In the first part, we examined the problem of oversaturation of air defense (air defense) through the massive use of air attack weapons (AHN). In many ways, this problem is solved by the use of missiles with active radar homing heads (ARGSN) as part of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), as well as the use of a large number of inexpensive short-range anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) as part of a short-range air defense system, whose cost can be comparable to the cost of EHV.
Unfortunately, ground-based air defense systems are faced with not only the problem of exceeding its capabilities to intercept targets. One of the most important components is the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and aviation of the Air Force (VVS).
The sad fate of ground air defense
The article "The Most Ineffective Weapon" provides several examples of how ground air defense groups were defeated by enemy aircraft (by the way, earlier the author drew somewhat different conclusions).
Operation Eldorado Canyon, 1986. The airspace over Tripoli was covered by 60 French-made Crotal air defense systems, seven C-75 divisions (42 launchers), twelve C-125 complexes designed to combat low-flying targets (48 launchers), three divisions of mobile Kvadrat air defense systems (48 PU), 16 mobile OSA air defense systems and 24 launchers of S-200 Vega long-range anti-aircraft systems deployed in the country.
A strike group of 40 aircraft broke through to all designated targets, losing only one bomber from air defense missile systems.
Operation Desert Storm, 1991. In service with Iraq, there was a significant number of Soviet-made air defense systems, supplemented by French radars and the Roland air defense system. According to the American command, the Iraqi air defense system was distinguished by a high organization and a complex radar detection system, covering the most important cities and objects on the territory of the country.
During the six weeks of the war, the Iraqi air defense system shot down 46 combat aircraft, most of which fell victim to heavy machine guns and MANPADS. This gives less than one thousandth of a percent of 144,000 aircraft sorties.
Operation Allied Force, bombing of Serbia, 1999. The FRY was armed with 20 outdated S-125 and 12 more modern Kub-M air defense systems, as well as about 100 Strela-1 and Strela-10 mobile complexes, MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery systems.
According to the NATO command, their planes carried out 10,484 bombing strikes. The only high-profile incident happened on the third day of the war: near Belgrade, the "invisible" F-117 was shot down. The second confirmed trophy of the Serbian air defense was the F-16 Block 40. Several RQ-1 Predator UAVs and presumably several dozen cruise missiles were also destroyed.
Can these incidents be considered an example of the fact that ground-based air defense is ineffective and not viable without air support? Most likely no. If we take the first two examples, Libya and Iraq, then one can doubt the statements of the American Air Force about their high level of organization and combat training. The creation of an echeloned air defense is one of the most difficult tasks, and the Arab states have always had problems with both combat training and the well-coordinated work of the military. Suffice it to recall the examples of the Arab-Israeli wars, when, after the first cases of the destruction of the air defense system by enemy aircraft, the calculations of the rest began to abandon their combat posts at the slightest sign of an air raid, leaving the air defense system to the enemy "at the mercy".
In general, several factors can be distinguished, as a result of which the air defense in the above cases was defeated:
- low level of preparation of air defense missile systems, and for the Arab states, you can still add sloppiness in the service;
- even if any calculation of the air defense missile system was well prepared, there are doubts that in the above countries, measures were taken to practice air defense actions on a national scale;
- used air defense systems for one or two generations were inferior to enemy weapons. Yes, the enemy could also use not only the latest aircraft, but also relatively old equipment, but the core of the aviation group, which carried out the suppression of air defense, consisted of the most modern military equipment;
- in the first part ("Breakthrough of air defense by exceeding its capabilities to intercept targets: ways of solving"), we took out of the brackets the electronic warfare (EW) systems, assuming approximately equal influence that they will have both from the ground air defense and from aviation of opponents equivalent in capabilities. In the given examples of the destruction of ground air defense, only the electronic warfare of the defending side was taken out of the brackets, and the attackers used it as much as possible;
- and, probably, the most important argument - there were much more of them (the attackers). The weight categories of the defenders and the attackers are too unequal. The NATO bloc was created to counter such a powerful adversary as the USSR. Only in the event of a full-scale non-nuclear military conflict between NATO and the USSR (or rather, with the Warsaw Pact organization) would it be possible to reliably assess the role of ground-based air defense in the conflict, understand its advantages and disadvantages.
Thus, we can conclude that Libya, Iraq, FRY lost not because ground-based air defense is useless, but because outdated air defense systems, with poorly trained crews, acted against the "system of systems" - an enemy that was utterly superior in combat training. the quantity and quality of the weapons used, acting according to a single concept, with a single purpose
Suppose that Libya, Iraq, or the FRY abandoned ground-based air defense, and instead purchased an equivalent number of combat aircraft in its place. Would this change the results of the confrontation? Definitely not. And it doesn't matter if these were aircraft made in Russia / USSR or Western countries, the result would be the same, all these countries would be defeated.
But perhaps their air defense was unbalanced, and the presence of an aviation component would help them to withstand the US / NATO? Let's take a look at examples of this interaction.
Interaction between air defense systems and combat aviation
In the USSR, working out the interaction of various types of troops was taken extremely seriously. The joint work of the air defense and the air force was practiced on such full-scale exercises as Vostok-81, 84, Granit-83, 85, 90, West-84, Center-87, Lotos, Vesna-88, 90 "," Autumn-88 "and many others. The results of these exercises in terms of the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and combat aviation were disappointing.
During the exercise, up to 20-30% of their aircraft were fired upon. Thus, at the Zapad-84 command-staff exercises (KShU), air defense forces of two fronts fired at 25% of their fighters, at the KShU Autumn-88 - 60%. At the tactical level, the air defense systems, as a rule, were given the command to fire at all air objects falling into the zones of fire of anti-aircraft missile units, which completely violated the safety of their aviation, that is, in fact, much more were fired at their aircraft than indicated in the materials of the analyzes.
