During the exercises of the air forces of the Moscow Military District, for the first time in the world on August 2, 1930, a small parachute assault force and supplies for it were successfully dropped into the rear of the "enemy". This date is considered to be the birthday of the Soviet airborne troops. In subsequent years, there was a rapid growth of the Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces). Auto-landing detachments, airborne battalions, regiments and special-purpose brigades were created. At the same time, an experimental and then mass domestic production of parachutes, parachute containers, platforms for heavy equipment, suspended cabins for paratroopers and materiel, gliders was organized. In 1938, the Airborne Forces were withdrawn from the Air Force and transferred to the Land Forces.
On the eve of the war, in May 1941, on the basis of airborne brigades (airborne brigades), the deployment of five airborne corps, numbering more than 8 thousand people each, began. Their manning was completed by June 1, but they did not have time to receive fully standard weapons, equipment, and landing gear. Since there was no military transport aviation, TB-1, TB-3, R-5 bombers and aircraft GVF ANT-9, ANT-14, PS-84, P-5 were used as transport aircraft.
The issues of conducting amphibious operations were reflected in the temporary Field Manual of 1936 and in the draft Manual on the conduct of operations. These documents spoke of the rear support of the landing forces only in the most general form. In the draft Field Manual of 1941 and in the first Manual on the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces, the planning of airborne operations and their logistical support were more broadly considered.
According to pre-war views, the preparation of the rear of the landing included the resupply of subunits, units and formations with personnel, weapons, equipment, parachute equipment and containers, ammunition, fuel, food, other materiel, as well as training in loading materiel into the parachute container (PDT), loading them into aircraft and unloading, a comprehensive study of the area of forthcoming actions and the appropriate training of personnel of the military transport aviation (MTA).
Not all the activities for the preparation of the Airborne Forces and Airborne Forces were completed by the beginning of the Patriotic War, which found the airborne corps (airborne corps) at the time of formation and coordination. The difficult situation at the front forced the high command to bring them into battle as rifle formations. At the same time, in the first period of the war, small tactical landings were used in battles near Kiev, Odessa, on the Kerch Peninsula. On September 4, 1941, the Airborne Forces were separated into an independent branch of the military. All their units and formations were transferred from the fronts to the direct subordination of the Office of the Commander of the Airborne Forces. The regulation on the Airborne Forces announced by the order determined that all parachute, landing and air-glider units were at the disposal of the People's Commissar of Defense and were used only at his direction and for their intended purpose.
More than 50 tactical and two operational airborne assault forces were deployed and landed during the war. The Vyazemskaya airborne operation is of the greatest interest. The combat actions of the Airborne Forces are described in sufficient detail in articles and books. However, the issues of logistic support, as a rule, were covered very little. Meanwhile, logistical support was of great importance to the course and results of this operation.
The Vyazemsk airborne operation (January 27 - June 24, 1942) began at the final stage of the offensive of the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, carried out after the counter-offensive near Moscow, when enemy resistance was growing, and the pace of the offensive of our troops was fading. In order to assist the front forces in the defeat of the German Vyazma-Rzhev-Yukhnov grouping, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to land an airborne assault in the German rear. The Airborne Forces headquarters, with the participation of the Air Force headquarters, by January 16, 1942, developed a plan for the airborne operation of the 4th airborne corps of Major General A. F. Levashov. The issues of rear support for the landing were practically not reflected in it. It was decided to carry out the landing of the 4th airborne battalion (8, 9, 214 airborne brigades and other units) from the Kaluga airfield hub to the Vyazma area. Since it was planned that independent combat operations of the corps formations in the enemy's rear will last no more than 2-3 days, after which they will be combined with the advancing formations of the Western Front, neither the Airborne Forces headquarters nor the Western Front headquarters had developed a plan for logistic support of the operation before the start of the landing.
