Discussions about the role of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft are very popular at Topvar. As soon as a suitable article appears to discuss this class of aviation, disputes flare up with renewed vigor. Someone writes that VTOL aircraft are a waste of time and money, others believe that VTOL carriers could well replace aircraft carriers with horizontal take-off aircraft, and someone seriously insists that the future of manned aviation lies in VTOL aircraft and that in a large-scale conflict in which cruise missiles will destroy airfields, only VTOL aircraft will be able to continue the war in the air. Who is right?
Without pretending to be the ultimate truth, the author will try to find an answer to this question in the analysis of the role of VTOL aircraft in the Falklands conflict of 1982, where the Argentine Air Force met chest to chest, represented by conventional aircraft, horizontal takeoff and several dozen British "vertical" - "Harriers". The Falklands battles should be considered an excellent illustration of the capabilities of VTOL aircraft against classical aviation, because:
1) aircraft of approximately the same technical level met in the air. "Mirages" and "Daggers" are almost the same age as the "Harriers", however, "Super Etandar" went into production 10 years later than the British "vertical", which to a certain extent was compensated for by the not striking performance characteristics of this brainchild of the gloomy French genius;
2) the training of pilots, if they differed, then by no means at times. Probably, the British pilots were still better, but the Argentines were not "whipping boys" at all, they fought desperately and professionally. Nothing similar to the beating of Iraqi babies, which was perpetrated by the MNF aviation during the air operation "Desert Storm", did not happen over the Falklands: both the Argentines and the British literally gnawed their victories from the enemy during the fierce struggle;
3) and, finally, the ratio of the number. Formally, Argentina's aviation surpassed the British in a ratio of about 8 to 1. But, as will be shown below, the technical condition of the aircraft and the remoteness of the continental Argentine airfields from the conflict area led to the fact that never during the entire period of hostilities the Argentines could not throw into battle against the British how many - any superior air force. Nothing like the skies of Yugoslavia, where several MiG-29s tried to somehow resist hundreds of NATO aircraft, did not happen.
But VTOL aircraft are not united … According to the author, the 1982 Falklands conflict is completely unique and is able to prompt answers to many interesting questions. These are the actions of the submarine fleet in modern warfare, and carrier-based aviation against the coast, and an attempt to repel an attack by a superior fleet by forces of a weaker one, but relying on a land-based air force, as well as the use of anti-ship missiles and the ability of warships to resist the latter. And yet the most interesting lesson is the effectiveness of the actions of a large naval formation, built around aircraft carriers - VTOL carriers. So let's look at what the 317th Task Force of the Royal Navy of Great Britain could and could not achieve, which was based on the carriers of the Harriers: the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible.
Of course, the origins of the conflict, its beginning - the capture of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by the Argentines, the formation and dispatch of a British expeditionary force, which was charged with the obligation to return the said islands to the hand of the British crown and the liberation of South Georgia by the British, are excellent topics for thoughtful research, but today we omit that and go straight to the morning of April 30, 1982, when the British squadron deployed in the so-called TRALA zone, located 200 miles northeast of Port Stanley.
Forces of the parties
As you know, the British announced that from April 12, 1982, any Argentine warship or merchant ship found to be 200 miles from the Falkland Islands would be destroyed. The TRALA zone was located practically on the border of the indicated 200 miles. Did the British think that staying outside the declared war zone would save them from Argentine attacks? Doubtful. Here, quite different, much more pragmatic considerations were more likely to play a role.
The fact is that the Falkland Islands were not just a provincial, but completely forgotten by the gods corner of Ecumene. The largest settlement (Port Stanley) barely numbered one and a half thousand inhabitants, and the rest of the villages rarely had at least 50 people. The only concrete airfield was too small to receive modern combat jet aircraft, while other airfields were unpaved. All this indicated that the British should not seriously fear the Argentine air force based in the Falkland Islands.
