The article is the final part of a series of publications in the journal "Foreign Military Review" about the peculiarities of the formation of the professional military in the United States, their role in the management of the armed forces.
Military intellectuals of the "post-classical era". American specialist in the field of military sociology Morris Yakovitz does not see anything surprising in the fact that quite a few outwardly looking "guys-grunts" and "martyrs" representatives of the American generals in reality were intellectually developed personalities, which clearly contradicts the thesis cultivated in certain circles of specialists about, as a rule, "the military has a low level of intelligence."
To the above named so-called. The category of American classics of military affairs in terms of the importance of contribution to the development of the armed forces adjoins the more than once mentioned General Practitioner George Marshall, as if throwing a bridge from the era of American military classicism to the modern era of the development of military science, more practical and pragmatic.
It is no coincidence that J. Marshall occupies one of the highest places in the hierarchy of US military leaders. Possessing an outstanding natural mind, he also had a wealth of life and work experience. Having started an active military career as an officer-surveyor and surveyor, he then trained reservists, served in various positions in the American ground forces, studied the course of hostilities during the Russo-Japanese War, being seconded to Manchuria, until he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army, having served before this appointment for only three years in the rank of general. During the Second World War, he was rightfully considered one of the architects of the Allied victories on the Western Front. His outstanding abilities were highly appreciated by such different in nature politicians-presidents such as F. D. Roosevelt and H. Truman.
His abilities as an organizer, business acumen and versatility allowed J. Marshall to successfully cope with the duties of Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense after the war. He was not the sole author of any outstanding theoretical works in the field of military art, but each publication under his name, whether on military topics or in the field of international relations, aroused and continues to arouse genuine interest among both military professionals and specialists. internationalists and historians.
Another prominent figure in the post-classical era of American military science is President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a professional military man, a five-star general, and a distinguished hero of World War II. Ike, as friends called the future president in his youth, and then in wide circles of American society, graduated with honors from West Point, standing out among his fellow students with a genuine interest in the works of military classics, especially Clausewitz. Like many outstanding officers, already in the first years of his service, he was faced with a lack of understanding of his zeal in learning the intricacies of military affairs on the part of his superiors. So, in his memoirs, he described such a case. After his article was published in the November issue of the Infantry Journal in 1920, Ike's direct superior, Major General Charles Farnsworth, complained to him that his “ideas are not only wrong, but also dangerous, and that henceforth keep them to yourself. “In particular,” writes Hayk, “I was denied the right to publish anything contrary to the current infantry doctrine.” Nevertheless, the young officer was not discouraged and, continuing to show interest in theory, embodied what he had learned into life, rapidly advancing in his career. Already in the course of World War II, having taken the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower caused considerable confusion to the British, who initially favored the appointment of an American general to the highest position in the military coalition in the hope that he would devote himself entirely to resolving political problems, and the strategic plan will be left to the decision of the British.
But they were grossly mistaken. In a gentle but persistent form, Ike managed to push through more than once, as it turned out later, the right decisions, despite the often sophisticated intrigues of the allies. In the end, the British, including Prime Minister W. Churchill, fully trusted the military talent of the American general. But Hayk's high intelligence manifested itself not only in the military field. George Kennan, one of the well-known US statesmen in the recent past, recalled that when, at one of the meetings in the White House, specially convened on the initiative of President Eisenhower, the problem of the ability to pay of the economy as a basic element of national security and the need to include this provision in the national security strategy was raised, "Hayk has proven his intellectual superiority over everyone who attended this forum."
American analysts reasonably include such generals as George Patton, Omar Bradley, Creighton Abrams, John Shirley Wood, Admiral Arthur W. Radford and some others among the galaxy of intellectual commanders who showed themselves positively during the Second World War.
The personality of J. Patton is very curious. At his mention, the image of a very eccentric military leader usually appears, from an early age, while still a cadet, who has established himself as a person prone to extraordinary deeds. A dashing cavalryman, a member of the 1916 expedition to Mexico, a hero of the First World War, who was retrained as a tanker. During the Second World War, it was he who was entrusted with solving the most difficult tasks, including the rapid reconstruction of the combat capability of the 2nd Army Corps defeated in North Africa. He was an outstanding athlete, participant, from the USA, 12th Olympic Games, finished fifth in the pentathlon. With all this, he was known as a poetry lover, an insatiable book reader, an admirer of military art, a collector of rare books … He left his descendants an exhaustive analysis of the operations of the Second World War.