However, the operation dragged on for almost five months. The element of surprise in the landing was not achieved. The concentration of 4 airborne forces and military transport aircraft near the front line went on for an unacceptably long time, under daily observation and enemy air strikes.
The dates of the landing, the composition, the tasks and the areas of operations of the landing force were specified and changed many times. This complicated the planning, organization and implementation of logistics support for the troops. The rear control body of the 4th Airborne Forces was the rear department of the corps headquarters, consisting of the chief and his assistants for the types of supply (artillery, food, clothing). The corps did not have any rear divisions and institutions. The logistics department planned and monitored the material support of formations and units from the corresponding warehouses of the district. The aviation-technical, engineering-airfield and parachute equipment of the brigade was received from the warehouses of the air force of the district and the center. The sanitary service was not part of the logistics department, but the head of the corps sanitary service was subordinate to his chief.
The VDB had an administrative and economic unit, which included the chief of technical supplies with an assistant for fuels and lubricants, military-technical and automotive equipment, a brigade quartermaster with chiefs of supply services (food and clothing), the chief of artillery supply and financial allowances. Each brigade had small warehouses (ammunition, food and clothing), artillery and automobile parts workshops. A medical center (14 people, an ambulance) was subordinate to the brigade doctor. The chiefs of artillery and quartermaster supplies, as well as the economic department (9 people), were subordinate to the supply commanders of the airborne forces and artillery battalions. The battalion (division) doctor headed the first-aid post (5 people).
The small rear units of the brigades and battalions (divisions) had limited capabilities. Logistic support of the 4th Airborne Forces was supposed to organize the rear of the Western Front (chief of the rear, Major General V. P. Vinogradov). However, the corps commander did not have any orders from the front regarding logistical support. The front command believed that in the conditions of short-term independent actions behind enemy lines, the corps would be provided with the material resources with which it was parachuted.
Landing delivery of vehicles for delivery and evacuation was not planned. It was assumed that they would be captured by the Germans in the landing area. But neither repairmen, nor a reserve of drivers for these cars were provided. Replenishment of the expense and loss of materiel by air after the landing was also not planned. The airfields did not have any reserve stocks of food. Due to the delay in the start of the landing, the units began to spend supplies intended for dropping to the rear.
The landing plan provided that all 65 allocated to the aircraft corps in 15 hours of darkness should make 2-3 flights at a distance of 180 km. The landing of units of the 4th Airborne Forces was planned to be carried out in two days. The calculations were based on favorable weather conditions, maximum crew stress, neither combat losses, nor aircraft failure due to technical reasons were taken into account. The necessary supplies of fuel for aviation were not accumulated at the initial airfields. No aircraft reserve was foreseen. The plan was clearly unrealistic: even with well-organized work of airfields and experienced aircraft crews, one flight took up to 4-6 hours. The reason for these and some other miscalculations was the lack of the necessary experience in planning the use of transport aviation in an airborne operation by the generals and officers of the command of the commander of the Airborne Forces, the Air Force, the headquarters of the front and the 4th Airborne Forces.
The landing began on January 27 at 14:30 from the Zhashkovo airfield with a parachute drop by two flights of PS-84 aircraft of the 2nd paratrooper battalion - the vanguard detachment of the 8th airborne brigade. In the first flight, 29 aircraft took part, in the second - only 17. Due to an error made by the crews, the battalion was thrown 15-18 km south of Ozerechnya from an altitude of 1500-2000 m (instead of 400-600 m). The paratroopers and materiel were scattered at a distance of 20-25 km around Tabora. Of the 648 who landed by the morning of January 28, 476 people were collected. In the designated place, it was also possible to concentrate about 30% of the airborne soft bags (PMMM) with food, weapons, ammunition and skis.
