What the British air defense is worth in practice, with all the mercilessness showed one and only "Aermacchi MV-339A" - a training jet plane with a maximum speed of 817 km / h, which did not have its own radar. When Lieutenant Esteban was still able to inform the command about the beginning of a full-scale British invasion, the command of the Malvinas Islands task force sent a couple of such planes for reconnaissance, but one of them, for technical reasons, could not take off. The pilot of the second, Lieutenant-Commander G. Grippa, taking advantage of the fog and the folds of the terrain, went to the amphibious group from the north and … of course, the appearance of an airplane flying at a speed of 800 km per hour flying 200 m above the waves was a complete surprise for the British. But he was not taken aback and, having estimated the scale of the invasion, he decided to play a little "hooligan" by attacking the frigate "Argonot" with his NURS and 30-mm cannon fire. He even hit, lightly wounding three sailors and slightly damaging the hull of the frigate, but then the British still woke up. A rocket was fired from the Canberra transport from the Bloupipe MANPADS, the Intrepid dock attacked the "insolent" Sea Cat air defense system, but G. gun mount "Plymouth" also did not reach the goal. The Lieutenant Commander returned to Port Stanley and reported the invasion.
Why was the plane not intercepted by the Sea Harriers? According to some reports, the British were just changing their shifts at that moment, and at the time of the flight of the daring Airmachi, there was simply no British air patrol over the compound.
The Argentine command of the Falkland Islands reported the invasion to the mainland, but, without waiting for aviation from the continental bases, it raised combat-ready aircraft from the Gus Green airport (Condor base) - there were as many as 4 Pukars there. This "air thunderstorm" attempted to attack the British ships, but one plane was shot down by a successful Marine's Bloupipe MANPADS, and the other was destroyed by the Sea Harrier aimed at the target by the destroyer Entrim. The other two nevertheless reached the ships, but, met by dense anti-aircraft fire, were forced to retreat. I won’t ask why the Harriers didn’t slaughter the Argentines on their way, but why did the British air patrol let them leave? However, then the real combat aircraft of Argentina came into play.
At 10:31 a.m. a troika of Daggers attacked the Brodsward, Argonot and Plymouth at a speed of 980 km / h. The Argentines were fired upon with Argonot, Plymouth and Intrepid air defense missile systems "Sea Cat", but to no avail, but "Sea Wolfe" "Brodsward" was successful - one "Dagger" was shot down. The Argentine bombs did not hit anywhere, but gunfire wounded 14 people on the Brodsward and disabled two helicopters on board. At the same time, the second three "Daggers" attacked the "Entrim" - and achieved two hits from aerial bombs. Both did not explode, but Entrim caught fire, and some of its equipment came out of its standing position, with one of the bombs stuck inside the hull. After the attack of the Argentines, they tried to intercept the Sea Harriers, but to no avail - the Daggers easily broke away from them.
Entrim tried to retreat under the protection of other ships, but did not manage to - the next attack began. Two "Daggers" attacked the ship, firing at it from cannons, 7 people were wounded, the ship caught fire even more, the fire threatened the cellars of the "Sea Slag" air defense system, so the missiles had to be thrown overboard. Another three "Daggers" attacked the "Diamond", the bombs missed the target, but the Argentines did not suffer losses either - all three cars returned to the base. The second attack was covered by 4 Mirage fighters, but they could not find the Sea Harriers and returned home without a fight.
In total, 15 aircraft, 11 Daggers and 4 Mirages participated in the first wave, they attacked the British four times, damaged 2 ships, lost one aircraft and were never intercepted by an air patrol of the British.
