On this day, the Argentine command decided to make every effort to turn the tide of hostilities. It was, of course, not only and not so much a desire to celebrate Independence Day as it should, but the fact that the British had been unloading for four days, and soon the main landing force, along with supplies, would be on the shore, and then it would be much more difficult. But, besides this, the Argentines finally groped for the location of the British aircraft carriers and were preparing to strike at them.
The first blow to the transports was to be inflicted by 4 Skyhawks, which took off at about 08.00 am. Two of them (traditionally) returned to the airfield for technical reasons, the remaining two found the British ship by instruments and attacked it, but … it turned out to be the hospital ship "Uganda". To the credit of the Argentine pilots, in the few seconds remaining from the moment of visual detection of the target, they were able to figure out what their target was and refrained from hitting. On the retreat, one Skyhawk was shot down by the Sea Dart of the destroyer Coventry - the British opened an account.
The four "Daggers" appeared over the islands two hours after the events described above - the Falklands were enveloped in a thick fog, so that the Argentines could not find the British ships, but the British did not risk taking their planes into the air. The Daggers returned, and after another hour and a half, four Skyhawks arrived - they were able to find the enemy by attacking the amphibious assault dock Fairless and the frigate Avenger covering it. The British shot down "Skyhawk", "aiming" at the "Fairless", but it is not clear why: whether the calculation of the Sea Cat air defense missile system from the frigate "Yarmouth" (according to British data) worked well, or the Rapier air defense missile system from the ground (in Argentine). The three remaining Skyhawks attacked the Avenger, luckily for the British, without success. But the ubiquitous Coventry again used its Sea Dart for its intended purpose, knocking down the group commander's Skyhawk when he was gaining altitude after the attack. Another Skyhawk was badly damaged, but the surviving pair of aircraft were still able to return to the continent.
The Coventry / Broadsword pair had been extremely annoying for the Argentines for a day already - their aviation suffered a lot from the Sea Harriers, which the Coventry was aiming at, and now the long-range Sea Dart was also involved. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was they who were designated the target for the subsequent strike: perhaps the Argentines hoped that by destroying the RLD patrol of the British, it would be easier for their strike groups to attack the transports? Be that as it may, the Coventry overheard the conversations of the Argentine pilots (among the crew there was a man who spoke Spanish) and knew about the impending strike. Even the composition of the strike group assigned to destroy the Coventry was not a secret for the British - 6 Skyhawks. But from the six that took off, two Skyhawks returned for technical reasons, so only four planes struck.
However, this time the Argentines resorted to an interesting innovation - realizing that the tactic "jumped out from behind the mountains and tried to drown someone" did not work very well, they decided to use external target designation to target a group of Skyhawks attacking Coventry. As a reconnaissance and control aircraft, the Argentines used … a mobilized passenger liner "Liar Jet 35A-L". Taking into account the fact that the aircraft of this type did not possess any military equipment, having only "native", civil airborne electronic equipment, their use did not look too sophisticated form of crew suicide. But the speed of these airliners was superior to the British Harriers, so that if necessary, the Liar Jets could avoid interception. Of course, they were threatened by the Sea Darts, but there was a hope of finding the British first and not being exposed to the attack of the only long-range British air defense system. Of course, the use of a civilian airliner as an AWACS aircraft could only go in a desperate situation, but the Argentines had it that way. And, as it is not surprising, the air airliner turned out to be more preferable as an aviation control point than a modern destroyer, stuffed with powerful radars and other combat electronics.
All four Skyhawks were demonstratively moving at medium altitude, so that the British found them about 100 miles from San Carlos. Naturally, the Sea Harriers received target designation and rushed to intercept, but as soon as the Liar Jet 35A-L considered that the British were already close enough, the Skyhawks went down sharply. Thus, the strike group disappeared from the radar screens of the British ships, and they could no longer direct the Sea Harriers, and the British pilots had not yet had time to locate the Argentines, and now they had little chance of finding the Skyhawks. At the same time, the position of the British ships, although it allowed them to successfully perform the functions of aircraft controllers, was not optimal from the point of view of their own air defense - they could be approached imperceptibly from the side of the islands. This is exactly what the Argentine pilots did, the Liar Jet 35A-L gave them the most important thing - the location of the British, and it was a matter of technology to find a suitable route.
