Today, Russia and the United States are two countries that have full-fledged nuclear triads. At the same time, for both the United States and Russia, the most exclusive elements of the triad are not ballistic missile submarines (four countries have a fifth, India is on the way) and, of course, not ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The most exclusive element of the Russian and US nuclear triads are bombers, simply because no one else has an intercontinental strike aircraft. These are too large-scale and complex programs for small countries or those who do not yet have experience in building such aircraft, could acquire them.
Why are these aircraft included in the nuclear triad? Why not have a nuclear dyad of submarines and ground missiles? The answer to this question contains the key to understanding some of the problems in the RF Aerospace Forces that are not obvious to observers. It is worth answering it and understanding the role and place of the nuclear deterrent aviation forces (ANSNF) in the defense of the country, both theoretical and real.
A bit of theory
A ballistic missile hits its target in tens of minutes from the moment of launch and practically cannot be shot down on the way. The plane is another matter. He goes to the goal for long hours, sometimes tens of hours. He can be knocked down many times along the way. Its flight to the target must be ensured, for example, by air refueling. And all this in the end is for the same thing that the rocket does much cheaper and with a greater probability at times.
At the same time, a heavy intercontinental strike aircraft is tied to airfields, moreover, to high-class airfields. Of course, there is experience in taking off the Tu-95 from the polar ice floe. But with this method of combat use, it is not possible to provide a high take-off weight, which means that the aircraft will not have enough fuel on board to complete the combat mission. This is also solvable, but complicates the combat mission to the point of impossibility.
With a sudden outbreak of war, the survival rate of bomber aircraft is zero. If there is a threatened period, then it can be dispersed in time, along with the weapons that it carries - missiles and bombs.
And again - all for the sake of what the rocket does faster and cheaper, with many times greater chances of success.
What is this all for?
Some might say that bombers, even without nuclear weapons, are extremely useful weapons of war. This is true, but this is not about that, but about the fact that they are included in the strategic nuclear forces and are taken into account in the relevant treaties, a lot of money is spent on nuclear weapons for them, and all this must be justified.
There is an answer, and it is this - a bomber differs from a rocket as a combat weapon in a fundamental peculiarity.
It can be retargeted in flight
This is what, in theory, we need not just long-range strike aircraft, but aircraft that are part of the strategic nuclear forces, one of the tools for deterring a nuclear war, or waging it (if deterrence fails). As a special case, a bomber with a bomb can fly out without target designation and receive a combat mission already in flight. No other means of waging a nuclear war possesses such qualities.
Airplanes give commanders and politicians the flexibility they need to make decisions - they allow enough time to react to changes in the environment. A ballistic missile is like a bullet. It cannot be returned or retargeted to another object in flight. Bomber - you can, and if necessary, you can simply recall it.
That is why the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is needed.
And this is where the questions begin.
Our realities
At present, the domestic ANSYA has several hundred nuclear charges, of which only a part is placed on cruise missiles. The other part is the "good old" free-fall bombs.
Cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are a type of weapon that restricts the flexibility of aviation - with it, the ANSNF can either inflict the same "irrevocable" strike as a ballistic missile (with all the disadvantages of such a weapon as a bomber), or, if there is a political need, be withdrawn before the launch - the latter is of importance after the nuclear war has begun.
Rockets also make it possible in emergency situations to organize combat duty of bombers in the air with repeated refueling, but one must understand that only stationary targets can keep such aircraft at gunpoint. But cruise missiles do not provide one of the fundamental properties of a bomber as a means of waging a nuclear war - the ability to retarget to another object after departure.
And this is very important. For example, a ballistic missile launched a nuclear attack on an airbase where part of the enemy's bombers and their nuclear bombs were located. However, by means of reconnaissance (no matter what) the activity of the enemy was established to remove something from this zone in a large number of trucks. Let's say at this moment an airplane with a nuclear bomb is flying towards a secondary target located nearby. Since the goal is clearly secondary, there is no point in spending ICBMs on it, it is also impossible to leave it as it is, since it is still important. At this moment, the bomber can be retargeted, because with a high degree of probability, the surviving nuclear bombs are taken out on trucks, otherwise why would they still poke around in the zone of radioactive contamination?
But if the bomber does not fly to the target with a bomb, but fired a cruise missile two hours ago, then nothing can be done - the enemy will take out the bombs and then use them against us.