An hour passed, and hostilities resumed: two "Pukars" from the "Condor" base tried to attack the frigate "Ardent", but were driven away by the fire of the "Sea Cat" air defense missile system and artillery. However, the stubborn Argentines did not lose hope and after 20 minutes tried to attack again, but this time they were intercepted by the Sea Harriers - one Pukara was shot down, the second left. But the second wave of aircraft from the continent was already approaching - 10 Skyhawks. Alas, only 8 of them reached the Falklands, two were forced to return due to technical malfunctions, so two fours went to the Falklands. One of them was intercepted by the Sea Harriers, the Skyhawks dropped their bombs and tried to break away, but only two planes succeeded, two others were shot down by the Sidewinder. The second four were also not too lucky - one plane, due to technical problems, was forced to return home directly from West Falkland, the remaining three discovered the ship, but the commander, suspecting something was wrong, ordered not to attack it. Alas, one of the Skyhawks managed to drop the bombs, and in vain - it would have been the Rio Caracana thrown by the Argentines. The remaining two planes attacked "Ardent", did not hit it, but did not hit them, so the cars left without return. Another four "Skyhawks", which set off a little later and reduced in flight to three, tk. one plane for technical reasons returned from halfway, somehow did not find the enemy and returned to the airfield.
And then a third wave hit the British.
Two flights of Skyhawks "lost" the plane on the way (again - for technical reasons), but the remaining five planted two bombs in the Argonot, and another 8 exploded near the ship. Both bombs that hit the ship did not explode, but they caused a fire and detonation of the rocket cellar, so the frigate was in a very difficult position. Four Duggers (five flew out, but the fifth was forced to return) went to the British ships from the south, but were discovered by the frigate Brilliant, which guided a pair of Sea Harriers on duty at them. This time the British pilots managed to intercept the Argentines and even shoot down one "Dagger", but the rest entered the "no-fly zone" where they attacked the frigate "Ardent", managing to get three hits, and then returned to the airfield.
At this time, two links of three "Daggers" tried to attack the British ships near San Carlos - but the frigate "Diamond" distinguished itself again: noticing enemy aircraft in time, he gave target designation to the second pair of "Sea Harriers" and those, having piled on one of the links completely destroyed it - all three aircraft, only one pilot survived. However, the second three broke through - to get under concentrated anti-aircraft fire: Entrim, Plymouth and Intrepid attacked with Sea Cat missiles, Sea Wolf operated from Diamond, but not a single missile reached the target. The Daggers attacked the Diamond, but could barely scratch it with cannon fire.
The last chord was the attack of three Skyhawks, who finished off the Ardent - 7 bombs hit the ship, 22 people were killed, 37 were wounded. Ardent in half. But the Argentines were not allowed to leave - a pair of Sea Harriers, who appeared too late to save the frigate, shot down two Skyhawks, and severely damaged the third, so the pilot barely made it to Port Stanley, where he ejected.
There was also a fourth wave, but 9 Skyhawks sent into battle could not find the enemy - low clouds and twilight reduced visibility to a minimum.
In total, on May 21, Argentine air detachments and individual aircraft attacked British ships 15 times, British VTOL aircraft were able to intercept enemy aircraft before the attack 5 times, but only in two cases out of these five Argentine air attacks were thwarted. In other cases, the Argentines, suffering losses, nevertheless broke through to the ships. Twice the Sea Harriers tried to pursue the Argentines after the attack, once successfully. The British lost the frigate "Ardent", and "Entrim" and "Argonot" were badly damaged, 2 more frigates were slightly scratched. The Argentines have lost 5 Daggers, 5 Skyhawks and 3 Pukaras - with the exception of one Dagger and one Pukara, this is the merit of the Sea Harriers.
So what happened on May 21st? Attention is drawn to the categorical discrepancy between the number of Argentine aviation and the number of combat missions made by it. The Argentine command was preparing for the landing of the British and according to the plan (and just in accordance with common sense) at the time of the landing they had to beat everything that was at hand. However, having about 75-78 relatively modern aircraft, they were able to make only 58 sorties (the remaining 7 sorties were on the account of "Pukar" and "Airmachi").
