So, on May 1, 1982, the Argentines were confident in the imminent landing of the British and were preparing to throw their fleet into battle. Demonstration group TG-79.3 consisting of the cruiser General Belgrano and two old destroyers was supposed to simulate an offensive from the south and distract the attention of British commanders. At this time, the main forces of TG-79.1 and TG-79.2, consisting of the aircraft carrier Bentisinco de Mayo, modern destroyers Santisimo Trinidad and Hercules (type 42, an analogue of the unfortunate Sheffield) and three corvettes were to inflict strike by deck "Skyhawks" from a distance of 120 miles on British ships. Their attack was to be supported by the Super Etandarov link from the Exocet anti-ship missile system, the San Luis submarine and, of course, attack aircraft from the continental air bases. The Argentine fleet commander ordered the operation to begin on the morning of May 2, immediately after the deployment of the tactical teams.
Interestingly, even if the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 were successful, the Argentines did not plan to throw their light cruiser into battle. According to their plan, in the event that the British fleet was defeated, the TG-79.3 ships should have engaged in piracy on enemy communications. Thus, the Argentines very realistically assessed the capabilities of the old artillery ship, assigning single transports and supply ships of the British to it as opponents.
The Argentine plan for the coming battle should be recognized as reasonable and had a good chance of success. If anything could crush the British, it was a concentrated strike from the Navy (carrier-based Skyhawks and Super Etandars) and the Air Force (Skyhawks and Daggers from the continent). An attempt to attack the British with the forces of the fleet alone would be obvious madness, since the TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 were twice as small as the British in the number of carrier-based aircraft, and their Skyhawks could neither defend themselves in the air nor provide air defense for the formation. At the same time, on six ships of the main forces of the Argentine fleet there were only two air defense systems ("Sea Dart"), which was clearly not enough to fight even such a scanty air group as the British had. As for the ship-based "Exocets", then, as noted earlier, the author does not know how many of these missiles were at the disposal of the Argentine fleet, but it is known for sure that the idea of rapprochement with the British compound is 35-40 kilometers (the flight range of MM38 is 42 km) followed by a massive salvo of anti-ship missiles, no one in the Argentine fleet considered. Although the British commander Rear Admiral Woodworth considered such an attack possible and feared it seriously.
So, by the morning of May 2, the Argentine fleet had moved to its initial positions, and the Air Force planes were only waiting for the command to take off. It seemed that the Argentine command had calculated everything correctly: air battles, shelling of the coast and the landing of amphibious groups in the afternoon of the past day seemed to foreshadow the imminent landing of the British expeditionary forces. Contacts did not stop at night - at 01.55 the destroyer Santisimo Trinidad discovered the patrolman Sea Harrier and fired at him with the Sea Dart air defense system, albeit to no avail. So the Argentines met the dawn on May 2 in full readiness.
And what was the British fleet doing at this time? In the same way as the Argentine, he was preparing for a general battle. The British 317th task force deployed its battle formations some 80 miles from Port Stanley: in the center of the battle formation were both aircraft carriers and their immediate escort: the frigates Brilliant and Brodsward. The close air defense zone was created by the destroyer "Glamorgan", frigates "Alakriti", "Yarmouth", "Arrow". Three more destroyers, positioned in threatening directions 30 miles from the main force, formed a long-range radar patrol and, of course, the Sea Harriers' air patrols were ahead of all.
The fleets were ready for the decisive battle. The distance between them was relatively short, at about 2 am, when the Sea Harrier and the Argentine destroyer saw each other, there were barely 200 miles between the squadrons. By dawn, this distance is likely to have become even smaller. But, nevertheless, the battle did not take place. Why?
The command of Argentina, alas, did not take advantage of the opportunities presented to them. The plan called for a strike during the landing operation of the British, but it did not begin in any way. While waiting for the British Marines, the Argentines made a very unfortunate mistake - they limited themselves to aerial reconnaissance of possible landing sites and did not send their planes out to sea. As a result, the British fleet, which was not too far from the islands and (at least part of the ships) within the reach of the Skyhawks and Daggers, was not found. The Argentines lost a good chance of delivering a concentrated strike against the relatively small British forces. It is difficult to say what would have happened if the Argentines had found and attacked the 317th Task Force of Rear Admiral Woodworth, but if the Argentine command had a chance to defeat the British, they missed it on May 2nd.
