This section is dedicated to looking at specific ships destroyed ahead of time and assessing the full severity of the loss, depending on combat capabilities.
Aircraft carriers
And immediately there is a sharp contrast between the United States and Russia. There are two extremes, two poles of attitude towards your own fleet. Russia lost 4 aircraft carriers of Project 1143 ahead of schedule. The Americans - none.
Yes, the author is aware of what the Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers were. There is no need to repeat all the features of this project for the hundredth time. There is no need to try to prove the uselessness of these ships and the benefits of their premature decommissioning. The author is well aware that the ships were controversial, their operating conditions were difficult, and their combat capabilities were modest. Only this does not negate the fact of their early sending to the trash heap. In an extreme case, there is such a word - "modernization". A thrifty owner does not make simple and quick decisions in relation to such expensive and complex products. At the very least, different options could be worked out. Preserve until better times. Well, the Indian restructuring project of project 11434 shows what could be done if desired. Only in those years it was not interesting to anyone. Much more interesting was the price of scrap metal.
The total score is 4: 0 in favor of the USA.
Oceanic ships
The most painful loss of the Soviet side can be considered the decommissioning of Project 1134 ships of all modifications. Yes, the combat capabilities of the pure 1134 without the letter were very modest, and most likely the modernization is not advisable. But "A" and "B" are quite young ships, excellent representatives of the class. They could well have been modified for modern tasks. An example of this is the BF modification. As the experience of "Ochakov" shows, the ships of Project 1134B could remain in service today.
The second heavy loss was the ships of the 956th project. All fleet lovers are well aware of the problems with the energy of this type of ships. But again, the problem is terrible not because it exists, but because of the unwillingness to solve it. For some reason, this problem did not exist until 1991. And in the Chinese Navy, four representatives of this project feel quite well.
In the USA, the most serious losses were suffered by destroyers of the Spruance class. 17 ships of the series were decommissioned under the age of 25. Destroyers were truly outstanding ships, allowing modernization and development from the outset. In the 80s, they received vertical launchers, some of the ships received the ability to fire the Standart missile defense system, and in the 2000s, several more ships even received the latest RAM air defense systems. Nevertheless, the entire series was decommissioned, although individual members of the class could well remain in service today. At the same time, they would not look like absolute dinosaurs against the background of more modern ships of the Arlie Burke type.
In addition, the US Navy chose not to modernize the first 5 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, although there were no fundamental obstacles to this. It can be assumed that the reason for their early write-off was the lack of money for modernization, and standardization required a departure from beam-guided launchers.
The only class of ships that should not be regretted are the Kidd-class destroyers, originally created according to the requirements of the Iranian Navy, and requisitioned by the Americans for their fleet. Obviously, some "export" foreignness initially impeded full modernization, and the ships were quickly sold to Taiwan.
In general, he draws attention to the fact that even the early dismantled US ships have a longer service life (20-22 years), while their Soviet opponents went on pins and needles at the age of 17-19.
Score 26:22
Ships of the near sea zone
The least sensitive loss of the USSR was the SKR project 159A. Despite their relative youth, they were clearly an outdated project, the modernization of which was hardly advisable.
19 ships of Project 1135 and 1135M were scrapped with an average age of 19 years. These were solid ships, with fairly strong anti-submarine weapons. The installation of the Uranium anti-ship missile system on one of the ships in the series demonstrated how the ship's strike capabilities could be enhanced. In any case, in the patrol class it was a solid, reliable ship.
21 small missile ships of projects 1234 and 12341 also seriously weakened the combat capabilities of the Navy in the near zone. Unlike the United States, Russia has a need for a certain number of such ships, since in the border seas we are opposed by the US allies in NATO. They do not have large ships, and corvettes and missile boats form the basis of their combat power. Norway is a typical example. A symmetrical response to this threat was the corresponding Soviet forces - MRK and RCA. Therefore, their premature write-off is quite painful for the Russian Federation.
Well, and a sad record - 46 ships of projects 1124 and 1124M. One of the most effective anti-submarine ships of the Soviet Navy. Of course, they did not have enough stars from the sky, possessing weak air defense, but their use presupposed the proximity of the coast and air support. The anti-submarine capabilities of these ships were quite adequate, and the tactics of their use have repeatedly shown their high efficiency. The search for the submarine was carried out on the foot at the point of duty, when its noises were minimized. And after establishing contact, the ship at full speed approached the target, conducting an additional search for the second GAS. Coastal aviation could be called at the same time. From the point of view of the modern day, the value of such ships may not be great - it is more economical and wiser to protect their waters using a stationary detection system (like the American SOSUS), without wasting fuel and crew time. But in the 90s, these were still quite dangerous ships for the enemy.
The United States built frigates, which, by and large, cannot be considered ships of the "near" sea zone, since their main task was to protect oceanic convoys from Soviet submarines in the event of a global war. As soon as the danger of a global battle disappeared, the United States began to get rid of all ships of the class.
Regretting the Knox-class frigates can be very conditional. They did not have special reserves for modernization, the placement of vertical launchers on them would hardly be possible. Their average age was 22 years, which is clearly more than their Soviet counterparts.
