islands, and as a result of the British attack, the Argentines could not unload it on land. As for the Baia Buen Suceso, this auxiliary ship was fired upon by the Sea Harriers from cannons, after which the Argentine team abandoned it.
Air domination was out of the question for a long time. The British task force was unable to interrupt Argentina's air traffic with the captured islands. Could not interrupt the sea either, although a couple of transports were nevertheless destroyed. Falklands airfields remained operational (except for the unfortunate "Kildin" on Pebble Island, which the Argentines evacuated after the SAS raid), the islands' aviation was not destroyed, the air defense and air situation lighting systems were not suppressed. The Argentine fleet retreated and was not found by the British, forced to take into account the likelihood of its appearance during the landing operation. The only relatively large air operation of the Argentines (the attack of "Diamond" and "Glasgow") went unnoticed by the British carrier-based aircraft. In fact, all the Sea Harriers were capable of was to unnerve the Argentines with their ineffectual but regular raids.