Unlike his "opponents", the British commander made every effort to find the main forces of the Argentine fleet, but his search was unsuccessful. Lacking specialized aircraft, the British were forced to use VTOL aircraft with their limited radius and weak radar for reconnaissance. And they suffered a fiasco at a distance from which the aircraft carriers of the Second World War no, no, and even found the enemy.
But the British knew the direction from which the main forces of the "Armada Republic of Argentina" (ARA) should be expected. On April 28, the Americans reported to their British allies the location of TG-79.3, obtained from space reconnaissance data, and on April 30, the Argentine tactical group "on the tail" of the village of Atomarina "Concaror". The commander of the British formation did not consider this formation to be the main threat, he believed that it was a decoy, although he admitted that, perhaps, the Argentines were trying to take him in pincers. If the Argentines knew the whereabouts of his ships, they could try, moving at night and at full speed, to approach the British squadron in order to launch a massive missile strike against it at dawn. But even in this case, the main threat, according to the British admiral, came from the northwest, it was from there that the destroyers and corvettes TG-79.1 and TG-79.2 were supposed to come, and it was from there that the carrier-based aircraft of the only Argentine aircraft carrier would strike. In support of this reasoning, the Sea Harrier discovered the Santisimo Trinidad at night and reported on a group of Argentine ships in the northwest. Now Rear Admiral Woodworth was confident that he understood the Argentines' plan and knew where to look for their main forces, but the limited capabilities of the VTOL did not allow him to detect the enemy. An attempt to find the enemy with the help of the Splendit submarine (she was told the coordinates of the last contact with the Argentine ships) also did not lead to anything. Rear Admiral Woodworth found himself in a difficult situation. Lacking data on the whereabouts of TG-79.1 and TG-79.2, he also realized that they could be very close.
While the British were nervous, the Argentines were tired of waiting. Dawn had long passed, morning gave way to day, but no disembarkation followed. Rightly judging that the British would not attack today, Rear Admiral G. Alljara at 12.30 ordered all three tactical groups to return to the areas of initial maneuvering. The Argentines retreated in order to regain their original positions and move forward for a concentrated attack as soon as the British decided to launch an amphibious operation. TG-79.3, led by General Belgrano, received this order and turned back without even entering a 200-mile war zone. However, she was not allowed to leave.
It is difficult to say what was Rear Admiral Woodworth's motivation for requesting permission to attack Argentine ships outside the war zone. The retreating old cruiser and two military-built destroyers did not threaten him. On the other hand, they were still warships of a hostile country, and it was not in the best British naval traditions to let them go in peace. The psychological impact of the death of the only Argentine cruiser with a large crew could greatly demoralize (perhaps it happened) the Argentine fleet. In addition, any energetic person (and we do not have a single reason to reproach Rear Admiral Woodworth for lack of energy), having fallen into a difficult situation, will prefer to do at least something rather than do nothing at all. Who knows if the destruction of the Belgrano will prompt the enemy command to take some rash actions, thereby allowing the British to discover and destroy the main forces of their fleet?
But, in addition to all of the above, there were other considerations: from the point of view of high politics, the British desperately needed a victory at sea, and the sooner the better. Unfortunately, until now, the actions of the 317th unit did not even remotely claim anything like that. The departure of TG-79.3 could tell the British admiral that the rest of the Argentine ships also lay on the opposite course, and there would be no general battle. This meant a complete failure of the British plan of operation - the airbases in the Falklands were not destroyed, air supremacy was not conquered, the Argentine fleet could not be destroyed … And what to do next? Having achieved nothing, hanging out at the Falklands, waiting for reinforcements? But what about British public opinion, accustomed to the idea that "where the fleet is - there is victory"? And how will the apparent impotence of the Royal Navy in Argentina be perceived?
It is not known exactly what reasons forced the British to make a decision, but as soon as they came to the conclusion about the usefulness of destroying the Belgrano, they immediately changed the “rules of the game” established by themselves - the fleet received permission to destroy Argentine ships outside the 200-mile zone. Well, of course, why else are rules needed if not to break them?
At 15.57, the Conqueror struck a fatal blow, two out of three torpedoes hit the old cruiser, and … it was all over in a matter of minutes. The lights on the Belgrano went out, the ship's electrical network was irreversibly damaged, all stationary drainage systems and all pumps that could pump liquid cargo and straighten the roll by counter-flooding stopped working. The fight for survivability became impossible, 20 minutes after the impact, the roll reached 21 degrees and the commander gave the only possible order - to leave the ship. It had to be transmitted by voice - the ship communication was also out of order.