The British spotted the first pair of Skyhawks in the range of the destroyer Coventry's air defense system and immediately recalled the Sea Harriers, fearing "friendly fire". This turned out to be a mistake: the radar station, which was responsible for guiding missiles of the Sea Dart air defense system, once again failed to capture low-flying targets, and the Sea Wolf of the frigate Brodsward, unexpectedly for its operators, portrayed Buridan's donkey. The OMS of the complex captured both goals, but the software could not decide which of them was the priority. Of course, from the point of view of "artificial intelligence" and there could be no question of allowing despicable people to make this responsible choice … As a result, the attack of the first pair of Skyhawks was repelled only by artillery and a few sailors who fired at approaching aircraft from small arms. This did not stop the Argentines.
Of the four bombs, three missed their target, but the fourth still hit the stern of the Brodsward. And, of course, it did not explode. Nevertheless, the flight deck (helicopter) was severely damaged, a fire started and water began to flow into the ship - a bomb broke through the side just a meter above the waterline. But the emergency parties worked perfectly and the frigate did not lose its combat effectiveness.
"Coventry" turned to go to the rescue of "Brodsward", but then a second pair of "Skyhawks" appeared, and because of the reversal of the destroyer they entered from the stern, from the sector where the Sea Dart air defense system could not reach them in any way. And then the Coventry commander made an understandable but fatal mistake for his ship. In an effort to attack the Argentines with his air defense system, he turned around again, not taking into account that as a result of this maneuver, his destroyer was blocking the line of fire for the anti-aircraft gunners "Brodsward". But by this time, the air defense missile systems had already figured out the program error, took the Skyhawks for escort and were ready to broadcast the exact coordinates of the crayfish wintering places to the Argentine pilots … I just want to write: "out of chagrin") is out of order. The Coventry was hit by three bombs from the lead Skyhawk, First Lieutenant M. Velasco, the bomb release mechanism of the second plane failed and its pilot could not attack the British. But the British ship also had enough “gifts” from Velasco, all three bombs exploded and only 20 minutes after the attack, “Coventry” sank.
The British radar patrol was defeated. Surprisingly, but two British ships with experienced crews and the latest air defense systems, supported by at least two Sea Harriers, lost dry to four Skyhawks operated from a passenger liner. All Argentine planes have returned home.
This fiasco came as a heavy blow to Rear Admiral Woodworth. This is how he himself describes this episode:
Even after a few years, looking back, I can imagine what a terrible moment it was for me. One of those moments when the commander has no one to turn to for fear of betraying his uncertainty or shaken willpower. But to myself I thought: “Lord! Where are we? Are we actually losing?"
This was, without a doubt, the most difficult moment for me during the entire operation. I returned to my cabin in order to be alone for a while. I opened my notebook and made a few comments.
1. The 42/22 combination does not work.
2. Sea Dart is practically useless against low-flying targets.
3. Sea Wolfe is unreliable.
4. Surface ships, in order to survive on the high seas, must have long-range aerial detection and air cover in the threatened direction.
5. We must conduct more scrupulous and comprehensive testing of air defense systems.
6. Strive to act at night or in bad weather.
7. Now they must try to strike at the aircraft carriers!
The premonition did not deceive the British commander. At the moment when he was writing these lines, a pair of "Super Etandars" with two of the three remaining air-based anti-ship missiles "Exocet" were already flying towards him.
Interestingly, the location of the British aircraft carriers, located about 80 miles from Port Stanley, opened the ground radar. Of course, the curvature of the globe did not allow the Argentines to detect the British compound, but they had the opportunity to observe the flights of the Sea Harriers, taking off from the deck and returning from combat duty. Having determined the place where the British planes go down on return and gain altitude on take-off, the Argentines thus calculated the position of the Invincible and Hermes. Guided by these data, a pair of "Super Etandars" set off on a raid, and the place of the British aircraft carrier group was determined with quite acceptable accuracy - the deviation of the actual location of the ships from the calculated one was about 80 km. The Super Etandars spotted British ships led by the aircraft carrier Hermes at about 1830 hours from a distance of about 40 miles. True, some sources indicate that the Hercules S-130 carried out targeting, but the author does not have exact data on this score.