He expounded his extraordinary thoughts on the art of war in numerous articles, lectures and, finally, in the classic work "War as I understand it." Another honored general of the Second World War, Omar N. Bradley, walked hand in hand with J. Patton both in service and in life. Despite the completely different temperament, characters (Bradley, unlike his colleague, was known as a very restrained person who knew how to get along with both his superiors and subordinates), the curiosities of the service, when there was alternate subordination of one to the other, both generals respected each other to a friend, generally sharing views on the fundamental provisions of military science and its implementation. O. Bradley was not a participant in the First World War, guarding mines in the piece during this period. Montana, but by perseverance in the knowledge of military affairs, was able to reach high posts, consistently passing all the steps of the military hierarchical ladder up to the chairman of the KNSH. The importance of his opinion on current and future military-political problems is evidenced by the fact that during his four years of presidency, O. Bradley met with the president 272 times and participated in 68 meetings of the National Security Council, which is considered unprecedented to this day. His contribution to the development of the theory of leadership in the armed forces is very noticeable. Thus, he owns the now well-known thesis that “leadership is invariably and unprecedentedly important; no weapon existing or invented in the future can replace it. The title carries only formal power and emphasizes only the formal position of the commander. To become the unconditional authority of subordinates, a commander requires more than a high rank and exemplary bearing. He must inspire confidence in those he leads. The same commanders who rely only on the outside of the leadership are doomed to failure, they are unable to be real leaders."
Singling out from among the generals of the post-classical era of American military science individual representatives claiming the title of intellectuals, one cannot fail to mention such an outstanding personality as the four-star General Creighton Abrams. By the way, the first and so far the only one in the history of the US Army, who died in his office at his desk on an autumn day in 1974. With a solid military experience from the Second World War and the Korean War, highly revered by his fellow generals and subordinate officers, who gave him the warm nickname "Abe", this serious and intelligent officer could not stand "leaning out" and "lecturing." He calmly, without annoying anyone, led the headquarters of the US Army. At the same time, the general's performance was simply phenomenal. Major Denis Reimer, who in a couple of decades himself became the Chief of Staff of the Army, recalled that Abrams, already “being sick and being at the headquarters for no more than 2 hours a day, nevertheless, during this time did a much larger amount of work than other young 10 generals for the whole day! " Quite infrequently, but with great resonance, General Abrams spoke to wide audiences, both military and civilian, wrote articles and pamphlets, in which he analyzed not only "the affairs of the past", but also proposed constructive solutions to pressing problems.
Deliberately limiting the list and characteristics of representatives of the highest generals of the US Armed Forces, one cannot fail to mention such outwardly harsh commanders as Matthew Rogers, a linguistic lover who taught French and Spanish for a long time at West Point, but also tactics, or who died in 2008 28- General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the US Army, who became famous as NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, is a very outstanding personality who amazed the environment, both military and civilian, with his extensive knowledge in many areas.
In addition to high-ranking intellectual commanders revered in the American armed forces, tactical generals who have proven themselves not only on the battlefield are often cited as role models. American analysts include, for example, the division commander during the Second World War, John Shirley Wood and Maxwell Taylor, and the commander of the unit during the Vietnam War, William Depewy, to such intellectual generals. The first, J. Sh. Wood, like most American officers traditionally, in the years of his officer's youth was known as an excellent athlete, a desperately brave soldier, awarded the "Cross for Impeccable Service." As the commander of the 4th Armored Division in the first echelon of the 3rd Army, led by J. Patton, he brilliantly participated in the liberation of France. The famous British military historian B. Liddell Garth bestowed upon him the nickname "Rommel of the American Panzer Troops" and described him as "one of the most determined tank commanders in World War II." But this is at the top of his military career. It is known that at the age of 16 he entered the University of Arkansas, where he successfully studied chemistry. But life turned so that he ended up in a teaching job at West Point, where he gained fame as a tutor, pulling up the lagging cadets to the required level, for which he even received the nickname "Pi" (from "professor"). He became interested in the theory of the use of armored forces, wrote many articles on this topic, was a very erudite, interesting conversationalist, knew several foreign languages, read the theoretical works of Charles de Gaulle and Heinz Guderian on the use of tanks in originals."