Indeed, the forces stationed there were still a freak show. The basis of the air power of the Falkland Islands was the air group with the proud name "Pukara Malvinas Squadron", which had in its composition 13 light turboprop attack aircraft "Pukara" (already during the hostilities 11 more machines of this type were transferred to the Falklands). This pride of the Argentine aircraft industry was originally developed for action against guerrillas in low-intensity conflicts and fully met these requirements. Two 20-mm cannons, four 7.62-mm machine guns, 1620 kg of maximum combat load and a speed of 750 km / h, coupled with an armored cabin from the bottom, were a good solution to the problems that small groups of people armed with small arms could create. The radar for this air warrior was considered superfluous, so that the only guidance system for airborne weapons was a collimator sight. This squadron did not exhaust the forces of the Argentines. In addition to the Pukar Malvinas, there were a dozen more vehicles with wings. Six Airmachi MV-339A were training jet aircraft, which for the first and last time in their history were tried to be used as light attack aircraft. They were slightly faster than the Pukara (817 km), did not have built-in weapons, but on external suspensions they could carry up to 2 tons of combat load, and there was no radar on them either. The list of the Argentine Air Force of the Falkland Islands was completed by 6 training and combat aircraft "Mentor T-34". The combat value of this two-seater single-engine propeller-driven aircraft with a maximum weight of less than two tons, capable of developing as much as 400 km of maximum speed, is truly difficult to underestimate.
And yet even such an air group had a certain usefulness for the Argentines: the planes could be dangerous for the sabotage groups that the British planned to land, and an attempt to attack from low altitudes the main landing of the British could cause trouble. Argentine aircraft could also become a formidable enemy for British helicopters, but, most importantly, despite the lack of radar, they could still conduct naval reconnaissance and identify the location of British ships, which was extremely undesirable for the British. After all, following the light reconnaissance attack aircraft, the Daggers and Super Etandars could have come from mainland bases.
Since military air bases appeared in the Falklands, it means that there should have been an air defense system designed to cover these bases. The Argentines depicted something similar, and we can safely say that the air defense of the islands matched their air "power": 12 paired 35-mm "Erlikons", several 20- and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns, portable air defense systems "Bloupipe", 3 launchers installations of the "Taygerkat" air defense system and even one "Roland" battery. The air situation within a radius of 200 km was illuminated by the Westinghouse AN / TPS-43 radar station located in Port Stanley. True, the hills and mountains left numerous dead zones, but still it was better than nothing.
In general, it is easy to see that the air force and air defense forces that the Argentines deployed in the Falkland Islands, from the point of view of military art and the level of technology in 1982, were not even weak, but frankly insignificant and obviously needed the support of the air force from mainland bases. But how could such support be provided?
There were about 240 combat aircraft on the lists of the Argentine Air Force and Navy, but in life things were much worse than on paper. In total, 19 (according to other sources, 21) Mirage IIIEA aircraft and 39 Israeli Dagger-class aircraft (including 5 training aircraft) were delivered to Argentina, however, according to available data, at the beginning of the conflict, only 12 of them were combat-ready. Mirages "and 25" Daggers ". Worse, according to some sources (A. Kotlobovsky, "The use of Mirage III and Dagger aircraft"), no more than 8 Mirage IIIEA and only nineteen Daggers took part in the battles.
Here, of course, a fair question arises: why did Argentina, waging a war with Great Britain, not throw all the forces at its disposal into battle? The answer, oddly enough, lies on the surface. The fact is that relations between South American countries have never been cloudless, and Argentina should have taken into account that while it was at war with England, someone could see a chance for themselves and strike at the most inopportune moment for the Argentines … To the beginning of the Falklands conflict the Chileans concentrated large military contingents on the Argentine border, and this could be by no means a diplomatic gesture: the war with Chile ended quite recently. The headquarters of Argentina directly pointed to the possibility of joint actions by Chile and England, this option (the simultaneous invasion of the Chileans and the landing of British troops in the Falklands) was considered quite probable. It is for this reason that the most combat-ready Argentine land units, such as the 1st Mechanized Brigade, 6th and 7th Infantry Brigades, were not sent to the Falklands, but remained on the mainland. Under these conditions, the desire to retain part of the aviation to counter Chile looks quite understandable, although in retrospect this decision should be recognized as erroneous. And if the British landing in the Falklands met with the color of the Argentine ground forces, the battles could become much more fierce and bloody than they were in reality. Fortunately, this did not happen, well, we will return to aviation.