Be that as it may, the British did not find out about the attack at the last moment. The electronic intelligence service of the destroyer Exeter did not disappoint, and the radiation of the Agave, the Super Etandar's radar, was detected and identified. Soon the Argentine aircraft "saw" the radar of the frigate "Embuksade" and almost immediately - the radar of the frigate "Brilliant". The Super Etandars launched both Exocets from a distance of 48 km. The British claim that the launch was carried out on the ship closest to the Argentines, which became the frigate "Embuchsade", the Argentines - that according to the largest "light" on the screen of the "Agave", i.e. most likely on the Hermes aircraft carrier, but more on that later.
Very little time passed between the discovery of the Argentines and the launch of their missiles, but there is a lot of confusion in the sources - who writes about 4 minutes, who about 6 minutes, Rear Admiral Woodworth indicates that from the moment the Agave was turned on and until the moment the planes were discovered A little more than a minute passed by the radars of British ships, but indicates at the same time that the Super Etandars made a hill at 18.30, and launched missiles at 18.38, which clearly contradicts his own statement. Apparently, the truth is that at that moment people did not have time to look at the clock, everything was decided by the seconds, so no one kept the exact timekeeping. Nevertheless, the British had at least a couple of minutes - although the Sea Harriers again did not have enough time to intercept the Argentine attack aircraft, the British managed to lift helicopters (!) Equipped with jamming systems into the sky.
Noteworthy is the fact that interference is, it seems, the only thing that the British were able to meet with the Argentine attack. Sources do not mention that someone managed to fire anti-aircraft missiles or even artillery at the attacking planes or "Exocets". But the order included a "Diamond" equipped with the latest Sea Wolfe air defense systems. Further it is well known: "Exocets" "went astray" and could not hit the warships of the British, but aimed at the "Atlantic Conveyor" not equipped with jamming systems. It caught fire, and eventually sank, carrying a bunch of payloads to the bottom of the Atlantic - a prefabricated airstrip for the Harrier ground airfield, a lot of aviation ammunition, and either 10 or 9 helicopters. However, Rear Admiral Woodworth points out in his memoirs that eight helicopters on the Atlantic Conveyor were killed, because two out of ten helicopters on board managed to fly to land even before the attack. Canonical, however, is the number 10 - six Wessex, three Chinook and one Lynx. The loss of helicopters was a very hard blow for the British - in the clinical off-road conditions of the Falkland Islands, it was the helicopters that were to become the main transport of the British Marines, giving them the mobility they needed in modern combat.
An interesting point - reading most of the review articles, you come to the conclusion that a group of British warships, having put obstacles, completely avoided danger, both "Exocets" went "into milk", and there, by an unfortunate accident, was the Atlantic Conveyor. But here is what Rear Admiral Woodworth writes about this:
“He (Atlantic Conveyor - author's note) was on the line between Hermes and Emboscade. If the "Konveyor" had installations for setting the LOC and would have diverted the missiles from itself, then they could go directly to the aircraft carrier. It is not known if we could then deceive them again …"
Those. it turns out that the "Atlantic" actually covered the "Hermes"! And now let's remember something else - the Argentines reported that they had attacked the largest ship of the British. And here it becomes quite interesting, because this largest ship could be either the Atlantic Conveyor or the Hermes, and the Hermes was located directly behind the Atlantic. Of course, if the target of the Argentines was the Embuchsade, then it would be possible to speak of the success of the interference delivered by the British ships. But if we assume that the Argentines fired at the "Atlantic" or "Hermes", it turns out that the British interference was virtually useless! This, of course, is nothing more than a hypothesis, but it perfectly explains why the British, denying the Argentines in common sense, insist that the target of the attack was precisely the frigate.
On the whole, the results of Argentina's Independence Day leave an ambivalent impression. Despite the fact that the Argentine command tried to inflict the strongest air strike, the result achieved is not at all impressive - only 20 sorties of strike aircraft. But innovations in tactics (the airliner as AWACS) and the fact that the Argentines were finally able to establish the location of the British aircraft carrier group led them to a major tactical success. On Argentine Independence Day, the British lost a Type 42 destroyer and a container ship with a mass of military cargo. And yet May 25 is the day when the Argentine aviation admitted its loss, because the British still did not consider the damage they received excessive, but the Argentines no longer expected to "convince" the British to interrupt the operation, causing unacceptable damage to their naval group. From now on, the Argentine command preferred to concentrate its aviation forces on land targets, which, however, does not mean that they completely abandoned attacks on the ships of the KVMF.
