What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?

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What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?
What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?

Video: What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?

Video: What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?
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Some aspects of the development of our artillery

But he is really forgotten. As evidenced by the pages of newspapers and magazines, television and radio broadcasts. If they are dedicated to the Russian army and navy, then, as a rule, we are talking about the Strategic Missile Forces and aviation, air defense and naval forces …

But before starting a conversation on the topic formulated in the subtitle, I want to draw the readers' attention to the following significant point. Military history teaches that each new type of weapon immediately has high-ranking fans who exaggerate the effectiveness of its action. High-precision weapons did not escape this either.

By no means a wunderwaffe

Well, indeed, in each of the last local wars (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq), the Americans used about 40 spacecraft, which provided aviation and artillery with intelligence, target designations, topographic positioning, communications, etc. That is, they did what for us now it is 90 percent unscientific fantasy.

What about the future? Should we absolutely rely on satellites located in near-Earth space? After all, the United States has anti-satellite weapons (in the USSR they were, but now they have floated away). China is also shooting down satellites. Yes, and without interceptor missiles and "killer" satellites, it is possible to disable a spacecraft. For example, using a powerful laser on board an airliner flying at maximum altitude, or powerful electromagnetic pulses.

Let me remind you that in 1959-1962, during the tests of Soviet and American nuclear weapons in space, because of the generated radiation, dozens of spacecraft were put out of action, and the means of conventional radio communication ceased to function. The Americans detonated a nuclear weapon at an altitude of 80 kilometers above Johnson Atoll, so communications were interrupted throughout the entire Pacific Ocean for the whole day. Note: this was only a side effect of nuclear explosions, which were carried out in the interests of creating an anti-missile defense.

In 2001, one of the Pentagon's offices (Defense Threat Reduce Agency, DTRA) tried to assess the possible consequences of nuclear tests on LEO satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), detonated at an altitude of 125 to 300 kilometers, is enough to disable all satellites that do not have a special protection against radiation. Plasma physicist at the University of Maryland Denis Papadopoulos had a different opinion: "A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, detonated at a specially calculated height, could lead to the loss of 90 percent of all LEO satellites in about a month."

What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?
What is the forgotten branch of troops equipped with?

Well, how did the laser systems and infrared guidance heads operate in the smoky and burning Grozny? It would be nice to remember what happened in Kosovo, when this still autonomous region of Serbia was bombed by all NATO aircraft. The Americans announced the destruction of 99 percent of the South Slavic military equipment. And after Belgrade decided to end the resistance, in the presence of journalists and NATO inspectors, 80-90 percent of tanks, artillery systems, missiles, etc. were withdrawn from Kosovo safe and sound. Do not forget that now false targets are not just dummies, but also unique electronic and optical traps for all types of precision weapons.

We destroy old ones, we don't produce new ones

The Chechen campaign of 2000 showed that a relatively small offensive operation requires a huge amount of ammunition. Moreover, in the overwhelming majority, they are not high-precision ones, but ordinary ones. So, for example, in January-February 2000, out of fifteen 240-mm Tulip mortars, 1,510 mines were fired, including only 60 corrected ones (that is, their share was 4%). On January 18, the daily consumption of all types of ammunition reached 1,428 tons. And by January 30, Russian troops had used up over 30 thousand tons of ammunition.

They will object to me: they say, during the conflict with Georgia in 2008, the consumption of ammunition was much lower. But there intense battles lasted for two or three days, and then it went along Lermontov: "Timid Georgians fled …"

Under Soviet rule, a huge mobilization stock of shells was accumulated. It would seem that he should provide the Russian army for many decades. However, widespread substandard storage and design flaws of certain types of shells (shots) led to a dangerous shortage of many types of ammunition.

For example, it was forbidden to use 122-mm shells fired before 1987. The reason: copper belts "fly", and the lateral deviation of the shells reaches two kilometers or more. This was one of the reasons for the abandonment of the 122 mm caliber. True, here it is worth noting that decisions are often made here, but even before they begin to be implemented, the management changes its mind and cancels them. How not to remember the unforgettable Ivan Aleksandrovich Khlestakov: "I have an extraordinary lightness in my thoughts."

Panegyrics to howitzers "Msta" - self-propelled 2S19 and towed 2A65 - we did not write only lazy and I, a sinner, praised them eight to ten years ago. Here, de shells OF-61 can be fired at a distance of 29 kilometers. And how many new OF-61 and OF-45 shells are there in the troops? The cat wept. But the old ones in bulk, but the firing range of them at the "Msta" and the old woman 2C3 "Akatsiya" does not differ much.

By the way, there are no 3NSO shells specially created for the Msta ammunition load in the troops at all. Let me remind you that 3NSO is equipped with an active radar jamming generator. The tabular firing range of them from the 2S19 is 22, 43 kilometers. True, there is an opinion that its interference is ineffective for new American communications, equipped with a frequency hopping system.