On the night of January 29, 500 pairs of skis, shells, mines, grenades, rifle cartridges and 400 drags were dropped by parachutes in the Ozerechnya area. After this flight, only 10-11 transport aircraft were in good condition. Some of the vehicles were shot down or damaged by the enemy in the air, others were destroyed at airfields, and some turned out to be faulty, largely due to the unsuccessful choice of the Kaluga airfield junction for the landing (located 40 km from the front, in the zone of active air and intelligence intelligence of the enemy), and weak observance in parts of measures of secrecy and concealment. All three airfields: in the region of Kaluga, Rzhavets and Zhashkov - were continuously subjected to enemy strikes, and the rising cars met enemy fighters.
In the current situation, transport aviation from January 28 began to make only night flights. On February 1, it was decided to stop the further landing of corps units from the Kaluga airfield hub. For six days of work, the transport aviation managed to drop 2,497 people (85% of the 8th airborne brigade) into the Vyazma region, as well as 34,400 kg of cargo (weapons, ammunition, food, skis, medicines).
The command of the 4th airborne brigade, units 9 and 214 of the airborne brigade and the remaining battalion of the 8th airborne brigade were returned by the command to the airfields near Moscow. Preparations began for the further landing of corps parts. From that moment on, the headquarters of the rear of the Western Front (chief of staff, Colonel D. S. Dollada), together with representatives of the directorates of the commanders of the Airborne Forces and VTA, began to prepare a plan for the rear support of the landing. The new plan was also changed and refined several times.
While planning new missions for 4 airborne forces, the headquarters of the Western Front and the command of the Airborne Forces took measures to prevent the repetition of the mistakes made earlier: the corps commander received intelligence about the Nazis in the area of the drop; the air group for the landing of the 4th Airborne Forces was reassigned to the commander of the Airborne Forces (41 PS-84 aircraft and 23 - TB-3); airfields near Moscow began to be reliably covered by the forces of the Moscow air defense zone; a reserve of aircraft was provided, before the start of the landing, a support group was sent to the landing area, with three radio stations and light alarms. The task of meeting the group was assigned to the commander of the partisan detachment.
However, mistakes could not be avoided. The landing began late and lasted 7 days (instead of three). Its sequence was broken. Many crews lost their bearings and dropped troops from high altitudes, with significant deviations from the designated areas. No radio stations were sent to the landing area. Numerous bonfires lit by paratroopers, partisans, our troops operating in the German rear, as well as by the enemy, disoriented the crews. Fearing a mistake, some crews (about 25%), having not completed their assignments, returned to the airfield.
Material support was organized as follows. Each paratrooper had with him three daily dachas of dry rations, 1-1, 5 rounds of rifle ammunition, two hand grenades, a corpse sword, a shovel or an ax. Heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank rifles, ammunition, supplies of medicines, medical equipment and skis were packed in a PMMM and thrown away simultaneously with the paratroopers. A reserve of weapons, as well as material resources in case of their losses, was not created.
The release of weapons, ammunition and other cargo was unsuccessful: far from the landing of the paratroopers and with a spread of up to 15-25 km. Some of the weapons, skis and other property were broken when hitting the ground, ice, trees - the inexperience of the paratroopers in packing cargo into parachute containers affected. The collection of goods was difficult in wooded and off-road conditions, deep snow cover and poor visibility (night, blizzard), as well as the opposition of the ground enemy and his aircraft. In the first two or three days after the drop, it was possible to collect only 30 to 55% of the dropped cargo. The situation demanded to organize the supply of materiel by transport aircraft from the initial airfields.
In March-April 1942, an average of 15-18 tons of materiel (ammunition - 80%, food - 12%, other cargoes - 8%) were supplied to 4 airborne ships per day, with a minimum requirement of 85-100 tons. were ammunition, which allowed the battalions and brigades of the 4th airborne forces to maintain combat effectiveness. In total, in the period from February 9 to June 19, 1942, in the interests of 4 airborne forces, air transport groups made 1,868 sorties, of which 1,376 (73%) were successful. A significant amount of all types of materiel was delivered to the paratroopers. At the same time, some of the aircraft returned to their original airfields without completing their assignments.