General Maxwell Taylor was akin to Voodoo. The same dashing, well-built officer who was thrown into Italy in 1943 behind the front line to carry out a secret mission, and during Operation Overlord already in 1944 landed in the rear of the German troops in France as commander of the 101st Airborne Forces. But in the interwar period, Taylor devoted himself entirely to philology and linguistics, studied and taught himself. He mastered several foreign languages deeply enough, having written two fundamental works. For some time he worked as president of the Lincoln Fine Arts Center in New York, and already in the post-war period he was entrusted with the most difficult mission of the American ambassador to Saigon during the period of the Vietnam War, which was catastrophically for the United States.
General W. E. Depewy, participating in the Second World War, became famous for having received the informal title of "the best battalion of the US Army". After the war, he was going to resign from the ranks of the Armed Forces, but the service, as they say, sucked him in giblets. Among the best he graduated from several educational institutions, but at the same time he always repeated that the main path of knowledge is self-education. Working in headquarters of all levels in leadership positions, he tried to break the routine analytical work of the officers-operators, who, in his words, “delved too much into the details,” without first covering, not understanding the essence of the whole concept in its entirety. As a divisional commander in Vietnam, Depewy accumulated a huge amount of impressions and experience, which he actively tried to summarize, generalize, analyze and issue to the leadership of the Armed Forces as one of the conceptual foundations of the military reform that took place after the end of the Vietnam War. Much of his theoretical research was published as a separate book, Selected Works of General DePewey, in Leavenworth. It was he who was assigned in 1973 to head the famous school of military thought - the Training and Military Research Command of the US Army (TRADOC).
Naval officers and admirals in the US Armed Forces, as in other countries, differed from their colleagues from the Army and the Air Force by a higher level of education due to incomparable special traditions (fostered in the British "gentleman" fleet and widely spread in the fleets of the rest states). Against the background of the "green-gray mass" of officers of the ground and air forces, they always seemed like intellectuals temporarily donning military uniforms. This cultivation of the special inner content of naval officers and their corporate psychology was facilitated by the long separation from the civil and military centers of civilization, the inevitability of a long and forced stay in officers' collectives closed for external penetration, where the rules of honor and a high level of culture were indisputable requirements and the law of being. But all this could not but give rise to some alienation of the sailors from their colleagues in the military department and even some arrogance. The reaction from the army officers was similar in relation to them.
Be that as it may, there were always more admirals-intellectuals in the US Armed Forces in percentage terms than in other branches of the armed forces. Bearing in mind the purpose of this work and not particularly spreading along the tree, let us recall only two of them.
Distinguished Battle Admiral Louis E. Defield, who served as Chief of Staff of the United States Navy from 1947 to 1948, has left his mark on history as a passionate supporter of integrated naval development. As a naval theorist and practical admiral, his "strong point" was the naval aviation. His countless speeches on this topic both in the media and at official briefings, meetings, etc., on the one hand, earned him authority, and not only among fellow sailors, but, on the other, caused serious discontent with sides of the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the service department. Of course, this admiral's career did not go well, but his reasoned ideas and proposals, in particular, concerning the development of naval aviation, nevertheless made their way into life, being later enthusiastically supported by congressmen.
Another extraordinary personality of the American fleet was Arthur U Radford, Battle Admiral, the pinnacle of his career was the position of chairman of the KNSh, in which he demonstrated his highest level of education and intelligence. In the most difficult discussions with opponents, mainly with colleagues from the military camp, he had to demonstrate the timeliness and logic of the unpopular cuts in military spending, demonstrating knowledge and strategy, tactics and economics, so that “today these funds can be redirected into business, and later, after a certain number of years, they (funds) will return to the same Armed Forces, but in the form of new weapons and military equipment modern by that time”. S. Hundington, comparing the two first chairmen of the KNS O. Bradley and A. Redford, emphasizes that “they were both people of exceptional nature, intelligence and energy … In six short years they managed to turn their department (KNS) into the most authoritative body of state power. They were samurai in spirit, but military statesmen to a greater extent than just military advisers to the country's leaders. " American experts point out that only the vigorous activity of Colin Powell at the turn of the 80s-90s of the last century, when he had to "change the vicious traditions of interspecies egoism" United Armed Forces ".