Of course, in such a situation, a ballistic missile can be sent to the target, but its value in a nuclear war is too high to hit such targets, because it will be impossible to get new missiles during the ongoing war.
Thus, the need for bombers not as just combat systems for conducting conventional wars (and even for delivering a limited nuclear strike against a non-nuclear country), but as part of the strategic nuclear forces, cruise missiles as the only weapon is significantly reduced. Its, this quality, even in our ultra-high-tech age, provides what was a weapon of strategic aircraft at the time of their appearance - free-falling nuclear bombs.
We have bombs, and the aircraft we use are technically capable of using them. But are the Aerospace Forces ready to use bombs in a nuclear war with such an adversary as the United States or China (with any other country, everything will end in "two moves" in the best case for the adversary)?
In order to assess the readiness of our aviation to use free-falling bombs in a nuclear war, it is useful to look at our enemies - the Americans.
Maximum combat readiness
The United States has always paid great attention to the aviation component of its strategic forces, while maintaining the level of combat readiness of bombers was carried out taking into account the possibility of a sudden Soviet nuclear strike by missile weapons.
In order to preserve bombers as an effective means of combat even in such a "scenario", the United States resorted to the regular allocation of part of its bombers on combat duty on the ground with already suspended nuclear bombs, with crews in the "duty" barracks, which generally corresponded to our "readiness number 2". It was assumed that upon an alarm received from the US early warning system, bombers with bombs would urgently take off from bases, thus emerging from the strike of Soviet nuclear missiles, and only then they would receive combat missions in the air.
The fact that both the early warning system, and bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States were subordinate to one structure - the Strategic Air Command of the Air Force (SAC), simplified the passage of commands through all command chains and ensured the required speed of transmission of orders and orders.
For this, the appropriate means of secure radio communications were installed on board the aircraft, and the flight crew studied the geography of the USSR.
In order to ensure that as many bombers and refuelers as possible emerge from a nuclear strike, the Americans have been practicing the so-called MITO - Minimum Interval Take-offs since the 60s, or in Russian - "Take-offs with minimal intervals." The meaning of the action was that the bombers and tankers practically in a column, one after the other, go to the runway, and then take off with an interval of tens of seconds. This is a very dangerous maneuver, because by the time one aircraft takes off from the runway, the next one has already gained the “decision speed”, and in the event of a catastrophe ahead of the one taking off, it will not be able to interrupt the takeoff. Moreover, the next aircraft in speed will still be able to interrupt takeoff, but will no longer be able to stop before the crash site if it happened on or over the runway. All this is complicated by zero visibility, in which most cars are forced to take off - the fumes from the exhaust of bombers that have already taken off are simply impenetrable. Nevertheless, by the height of the Cold War, the Americans were able to lift one wing after another with an interval of 15-20 seconds between aircraft taking off.
Taking into account the fact that until 1992 some of the bombers were always in the air in readiness for an immediate nuclear strike, with bombs on board, it guaranteed that the SAC would have a tool for "flexible" attacks in any case.
Thus, part of the US strike aviation would be guaranteed to be withdrawn even from the USSR nuclear missile strike that had begun. Currently, the Strategic Air Command maintains this level of combat readiness for bombers. True, for decades without a real enemy and a real threat, the Americans have somewhat "softened" and now the intervals between bombers taking off can reach up to 30 seconds.
The second important aspect of bombers' readiness to use bombs was the ability to penetrate air defenses.
I must say that the main SAC aircraft, the B-52, had and, apparently, has either one of the most powerful electronic warfare systems in the world, or the most powerful. In 1972, the US Air Force and Navy conducted Operation Linebreaker 2, a series of massive bombing raids on densely populated areas of North Vietnam. The main blow in this operation was inflicted by B-52 bombers, moreover, being loaded with conventional bombs "to the eyeballs", they were forced to use them from a great height, from horizontal flight, that is, from the mode most vulnerable to ground-based air defense.
The losses of aircraft in this operation were great. But behind them was the fact that for each downed plane there were dozens of anti-aircraft missiles of the Vietnamese air defense, which "went into hindrances." The missiles of the S-75 complexes basically simply could not hit the aircraft covered by interference. In the event of a nuclear war, all this would be seriously aggravated.