England was jubilant, newspapers were full of headlines "Throw Argentines into the Sea", "Turn Them On", "Got" and even: "Final Score: Britain 6, Argentina 0". The British man in the street got his victory … Argentina, on the contrary, grieved - rallies of many thousands, flags at half-mast.
In general, the situation with the sinking of "Belgrano" painfully resembles the death of the German armored cruiser "Blucher" in the First World War. Then, due to a misunderstood signal, the squadron of Admiral Beatty, instead of finishing off the retreating German battlecruisers, attacked the heavily battered ship, which would not have gone anywhere from the British without it. “Everyone thinks that we have achieved tremendous success, but in fact we have suffered a terrible defeat,” Beatty wrote about this case. The valiant (the author writes this without a shadow of malice) British admiral knew how to face the truth and realized that he had missed an excellent chance to inflict a sensitive defeat on the Germans, and instead "won" a worthless, in general, ship. But if during the First World War only an unfortunate mistake prevented Beatty from achieving success, then in 1982 Rear Admiral Woodworth could not find and defeat the main forces of the "Armada Republic Argentina" due to the lack of the ability to conduct any effective aerial reconnaissance - he there were simply no aircraft capable of producing it. As a result, having failed to achieve a true victory, the British commander was forced to be content with an imaginary victory.
However, a psychological victory (and this is also a lot!) Went to the British: after the death of General Belgrano, the Argentine fleet no longer tempered fate, and the ARA surface ships retreated to the coast of Argentina without trying to intervene in the conflict anymore. Most likely, the Argentines realized how vulnerable their tactical groups were, maneuvering within "walking distance" from the Falkland Islands to modern submarines, although it is not at all excluded that Rear Admiral Allara was forced to "wrap the fleet in cotton wool" by Argentine politicians.
But all this happened later, and while the British were lifting planes and helicopters into the air, in an unsuccessful search for Argentine ships in the north. However, the main forces of the ARA fleet had already left, and as a consolation prize, the British got only two small ships with a displacement of 700 tons each. At the same time, the "Komodoro Sameller" carrying mines exploded, struck from a Sea King helicopter by a Sea Skew missile and died along with the entire crew, and Alferes Sobraal, having received two such missiles, still managed to return to its home port. The British pilots, observing the explosions of their missiles and the flaring fire, considered it destroyed, but the crew managed to save themselves and the ship. Nothing more interesting happened on May 2nd or 3rd.
Having won a "victory" over the unfortunate "General Belgrano", the British had many reasons for thoughtfulness. Public opinion is jubilant - that's great, but what to do next? After all, not a single task facing the British Expeditionary Force was ever solved. The massive hull of the sinking Argentine cruiser successfully blurred out the fact that the British operation had failed on all counts: the airfields were not destroyed, air supremacy could only be dreamed of, the Argentine fleet was not defeated, therefore, no prerequisites for a successful landing were created. Before the British command, the shadow of Chernyshevsky rose up with his eternal question: "What is to be done?"
Alas, the gloomy British headquarters genius did not come up with anything better than to repeat to the comma all the activities of the operation just completed! On the night of May 3rd-4th, the British again sent two Vulcan strategic bombers to smash the runway of the Malvinas Islands base (Port Stanley airfield). Again, 10 "flying tankers" "Victor" had to be sent to support two combat aircraft. The operation, without further ado, was called "Black Buck 2" and the only difference from "Black Buck 1" was that this time both bombers were able to reach the target. But again, not a single bomb hit the runway of the airfield, so this did not affect the final result.
On the morning of May 4, Task Force 317 again deployed to attack the Condor and Malvinas Islands airbases with its few Sea Harriers. But if the last time the British VTOL aircraft fell on the Argentines like a bolt from the blue, now the British decided to be imposing: first at 08.00 they raised a pair of Sea Harriers, which were supposed to fly off to inspect the consequences of the work of the Volcanoes and only then, closer to lunchtime, an air strike was planned. In the evening, it was planned to land small reconnaissance groups.
Of course, a true British gentleman should demonstrate adherence to tradition and be distinguished by a desire for a measured lifestyle, but such inclinations are categorically contraindicated in the planning of hostilities. This time, the Argentines, taught by bitter experience, were not at all going to play giveaway with the British, but acted in a completely different way.