In my opinion, the development of projectiles that create active interference, or simply a super-powerful magnetic pulse, incapacitating enemy electronics, is very promising. Moreover, the action of the projectile does not affect personnel and cannot be visually detected, which makes it possible to use it during conflict situations even before using conventional weapons. And go and prove "was there a boy …" Another question is that the power and, accordingly, the weight of such ammunition should be significantly greater than the 152-mm projectile 3NSO. As a carrier of such projectiles, you can use the MLRS "Smerch" or some remotely piloted aircraft, for example, "Pchelu-1".

From 1979 to 1989, 1432 self-propelled tracked installations "Nona-S" were produced in the USSR. They were equipped with unique 2A51 120-mm guns, which can fire cumulative anti-tank shells, rotating high-explosive fragmentation shells and all types of 120-mm domestic mines. In addition, the gun is capable of firing 120-mm mines of Western production, in particular from the French RT-61 mortar.

In 1990, small-scale production of wheeled 120-mm self-propelled guns "Nona-SVK" 2S23 began.

Both systems are generally good and fire effective. The only question is how many new shells were available to them in the troops in November 2011. So what remains to shoot from 120-mm guns exclusively with old 120-mm mortar mines?

The trouble is that in the last ten years in the Russian Federation there has been no large-scale production of ammunition. Only pilot production in small batches is underway. Well, the powerful factories of the developed Soviet ammunition industry were closed a long time ago and their equipment was largely "privatized".

Bad luck and good luck

Since 1997, State Unitary Enterprise “Plant No. 9” has been actively promoting the 152-mm 2A61 howitzer. It is mounted on a three-sided carriage from a 122-mm D-30 howitzer and is designed to use 152-mm shells from ML-20, D-20 and D-1, including the Krasnopol corrected projectile. The author of these lines wrote back in 2000: "However, a large weight - 4, 3 tons - will turn the system into a stillborn child." And now (in the middle of 2011) the SUE is selling to organizations or individuals the only prototype 2A61. The price is quite acceptable - 60 thousand rubles.

In 2006, a prototype of the unique self-propelled gun "Coalition-SV" was demonstrated to the media. The system is equipped with two twin 152 mm barrels. In the export version, 155 mm pipes can be used.

The main contractor of the SAU is FSUE TsNII Burevestnik (Nizhny Novgorod), co-executors are FSUE Uraltransmash, FSUE TsNIIM, FSUE Uralvagonzavod. The loading system is fully automated for all 50 rounds, the fighting compartment is uninhabited.

In comparison with single-barreled large-caliber artillery systems, the maximum technical rate of fire has been doubled by providing the possibility of simultaneous loading of two barrels, which brings such an artillery mount closer to multiple launch rocket systems in terms of fire performance while maintaining the accuracy of rifled cannon artillery. The entire system should be serviced by a crew of two (for comparison: the demo model was serviced by a crew of five), which will be housed in a well-protected compartment located at the front of the chassis.

Everything said about the "Coalition" is taken by me from advertising brochures. But apparently, the issue of its serial production has not been resolved. In early 2010, it was reported that the project was not funded by the state, since the "Coalition-SV" was not included in the priority samples of military equipment, but no official statements about the complete cessation of work were made.

Nevertheless, work on the "Coalition" is underway and by the end of this year it is planned to complete the release of working design documentation for the wheeled and tracked versions of the system, as well as the transport-loading vehicle for them. And in the middle of 2012, state tests will allegedly be completed. Why ostensibly? Well, can this date be considered seriously? In my opinion, if the state tests come to an end, in which there are great doubts, it will be no earlier than 2014-2016.

I would like to remind the authors of the laudatory brochures that there is a rate of fire in the first seconds of firing, which is determined by the feed rate, the time of the shutter, etc. And there is the rate of fire in 10 minutes, per hour, determined by the heating of the barrel and fluid in the recoil devices. The howitzer is not an anti-tank gun, and it must conduct fire training for 30 or even 60 minutes.

After the Chechen war, under the leadership of V. A. Odintsov, a light assault gun was designed - the 122/152-mm howitzer D-395 Tver. Its weight in the firing position is 800 kilograms for a 122-mm barrel and 1000 kilograms for a 152-mm barrel. Elevation angle -3º, + 70º. The rate of fire is five to six rounds per minute. The difference between the gun is a unique carriage, wheels from a UAZ car. The ammunition load includes standard rounds from 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, charges No. 4 from M-30 and D-1 howitzers.

If funding was available, the D-395 howitzer could have been submitted for testing as early as 2008.

Alas, the Chechen war was forgotten and full-scale work on Tver and similar systems never began.

In my opinion, it is dangerous to restrict Russian artillery with a caliber of 152 millimeters. Let's remember that this caliber was often not enough in Chechnya and Dagestan. Finally, let us recall the local wars of the second half of the twentieth century. Then there were dozens of conflicts without the use of aviation and operational-tactical missiles. We are talking about an artillery duel in the Formosa Strait in the late 50s, artillery skirmishes across the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights in the early 70s, the "first socialist war" between China and Vietnam, etc. And everywhere the decisive role was played by long-range heavy artillery.