The growth of the capabilities of the USSR air defense at a certain moment led to the fact that its overcoming in the high-altitude breakthrough mode in the United States was considered impossible for any speed. That is why, in the end, the United States moved away from supersonic strike vehicles. Such aircraft as the serial B-58 bomber "Hustler" with its "two sounds" or the experienced "three-fly" "Valkyrie" show that the Americans could easily set up supersonic attack aircraft in any number, if it made sense. In the light of the capabilities of the USSR air defense, this did not make sense, speed did not give any "bonuses" to survival, but it cost money.
Gave another.
Beginning in the eighties, the B-52 crews began to practice air defense breakthroughs at low altitudes. This caused an increased risk of aircraft destruction in flight, since its glider was not designed for such loads. There was even the fact of the destruction of the vertical tail in such a flight. But thanks to the restrictions on the minimum height of about 500 meters, the automatic system for increasing the stability of the ECP 1195, which blocks the launch of the aircraft into modes that are dangerous for its mechanical strength, and the high skills of the crews, the severity of the problem was reduced, reducing it to accelerated wear of the airframe, which is solved by timely repair.
The avionics of the aircraft do not provide flight in the terrain bend mode (and this is impossible for such a machine, it will simply collapse in the air), but it can warn of an obstacle right along the course. Optoelectronic surveillance systems allow the crew to orient themselves in flight at night and in conditions of bright flashes from nuclear explosions, in addition, pilots have the opportunity to use individual night vision devices, and the illumination and indication of instruments and screens in the cockpit allow them to see their readings in the night vision device.
The small mass of several nuclear bombs compared to dozens of non-nuclear bombs made it possible for the aircraft to perform maneuvers that were dangerous in a different situation.
The combination of the possibility of a long-term approach to the enemy air defense zone of action at low altitudes, the possibility of making such a breakthrough at altitudes of 500 meters (and by the decision of the commander, if the relief and meteorological conditions allow, then less), a powerful electronic warfare system, and the fact that the attack was carried out would against a country on which a massive nuclear missile strike has already been inflicted, with all the ensuing consequences, would give the bomber a good chance of breaking through to the target with bombs.
His adversary would have to fight in conditions when part of the air bases are covered with nuclear strikes, communications are paralyzed and do not work, the headquarters and their command posts important in the command system are destroyed, and the effects caused by electromagnetic pulses of exploding nuclear warheads of American missiles and bombs continue to appear in the atmosphere in places. The number of attacking bombers in this case, in any case, would be counted in dozens of machines, and with a sufficiently successful withdrawal of US aviation from the first strike (or if it was dispersed during a threatened period), then hundreds.
All this made the bomber aircraft a strategic weapon, and not a bad and slow "substitute for ICBMs" with an "option" to cancel the attack, like any aircraft carrier of cruise missiles, namely, a flexible means of warfare that can be retargeted, recalled and directed to a new one. target directly in the course of an ongoing offensive operation, in the presence of a sufficient number of air tankers - repeatedly.
The B-1 "Lancer" and B-2 "Spirit" bombers that appeared later in service inherited this "ideology" of combat use, but their capabilities for low-altitude air defense breakthrough and the secrecy of passage through it cannot be compared with the B-52. In 1992, during the relaxation of tensions between the United States and Russia, the commander of the Russian Air Force, General Pyotr Deinekin, while on a visit to the United States, tested the B-1B bomber in flight. The aircraft's flight data and ease of control allowed General Deinekin to easily put the Lancer into a supersonic flight at an altitude of 50 (fifty!) Meters above the ground. American pilots were surprised, saying that "our generals don't fly like that." It must be understood that at such an altitude, the air defense system is able to detect and hit a target only when it is in close proximity to it and on flat terrain, that is, in ideal, polygon conditions.
Upon returning to Russia, General Deinekin himself had to admit that our combat pilots also do not fly the way the Americans can - the latter pilot their heavy machines much bolder than we do, and those maneuvers that are included in their combat and flight training program, we are often simply prohibited by governing documents.
As for the B-2, its "gap" in combat effectiveness from the predecessor B-1 is even stronger than that of the B-1 from the B-52. In the case of the B-2, the "supersonic" not particularly needed in this mode (which also "catches up" the additional RCS due to the concentration of moisture from the air in the jump front behind the aircraft) goes away, but significantly, at times, a smaller detection range of such an aircraft is added Radar of any type, except for long-wave, which is unsuitable for missile guidance.
With all this, the United States does not deny the importance of missile weapons. Both the Americans and we have always tried to equip bombers with a "long arm" - missiles that enable them to strike from outside the enemy's air defense zone. Moreover, cruise missiles of a modern type, that is, small-sized, stealthy, subsonic, with a folding wing and low-altitude flight, with an economical turbojet engine, were invented by the Americans.
