Historically, the most important components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) of the USSR and then of the Russian Federation have always been the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). As we discussed in the previous article, the Strategic Missile Forces can effectively carry out nuclear deterrence even in the event of a sudden disarming strike and a full-scale deployment of a missile defense system by the enemy. Nevertheless, the Russian SNF also includes the aviation and naval components of the nuclear triad. In this material, we will consider the prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces.
Air component of strategic nuclear forces
We examined the capabilities and effectiveness of the air component of the strategic nuclear forces in detail in the article The Decline of the Nuclear Triad? Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces. Based on the results of the analysis, it can be said that the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is currently practically useless from the point of view of deterring the United States. The long reaction time does not allow carriers (strategic bombers) to avoid being hit at airfields during the enemy's sudden disarming strike. The weapon of strategic bombers, cruise missiles (CR), is extremely vulnerable to enemy fighter aircraft and air defense systems.
Thus, we can say that the existing and future strategic bombers of the "classical" design are absolutely useless as an instrument of nuclear deterrence, provided that the "first move" is made by the enemy. At the same time, they are quite effective as a first strike weapon, taking into account some of the shortcomings, which we will talk about below. Even more strategic missile bombers are effective as weapons of strategic conventional forces.
Can a strategic bomber be created capable of effectively solving nuclear deterrence tasks in the presence of the possibility of an adversary delivering a surprise disarming strike? In theory, this is possible, but such a product should be radically different from conventional aircraft designs.
Aviation complexes of constant readiness
First of all, the constant readiness of the carrier aircraft for launch must be ensured within three to five minutes after receiving a warning of a missile attack. That is, it should be something like an intercontinental ballistic missile in a container: an aircraft in a closed hangar, with direct access to the runway. After the alarm signal, the pilots on duty take their places, the tunnel to the cockpit is retracted, an emergency takeoff is carried out, possibly on rocket boosters, and the departure from the home airfield is at least several tens of kilometers. In case of cancellation of the launch, a return to the airfield and re-conservation in the hangar is carried out.
The weapon of such a carrier should not be cruise missiles, even subsonic or hypersonic, but intercontinental ballistic missiles with an air launch. As such, we can consider a modification of the YARS intercontinental ballistic missile, the mass of which is about 46-47 tons, which is quite acceptable for a carrier aircraft. Accordingly, the range of air-launched ICBMs should ensure the ability to defeat targets in the United States when launched from the basing area.
The carrier is an "oak" construction, something of the B-52 type with its unrealistically long life cycle and excessive strength of hull structures, uneconomical but reliable engines.
What are the advantages of such a system? Reaction time comparable to the launch of an ICBM from a mine, no need for the launch vehicle to leave the borders of the Russian Federation, the ability to cancel the launch after launch. In the event of receiving an initial warning of a missile attack, even the slightest suspicion, the carriers can start immediately, even before the information about the attack is confirmed, in order to get out of the affected area. If the information is not confirmed, the carriers simply return to the home airfield, undergo maintenance and take their place in the hangar.
The main problem of constant readiness aviation complexes is that it is necessary to create and ensure the synchronous operation of the aircraft itself, ICBMs and all related infrastructure - emergency takeoff in any weather, constant readiness of equipment and pilots. How difficult, expensive, and generally possible it is, is difficult to assess. How will ICBMs behave after several takeoff and landing cycles? The enemy can play on the brink of a foul, causing the carriers to take off and wasting their resource, and then inflict a real blow during the period of the carriers or missile maintenance.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that due to the need to ensure an emergency takeoff and being in constant readiness, such complexes will be extremely highly specialized, no multifunctional use - everything is like the mobile complexes Topol or Yars.
Are the Strategic Nuclear Forces and the RF Air Force ready to create such weapons? If so, what should be the number of such media? Given the novelty and narrow specialization, it is unlikely that it will be possible to build more than 10-20 units of them, especially considering the need for accompanying support - special hangars adjacent to the runways intended only for them. In the presence of one or three nuclear warheads (YBCH) on one air-based ICBM, this will be a total of 10-60 warheads.
The foregoing suggests that in the context of resistance to a sudden disarming strike, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is practically useless, and this cannot be changed. The development of aircraft systems of constant readiness is likely to be a complex and cost-intensive task with a large number of technical risks
So, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces can be written off?
In addition to the task of nuclear deterrence of the enemy by inflicting a guaranteed retaliatory strike, the RF SNF can and should be entrusted with the task of exerting continuous pressure on a potential adversary. That is, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces should be used to create an unpredictable threat, countering which will require the enemy to attract significant funds, which, in turn, will reduce its offensive capabilities due to the inevitable finiteness of any resources: financial, technical, human.