The Syrians, who suffered from the fire of the long-range (32 km) American 175-mm self-propelled guns M107, turned to Moscow for help. And thanks to dear Nikita Sergeevich, we no longer had long-range guns. As a result, they remembered the S-23 180-mm Grabin cannon. Eight of these weapons were manufactured in 1953-1955, and then the rocket lobby insisted on stopping their production. Urgently and literally from scratch, it was necessary to resume the manufacture of guns at the Barricades plant. In 1971, twelve S-23 cannons were handed over for Syria, for which they urgently designed and manufactured an OF-23 active-rocket projectile with a range of 43.7 kilometers.

Even now, American propaganda imposes on the world the concept that aviation is an inhumane weapon and its participation in local conflicts should be prohibited.

So, in my opinion, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation should maintain in complete safety those few samples of the 203-mm self-propelled gun "Pion" and 240-mm mortars "Tulip" that are still in warehouses. They have not been in the army for about eight years. Fortunately, many 203-mm shells and 240-mm mines with special warheads were made for these systems. I hope that our leadership was smart enough to preserve these nuclear warheads.

Do you need "Hurricane" and "Buratino"?

Finally, you need to pay a little attention to rocket artillery. By the fall of 2011, the Russian Ground Forces had three caliber MLRSs - 122, 220 and 300 millimeters. The divisional MLRS "Grad" (put into service in 1963) and the regimental MLRS "Grad-1" (entered service in 1976) were created in the caliber of 122 mm. In the caliber of 220 millimeters, the army MLRS "Uragan" was developed (put into service in 1975), in the caliber of 300 mm - the long-range MLRS of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command "Smerch" (adopted in 1987). Until the beginning of the 21st century, these systems were considered the best in the world. For example, the Grad system was exported to 60 countries.

However, to date, domestic systems are inferior to the best foreign models in terms of the degree of autonomy, the level of automation of the combat vehicle, survivability, reloading time and execution of firing missions, the actual absence of cluster warheads with cumulative fragmentation warheads.

Nevertheless, for financial reasons, it is much more expedient to modernize the existing MLRS systems - 122-mm Grad and 300-mm Smerch, rather than create fundamentally new systems.

As for the Uragan MLRS, there are serious doubts about the need to have an intermediate caliber of 220 millimeters. In addition, the already manufactured shells of the "Hurricane" have a number of design defects, including burnout of the chamber and others. And the engine of a combat vehicle is not economical enough.

The heavy flamethrower system TOS-1 "Buratino" has a firing range of 45-kilogram incendiary projectiles only 3.5 kilometers, and 74-kilogram thermobaric projectiles - 37 kilometers. For comparison: a 300-mm projectile 9M55 MLRS "Smerch" with a thermobaric warhead weighing 800 kilograms (warhead - 243 kg) has a firing range of up to 70 kilometers. So, "Buratino" has a chance to survive only in the fight against an enemy armed with small arms and grenade launchers.

The development of composite fuels made it possible to significantly increase the firing range of 122-mm shells of the Grad system while maintaining the same weight and dimensions. So, on the ship's A-215 launchers, shells with a firing range of 40 kilometers are already in service. Previously, the firing range of a 122-mm M-210F projectile did not exceed 20 kilometers. It can be assumed that in the foreseeable future, the 40-kilometer limit for Grad projectiles will be surpassed and will reach 60-70 kilometers.

Needless to say, doubling the firing range will lead to a twofold increase in dispersion. If the range of fire increases by 3–3, 5 times, the dispersion will also become large. Naturally, there is an idea to design a control system for a 122-mm projectile. Two options are being considered. The first provides for the design of a complex electronic control system, close to the American one, which was created for the 240-mm MLRS MLRS. However, we do not have similar equipment, its development will be expensive and the cost of one projectile will increase significantly. An alternative is a simplified correction system, as in "Tornado". However, what is in the first and what is in the second version is not clear where to place the control system in the 122-mm projectile "Grad" - there is no free space. Perhaps by reducing the weight of the explosive.

In conclusion, I will repeat what I have been repeating for 20 years in my articles and books. Under the current economic system in Russia, the salvation of the domestic defense industry in general and artillery factories in particular - in the massive export of weapons "in all directions", that is, regardless of the policy of buyers and the opinion of the "Washington Regional Committee".

An example is France in 1950-1990, where exports for a number of types of military equipment ranged from 50 to 80 percent. French weapons were used, fighting for the Falkland Islands, by the British and Argentines, in the Middle East - by the Arabs and Israelis, both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Does the Kremlin really fail to understand that if Russia is afraid of a shout from across the ocean, the same weapon will be sold to the "bad", according to the Americans, "guys" to Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, etc. Finally, both copies and and deep modernization of many Soviet missiles and artillery systems. So, in the Celestial Empire created the MLRS PHL-03, copied from our "Smerch". Beijing is not afraid of Washington and sells weapons with whomever it has to, completely forgetting the remnants of the communist ideology. As you can see, in any case, the Russian defense industry turns out to be the loser.

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