The results of the battles on May 21 provide an excellent basis for analyzing the effectiveness of VTOL aircraft against horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. In total, as mentioned above, the Argentine aviation made 65 sorties. As practice shows (the actions of the MNF Air Force during the "Desert Storm", the operation of the Aerospace Forces in Syria) the aircraft of the first-class powers are capable of making at least 2 sorties per day, the British sometimes flew even more often at the Falklands. Thus, 65 sorties on British ships could be provided by an air group of 32-33 aircraft, and if divided by aircraft types according to their combat missions - 1 Airmachi, 3 Pukars, 2 Mirages, 11 Duggers "And 16" Skyhawks ". In other words, the Argentine Air Force and Navy were able to provide such an impact on the British, which would require 33 aircraft from the US Air Force or the modern Russian Federation. Taking into account the fact that the British themselves had 25 Sea Harriers (five attack aircraft are not taken into account, since they could not perform air defense functions), we can talk about parity. What is the result?
From the point of view of the downed aircraft, it is definitely in favor of the Sea Harriers, since they destroyed 11 aircraft: 2 Pukars, 4 Daggers and 5 Skyhawks, which would have made up 30% of the air group calculated by us. But from the point of view of fulfilling its immediate task - the air defense of the formation - nothing else can be called a deafening failure of the actions of the British VTOL aircraft. Of the 15 groups of aircraft that attacked the British, only 5 groups or 33% were intercepted, while the British managed to thwart only 2 attacks - 13.4%! Thirteen breakthroughs to British ships from 15 attempts … And this - in conditions when the Argentines attacked, without "flying control points" - AWACS aircraft, not covering their links with electronic warfare aircraft, not suppressing British fighter guidance points with anti-radar missiles, without providing air cover shock links (4 Mirages sorties were lost in vain). Bottom line: one sunken ship and two heavily damaged - in conditions when the Argentines did not use guided weapons, but only free-fall bombs and NURS, and the bombs regularly did not want to explode! The tactics of the Argentine aircraft operating in 1982 differed little from the tactics of the Second World War, and if it was anything different, it was only for the worse - the Argentines did not have torpedo bombers who could do things in the Falklands Strait and the Argentines never managed to carry out any massive attacks, nothing like the famous "star" raids, when the same Japanese surrounded enemy ships and then attacked them from several angles, the Argentines did not demonstrate.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that not all of the Sea Harriers available to the British were used to cover the amphibious compound - a significant (but unknown to the author) part turned out to be "outside the brackets" of the battle and guarded the aircraft carriers. And now we can understand much better the reasons for Rear Admiral Woodworth, who did not want to place his aircraft carriers between the continental airbases of Argentina and the Falkland Islands. If we assume that he used half of his VTOL aircraft to protect aircraft carriers, even if the effectiveness of his carrier-based aviation in protecting the main forces of the 317th operational formation pushed forward would be 2-3 times higher than that shown above the ships of the amphibious formation, but concentrate the Argentines their strikes on its aircraft-carrying ships - the British will not get it. It is highly likely that the British commander would be left without at least one aircraft carrier (maybe not sunk, but disabled). And if Woodworth were opposed by a properly organized air force of 30-40 aircraft (with reconnaissance, electronic warfare, etc.), trained to fight over the sea and provided with guided weapons (the same Exocet anti-ship missiles) in sufficient numbers, with a probability of 99 % its operational connection would be destroyed.
Interestingly, in all five cases, when the British VTOL aircraft intercepted enemy aircraft on May 21, the British pilots did so thanks to guidance from their own warships. For the first time (at the Pukar's four), the Sea Harriers pointed the Entrim - it was on it that the command post for the air cover of the amphibious group was located. Alas, being the center of British air defense, the ship was unable to defend itself, and after being hit by two bombs, it transferred control of the air patrol to the frigate Brilliant. It was he who carried out the guidance in the remaining four cases: intercepting four Skyhawks (two shot down), four Daggers (one shot down) and three Daggers (all three shot down), as well as intercepting two crazy Pukar attack aircraft, attacked the frigate "Antrim". In addition, "Diamond" was able to direct the "Sea Harriers" and "Skyhawks", who finished off "Ardent".
Naturally, ships as aviation control points were of little use, if only because of the low detection range of enemy aircraft. Of course, the position of the British ships also played a role - being in the "box" surrounded by mountainous shores, they could not detect the Argentines in advance, as a result of which the Sea Harriers had very little time to intercept. However, in the open sea the situation did not improve much - in any case, the aircraft traveling at low altitudes was detected by the ship's radar station too late.