A detailed analysis of subsequent battles will add nothing to the above. At the final stage of the conflict, the following tasks could be expected from the British aviation:
1. Air defense support for land forces and KVMF ships.
2. Destruction of Argentine aircraft based in the Falkland Islands and the air bases on which it is based.
3. Interruption of the "air bridge" - the supply of Argentine troops by air from the continent.
4. Supporting the actions of the ground forces by striking the positions of the Argentine troops
In total, from May 26 until the very end of the war, Argentina's strike aircraft made about 100 sorties, while the ground positions and British ships were attacked 17 times, once again the Pukara attacked an air target (the British Scout helicopter was shot down). "Sea Harriers" were able to thwart one attack of the Argentines, while failing to shoot down a single enemy aircraft, in another case, the British VTOL aircraft arrived at the moment when 4 "Skyhawks" attacked the landing craft "LCU F4". As a result, the boat was sunk along with a cargo of equipment for the 5th Infantry Brigade, 6 people were killed, but the VTOL aircraft shot down three Skyhawks. Thus, in terms of air defense support, the British carrier-based aircraft achieved impressive "successes" - 2 interceptions per 18 attacks (11, 1%), while only one attack out of 18 was repulsed (5, 55%).
Of course, the destruction of the Argentine airspace control system would play an important role in providing British air defense - in this case, aircraft from continental air bases lost target designation from the ground, but Argentine radars were too tough for the Harriers. As a result, the task of destroying them had to be entrusted to the Vulcanoes of the Royal Air Force, since they were capable of using Shrike anti-radar missiles. On June 1, Black Buck 5 failed, but on June 3, during Black Buck 6, the main radar of the Argentine air defense was disabled.
The British planes did not succeed in destroying the Pukara light attack aircraft and the Airmachi training aircraft - bad weather and ground air defense forces did it for them. For example, on the day when the British "Scout" was shot down, only one of the two "Pukars" returned to the airfield, the second attack aircraft crashed, landing in a low cloud area. In the last operation of the light air force of the Falkland Islands, undertaken by the forces of two Airmachi and two Pukars, one Airmachi was shot down from the Blupipe MANPADS, one attack aircraft was destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire, and the second received such damage that, although he managed to return to the airfield, he could no longer fight.
The runway of the main base "Malvinas Islands" (Port Stanley airfield) functioned until the very end of the war; neither the British carrier-based aircraft nor the "Volcanoes" could do anything about this concrete road. The last time it was bombed was on the night of June 12 (Black Buck-7), and in the evening of the same day the last cargo Hercules arrived in Port Stanley. Surprisingly, the Argentine "air bridge" also functioned almost to the very end. The only S-130, which during the entire war was able to destroy the "Sea Harriers" (it happened on June 1), tried to conduct intelligence activities.
And finally, ground operations. In essence, only one thing can be said about the Harriers: "They were there." Here, for example, what A. Zabolotny writes in his article "Harrier" - a bird of prey of the Falklands ":
"In general, during the campaign, only the Sea Harriers of the 800th AE dropped forty-two 1000-pound bombs and 21 BL.755 cassettes, and the Harriers of the 1st Squadron dropped 150 bombs, of which 4 were guided."
The 800th Air Squadron participated in the Falklands Conflict from the very beginning, and dropped 63 bombs and cassettes. Is it a lot or a little? For example, on May 29, in the course of one, but a massive raid, British carrier-based aircraft dropped 27 time bombs on the Port Stanley airfield, which then exploded within four hours. The next day, British Harriers bombed this unfortunate airfield four times (at 09.30; 10.30; 12.25 and 14.40), and in the course of these attacks they dropped 27 more bombs - again, without much effect. Thus, from May 1 to June 14, when the Argentine garrison surrendered, the 800th nuclear power plant dropped only 9 more bombs than was dumped at the Port Stanley airfield in two days of not too intensive work (May 29 - only one blow) … It is difficult to call this a great achievement.
It is also worth remembering that a total of five air squadrons participated in the conflict zone - the 800th, 801st, 809th, 899th squadrons of the Navy and the 1st Air Force Squadron, and the latter was equipped with GR.3 Harriers, which were not were capable of conducting aerial combat and were used exclusively for ground attacks. This, apparently, explains the relatively high consumption of air bombs - 150 pieces. The planes of the remaining squadrons hardly "threw" more bombs than the 800th AE. And it should be borne in mind that a significant part of the bombing was "pulled" to the airfields of Gus Green (base "Condor") and Port Stanley ("Malvinas Islands"), which the British attacked as regularly as to no avail.
