In the past, the PRC leadership focused on ballistic missiles in the implementation of nuclear deterrence plans. In addition to strategic and tactical missile systems, the PLA Air Force has about a hundred Xian H-6 bombers - carriers of free-fall nuclear bombs. This rather old aircraft is a "Chineseized" Soviet bomber - Tu-16.
H-6 bomber with suspended cruise missile
In 2011, the upgraded Xian H-6K was adopted. This aircraft has implemented a set of measures designed to increase the combat potential of the bomber. The H-6K is powered by Russian D-30KP-2 engines, and a new avionics and electronic warfare system has been introduced. The combat load has increased to 12,000 kg, and the range has been increased from 1,800 to 3,000 km. The N-6K is capable of carrying 6 CJ-10A strategic cruise missiles, which were created using the technical solutions of the Soviet Kh-55.
However, the modernization did not make the N-6K a modern machine. Its combat radius, even with long-range cruise missiles, is absolutely insufficient for solving strategic tasks. A subsonic, bulky, low-maneuverable aircraft with a large EPR in the event of a real conflict with the United States or Russia will be extremely vulnerable to fighters and air defense systems.
Several years ago, information appeared about the development of a promising long-range bomber in the PRC. But, apparently, it is not necessary to expect the adoption of a modern Chinese long-range aviation complex in the near future.
This daunting task turned out to be very difficult for the Chinese aircraft industry. Apparently, wanting to save time, China turned to Russia with a request to sell a package of technical documentation for the Tu-22M3 bomber, but was refused.
For a long time, the main Chinese carrier of tactical nuclear charges was the Nanchang Q-5 attack aircraft developed on the basis of the Soviet MiG-19 fighter. Approximately 30 vehicles of this type out of 100 in service have been modified for the use of nuclear bombs.
Attack aircraft Q-5
Currently, Q-5 attack aircraft as carriers of tactical nuclear weapons are gradually being replaced in the PLA Air Force by Xian JH-7A fighter-bombers.
Fighter-bomber JH-7A
In the early 2000s, the PRC began the construction of a full-fledged naval component of the strategic nuclear forces. The first Chinese nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles (SSBN) "Xia" pr.092, created on the basis of the "Han" class nuclear submarine, was laid down back in 1978 at the Huludao shipyard. The submarine was launched on April 30, 1981, but due to technical difficulties and several accidents, it was only put into operation in 1987.
Chinese SSBN 092 "Xia"
SSBN project 092 "Xia" was armed with 12 silos for storing and launching two-stage solid-propellant ballistic missiles JL-1, with a launch range of more than 1700 km. The missiles are equipped with a monoblock warhead with a capacity of 200-300 Kt.
The Chinese nuclear submarine "Xia" was not very successful, and was built in a single copy. She did not conduct a single combat service as an SSBN and did not leave the internal Chinese waters for the entire period of operation. Thus, the Xia SSBN can be regarded as a weapon in experimental operation, unable to fully participate in nuclear deterrence due to its weak tactical and technical characteristics. Nevertheless, it played an important role in the formation of China's naval nuclear forces, being a "school" for training and a "floating stand" for technology development.
SSBN 094 "Jin"
The next step was the Jin-class 094 SSBN, developed in China to replace the outdated and unreliable strategic 092 Xia-class submarine. Outwardly, it resembles Soviet missile carriers of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin". Type 094 submarines carry 12 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) of the JL-2 type (Tszyuilan-2, Big Wave-2) with a range of 8,000 km.
When creating the Chinese two-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile JL-2, technical solutions and individual assemblies of the Dongfeng-31 ICBM were used. There is no exact data on the warheads of the JL-2 missile.
Satellite image of Google Earth: Chinese SSBN type 094 "Jin" at the base in the Qingdao region
The first submarine formally entered service in 2004. Satellite images suggest at least three more Jin-class SSBNs. According to Chinese media reports, the 6th submarine of this type was launched in March 2010. According to some reports, the commissioning of all 094 Jin SSBNs is delayed due to the unavailability of the weapons complex.
Satellite image of Google Earth: Chinese SSBN type 094 "Jin" at the base on the island of Hainan, the covers of the missile silos are open
China began putting new Jin-class strategic nuclear submarines on patrol in 2014. Patrolling was carried out in the vicinity of the territorial waters of the PRC under the cover of surface forces of the fleet and naval aviation, and, most likely, was of a training nature. Given the fact that the range of the JL-2 SLBM is not enough to engage targets in the depths of the United States, it can be assumed that real combat patrols far from their native shores will meet with serious opposition from the US Navy's anti-submarine forces.
Currently, the PRC is building SSBN pr. 096 "Teng". It should be armed with 24 SLBMs with a firing range of at least 11,000 km, which will allow it to confidently hit targets deep in enemy territory while under the protection of its fleet.