Thus, if the Argentine pilots, even after the discovery of the Sea Harriers, continued to rush to the ships, then before their aircraft entered the air defense zone of the formation, the British pilots simply did not have time to destroy the enemy. So, for example, 4 "Daggers" went on the attack in spite of everything and the air patrol managed to shoot down only one plane, after which it was forced to stop pursuing, so as not to be exposed to the attack of the native air defense systems. But in another case, when the British had more time, and the Argentines started a series of maneuvers, trying to shake the British off the tail, none of the three "Daggers" survived. If the British had air defense command posts (in the form of the same AWACS aircraft), the effectiveness of the Sea Harriers would be much higher, simply due to the fact that target designation would arrive earlier and there would be more time for interception and air combat. However, it must be admitted that if horizontal take-off and landing fighters were in place of VTOL aircraft, their effectiveness would be even higher. Yet the Sea Harriers lacked either ammunition (only two Sidewinder) or speed. The three Daggers, attacked by the British after they stormed the ships, simply left the area at high speed and the VTOL aircraft could do nothing about it. In another case, having intercepted the four Skyhawks, the British were able to shoot down only two of them - the rest fled. If the British had the same "Phantoms" - the above "Daggers" and "Skyhawks" would not have left them.
The main reason for the low effectiveness of the Sea Harriers as a means of air defense of the formation is the lack of timely external target designation. If the British had several E-2C Hawkai, which could effectively and at a great distance control the airspace for several hours, as well as control air patrol fighters, the number of successful interceptions would have been much greater - but for this the British would have to have a full-fledged ejection carrier, which they did not have.
Let's go back to the Falklands. The first day of fighting left the sides in an unstable balance - the Argentines suffered significant losses in aircraft, but the British had a very difficult time. Their air defenses, as might be expected, turned out to be very imperfect, and Rear Admiral Woodworth later wrote:
“If the Argentines continue to act like this for two more days, then all my destroyers and frigates will be destroyed. The question arises: can we survive in such conditions? The answer is of course not."
From the experience of fighting on May 21, the British brought their aircraft carriers closer to the landing site in order to provide better air cover. The 317th Task Force Commander ordered Patrol 42/22 (Destroyer Coventry and Frigate Broadsward) off the northern tip of West Falkland Island, from where Argentine aircraft usually emerged. The losses in the ships were replenished by the British - 4 more warships approached them, including the Type 42 Exeter destroyer, Project 21 Antilope and Emboscade frigates, and the Forsys advice letter. Even Rear Admiral Woodworth relied heavily on the Rapier air defense system at the disposal of the Marine Corps - it was assumed that these complexes, deployed on bridgeheads, would significantly strengthen the air defense of the amphibious formation.
Everything was ready for the second day of intense fighting, but … over the past day, having made 65 sorties, the Argentines were completely exhausted, so all that was enough for them on May 22 was 14 sorties. The first four "Skyhawks" did not detect the enemy, the next "wave" of six aircraft to the Falklands "melted" to two cars (four returned for technical reasons) and even seemed to attack someone, however, unsuccessfully. Taking into account the fact that the British did not register attacks on their own ships at all, it cannot be ruled out that the "Rio Caracana" again became the "victim" of the Argentine pilots. The departure of these Skyhawks was covered by two pairs of Mirages, they (as usual) could not find anyone and returned home without a fight.
The British, concentrating on protecting the transports, did not do anything special, but their Harriers found and sank an Argentine boat carrying two 105-mm guns and 15 gunners to Gus Green. In addition, the Harriers once again attacked the airfield of the Condor base, but, being met by dense anti-aircraft fire, they retreated without achieving any result.
On the third day, May 23, the Argentines tried to resume hostilities in the morning. Already at 08.45 the Argentines began to lift their planes into the air, but the day went wrong: the six Daggers did not find the tanker at the rendezvous point and returned to the airfields, and from the six Skyhawks, two returned half way for technical reasons. The remaining four were somehow unable to locate the British, and the morning blow thus failed.