At 05.33 am, a hail of Vulcan bombs rained down on Port Stanley airfield, not causing any harm, but warning the Argentines that the British fleet was again looking for battle. The response of the Argentine command was both reasonable and tactically competent - instead of useless attempts to cover the airfields with fighter aircraft from continental bases, the Argentines sent their planes in search of British ships that were supposed to attack the Falklands. Approximately between 0800 and 0900 the Neptune reconnaissance aircraft opened the location of the British order and at 0900 a pair of Super Etandars took off, each carrying one Exocet anti-ship missile system. At 0930 hours, Neptune transmitted the coordinates of the two British naval groups to the Super Etandar pilots.
The Argentine operation was superbly conceived and superbly executed. The target designation received from "Neptune" allowed the "Super Etandars" to plot the optimal combat course - attacking aircraft entered from the south, from where the British expected an attack the least. In addition, in this direction, flights of rescue aircraft and multiple radio communications of ships and aircraft (the search for the crew of "General Belgrano" continued) made it extremely difficult to find the Argentine combat group. The "Super Etandars" themselves went at low altitude, with the radar stations turned off and in radio silence, which, again, was possible thanks to target designation from the "Neptune". In addition, a diversionary maneuver was undertaken - a Liar Jet 35A-L airliner was raised from the Rio Grande airbase (Argentine coast) in order to simulate an attack from the west and divert the attention of the air defense. Two pairs of Daggers were on duty in the air to cover the Super Etandars and Neptune. At 10.30, "Neptune" once again clarified the coordinates and composition of the group of ships selected for the attack: three surface targets, one large, and two others smaller. Approaching 46 km to the British ships, "Super Etandars" climbed up to 150 m and turned on their "Agaves" (radar), but the enemy was not found, after which they immediately went down. A few minutes later, the Argentine pilots repeated their maneuver, and in about 30 seconds of radar operation they found the enemy. True, the radio intelligence station of the destroyer "Glasgow" also detected the radiation of the "Agave", which saved the ship from big trouble. The Argentines attacked, but Glasgow, warned of the presence of unknown aircraft nearby, managed to jam, thereby rejecting the Exocet aiming at it. Sheffield was much less fortunate: the attacking missile was found just six seconds before it crashed into the ship's hull.
The rest is well known. The struggle for the survivability of the Sheffield did not lead to anything, the crew had to be evacuated, the burning ship drifted for some time, until the fire, devouring everything that it could reach, on May 5 did not subside by itself. It was decided to take the ship with burnt-out central compartments and (partially) superstructure to New Georgia. On May 8, the frigate Yarmouth began towing, but the ensuing storm did not leave the British hope of success, and on May 10, Sheffield sank.
About an hour after the successful attack on Sheffield, three Sea Harriers attacked Goose Green airfield (Condor Air Base). The meaning of this action is not entirely clear. Rear Admiral Woodworth writes in his memoirs that the purpose of this raid was "to destroy several aircraft," but was it worth the effort? The British did not try to disable the airfield, for this the outfit of forces was obviously insufficient, while the attack on the British ships clearly indicated that the Argentines knew about the presence of the British and were ready for battle. The troika of VTOL aircraft did not have the opportunity to suppress the air defense of the airfield, respectively, the attack turned out to be very risky, but even if successful, the British destroyed only a few propeller-driven aircraft … In general, the motives of this act are unclear, but the result, alas, is logical: one Sea Harrier was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, the rest returned with nothing. The 317th Task Force then aborted the operation and retreated to the TRALA area. The second attempt by the British to establish control over the waters and airspace of the Falkland Islands suffered a crushing fiasco. Having lost the destroyer and VTOL aircraft, the 317th task force was forced to withdraw, and until May 8 its surface ships did not undertake any activity.
What conclusions can we draw from all this?
Even the most cursory analysis of what happened on May 1-4, 1982 shows the complete inconsistency of the concept of aircraft carrier groups built around vertical take-off and landing aircraft carriers. These days, the British carrier-based aviation consistently failed absolutely all the tasks facing it.
Despite the fact that the Falklands airbases were not destroyed, and air supremacy over the islands was not conquered, the British managed to achieve success on one point of the plan: they lured the Argentine fleet over themselves, forcing its commanders to believe in the inevitability of a British landing. Now the British had to destroy the main forces of the ARA in battle, and this was quite within their power. All Rear Admiral Woodworth needed was to find the ships TG-79.1 and TG-79.2, after which the use of atomarin in conjunction with the attacks of the Sea Harriers would not leave the Argentines a single chance.