The multi-stage and complexity of managing the forces and means of various subordinate instances made it difficult to deliver by air (VTA and airfields were subordinate to the Air Force and Civil Air Fleet; transport gliders and handlers of PDT - Airborne Forces; towing aircraft - ADD; cargo and packaging were disposed of by the corresponding content services). Combat support of the VTA was organized by non-profit organizations, front headquarters, air force, air defense. The transportation was carried out by the headquarters of the rear of the Soviet Army and the front. Packaged goods were transported to airfields by central and district warehouses. They were loaded onto planes by non-staff teams from the warehouse service units. The sites for the dumping (unloading) of cargo were prepared by the troops to whom they were intended. They also collected the dumped material resources. There was a shortage of parachute containers, packing materials, parachute systems and parachute packing and cargo loading teams. It was not easy to organize the well-coordinated work of all links of this complex mechanism, especially since the enemy tried to disrupt it at all stages.
What could not be delivered by air was procured from local funds, and was obtained by fighting in enemy garrisons. Units of the 8th Airborne Brigade only in the battles on February 8 and 9 captured about 200 cars, 64 motorcycles and even several tanks and armored personnel carriers. Since there were no repairmen and drivers trained for the restoration and operation of cars, the trophies were destroyed, and horse-drawn carts and sledges were used as the main vehicle. Scoops and skis were also used. Frequently loads were delivered by carriers.
In the course of hostilities, a significant amount of food, weapons and ammunition was seized from the enemy (for example, a warehouse at the Ugra station). With the help of the local population, the paratroopers searched the forests for stocks of weapons and ammunition left by our retreating troops in 1941. Procurement of food from local funds was complicated, since its reserves were devastated by the enemy. In addition, many settlements hosted a large number of refugees from Smolensk and other places. For units of the 4th Airborne Forces and the First Guards Cavalry Corps, regional and district party committees allocated food resources from collective farms (up to seed funds). Meat products were replenished at the expense of personal cattle, which were confiscated by partisans from persons who worked for the enemy (in councils, headmen, police). District executive committees also requisitioned livestock from small-family citizens. At the same time, they were given written obligations to return it after the liberation of the region from the invaders.
The lack of material resources required the centralization of their distribution. At the headquarters of the 4th Airborne Forces, a non-standard body for managing the rear of the corps and two depots - ammunition and food were created. Hull depots were secretly deployed in remote, sparsely populated places and forests, in the center of the landing area, at a distance of 4-6 to 10-12 km from the line of contact. Not far from them, sites were being prepared for receiving supplies delivered by aviation, and a corps evacuation receiver was deployed for the wounded awaiting evacuation by aircraft to front hospitals. At the disposal of the head of the corps rear was the launch team, which provided the preparation of sites for the release of cargo and the landing of aircraft, as well as a team for the collection and protection of cargo, formed at the expense of the convalescent sick and wounded. Both teams often took part in battles.
Requests for materiel indicating the sites and terms of delivery of goods in cipher-radiograms were submitted to the front headquarters. The delivery was carried out by PS-84 aircraft, and in April-May also by light (U-2) and heavy (TB-3) bombers. The wounded were evacuated by return flights. The headquarters of the rear of the Western Front reported to 4 airborne forces by radio how much and what kind of cargo, when and to what sites it would be delivered, and in what packaging; the number and type of aircraft delivering; signals to designate landing sites. In the case of a parachute drop of cargo, the height of the drop, quantity, type and marking of the package were reported. Sometimes planes dropped cargo from low-level flight without parachutes.