The second wave was also unlucky - out of 12 Skyhawks lifted into the air, six did not find the tanker (as it turned out, due to an equipment error, he was waiting for them 93 miles from the designated point), two more Skyhawks were forced to return to the airfield almost immediately after take off and only four cars were able to refuel (the "tanker" "Hercules" was finally able to deal with its instruments and went to the rendezvous point) and reached the Falklands.
It was this four that attacked the newly arrived frigate "Antilope", hitting it with two bombs (both did not explode), but losing one plane. The Skyhawk passed so low over the attacked frigate that it caught on its mast and began to fall, and at the very water it was hit by a Sea Wolf missile from the Brodsward.
The next nine "Daggers" and 4 "Mirages" covering them were supposed to finish off the "Antilope", but they did not achieve anything at all - one "Dagger" returned for technical reasons, two other cars of his link searched the area, but the damaged frigate had already left by that time … On the retreat, these planes were intercepted by the Sea Harriers and one Dagger was shot down. The rest, having learned about the presence of "Harriers" in the air, did not dare to tempt fate and retreated. And only the last three "Daggers", sent (for the first time in the operation) to bomb the ground troops of the British, brought their business to the end - despite the intense anti-aircraft fire, the blow was struck and the planes, without suffering any losses, returned to the airbases. In addition, two Super Etandars conducted a search for British aircraft carriers - there was no one to direct them, so the Argentines did not hesitate to turn on their onboard radars from time to time, but did not find anyone. The British responded with two air attacks. In the first of them, the Harriers stormed the helipad and destroyed 3 helicopters located on it, and then the forces of the four Harriers once again hit the Port Stanley airfield. But even on approach, one Sea Harrier exploded over the sea for an unknown reason. They searched for the pilot all night, but to no avail.
In general, nothing similar to May 21 happened, the Argentines were extremely cautious. However, this did not save the British from losses - already at night, while trying to clear mines of the bombs that fell into the Antilope, one of them exploded. The position of the frigate became critical, the crew had to be evacuated, the ammunition detonated and the frigate, breaking apart, sank. The result of the day was 40 Argentinean sorties (of course, we are talking only about fighters and attack aircraft), one single (though effective) attack and one interception of the Dagger troika on withdrawal. The Argentines lost the Dagger, Skyhawk and three helicopters, while the British lost the frigate Antilope and Sea Harrier.
Neither May 22 nor May 23 the Argentines were able to create pressure on the British, similar to what they exerted on May 21, but the British did not have much to rejoice. While attempting to fire at an unidentified aerial target, the Sea Dart on Coventry failed. The Sea Wolfe air defense missile system on the Broadsward, on which so many hopes were pinned, demonstrated an amazing programming error - it perceived as a threat only those aircraft that flew directly to the air defense missile carrier frigate. If the Duggers or Skyhawks attacked a nearby ship, flying past the Brodsward, then Sea Wolf categorically refused to perceive such a target as a threat, and its fire control system was to take the Argentines to escort. However, this problem was quickly resolved.
In general, the pendulum swayed perceptibly in the direction of Great Britain - despite the losses incurred by the warships, the British transports continued unloading without much interference. As a result of suitable reinforcements, the number of escort ships even increased. The Marines deployed their Rapier air defense systems, but more importantly, the British equipped anti-aircraft observation posts on Mount Sussex, which should have helped to timely detect enemy aircraft
The Argentines realized that three days had passed, but in attacking the escort warships, they did not succeed and could not inflict losses unacceptable for the British. And so on May 24 they switched to British transports.
Nevertheless, on May 24, the British began air hostilities, attacking the Port Stanley airfield. At 09.35 a pair of Sea Harriers, dropping shrapnel bombs on anti-aircraft artillery positions, were able to disorganize the Argentinean air defenses for a while, and immediately the four GR.3 Harriers dropped a dozen time bombs onto the runway and buildings. This strike (according to the same scheme) was repeated twice more, at 12.50 and 14.55 - as a result, the airfield was disabled for as much as six hours, and two light attack aircraft were destroyed on the ground.