American analyst Ward Just emphasizes: "The American army never had Clausewitz, since writing a work like" On the War "takes time and requires serious thought …", which is supposedly not inherent in the American national military character. In other words, America is incapable of producing military geniuses. However, this passage does not look as convincing and relevant today as, for example, 200 years ago.
In the nineteenth century, there was a theory, very popular both in Europe and in North America, according to which the generals as such are the product of the implementation of military geniuses. The ability to command troops was recognized as akin to art, such as music or sculpture, where natural talent is needed. Therefore, supposedly military competence cannot be learned: it is a product of purely subjective factors that exist against the will of the people.
It is easy to see that these arguments are from the area of the so-called. the theory of the elect, for example, by birth of aristocrats, according to which a person is already born as a commander. Further in life, only his polishing is going on. With the departure from the arena of the social life of the aristocracy in developed societies and the various theories of exclusiveness accompanying it, the theory of military geniuses has gone nowhere.
At the same time, the role of talent in military affairs, which is a component of natural data, intensive training and self-education, no one dares to refute. The Duke of Wellington, an outstanding statesman and commander of Great Britain, the conqueror of the French, once remarked that "the appearance of Napoleon among the troops on the battlefield can only be compared with the reinforcement of 30 thousand bayonets." The general professionalization of the military since the second half of the nineteenth century, specialization in their training in the most natural way began to produce masses of capable officers, from whom talented military leaders were later formed. Germany served as a role model for almost all the armies of advanced states, where, as one of the organizers of the modern military education system in the United States pointed out at the beginning of the 20th century, “the training of officers and their honing through the General Staff system is aimed not at the formation of a super-soldier or a genius, but at those who simply carry out their duties clearly”.
Something similar, at least declaratively, exists in the United States. In any case, as a result of the reform of military education, initiated by the Minister of War I. Ruth at the beginning of the twentieth century and completed by the beginning of the First World War, the US Armed Forces began to replenish with fairly well-educated officers. But, on the one hand, realizing the correctness in modern conditions of such a setting, the public wants to see in officers, and even more so in generals, individuals who can be confidently entrusted with children, sons, daughters and who, with their inadequate actions, will not bring trouble to their country, but hence, on the layman himself.
In Western societies, IQ tests have been used to determine the intelligence of a person for a long time. If we proceed from the fact that for most people it fluctuates between 90 and 110 units, and for the great scientist Isaac Newton it was only 130 units. (which is considered a mediocre result), then, according to the Stanford-Bynet criteria, for some prominent figures who had or are related to military affairs, this coefficient fluctuates within the normal range and even higher: Schwarzkopf - 170 units, Napoleon - 135, R. Lee - 130, Sherman - 125, J. Washington - 125, G. Nelson - 125, G. Cortes - 115, Joachim Murat - 115, US Grant, F. Sheridan and G. Blucher - 110 each.
But from this, some harsh critics of the generals conclude that this indicator can in no way be called the only "criterion of mental development." Recently testing US Army Brigadier Generals in a Team Skills Development Course at the Creative Leadership Center in Greensboro, PA. North Carolina averaged 124, which was rated as "almost certainly not enough" by the Center. These data were transferred to the leadership of the ground forces for analyzing the situation with the state of intelligence of the future command personnel of the service of the Armed Forces and taking appropriate measures.
In modern conditions in the US Armed Forces, two contradictory tendencies coexist among senior officers: on the one hand, the cultivation of an alleged axiom about the absolute superiority of practice over “fruitless theorizing,” and on the other, the widespread propaganda of the drive to gain knowledge.