Unpredictable threat
To some extent, the existing strategic bombers are suitable for solving this problem: Tu-95, Tu-160, and the promising PAK-DA. Nevertheless, for the most effective fulfillment of the task of creating threatened situations for the enemy, the design and armament of promising aviation complexes of the Russian strategic nuclear forces must meet certain requirements:
- firstly, the main requirements for a promising strategic bomber-missile carrier should be to minimize the cost of a flight hour and maximize reliability. Everything else - speed, stealth, and so on is secondary;
- secondly, the existing cruise missiles with nuclear warheads as the main weapon of strategic bombers can hardly be considered an effective solution. Due to the subsonic flight speed, they can be intercepted by almost any air defense (air defense) device, as well as by enemy fighter aircraft. Hypersonic missiles are likely to have a limited flight range, which will require missile-carrying bombers to reach their launch lines outside the Russian state border, where they (carriers) can also be destroyed by enemy air defense and fighter aircraft.
Proceeding from this, the most effective weapons of promising missile-carrying bombers can be air-launched ICBMs, which we previously considered in the context of their use in constant readiness aviation complexes. The design of the missile can be largely unified with a promising ICBM for the ground-based component of the strategic nuclear forces.
Given the size of existing and prospective ICBMs, their placement on traditional missile-carrying bombers may be difficult, or even impossible. The best option seems to be the creation of a missile carrier aircraft based on one of the Il-76 modifications, or on the basis of a promising transport aircraft (PAK TA).
The length of the existing Yars ICBM is about 23 meters with a mass of about 47 tons, which is already quite acceptable for a transport aircraft. The estimated length of the promising 15Zh59 missile of the Kurier complex should be about 11.2 meters, with a mass of about 15 tons.
The maximum carrying capacity of the Il-76MD aircraft is 48 tons, the Il-76MD aircraft - 60 tons. The IL-76MF modification has the cargo floor length increased to 31, 14 m, the flight range of the IL-76MF with a load of 40 tons is 5800 km. The carrying capacity of the latest modification of the Il-476 is 60 tons, the flight range with a load of 50 tons is up to 5000 km.
PAK TA with an estimated payload of the order of 80-100 tons may have even greater opportunities for the deployment of air-launched ICBMs.
Thus, a promising aviation ballistic missile complex (PAK RB) based on a modified Il-476 can carry one aircraft-based ICBM, and PAK RB based on PAK TA (possibly) two aircraft-based ICBMs.
An important problem that will need to be solved when creating the PAK RB is the ability to carry out multiple takeoffs and landings of a carrier aircraft with an ICBM on board. Most likely, it will be something like a complex computerized damping system, with active suppression of shocks, vibrations and vibrations over a wide range.
What is the difference between the PAK RB and the previously considered constant readiness aviation complex? In the absence of the need to ensure constant vigil on the ground, in a minute readiness for the start, in the absence of requirements for strengthening the structure for an emergency takeoff. Also, during the operation of the PAK RB, the existing infrastructure and airbases of strategic missile-carrying bombers should be used, there is no need for dedicated lanes for each aircraft. The very operation of the PAK RB should be carried out in a standard mode for aircraft of this type.
Is the creation of the PAK RB real? Yes, it is quite possible to create such a complex. This is confirmed by research and testing in this direction carried out by the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. The Makeev SRC considered the possibility of creating an Air Launch complex based on the An-124 aircraft and a rocket with a liquid-propellant rocket engine. Do not forget about the success of private astronautics in this direction.
In what quantities should the PAK RB be built? Presumably, their number should be comparable to the number of existing strategic missile-carrying bombers, that is, about 50 units. Accordingly, the number of warheads will be 50-150 nuclear warheads for the PAK RB based on the Il-476, or 100-300 nuclear warheads for the PAK RB based on the PAK TA.
Can PAK RB be used as a carrier of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads?? Yes, and the CD with nuclear warheads, most likely, can be placed on the PAK RB in greater numbers than in the classic-design missile-carrying bombers, especially the version of the PAK RB based on the PAK TP.
The cargo compartment of the PAK RB based on the Il-476 can potentially accommodate about 18 Kh-102 type missile launchers or their non-nuclear version Kh-101 (the mass of 18 missile launchers is 43, 2 tons). In turn, the PAK RB based on the PAK TA can potentially carry about 36 KR of the Kh-101 / Kh-102 type (the mass of 36 KR without the launching device is 86.4 tons), which is already comparable to the ammunition load of a "frigate" or multipurpose nuclear submarine (MCSAPL) of the Yasen type. The CD can be dropped from special cassette-type containers, by analogy with the ICBM.