Of course, something fell to the share of the ground forces of Argentina, and this "something", of course, added anxiety to the Argentines, but in general, the Harriers did not play any significant role in ground battles. The most important factors that determined the success of the British landing were:
1. Powerful and long-range artillery of the British ground forces, superior to that of the Argentines.
2. Extensive use of ATGM "Milan" to suppress Argentine firing points.
3. Night vision devices, which gave the British an invaluable advantage in night battles against the Argentines who were not equipped with such means.
4. Artillery support of ships.
5. The resilience of the British infantry.
According to clause 5, I would like to note that during the battles for Gus Green, Darwin and Port Stanley, the British repeatedly engaged in hand-to-hand combat, and the number of Argentines killed or wounded with a bayonet is a noticeable value. So, for example, as a result of the battles for the Longdon Hill (according to D. Tatarkov, "Conflict in the South Atlantic: Falklands War 1982"):
"The Argentines have lost 31 people just killed, and many of them died from the received bayonet wounds."
Perhaps the only notable achievement of the British VTOL in terms of support for the troops was the destruction by them on May 28 of the Argentine air defense battery, located at the forefront of the Argentine troops defending Guz Green. The guns were located only 180 meters from the British infantry, but three "Harriers" from the "Hermes" were able to inflict a jewelry blow without hitting their own. By this time, the battle had been going on for 36 hours and the sides were in a state of unstable equilibrium, and the destroyed battery was the basis of the firepower of the Argentines defending here. Its destruction tipped the balance to the side of the British, and soon the Argentine commanders sent their parliamentarians to discuss the terms of the ceasefire. After negotiations that lasted all night, the Argentine troops defending Gus Green surrendered.
In general, during this period, the combat activities of the British carrier-based aircraft were not impressive. However, between May 26 - June 14, 5 Sea Harriers and GR.3 Harriers were lost.
On May 27, two Harriers GR.3 from the aircraft carrier Hermes attacked the positions of the Argentine 105-mm battery covering Gus Green. Despite the target designation of the ground gunner (or maybe, on the contrary, "thanks" to him?), The target could not be hit either from the first or from the second approach. Well, on the third run, Lieutenant Iveson's Harrier was so damaged by 35-mm shells that the pilot was forced to eject.
The Sea Harrier was killed on the day of the aforementioned bombing of the Port Stanley airfield on May 29. The Argentines claim that the plane was shot down by the Roland air defense system, while the British insist that the Harrier, hull number ZA-174, fell from the flight deck of the Invincible during the turn and the accompanying roll.
On May 30, Harrier GR.3 was hit by a 35mm projectile near Wall Hill, causing it to rapidly lose fuel. Pilot D. Pook still tried to bring the plane to the aircraft carrier, but he failed - the plane fell into the sea 30 miles from the escape deck.
On June 1, two Sea Harriers fell into an Argentine ambush: not far from the coast, anti-aircraft artillery fired at them, which forced the pilots to gain altitude, and immediately the car of Lieutenant Mortimer was hit by a Roland air defense missile system. The pilot spent several hours on a life raft a few kilometers from the coastline, but was rescued.
June 8 "Harrier GR.3" for technical reasons (officially: "loss of thrust on approach) fell near the San Carlos airfield. The damage turned out to be such that the aircraft could not be repaired.
Thus, it can be stated that despite the certain, and, in general, non-zero usefulness of VTOL aircraft, they did not cope with any of the tasks facing the British aviation in the Falklands conflict. This could end the description of the battles and move on to conclusions, but nevertheless, the story of the 1982 conflict would be incomplete without mentioning two attacks by Argentine aircraft on British ships.
The destruction of the Atlantic Conveyor and the death of ten (or still eight?) Transport helicopters led to very far-reaching consequences - the British simply could not now airlift enough forces to storm Port Stanley. Nobody wanted to send troops on foot - in the absence of roads, there would be a lot of problems. Therefore, the British conceived another landing operation, namely the transfer of the 5th brigade to the area of Port Fitzroy and Bluffkov bays.