But the reconnaissance capabilities of the 317th operational formation did not at all correspond to the tasks facing it. The British did not have long-range radar aircraft, and they did not have aircraft capable of performing electronic reconnaissance. But what can I say: the British did not have any reconnaissance aircraft at all, as a result of which they were forced to send Sea Harriers, which were completely not intended for this, to search for the Argentines. The presence of a rather primitive radar station in the latter led to the fact that the pilots had to rely on their eyes for the most part, which in bad weather conditions (typical for this region of the Atlantic) was categorically insufficient. The small combat radius of the VTOL aircraft limited the search time for the enemy, and all this together reduced the search capabilities of the British aircraft carrier group, at best, to the level of aircraft carriers during the Second World War, rather even its first half.
The British pilots were well trained, and their aircraft (due to more modern weapons) proved to be individually stronger than the fighters of the Argentine Air Force. This allowed the British pilots to win aerial victories, but none of the above gave them the opportunity to timely detect the enemy and control his (or their) airspace. As a result, of the three Argentine task forces, the British were able to find only one (TG-79.3, led by "General Belgrano"), and even that one thanks to US satellite intelligence. It is very likely that if the Americans had not provided the British with the location of the TG-79.3 ships, the Conqueror would not have been able to take the General Belgrano "for escort."
Speaking of submarines, it should be noted that their ability to detect the enemy was also very far from what was desired. Atomarines "Spartan" and "Splendit" deployed on the routes of the possible following of the main forces of the ARA could not find the enemy. Moreover, Splendit was unable to find the TG-79.1 ships even after being prompted by the location of the Argentines (Sea Harrier's night contact with Santisimo Trinidad).
But back to the actions of aviation. This time Argentina sent out the best it had - the Neptune SP-2H patrol aircraft. The prototype "Neptune" first took to the air on May 17, 1945, its operation began in the US Navy in March 1947. For its time, the aircraft turned out to be extremely successful, but, of course, by 1982 it was very outdated. But an AN / APS-20 decimeter radar was installed on it. Created under the Cadillac program in 1944, this system was installed on the deck torpedo bomber Avenger, turning it into an AWACS aircraft, and this modification of the Avengers even managed to fight, having received the baptism of fire in the battle for Okinawa in March 1945. The capabilities of AN / APS-20 in 1982 were no longer amazing, but they could not be called scanty. A compact group of aircraft, or a single large aircraft flying at high altitude, she could detect at about 160-180 km, but the detection range of low-flying targets, presumably, was lower, since decimeter radars do not work very well against the background of the underlying surface (with which the Americans collided during the operation of the "Aegis" radar AN / SPY-1). To his deep regret, the author of the article could not find the detection range of surface targets by the AN / APS-20 station.
The technical condition of "Neptune" was appalling. The radar was periodically turned off, and the plane itself just did not fall apart in the air. By the beginning of the Falklands conflict, Argentina had 4 vehicles of this type, but 2 of them could no longer take off. The rest nevertheless made 51 sorties at the beginning of hostilities, but on May 15, the Argentines were forced to put their best scouts on hold forever - the service life of the machines was finally depleted.
Under no circumstances can the commander of the British forces, Rear Admiral Woodworth, be accused of roguishness. He did everything in his power. It echeloned Task Force 317, pushing three radar patrol ships into the most threatening direction. A second line of defense, consisting of a destroyer and three frigates, passed 18 miles behind them, three auxiliary ships went directly behind them, and only then both aircraft carriers with immediate protection. The British commander also organized an air watch. In terms of organizing the air defense of the compound entrusted to him, he did everything right, but …
Many people who are just starting to study the Falklands Conflict have the same question: why did they oversleep the attack on the destroyer? Why did the Super Etandarov radar spot the British ship, while the Sheffield radar did not see any Argentine aircraft or the missile that attacked it? After all, ship radars, in theory, are much more powerful than aircraft radars. The answer to this question has been known a long time ago - the Sheffield radars were turned off in connection with a communication session with the Navy headquarters in Northwood, so that the radiation of the radars did not interfere with the operation of satellite equipment. A completely understandable and all-explanatory answer: the British ship was unlucky, so Fate decided …
But in fact, the question is not why the Sheffield radar stations did not see the Exocet anti-ship missile system flying towards it. The question is, how did the old "Neptune" manage to track the movements of the British squadrons for several hours and was not discovered by them themselves ?!