The aforementioned American analyst Matthews Lloyd quotes from a speech by Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray at a meeting at the Pentagon, published several years ago in the Colorado Springs Newspaper Telegraph: “There are too many intellectuals at the top of the US military today …, But old-fashioned warriors are required who like a good slaughter, and not abstract reasoning”.
Another, moreover, a very honored four-star general, whose name is not named, somehow, casually, told the same M. Lloyd that, they say, he had never read anything except the contents of his mailbox. And in that, and in another statement, of course, a lot of posture and bragging. However, this is also evidence of a demonstrative disrespect for intellectual activity.
Meanwhile, the British Admiral G. Nelson, revered by the American military, once noticed that “although many admirals and officers behaved courageously in battle, sometimes even showed reckless personal courage, they instantly deflated when faced with a choice of decision. The reason for this was an elementary lack of education and a lack of the habit of thinking."
Or one more statement on this score, no less appreciated by the American military, Napoleon Bonaparte: “The calculations required to solve problems on the battlefield were carried out by Newton, but when a choice needs to be made immediately, only a highly trained brain can guarantee that this choice is correct.
Noting the fact that the first trend prevails in the modern American military environment, the famous military specialist Theodore Crackel bitterly emphasizes that “if Clausewitz and Jomini served today in the American armed forces, their lot would be teaching in some school, and then in for no more than three years, and then quiet retirement. " Former chairman of the KNSH David Jones, in principle supporting the pessimistic mood of his colleague, clarifies: "Most likely, under our system, today Clausewitz would have risen to the rank of colonel, and after 20 years of service he left as a civilian scientist in some scientific institution." To a certain extent, M. Lloyd emphasizes, the words of both analysts are not far from the truth.
In reality, the departments of American military educational institutions are filled to capacity with professional intellectuals, but they are, as it were, locked up in the educational and scientific block and have too little chance, even if they wish, to enter the office, forced to dismiss with the rank of lieutenant colonel, at best - colonel.
Moreover, opponents of "excessive intellectualism" complain that recently, the alleged possession of an academic degree has become fashionable and even obligatory for getting into the military elite. Armed Forces higher education institutions are already competing for greater coverage of their graduates with master's degrees for work in the field of strategy. It is expected, concludes M. Lloyd, that soon it will become mandatory to have two degrees - civil and military, in order to insure against early dismissal and at best guaranteed to become a general. On the one hand, one can understand the officers who have dedicated their lives to the armed forces and who fear being overboard after only 30 years of service, or even earlier. On the other hand, this process is more reminiscent of the "unhealthy collecting" of degrees, titles and titles, which in no way supposedly testify to the true level of intelligence of its bearer.
Other experts do not see any particular negative in this, but rather even believe that working on a dissertation, whether you like it or not, still adds intelligence. It is negative, in their opinion, that the de facto division of the officer corps into "purely theoreticians" and "purely practitioners" has already taken place in the US Armed Forces. Retired General William R. Richardson drew the attention of retired General William R. Richardson back in June 2001 at a conference on improving the quality of ground forces command personnel, which was held within the walls of the command of educational and scientific research of the ground forces, without a proper reaction, however, from the audience. If, according to an analysis carried out in the early 1950s by John Masland and Lawrence Redway, only one third of the generals' corps, which numbered about 500 in the Army, served "in the field", and the remaining two thirds - in the administrative, technical and teaching positions, now this proportion has changed for the worse, naturally, not in favor of the commanders of combat formations.
Supporters of military "intellectualism" usually counteract the fact that over the past decades, even with significant reductions in the armed forces, the proportion of combat and service (their) formations has changed in approximately the same way. (But here there is deceit, because in accordance with the well-known and universal, but unspoken law, or tradition, with the reduction of troops, the number of generals always decreases disproportionately). In addition, not every grunt general can correspond to a staff, in fact, intellectual activity. And the abrupt, almost landslide inclusion in staff work at all levels of information technology, as practice shows, simply discourages military commanders, who, due to the rotation, find themselves in sometimes completely "unwanted" staff positions.