The exact number of "Skyhawks" is also very difficult to determine, the data of sources vary, but, apparently, there were about 70 of them on the lists. Often there is a total of 68 or 60 aircraft in the Air Force and 8-10 Skyhawks in naval aviation. However, only 39 of them were combat-ready by the beginning of hostilities (including 31 Air Force aircraft and 8 Navy aircraft). True, Argentine technicians managed to put 9 more vehicles into operation during the hostilities, so that in total about 48 Skyhawks could take part in battles. It was not okay with the French "Super Etandars". Sometimes in the Argentine Air Force at the beginning of the war, 14 machines of this type are indicated, but this is not true: Argentina really signed a contract for 14 such aircraft, but only before the conflict with England and the accompanying embargo, only five cars got into the country. Moreover, one of them was immediately put on hold in order to use it as a warehouse for spare parts for four other aircraft - due to the same embargo, Argentina had no other sources of spare parts.
Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, 12 Mirages, 25 Daggers, 4 Super Etandars, 39 Skyhawks could have supported the Falklands, and - I almost forgot! - 8 light bombers "Canberra" (honored veterans of the air, the first aircraft of this type took off already in 1949). The combat value of "Canberra" by 1982 was negligible, but still they could fly to British ships. A total of 88 aircraft are obtained.
No, of course, Argentina had other combat vehicles "with wings" - the same "Pukara" existed in the number of at least 50 units, there were also "wonderful" MS-760A "Paris-2" (training aircraft, in certain conditions capable of performing the role of a light attack aircraft) in the amount of about 32 machines, and something else … But the problem was that all these "Pukars" / "Paris" simply could not operate from continental airfields, from which only to Port Stanley it took 730-780 kilometers to fly. They did not act - the Mirages, Canberra, Super Etandara and Daggers, as well as those light Pukars / Mentors / Airmachi, which they managed to base at the airfields of the Falkland Islands.
Thus, by April 30, even taking into account such rarities as the Mentor T-34 and Canberra, the Argentines could send no more than 113 air vehicles into battle with the British, of which only 80 Mirages had combat value. Daggers "," Super Etandars "and" Skyhawks ". This, of course, is not at all the 240 combat aircraft that most review articles on the Falklands conflict mention, but even such numbers in theory provided the Argentines with overwhelming air superiority. Indeed, before the start of the fighting, the British had only 20 Sea Harriers FRS.1, of which 12 were based on the Hermes aircraft carrier and 8 on the Invincible. And so it is quite understandable that the British want to stay 200 miles (370 km) beyond the islands. Located more than 1000 km from the mainland Argentine bases, the British could not be afraid of massive air raids on their compound.
Yielding to the Argentines in the air, the British were not too much superior to them in surface ships. The presence of two British aircraft carriers against one Argentinean to a certain extent was compensated by the presence of powerful land-based aviation in the latter. As for other warships, during the Falklands Conflict, 23 British destroyer-frigate-class ships visited the combat zone. But by April 30 there were only 9 of them (2 more were at Ascension Island), the rest came later. At the same time, the Argentine Navy had a light cruiser, five destroyers and three corvettes, however, when the main forces of the Argentines went to sea, in readiness for a sea battle, one of these destroyers remained in the harbor, probably for technical reasons. Therefore, by April 30, four British destroyers and five frigates were opposed by a light cruiser, four destroyers and three corvettes (sometimes called frigates) of Argentina. Argentine ships were greatly inferior to the British squadron in air defense capabilities: if 9 British ships had 14 air defense systems (3 Sea Dart, 4 Sea Wolf, 5 Sea Cat and 2 Sea Slug) to which it was worth adding 3 more "Sea Cat" located on aircraft carriers, then 8 Argentine ships had 2 "Sea Dart" and 2 "Sea Cat", and their only aircraft carrier did not have an air defense system at all. But on the other hand, the opponents' strike capabilities were equal: all Argentine destroyers had 4 launchers for the Exocet anti-ship missile system, and two of the three corvettes - 2 each (two launchers from the Guerrico were removed and delivered to Port Stanley to organize coastal defense). The total number of launchers "Ecoset" of the Argentine squadron was 20. The British, although they had more ships, but not all of them were equipped with anti-ship missiles, so that by April 30, the ships of the 317th task force also had 20 Exocet launchers.