Given the economic growth of China, it can be assumed that by 2020 the country's naval forces will have at least 6 SSBNs of pr. 094 and 096, with 80 intercontinental-range SLBMs (250-300 warheads). Which roughly corresponds to the current indicators of Russia.
At present, the PRC is actively improving its strategic nuclear forces. In the opinion of the Chinese political leadership, in the future, this should deter the United States from trying to resolve disputes with the PRC with the help of armed force.
However, the improvement and increase in the quantitative indicators of strategic nuclear forces in the PRC is largely constrained by the insufficient amount of nuclear materials required for the production of warheads. In this regard, the PRC has officially launched a project for the technical transformation of 400 tons of nuclear fuel elements, which should lead to a twofold increase in uranium production.
There is a methodology that allows you to roughly represent the number of nuclear warheads in China. According to various sources, from the late sixties to the early nineties, Chinese enterprises produced no more than 40-45 tons of highly enriched uranium and 8-10 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Thus, in the entire history of the Chinese nuclear program, no more than 1800-2000 nuclear charges could be produced. Despite advances in technology, modern nuclear warheads have a limited shelf life. The United States and Russia were able to bring this parameter to 20-25 years, but in the PRC they have not yet achieved such success. Thus, the number of deployed nuclear warheads on strategic carriers is no more than 250-300 units and the total number of tactical ammunition no more than 400-500 looks most likely in the light of the available information.
Estimated number of Chinese missiles according to the US Department of Defense as of 2012
The potential, it would seem, is modest in comparison with the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation. But it is quite enough to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike by the People's Liberation Army of China and conduct large-scale military operations with the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the armed forces of any nuclear power.
The radius of action of the BR of the PRC
Noteworthy is the presence in the PRC of the Second Artillery Corps in service with a significant number of mobile DF-21 airborne missiles (more than 100). These complexes are practically useless in the confrontation with the United States. However, they cover a significant part of the territory of our country.
The nuclear missile systems in service with the PRC, created in the 60s and 70s, due to their low combat readiness, survivability and security, cannot yet ensure the delivery of a retaliatory counter strike or a sufficiently powerful retaliatory strike.
As part of the modernization of its strategic forces, China is moving from obsolete liquid-propellant missiles to new solid-propellant ones. The new systems are more mobile and therefore less vulnerable to enemy attacks.
But the production of new mobile systems is going very slowly. The weak point of Chinese ballistic missiles is still not a very high coefficient of technical reliability, which partly devalues the achievements in this area.
By all indications, Chinese mobile systems are more vulnerable than Russian ones. Mobile launchers of the PRC are the largest Russian ones, have the worst maneuverability and require more time for pre-launch procedures before launch. The central regions of the PRC, unlike Russia, do not have large forests where missile systems could hide in the daytime. Their maintenance requires significant human resources and not a small amount of auxiliary equipment. This makes the rapid movement of mobile complexes difficult and relatively easy to detect by space reconnaissance means.
Nevertheless, the PRC continues to spend huge funds and resources not only on the direct creation and improvement of new types of ballistic missiles, but also on the further development of directly nuclear charges of a new type. If in the 70s and 80s the few Chinese ICBMs with a CEP of about 3 km were equipped with megaton monoblock thermonuclear charges, which made them typical "city killers", then modern Chinese ICBMs carry multiple independently targetable warheads with a capacity of up to 300 Kt with a CEP of several hundred meters …
It should be noted that with the presence of the United States in Central Asia, part of China's nuclear arsenals ended up in the zone of influence of US tactical aviation. In this regard, a significant part of the Chinese strategic nuclear forces, on a permanent basis, is located in underground shelters cut in the rock, in the mountainous regions of the PRC. Such an arrangement provides in peacetime protection from satellite reconnaissance means, and in wartime, to a large extent guarantees invulnerability in the event of a surprise attack. In China, underground tunnels and structures of considerable area and length have been built.
It is assumed that Chinese mobile missile systems will wait there for nuclear strikes against the PRC, after which they must move out of cover for two weeks and deliver extended strikes against the enemy, thus guaranteeing the inevitability of nuclear retaliation. The delivery of a simultaneous nuclear missile strike by all strategic nuclear forces of the PRC requires lengthy preliminary preparation. This discrepancy was the main reason for the change in views on the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons by China.
According to the official military doctrine, the PRC undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But in recent years, the military leadership of the PRC has already begun to admit the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. This can be done in such extreme conditions as an unsuccessful border battle and the threat of complete defeat of the main PLA groupings, the loss of a significant part of the territory with the most important administrative and political centers and economic regions that are of strategic importance for the outcome of the war.a real threat of destruction of strategic nuclear forces by conventional means of destruction (which is extremely unlikely, given the state and number of the PLA).
The further scientific, technical and economic growth of the PRC, while maintaining the current rate of development, will provide its strategic nuclear forces in the coming decades with the possibility of delivering retaliatory and counter and counter nuclear missile strikes. So the new quality of the Chinese military machine is not far off.