After all, the SP-2H Neptune is not the B-2 Spirit or the F-22 Raptor. This is a flying shed with a wingspan of over thirty meters, whose glider was designed at a time when invisibility was exclusively under the authority of H. G. Wells (referring to his novel The Invisible Man). And this glider was supposed to shine like a Christmas tree garland on British radar screens. Well, do you want to think that the English phot from 09.00 to 11.00 turned off all its radar stations, and was enthusiastically chatting over satellite communication with Northwood ?! Well, let's imagine for a second that due to some kind of cosmic fluctuation, all the radars of the British were suddenly blinded. Or the sea god Neptune endowed his Argentine "namesake" with temporary radar invisibility. But what about passive radio intelligence stations? The British should have detected the radiation from the Neptune airborne radar!
On the destroyer "Glasgow" they recorded the radiation of "Agave" - the standard radar "Super Etandara", on the "Sheffield" - they failed, and most of the sources explain this by "questions about the level of training of the crew." But we must face the truth - on a single ship of the 317th task force could not detect the operation of the radar station of the Argentine "Neptune". Well, the whole British fleet suddenly lost its shape? In fact, sadly to admit it, in 1982 the British fleet, despite the presence of many radars, radio intelligence stations and other things, simply did not have the means to reliably detect an enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Even if this plane was equipped with equipment from the Second World War.
Long ago the famous British Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham remarked: "The best way to fight the air is in the air." But the deck aviation of the British could do nothing to help their ships. The British had two dozen Sea Harriers. The Argentines opposed them with a pair of Super Etandars, two flying tankers, a Neptune reconnaissance aircraft and a Liar Jet 35A-L airliner, which was supposed to divert the British attention to itself. Moreover, the airliner that day became the only aircraft of the Argentines that did not cope with its task, since the British did not even think to notice it. Moreover, for some time, it was possible to ensure the watch in the air of two two "Daggers", covering the above forces. In total, a maximum of 10 Argentine aircraft were present in the combat zone, of which no more than six were combat aircraft. But twenty British planes, each of which had no difficulty in dealing one-on-one with either the Super Etandar or the Dagger, could not do anything.
The actions of the Argentines on May 4 clearly demonstrated that information plays no less, but even a greater role than the actual means of destruction (although, of course, one should not forget about them). The Argentines sent into battle half the size of those at the disposal of the British, and this does not take into account the ships of His Majesty's fleet. And they succeeded, because one single antediluvian Argentine reconnaissance aircraft turned out to be more valuable than both British VTOL aircraft carriers with their air groups combined.
You can, of course, ask: what did the British think about when creating VTOL carriers instead of building full-fledged aircraft carriers? Really no one realized the value of AWACS and radio reconnaissance aircraft, which needed catapults for takeoff and which could not be based on ships like the British Invincible? Couldn't anyone have foreseen in advance the extremely weak capabilities of the Sea Harriers for reconnaissance and airspace control? Of course, they guessed and foresaw, but Britain decided to save money on the construction of full-fledged aircraft carriers, which seemed too expensive to the sirs and peers. The British admirals found themselves in a situation where they had to choose: either to abandon carrier-based aircraft altogether, or to get "stubs" - "Invincibles" with VTOL aircraft. The Royal Navy Command cannot be blamed for choosing the tit in the hands of the pie in the sky. Moreover, the British admirals perfectly understood that in a real battle, without reconnaissance and target designation, such a tit would turn into a duck under the bed, if not a dove on a tombstone. And, in order to avoid such a radical ending, we developed the appropriate tactics for using aircraft carriers - VTOL carriers, according to which these ships and aircraft were to be used exclusively in areas controlled by British AWACS aircraft and Nimrod AEW control or NATO AWACS E-ZA Sentry …
The British created their post-war fleet to counter the underwater threat, to prevent the breakthrough of Soviet nuclear submarines into the Atlantic, while the air defense of anti-submarine formations had to be able to withstand only single aircraft. Massive air attacks were not expected due to the lack of aircraft carriers in the USSR. It was logical, but, alas, life has a peculiar sense of humor, so the English fleet had to fight with the wrong enemy and not where it was supposed to. This once again shows the inferiority of the naval forces, "sharpened" for solving a limited range of tasks, and speaks of the need to build a fleet, whose capabilities will make it possible to respond to any challenge.
Their lordships, sisters and peers "optimized" the costs of the military budget, but the sailors of the Royal Navy had to pay for this savings.