Unfortunately, the author does not know how many Exocet anti-ship missiles were at the disposal of the Argentine Navy. Sources usually indicate the presence of five such missiles, and here's why: shortly before the start of the war, Argentina ordered 14 Super Etandars from France and 28 Exocet AM39 anti-ship missiles for them. But before the embargo was imposed, Argentina received only five aircraft and five missiles. However, it is overlooked that the Argentine fleet, equipped with an early modification of the "Exocet" MM38, had a certain number of such missiles, which, however, could not be used from aircraft. So the commander of the British squadron, not without reason, feared that the Argentine ships, sneaking up to his compound, would launch a massive missile strike.
The only class of ships in which the British had an unconditional superiority was submarines. By April 30, the British were able to deploy 3 nuclear-powered ships: Conqueror, Spartan and Splendit. Formally, at the beginning of the war, the Argentines had four submarines, of which two were American military-built Balao-class submarines that had undergone radical modernization under the GUPPY program. But the technical condition of the submarine was absolutely terrible, so one of them, the Santiago de Estro, was withdrawn from the Navy in early 1982 and was not commissioned despite the war. The second submarine of this type, "Santa Fe" (about the capabilities of which one single fact perfectly speaks: the submarine could not submerge to a depth greater than the periscope), was going to be withdrawn from the fleet in July 1982. But nevertheless, she took part in the conflict, was knocked out and captured by the British during Operation Paraquite (liberation of South Georgia on April 21-26), and by the time of the events described, it could not be taken into account in the Argentine Navy.
Two other Argentine submarines were quite modern German boats of type 209, but only one of them, "Salta", unexpectedly went out of order at the very beginning of 1982, was under repair and did not take part in the conflict. Accordingly, by April 30 the British could resist one and only Argentine submarine - "San Luis" (type 209).
Parties' plans
On April 30, two British operational formations were in the conflict zone: Task Force-317 under the command of Rear Admiral Woodworth, which included almost all surface warships, and Task Force-324 (submarines). As mentioned above, the TF-317 carriers, destroyers and frigates were finishing refueling and other combat training in the TRALA zone, 200 miles northeast of Port Stanley. Submarines TF-324 entered patrol areas on the routes of possible Argentine squadrons between the mainland and the Falkland Islands. There was only an amphibious group with a landing - she barely left Fr. Ascension, which was the closest base of British forces to the conflict area, but it was separated from the Falkland Islands by about 4 thousand nautical miles. However, the absence of an amphibious group did not interfere with anything, since no one was going to use it at the first stage of the operation.
The British forces in the Falklands area were very limited and did not guarantee the support of a large-scale amphibious operation. This could be corrected in two ways: to provide Rear Admiral Woodworth with powerful reinforcements, or to radically weaken the Argentine army. The British chose both, and therefore, even before the concentration of the amphibious group in the initial positions, it was assumed:
1) use the forces of KVVS strategic bombers and carrier-based aviation to disable the Argentine air bases in the Falkland Islands - "Malvinas Islands" and "Condor". After that, the basing of even light aircraft on the Falklands became impossible, and the Argentines could only rely on aviation from continental airfields. The British believed that with the defeat of the Falkland air bases, air supremacy over the islands would pass to them;
2) maneuvers of the fleet, the landing of sabotage groups and the shelling of ships specially allocated for this purpose to convince the Argentines that a large-scale landing operation has begun and thereby force the Argentine fleet to intervene;
3) defeat the Argentine fleet in a naval battle.
The British believed that, having achieved all of the above, they would establish air and sea supremacy in the Falkland Islands region, thereby creating the necessary prerequisites for a successful landing, and then the conflict would not drag on.