Although, due to serious shortcomings in the work of the rear, unfavorable weather and the limited transport aircraft, the delivery of materiel by air was carried out with interruptions, it played an important role in providing parts of the 4th airborne battalion. So, only on March 20, 5 heavy machine guns, 10 82-mm mortars, 1,500 shells for 45-mm cannons, 900 82- and 50-mm mines, 200 kg of sanitary equipment, about 7-8 days of food supplies were delivered to the corps by parachute method. In April, the spring thaw began. Neither sleighs nor carts could be used to deliver supplies. I had to bring everything I needed in packs on horseback, and sometimes carry it on myself.
Material resources from the corps warehouses were fed to the brigade depots, and from them to the battalion depots. The battalions often received supplies directly from corps warehouses. Sometimes cargoes were dropped into the areas where battalion warehouses were located by U-2 aircraft from low altitudes, to the clearings and roads closest to the warehouse. Brigade depots were located in the center of the combat area, not far from the battle formations of battalions: in the offensive - 1-2 km, in the defense - 3-4 km. The warehouses were located in the forest and in ravines, sheltered from observation, convenient for defense. They were guarded by teams of convalescents. Around the warehouses, a circular defense was organized, observation posts, patrols, and patrols were set up. The personnel of the rear units were armed, in addition to submachine guns and rifles, grenades and machine guns.
During the period of raid operations and when leaving the encirclement, the air delivery of goods was seriously complicated. The corps applied while on the move. The frontal rear headquarters reacted slowly to incoming requests, and was often late with information about the delivery of goods by airplanes. Parts of the corps left for new areas, and the arriving planes looked for them in the old ones. Sometimes corps subunits could no longer collect the dropped loads. The crews, however, not finding the starting commands at the designated points, often returned to the airfields.
In order to increase the responsibility of the crews for the delivery of materiel to the paratroopers, the order obliged all cargo to be marked with the number assigned to the aircraft. The head of the rear of the front had to inform the recipients on a daily basis what goods, where, how and when they would be delivered. The recipients were obliged to immediately report when, what cargoes and under what numbers were received, which were not delivered, broken or dropped to the wrong place. The crews of the TB-3 were obliged to make one, and the PS-84 at least two sorties per night. Crews that deliver cargo well with airborne assault forces were ordered to submit for state awards, and all facts of failure to fulfill the assignments should be investigated. The measures taken have significantly improved the supply of the landing force. However, the intense battles that began at the end of May almost completely ruled out the possibility of planned aviation supply of airborne units.
The medical support of the operation had its own characteristic features. According to the states, each airborne brigade company was supposed to have a medical instructor; in the battalion's first-aid post - a doctor, paramedic, sanitary instructor, two orderlies, in brigade first-aid posts - three doctors, as well as a paramedic, chiefs of a pharmacy and laboratory, a sanitary instructor, an orderly and a driver. Medical staffing was incomplete. Most of the medical posts (60%) were dropped away from their units and formations, and for a long time could not serve the wounded. The collection of first-aid posts continued until March. Before the landing, medicines and medical equipment were divided into wearable supplies and supplies dropped by parachutes into the PMMM. Wearable supplies included three types of medical bags: a medical assistant's (outpatient, dressing) bag, a bag for medical instructors and orderlies, and a bag for additional supplies of dressing material. Each battalion first-aid post (BMP) was provided with a set of B-1 (bandages), B-2 (tires), an anti-chemical bag (PCS), as well as additional supplies of iodine and alcohol. All stocks were dumped in 4-5 PMMM. Some of the B-1 kits were dropped in ordinary bags without parachutes. The stretcher was tied to the PMMM from above. Each paratrooper was provided with two individual packages. The team's doctors received surgical instruments. After the landing, part of the equipment dropped into the PMMM could not be found, which greatly impeded the provision of assistance and evacuation.
Soon after being dropped by the decision of the corps commander, a corps medical service was created from military and civilian doctors, headed by a military doctor of the 2nd rank I. I. Molchanov. The front sent several doctors to strengthen the corps, and in March began to deliver canned blood, alcohol, ether. The sanitary service received part of the medical property from local medical institutions, as well as from the trophies captured from the enemy. The bandage was often replaced by parachute cloth.