Of course, first it was necessary to make sure that there were no large Argentine forces in the area of the future landing. This was done with true English humor - the helicopter transferred a reconnaissance group of the British to the lonely farm of Swan Inlet House, not far from Port Fitzroy, after which the commander of a dozen paratroopers who landed … called one of the residents of Port Fitzroy and asked him about the presence of Argentine troops.
The landing from the sea began on the night of June 5-6 and lasted several days, but the Argentines did not find the British ships at Port Fitzroy until June 8th. It must be said that in the absence of any serious opposition from the Argentines, the British unacceptably relaxed - in fact, two of their landing transports were unloading in the bay without direct cover of warships, having only the Sea Harriers patrol and deployed on the coast of the Rapier air defense missile system.
First of all, the Argentines sent 2 Mirages to distract the British air patrol. At this time, 8 "Skyhawks" and 6 "Daggers" were to destroy the British transports. But it turned out as always - "Mirages" did not find anyone and flew away with nothing, and six "Daggers" on the way to Port Fitzroy accidentally stumbled upon the frigate "Plymouth". The commander of the group of "Daggers" decided that since the surprise was lost, he would not have a chance to break through to the landing ships and attacked the "Plymouth", which received direct hits from four aerial bombs. As usual, none of them exploded, but this was enough for a small frigate - the Plymouth did not participate in the battles anymore. And besides, the Daggers did the work of the Mirages - a pair of Sea Harriers patrolling the landing site rushed after them in pursuit. And at this time, five "Skyhawks" (of the eight, three returned for technical reasons) attacked "Sir Tristram" and "Sir Galahad"."Sir Tristram" received two bombs, one exploded, the ship lost two people, but at the same time was completely incapacitated and, like the "Plymouth", no longer participated in hostilities. But "Sir Galahead" got 3 bombs, all three exploded, and one - in the landing room filled with Welsh guards, and then ammunition prepared for the landing was detonated on the deck. The ship was completely burned out, but by some miracle it kept afloat, its skeleton was subsequently flooded in the immediate vicinity of the coast. The British admit the loss of 50 people and another 57 seriously wounded.
The Argentines lifted six more Skyhawks into the air, two of which returned to the airfield, and four flew to Port Fitzroy, but then they were met by the "awakened" air defense bridgehead. Realizing that they would not pass, the Skyhawks laid down on the opposite course, accidentally found the LCU F4 landing craft in Choiseul Bay, attacked and sank it, but at the time of the attack they were themselves covered by the Sea Harriers, who shot down three Skyhawks from four.
The last attack on the British aircraft carrier, undertaken by the forces of 2 Super Etandars and 4 Skyhawks, is described in many sources, but still its effectiveness remains a mystery to this day. This time, the "Agavs" of the "Supers" managed to spot a large ship at a distance of 25 miles, after which the last "Exocet" was immediately launched, and 4 "Skyhawks" followed her at an altitude of only 12 meters. The British did not sleep, between the attacking planes and the aircraft carrier "Invincible" were three ships - the destroyers type 42 Exeter and Cardiff and the frigate type 21 "Avenger". They had spotted the Argentine planes even before the Exocet was launched and knew what they were about to face. It is reliably known that two Skyhawks were shot down by the Sea Dart air defense system of the latest modification installed on the Exeter, and the other two were able to attack the British. Otherwise, there are continuous discrepancies.
The Argentines claim that they saw the Invincible shrouded in smoke (from the anti-ship missile that got into it), and the two Skyhawks made three hits with 250 kg bombs. The British claim that the missile did not hit anywhere, and the Skyhawks attacked the Avenger frigate, enveloped in smoke from their gun mounts. Who is right?
On the one hand, the British should know better about their losses. But there are some very strange facts, which are difficult to close our eyes to: according to the Argentine electronic intelligence, immediately after the attack on the Invincible, an excess activity of British helicopters was recorded. Simultaneously, a group of Sea Harriers flew at high altitude to the temporary airfield in San Carlos. On the same day, General Moore's command post was transferred from the Invincible to San Carlos, and an analysis of British flight activity after May 30 revealed a significant decline over the next few days. But the most important thing is the discrepancy in the reports of the British themselves. On June 1, the UK Department of Defense announced that on May 30, it was not the Invincible that was attacked, but … the still-sunken Atlantic Conveyor. But on June 3, the version changed: the British announced the unsuccessful attack of the Avenger.
What actually happened? Alas, most likely, we will never know.
The end follows …