In retrospect, we can say that the British plan had many stretch marks. Not that the TF-317 ships should seriously fear the Pukar Malvinas Squadron, but, of course, having lost the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance flights from the airfields of the Falkland Islands, the Argentines lost a lot. However, in the composition of their air force there were aircraft capable, at the very least, of conducting long-range aerial reconnaissance, and the islands themselves, although at the limit, were still within the reach of aviation from continental airfields. Therefore, the planned destruction of air bases did not ensure air supremacy over the contested islands - it was to be provided for the pilots of the Sea Harriers. As for the destruction of the Argentine fleet, it was obvious that two dozen VTOL aircraft, which still needed to cover the ships of the fleet from enemy raids, would not be able to solve this task, if only due to their small number, and the destroyers and frigates in the Russian Navy were not intended for these purposes in principle. So for almost the first time in the history of the KVMF, submarines were to become the main means of routing the main enemy forces. But there were plenty of possible courses by which the Argentine squadron could approach the Falkland Islands, therefore nuclear submarines had to be deployed among a very vast water area. All would be fine, but now it was very difficult to bring them together for a joint attack on the Argentine ships, and it is somewhat naive to expect that one submarine will be able to destroy the entire Argentine squadron.
Nevertheless, despite all the strains, the British plan should be considered logical and quite reasonable. And with the forces that the British had at their disposal, it would hardly have been possible to come up with something more sensible.
Surprisingly, the Argentines found their own "Admiral Makarov", who advocated offensive actions, despite the fact that the "Armada Republic Argentina" (outside the area of action of ground aircraft) was obviously inferior to its enemy. The commander of the Argentine fleet, Rear Admiral G. Alljara, proposed using the only Argentine aircraft carrier on the British communications (rightly believing that there will be more benefit from his 8 Skyhawks than from a frontal attack on the British formation). Also, this worthy husband offered to relocate several surface ships directly to the Falkland Islands and to be ready, on the eve of the inevitable landing, to turn old destroyers into artillery batteries in Port Stanley Bay.
But the Argentine leadership had other plans for the fleet: assuming that the general superiority in forces would be for the British and not doubting the training of British crews, the Argentines came to the conclusion that even if the naval operations were successful, their cost could be the death of the main forces of their fleet. And he, this fleet, was an important factor in the alignment of forces of the South American states, and it was not part of the plans of the political leadership to lose it. Therefore, the Argentines chose a moderately aggressive tactic: it was supposed to wait for the start of a large-scale landing of the British on the Falkland Islands - and then, and only then, to strike with all the power of land and deck-based aviation, and if successful (what the hell is not kidding!) And surface / submarine ships …
To this end, the Argentines carried out the deployment of their fleet, dividing it into three operational groups. The backbone of the Argentine naval forces was Task Force 79.1 as part of the Veintisinco de Mayo aircraft carrier and two of the most modern Argentine destroyers, which almost completely copied the British Type 42 (Sheffield), but, unlike their British counterparts, equipped with 4 Exocet anti-ship missile launchers each. Not far from them was Task Force 79.2, which included three corvettes and was intended to build on the success achieved by deck aviation and land-based aircraft. However, the idea of separating corvettes into a separate compound looked, to put it mildly, doubtful: three ships less than 1000 tons of standard displacement, which did not have a single air defense system, and only 4 missile launchers "Exoset" for three (especially in the absence of missiles) could not threaten British connection. The only Argentine submarine, San Luis, was not part of any of these task forces, but was to attack the British from the north with Groups 79.1 and 79.2.
The use of the third and last Argentine task force (79.3) was intended solely for demonstration purposes. The light cruiser "Admiral Belgrano" and two military-built destroyers "Allen M. Sumner" (in spite of equipping the destroyers with anti-ship missile launchers) included in it were called upon to deflect the attacks of the British and thereby ensure the smooth operation of Task Force 79.1 and 79.2. The leadership of "Armada Republic Argentina" for Task Force 79.3 did not expect anything else: the breakthrough of the antediluvian cruiser of the "Brooklyn" class to the British formation at a distance of effective artillery fire would not have dreamed the Argentines in a narcotic dream, if they were using drugs containing drugs. But 79.3 was quite suitable to distract the attention of the British: by sending the formation south of the Falkland Islands (while 79.1 and 79.2 went further north) and taking into account the relatively high survivability of the light cruiser, the chances of delaying the attacks of the British carrier-based Harriers on it looked quite decent, and the presence of two destroyers, large dimensions, armor and 2 air defense systems "Sea Cat" on the "Admiral Belgrano" made it possible to hope that the ship would be able to hold out against such attacks for some time.
Thus, by April 30, the sides completed the deployment and prepared for large-scale hostilities. It was time to start.