With the help of partisans and local authorities, improvised hospitals were deployed in public buildings and private houses in places hidden and hardly accessible to the enemy. In the spring, hospitals were set up in the forest, in tents. They were guarded by teams of lightly wounded and convalescent ones. All the wounded were left with their personal weapons, and they were included in the combat crew of the all-round defense in case of an enemy attack.
The wounded were carried out of the battlefield by non-staff orderlies-porters of units, partisans, and local residents. From the mouths of the wounded, they were evacuated to the BMP deployed one and a half kilometers from the front line, and then to the BMP and further to hospitals, taking into account their specialization. The medical units lacked medicines, linen, soap, stretchers and vehicles. The lightly wounded usually got there on their own, the seriously wounded were transported on carts. Sometimes the wounded had to be evacuated manually on makeshift stretchers. Even with a lack of food, each wounded received daily 300 grams of rye bread, 200 grams of meat, potatoes and other products. Hot food was provided in first-aid posts and hospitals. When leaving the encirclement, some of the non-transportable wounded paratroopers handed over to partisan detachments. Later they were evacuated by plane to front hospitals. In total, about 3,600 wounded and sick passed through the corps hospitals. Of these, 2,136 (60%) returned from corps hospitals to service, 819 people were evacuated by aviation. Some of the wounded withdrew from the enemy rear along with the troops that had broken through.
The experience of the Vyazemsk airborne operation showed that the rear services of the airborne formations and units were few in number, poorly trained and in difficult conditions could not successfully solve the tasks assigned to them. On the agenda was the question of strengthening the rear units and strengthening the management level. In this regard, in August 1942, the position of deputy brigade commander for the rear was introduced to the headquarters of the airborne brigades. The chiefs of the artillery, military-technical, food and clothing supply of the brigade, the chief of financial allowances, and the brigade doctor were subordinate to him. The brigade contained four warehouses: food, artillery weapons, parachute and clothing items. According to the new staff, the brigade had an artillery workshop and a transport platoon.
Much of the experience of logistics support in the Vyazemsk operation was later taken into account during the Dnieper airborne operation, which took place from September 24 to November 13, 1943. So, to ensure the landing of the 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards. It was planned to attract significant forces of transport aviation - 180 Li-2 aircraft and 35 gliders. To supply the landing party with material resources after it was dropped at the airfields, one ammunition load of ammunition and two days of food were packed into the PMMM. The norms of the stocks held by the personnel in the warehouses of the airborne battalions and brigades were determined in advance. An aviation detachment of 10 U-2 aircraft was allocated specifically for the evacuation of the wounded, and a detachment of 25 Li-2 aircraft was assigned to deliver cargo to the landing party. Each paratrooper had food for two days and 2-3 ammunition loads.
At the same time, in the course of this operation, there were mistakes and miscalculations typical of the Vyazemskaya operation. Thus, the reconnaissance did not reveal a reliably German grouping in the area of the drop. The training of crews and units of military transport aviation continued to be weak. The landing was carried out by single aircraft, from high altitudes, with a significant deviation of the drop sites from the designated areas. This led to a significant dispersion of the landing troops and materiel. The experience of logistics support of the Vyazemsk airborne operation showed that for the leadership of units and agencies of the rear involved in airborne operations, a single centralized control body is needed, endowed with the appropriate rights, forces and means, that issues of logistics support for airborne assault forces must be coordinated in advance with the command and the chief of the rear of the formation, in whose interests the landing operation is being carried out.
The airborne corps needed not only the military, but also the airmobile corps rear. At the same time, the rear of the airborne formations must be ready for long-term autonomous actions, and the rear units for combat, both with a ground and air enemy. Regular delivery of materiel to the landing force by air is only possible if the enemy's air defense system is reliably suppressed in the flight zone of the military transport aviation. All these conclusions affected the further development of our airborne forces.