The joint use of air defense systems and the Air Force in local conflicts confirms the danger of "friendly fire" for its own aviation.
Can we assume that in the event of a full-scale Russia / NATO conflict, without the use of nuclear weapons, the situation will change for the better?
On the one hand, highly effective control facilities have appeared that make it possible to combine information from ground-based air defense and air force aircraft, on the other hand, in a situation when in the sky, in addition to dozens of enemy aircraft and hundreds of guided munitions and decoys, there will also be own aircraft, and that's it. this, taking into account the active use of electronic warfare equipment by both sides, losses from friendly fire are not only possible, but practically inevitable, and it is unlikely that the percentage of losses will be less than that of command and control operations conducted in the USSR.
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that, based on open information about the ongoing military exercises, it is impossible to draw a conclusion about the development of full-scale interaction between ground air defense and air force aircraft in modern Russian armed forces.
Well, let's say, taking into account the above, we removed tactical aviation from the zone of operation of echeloned air defense, but then how to solve the problem of curvature of the earth's surface and uneven terrain?
AWACS and SAM aircraft
One of the ways to ensure the ability of ground-based air defense systems to "see" low-flying targets at a great distance is to pair them with a long-range radar detection aircraft. Significant time and flight altitude will make it possible to detect EHV at a great distance and transmit their coordinates to the air defense missile system.
In practice, several problems arise. Firstly, we have very few AWACS aircraft: 14 A-50s in service and 8 in storage, as well as 5 modernized A-50Us. Presumably, all aircraft of this type available to Russia should be upgraded to the A-50U variant. A new A-100 AWACS aircraft is being developed to replace the A-50. At the moment, the A-100 is being tested, the timing of its adoption has not been reported. In any case, many of these aircraft, unfortunately, are unlikely to be purchased.
Secondly, the resource of any aircraft is limited, and an hour of flight is extremely expensive, therefore, it will not work to provide the possibility of constant "hovering" of the AWACS aircraft over the positions of the air defense missile systems, and attracting AWACS aircraft occasionally means indicating to the enemy a convenient time for an attack.
Thirdly, at the moment, neither the A-50 nor the A-100 have announced the possibility of interfacing with ground-based air defense systems, with the possibility of giving them target designation. In addition, even if such improvements are implemented, the radar of the AWACS aircraft will be able to guide only missiles with ARGSN or thermal (infrared, IR) homing.
The Ka-31 AWACS helicopter is also not suitable for joint work with the air defense missile system, both because of the outdated filling and lack of interfacing with the air defense system, and because there are only two of them in the Russian Navy. By the way, 14 Ka-31 helicopters were delivered to the Indian Navy, and 9 Ka-31 helicopters to the Chinese Navy.
As a digression, we can say that even without taking into account the needs of the ground air defense and air defense of the navy, the Russian Air Force is in dire need of an inexpensive modern AWACS aircraft, such as the American E-2 Hawkeye, the Swedish Saab 340 AEW & C, the Brazilian Embraer R-99 or the Yak-44 carrier-based AWACS aircraft developed in the USSR.
What conclusions can be drawn?
Based on the above examples, it is impossible to say unequivocally that the modern layered air defense is guaranteed to be destroyed without the support of aviation. The presence of modern military equipment and professionally prepared calculations can radically change the situation. Combined with the capabilities of repelling a massive attack of the SVO, which are described in the first part, ground air defense is quite capable of creating an A2 / AD zone for the enemy.
The most important criterion is the comparability of adversaries in terms of technical excellence and the number of weapons and military equipment used. In the end, as the French marshal of the 17th century said. Jacques d'Estamp de la Ferte: "God is always on the side of the big battalions."
The interaction of ground-based air defense systems and combat aviation is an extremely complex organizational and technical measure. Presumably, the simultaneous operation of ground-based air defense systems and fighters, in the range of air defense missile systems, can lead to large losses of their aircraft from "friendly fire". The situation may worsen with the massive use of electronic warfare by both sides.
AWACS aircraft are too expensive and few in number to "tie" them to the positions of the air defense missile systems, according to available information, the AWACS aircraft existing in the Russian Federation currently do not have the ability to issue target designations to air defense missile systems.
To eliminate losses from "friendly fire", the interaction of ground-based air defense systems and Air Force aircraft must be spread out in space and in time. In other words, in the event that ground-based air defense is conducting combat operations, i.e. reflects the raid of enemy aircraft, it is necessary to prevent the presence of their aircraft in the reach zone of ground-based air defense systems.
How much will this affect the ability of the air defense missile system to repel an enemy attack? First of all, it is necessary to understand that the very presence of combat aviation will not allow the enemy to form a strike group, optimizing it only for attacking ground-based air defense systems. To exert pressure on the enemy of its aviation, it is not necessary to enter the zone protected by the air defense system. Enemy air force aircraft may be attacked in advance, before entering the area of action of ground air defense, or there may be a threat of retaliation on the retreat route, when the air group has fired at the air defense system and has already lost some of its aircraft.
The threat of a counter strike on the route of advancement for an attack by an air defense system or a retaliatory strike after its completion will force the enemy to change the composition and armament of the air group, optimizing them simultaneously both for destroying the air defense system and for countering aviation, which will reduce the total capabilities of the air group to solve both problems. This, in turn, will simplify both the work of ground-based air defense systems and their own combat aviation. In the event that the enemy optimizes its air group for air combat, its own combat aviation can use ground-based air defense zones for cover, forcing the enemy to either risk falling under air defense system fire, or spend more fuel on a safe route around the ground air defense.