But the Argentine Air Force was preparing to give a crushing response. The first strike was to be delivered by 11 Skyhawks, operating in two groups of 6 and 5 aircraft, respectively. Six cars, traditionally "losing" one on the road (for technical reasons!), Five of them came to the British from the southeast. They were spotted by observers from Mount Sussex, they were hit by anti-aircraft fire, but the Sea Harriers could not be targeted and the "magnificent five" hit the transport landing ships "Sir Lancelot", "Sir Galahed" and "Sir Beadiver". Of course, all three bombs did not explode, but still a fire started on the Lancelot. Not a single Skyhawk was shot down, everyone returned to the airfield.
The approach of the second five "Skyhawks", which were supposed to strike from the north, was discovered by the destroyer on duty "Coventry", who immediately gave target designation to the air patrol. The Skyhawks were intercepted and forced to retreat - this time the British could not shoot down a single plane, nevertheless the attack was completely thwarted. The second wave was to consist of 10 "Daggers", operating in two detachments. The first - four "Daggers", attacking from the southeast, bombed "Sir Beadiver", but could not hit him. Not a single Dagger was shot down, but two of them were heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Already on the withdrawal of the Argentines, he tried to catch up with the English fighter, but, of course, unsuccessfully - using their superiority in speed, the Daggers easily broke away from him. The second detachment consisted of two units of three vehicles. The first link broke through to the British ships, attacked Fort Austin, Stromness and Norland, and then also a fuel depot on the shore. They were fired upon by air defense missile systems and artillery from ships, Bloupipes and Rapiers of the Marine Corps, all three aircraft were damaged, but still they were all able to return home.
The second link was discovered by Coventry and completely destroyed by the air patrol of the Sea Harriers, which it directed.
The "last chord" that day was the raid of three Skyhawks, bombing the frigate "Arrow", which (according to the British) received no damage, which cannot be said about the planes that attacked it. All three cars managed to return to the course, but one of the Skyhawks crashed into the sea - the pilot was killed. The other two cars had the same fate, for each of them there was a train of fuel from the punched tanks, but … the Argentines made a non-standard move and sent the "flying tanker" "Hercules" C-130 to the rescue. It docked with both machines, and so, continuously supplying fuel to the mutilated Skyhawks, the three of them were able to reach the airfield.
This is how the day ended. Argentine aviation made only 24 sorties, of the six attacking groups of aircraft, the British VTOL aircraft managed to intercept only two, but in both cases the attacks were completely disrupted. This, in the first place, was the merit of patrol 42/22 - "Coventry" and "Brodsward", located in a good location, which allowed the British to learn in time about the groups of aircraft that attacked from the north and direct their air patrols to them. The British did not lose a single ship, but three landing transports were damaged, but the Argentines lost three Daggers, Skyhawk, and another 2 Daggers and 2 Skyhawks were seriously damaged and could hardly participate in the further battle.
Rear Admiral Woodworth saw that the Argentines could not keep up the pace they had taken on 21 May. He also believed that on May 21-24, he was able to destroy at least 24 aircraft and, in addition, severely damaged a number of them. Therefore, he believed that he was winning this war of attrition and that he was destroying the enemy's forces faster than they were destroying his ships. In addition, new destroyers and frigates regularly approached the British and more were expected (in those days, the destroyers Bristol and Cardiff joined the 317th operational formation, as well as four frigates, but how many of the above ships arrived by May 25, the author did not knows - most certainly the frigate Avenger had arrived), but the Argentines had nowhere to wait for reinforcements. And the commander of the 317th formation looked to the future with optimism.
But he also saw that, despite fewer sorties and attacks, the Argentines again fight extremely bravely (on May 22 and especially on May 23, their determination to fight seemed to be greatly shaken). In addition, the British commander knew that the next day, May 25, was celebrated by Argentina as its greatest national holiday, Independence Day. Therefore, a culmination was to be expected: the Argentines will probably throw everything they can into battle and, perhaps, their fleet will also go into action.