Opponents also do not hesitate to express sharply critical remarks about the commanders-practitioners and their fierce defenders. Analyzing the reasons for the incompetence of many military leaders, retired Lieutenant General Walter Almer states that often "an officer who has shown himself well at the tactical level of leadership, and even after gaining some experience and learning, may turn out to be completely dysfunctional at the strategic level." Another specialist, Colonel Michael Cody, echoes his senior colleague's point by emphasizing that “the practice of military service has legitimized the tradition that if an officer succeeds at a lower level, he will automatically be able to handle duties at a higher level. ". At the same time, the experience of World War II, the Vietnam and Korean Wars was allegedly completely forgotten, when sergeants called up from the reserve, showing themselves at their best as platoon commanders and even companies, showed complete incompetence, finding themselves in battalion headquarters. According to M. Lloyd, the history of wars is full of examples of major failures, when the corps and sometimes the army were entrusted to successful brigades and even division commanders. Obviously, a higher level of leadership also requires a broader outlook, in addition to purely military knowledge, the ability to navigate in the field of politics, diplomacy, economics, regional geography, and finally … As Clausewitz said, a commander, while remaining a soldier, must to a certain extent also be a statesman … At the same time, the lawyers of the commanders-practitioners nod at Moltke Sr., who somehow cynically stated that, they say, “sometimes it takes the loss of an entire division to train one major general”!
In fact, it turns out that, as a rule, intellectuals devoid of "impudence" "plow" in not prestigious positions, having little chance of making a constructive contribution to the general climate of the influential army environment. Meanwhile, the "practitioners" are methodically advancing towards the monopolization of general positions. John Hillen, a Gulf War veteran, author of military professionalism and military ethics, and a former member of the bipartisan national security analysis group, commented as follows: … They are good guys, they are just great guys, they are even heroes! But I am sincerely convinced that they feel more comfortable with the Bass Fishing magazine (a publication for fishermen) in their hands than with a book on military theory …"
But try to destroy this vicious order of things! In this connection, a specialist in the field of military history Robert Bateman cites the following imaginary algorithm for the behavior of a senior leader when he thinks about dismissing a negligent general: “First, a conclusion is made about the worthlessness of General X; further analyzed the numerous political and other consequences in the event of his dismissal; a decision is made not to dismiss this general. "Moreover, the analyst concludes, only in his memory presidents Johnson, Nixon, Bush Sr. and Clinton faced such a situation. And only the first two managed to bring the matter to its logical conclusion a couple of times."
As if in continuation of this topic, another critic of the American generals shares the following conclusions from his analysis. So, according to his calculations, in 2002, 330 generals served in the US ground forces, which is enough to form a battalion without service units. Having 10-11 equivalent divisions in the SV, the country simply does not need so many army generals. Yes, it’s just that, with all the desire, allegedly not to find the appropriate positions, but practical campaigners will definitely make it so that positions are found or appear. The command will have to appoint warrior generals to positions where it would be appropriate to keep an intellectual general, but the former take priority.
It is comforting that, as M. Lloyd writes, “even in the darkest times of anti-intellectualism, a healthy army organism has always squeezed out of itself intellectual generals, such as E. Goodpeister, W. Depewy, G. Sullivan, and others, who were guided by the postulate that "reform is not a swear word and that professional disagreement with a boss is not a manifestation of disrespect." And the supporters of the general intellectualization of the American military leadership, and even the advocates of the tough practicality of the American generals, unanimously admit that the armed forces, rejecting constructively thinking officers, isolating themselves from innovative ideas, depriving the officer environment of the possibility of intellectual self-reproduction, will inevitably sip the bitterness of defeat on the battlefield. "Only constant training and experience in the aggregate form a successful general," D. H. Mahan emphasized the absolute authority of military science in the United States.
The above analysis, of course, does not exhaust all the features of such a complex topic as the emergence, formation and functioning of the professional military as a separate social group in the system of social relations in the state, in this case the United States, where military construction is carried out according to a specific, historically established model. received in the scientific and journalistic literature the definition of "Anglo-Saxon". As in the alternative "Prussian (or Soviet) model" of the military structure, the professional military, especially the generals, being in the focus of increased attention from society, have always been, are and will be the object of constructive, sometimes biased, criticism, formally declared, the purpose of which, with good intentions, is to ensure the appropriate level of combat readiness of the armed forces led by them as the main element of the national security of a particular state.