But, unlike us, for them this weapon has always been only one option for some conditions. It is invaluable for a limited-scale war, including a limited nuclear one. But as an element of strategic nuclear forces, it cannot be the main or the only weapon of the ANSNF. The reliance on cruise missiles as the only type of weapon for the ASNF deprives "nuclear" bombers of their meaning - in the event of a nuclear war, they simply become "substitutes for ICBMs", with the additional ability to withdraw them from an attack if their missiles have not yet been launched. In a conventional war, their value is indisputable, but in a nuclear war, the potential of aviation as a combat weapon cannot be revealed only by missiles.
For the Americans, guided missiles have always been a means of "hacking air defenses" on the way to a bomb target. To inflict nuclear missile strikes from afar and from a safe distance, at previously known air defense targets, air bases, long-range radars that survived an ICBM strike, then break through the devastated zones to the main targets deep in enemy territory. That is why they almost never, when new missiles appeared, did not re-equip all aircraft for them. For local wars, this does not make sense, they do not need many missile carriers, nuclear aircraft are needed mainly as a "flexible" retargetable tool, which means that they must mainly carry bombs, and "rocketization" costs a lot of money … why spend it then?
At the same time, cruise missiles could well be used as a tool for an independent strike against a stationary target - if the situation required it.
Currently, the United States is actively improving the means of nuclear attack, including in the arsenal of the first strike SLBMs of increased accuracy, carefully studying how the automated retaliatory strike systems ("Perimeter") work, and widening the gap in the effectiveness of its submarines with torpedoes and our RPLSN in combat. with ballistic missiles, and are actively preparing the crews of stealth B-2 bombers to independently search for and destroy with bombs the surviving Russian or Chinese PGRKs who evaded defeat by the first American nuclear missile strike, but did not manage to receive a launch order due to the destruction of communication centers and command points.
The role of nuclear bombs is thus retained even in the event of a first counterforce nuclear strike by the United States.
At the same time, the fact that the B-52 and B-1 are removed from the list of nuclear bomb carriers should not deceive anyone - the B-2 are still focused on these tasks, and the number of targets that they will need to hit is not so great today., like before. The B-52 remains the carrier of cruise missiles, including those with a nuclear warhead.
Recently, the United States has been upgrading its free-fall nuclear bombs, equipping them with guidance and control systems similar to JDAM, which will increase their accuracy. In this case, the power of the explosion of the warhead is reduced.
The US nuclear arsenal is rapidly turning from a deterrent into a means of attack, and it is precisely the deterrent potential that the Americans have sacrificed - they have already sacrificed in order to improve their capabilities for a surprise nuclear attack.
The role of bombs and their carriers in the US military plans continues to be very important.
The risk of an offensive nuclear war by the United States is growing steadily.
Several emotional statements by V. V. Putin's theme "we will go to heaven, and you will simply die" is due precisely to the understanding of the covert preparation of the United States to conduct an offensive nuclear war, the fact of which does not depend on who occupies the White House.
In such conditions, we need not only to improve the mechanisms of nuclear deterrence, but also to prepare for its failure, taking into account the fact that the United States is significantly reducing the power of its nuclear weapons (for example, SLBM warheads from 100 to 5 kilotons) and the fact that their first the strike will be directed at our military facilities, and not at the cities, wage a nuclear war and after the first strike there will be both to whom and for what.
This means that it is necessary to be ready to fully realize the potential of all the instruments for waging such a war, the main of which, after the majority of missiles are expended in a retaliatory or retaliatory strike, will be bombers.
Let's formulate the problem
The problem is as follows - although Russia has a technically full-fledged strategic aviation, and reserves of nuclear weapons for it, doctrinally, and due to the existing level of training, long-range aviation units are not ready to wage a nuclear war.
This in itself could be acceptable if they were not considered as an instrument at all, and if their combat use as a strategic force were not planned at all. Then one could simply decide: “our planes are not for this” and use them in the future as well as in Syria, and the planning of a nuclear war should be carried out taking into account the fact that bombers will not be used in it. This approach has a right to exist.