Thus, the PAK RB can also be used as an effective carrier of high-precision non-nuclear weapons - an element of the Strategic Conventional Forces. Whether it will be one modification of the PAK RB with a variable load in transport and launch containers (TPK), or will it be necessary to create separate modifications for air-based ICBMs and for the Kyrgyz Republic, the question is open, but, most likely, the creation of a single version of the PAK RB is possible.
How expedient is the creation of a PAK RB based on transport aircraft? Perhaps it is better to create specialized missile-carrying bombers of classical design? The creation of specialized aircraft of this type will cost much more than the development of the Il476 or PAK TA modification. The range of missile weapons is such that it is no longer required to enter the air defense or fighter aircraft zone, and bombing is only possible on an enemy who has no air defense in principle, whether the carrier is even "invisible" or "hypersonic".
The RF Air Force desperately needs a large fleet of transport aircraft, which is the cornerstone of the mobility of modern armed forces. In addition, we need tanker aircraft, early warning aircraft, and other auxiliary aircraft, which are being built on the basis of transport aircraft. Perhaps, on the basis of the Il-476 or PAK TA, the Peresvet-A aviation combat laser complex (ABLK) will be built. In this sense, the development of the PAK TA and the further modernization of the Il-76 (or the creation of a new aviation complex to replace it) have a much higher priority than the creation of the PAK DA, a "classic" bomber-missile carrier. The construction of the PAK TA and / or IL-476 in a large series, in many unified modifications, will significantly reduce the cost of a separate vehicle.
Do we then need strategic missile-carrying bombers of classical design, is there a niche for them? Yes, such vehicles can and will play an important role as conventional weapons. But the very essence of such machines will change significantly, most likely, they will not be strategic bombers, but multifunctional aircraft capable of hitting ground, surface, air targets, and possibly targets in near space. However, this is a topic for a separate conversation.
conclusions
1. The aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is unsuitable for nuclear deterrence in the context of a possible US surprise disarming strike. Even if it is theoretically possible to implement complexes capable of providing continuous watch on the ground and takeoff a minute after receiving the command, in practice their implementation can be associated with both technical difficulties and significant financial costs.
2. Nevertheless, the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces can become an important element of strategic deterrence, designed to exert continuous pressure on a potential adversary using the factor of uncertainty in the location of carriers and their combat load.
3. As a carrier of nuclear weapons for the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces for the period from 2030 to 2050, a promising aviation ballistic missile complex - PAK RB based on the Il-476 transport aircraft or PAK TA - can be considered.
4. The main weapon of the PAK RB should be an air-launched ICBM with an air launch, maximally unified with a promising solid-propellant ICBM for promising silo and mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK).
5. In addition to air-launched ICBMs, the PAK RB can use existing and promising cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which are currently the main weapon of strategic missile-carrying bombers, as well as promising hypersonic air-launched missiles with nuclear warheads.
6. Significant volumes of internal compartments and large carrying capacity of transport aircraft allow to take on board large volumes of high-precision cruise, hypersonic or aeroballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads, which will make the PAK RB an important element of the Strategic Conventional Forces.
7. The shorter range of the PAK RB, implemented on the basis of a transport aircraft, in comparison with existing and prospective missile-carrying bombers of the classical design, is compensated for by a longer range of weapons, which for an ICBM with an air launch should be about 8000-10000 kilometers. The range of existing cruise missiles is about 5500 kilometers and can be increased in promising weapons of this type.
8. Prospective airborne ICBMs should provide the ability to strike along a flat trajectory with a minimum launch range of about 2000 km or less in order to exert pressure on the enemy with the threat of a sudden decapitation strike against him.
9. An important advantage of the PAK RB will be its ability to camouflage among a huge fleet of military transport and auxiliary aviation, made on the basis of aircraft of a similar type. In fact, it will be something like a PGRK disguised as a cargo van, only in the air. If now the US Air Force and NATO are forced to respond to the appearance of Russian strategic bombers in the air near their territory, then if the PAK RB is created, they will have to respond in the same way to all aircraft of the military transport and auxiliary aviation of the Russian Federation, which will lead to an increased load on their Air Force, a decrease in the resource of fighter aircraft aimed at intercepting, an increase in personnel fatigue, a significant complication of the work of reconnaissance.
10. The estimated number of PAK RB should be about 50 units. Depending on the selected initial aircraft, IL-476 or PAK TA, the total number of air-launched ICBMs can be about 50-100 units, respectively, the number of nuclear warheads deployed on air-launched ICBMs can be about 50-300 units, in depending on the type of warhead (monoblock or split). The total number of nuclear or non-nuclear cruise missiles can be of the order of 900-1800 when deployed on the PAK RB instead of airborne ICBMs.