But if we are guided by common sense, it becomes clear that it is much better to bring the training of aviation units to a level that will allow it to be used precisely as a strategic one and precisely in the course of an ongoing nuclear war. Because the use of aircraft by the same methods used by the United States will make it possible to have precisely a flexible instrument of war that can be retargeted, withdrawn, re-directed to another target, used to strike with additional reconnaissance at a target whose coordinates are not known exactly, in some cases, to reuse aircraft is not so unrealistic, given the destruction from missile strikes and how they will affect the operation of the enemy's air defense, his communications, the supply of fuel to airfields, etc.
What is needed for this?
It is necessary to give strategic aviation the ability to receive a combat mission in flight. With regard to an aircraft that is a "clean" missile carrier, this means the ability to enter a flight mission into the missile directly in flight. Moreover, taking into account the interruptions in communication after the start of the exchange of nuclear strikes, the aircraft crew should be able to perform this. I would like to be able to retarget the missile in flight, but this can create a serious vulnerability of the missile to cyberattacks and such an improvement should be taken with caution
In addition, it is necessary to resume training in the use of free-fall bombs. This must be done if only because these bombs exist. In war, there are always losses and there is no guarantee that cruise missiles will not be lost at the first enemy strike. This means that we need a willingness to act with bombs too.
Most likely, our Tu-95s will not be able to act in the same way as the American B-52s. Smaller fuselage in cross-section, lighter weight of the aircraft, greater wing loading in comparison with the B-52 indicate that the Tupolevs will not be able to slip through the air defense coverage area at low altitude, they, apparently, will not have enough structural strength for this. But firstly, the capabilities of this aircraft for the use of bombs in difficult conditions must be investigated, finding those limits that cannot be exceeded when performing maneuvers and flights.
However, there is unconfirmed information that in the 60s low-altitude attacks on the Tu-95 were practiced, but these were other modifications, not the MC, so everything will have to be checked again.
Secondly, there are other options. The same Americans planned to use not only bombs, but also SRAM short-range aeroballistic missiles. The latter were supposed to "hack" the air defense of the area by destroying air bases and stationary air defense facilities, and also give a "light" in the atmosphere, which would interfere with the operation of the air defense system. And only then, under the cover of interference from its electronic warfare system, the bomber had to break through to the target.
Technically, Russia can do the same thing - we had X-15 missiles, with which such things worked out quite well, we have the Kh-31P supersonic anti-radar missiles, we have the Kh-35 missile modified for strikes against ground targets, on the basis of which it is also possible to create an option for destroying the enemy's radar, and in two versions at once - in nuclear and non-nuclear. In addition, when flying over an absolutely flat surface, for example, over water, even the Tu-95 is able to fly for some time at a relatively low altitude for it. Taking into account that all ZGRLS will be destroyed by cruise missiles, the chances of a Tu-95 attacking from the sea side to reach the launch line of a large number of its small missiles to "hack" enemy air defenses cannot be considered small. I would like not to complicate the life of the "oldies" Tu-95, but this is our main plane, alas, and we will have to fight with what we have.
Naturally, some tactical schemes can only be worked out after a deep theoretical study. Perhaps it is worth returning the Tu-22M3 to the "strategist" and assigning the "bomb" tasks mainly to them.
As for the Tu-160, the production of which is supposed to be resumed (about the fact that it is resumed, say, when the first aircraft created without the remaining "old" groundwork takes off), then its combat potential is simply endless, the airframe of this aircraft allows more than the people who manage it can, and with it the question arises only in adequate modernization just for such tasks. For example, it is worth studying measures to reduce the radar signature of this machine, which is very large. The Americans on the B-1B managed to reduce the RCS many times compared to the B-1A. There is no reason to believe that we cannot do the same with the Tu-160.
Much more important is the reduction of the labor intensity of the inter-flight service. It takes hundreds of man-hours to prepare one Tu-160 sortie. It is necessary to fight against this, the weapon cannot and should not be so "gentle". And it is quite possible to reduce this figure, although it will take a lot of time and money.
But this all concerns combat missions. But exercises on the emergency dispersal of aviation, weapons and airfield equipment can be started right now. In any case, it will take years to show a level of combat readiness comparable to the enemy, and it is better not to delay.
The situation in the world is heating up. The formal approach, when we believe that the presence of bombs and aircraft gives us combat aviation, has completely exhausted itself. Just as the presence of a piano at home does not make a person a pianist, so the presence of bombers, missiles and bombs does not mean that the Aerospace Forces has strategic aviation in the full sense of the term. You also need to be able to apply it properly.
In order for us to really have it, the strike potential of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces must be brought to the maximum possible. And preferably as soon as possible.