But the Americans did not dispose of O. Perry class frigates so actively. In the 90s, they got rid of 21 fairly new frigates, and this, of course, from the point of view of common sense, looks premature. Then the process of decommissioning this class of ships was stopped, and the remaining units served until 2011-2015. The last ships of the series were scrapped in 2015, having served an impressive 30 years.
Total score 86:21
Missile boats
The United States practically did not build ships of this class, and therefore there is nothing to compare. The only representative of the Pegasus class, in fact, experienced ships. Based on American interests, this is hardly a serious loss.
On the part of Russia, the most sensitive loss is the decommissioning of Project 12411 boats with rather powerful strike weapons of 4 Mosquito missiles. There is no point in regretting the boats of Project 205U - 10 boats written off under the age of 25 were clearly outdated.
But the boats of the project 12411T had every chance to undergo modernization with the replacement of the Termites with the same Mosquitoes or Uranus. Nevertheless, 9 boats were written off ahead of schedule. The hydrofoil boats of the 206MR project could undergo the same modernization.
In total, the loss of 30 boats has become quite painful for Russia.
Minesweepers
The United States got rid of mine-sweeping missions almost completely at the height of the Cold War, pushing this "not tsarist" business onto its European NATO allies. But they continued to build a certain number of ships of this class. Nevertheless, they did not pay much attention to them, and with the end of the Cold War, even such relatively young ships as the Osprey were gradually got rid of. Also after 2010, several more serious minesweepers of the Avenger class were decommissioned.
The USSR had no one to push the mine-sweeping business on, and therefore we built a lot of minesweepers. And by the end of the Cold War, a huge number of them had been accumulated, including very outdated ones. Minesweepers, in general, are ships that have been living for a long time. their equipment may be updated during service. Nevertheless, in the 90s, a large number of relatively new sea minesweepers of Project 266M and even more basic ones, Project 1265 were decommissioned. It is not worth regretting the ships of Project 266 "without a letter", their average age was 24 years. they were old enough.
Total score - 57:13
Landing ships
The only loss of the US Navy "ahead of time" among the amphibious forces was the Newport-class tank landing ships. Frankly, it is difficult to characterize this loss in terms of benefit or harm. The ships were quite controversial in design and almost did not fit into the concept of "battle for landing" adopted in the United States with its massive vertical coverage and transshipment of equipment using the DKVP. On the other hand, by the standards of the landing force, these were not yet old ships.
The USSR did not have such powerful amphibious forces. All the early decommissioned "paratroopers" were equally important, tk. it was the set of relatively small ships that created a more or less impressive force. This was in line with the concept of using the landing force - unlike the United States, we were going to land as part of "assisting the coastal flank of ground forces" - that is, not far from their shores, with a short passage by the sea, but on the move - straight to the shore with tanks and armored vehicles. It is customary to criticize this concept today, pointing to the United States, but this is a topic for a separate conversation.
Final score 19:18
Submarines
The submarine fleet of the USSR suffered the most tremendous losses.
Among diesel submarines, the most serious is the loss of six Project 877 boats. Outdated Project 641B boats, written off ahead of schedule in the amount of 15 pieces, are less significant losses, although these ships could still bring some benefit. For example, as a curtain at previously prepared positions near their shores.
The nuclear forces have lost as many as 48 ballistic missile submarines! In principle, one can not regret about them, the reduction of nuclear weapons is inevitable in any case. However, the experience of the United States speaks of the possibility of changing qualifications - rebuilding SSBNs into carriers of cruise missiles or special means. In the USSR, similar work was carried out within the framework of the 667AU projects. Another thing is that it is simply impossible to convert all boats of the type 667A in the amount of 19 pieces and 667B in the amount of 15 pieces into carriers of CD and underwater vehicles. So these ships in any case should have suffered irreparable losses. To a lesser extent, this applies to projects 667BD and -BDR. But the boats of Project 941 could still serve. And it is not necessary to cite their supposedly titanic dimensions as a counterargument - for a submarine carrier of a KR or SSBN, this is not essential.
Among the carriers of cruise missiles, the ships of projects 670M, 949 and 949A became a premature loss. True, the former did not quite meet the noise requirements. But they were simple, inexpensive and very reliable ships, which could well still benefit, if not in the hunt for the enemy's AUG, then at least in creating tension for the US allied fleets in the coastal seas.
Among the torpedo nuclear submarines, the Project 705 ships became an inevitable loss - their advanced and not very successful design, with huge maintenance costs, made their decommissioning inevitable. Besides them, the ships of Project 671 "without a letter" were quite outdated and noisy boats. But the premature destruction of the ships of projects 671RT, 671RTM and 971 can only be called sabotage.
As for the United States, its losses against the background of the USSR can be counted indiscriminately. Moreover, all US submarines were quite perfect and were almost always ahead of Soviet submarines in terms of equipment and noise levels.
Total score 62:24
Final conclusions
So now we can place our final grades. Let's repeat the previously made discoveries and add new ones.
Russia lost about 1200 thousand tons of displacement of modern ships, 85% of which fell on the era of Yeltsin's rule. At the same time, construction was reduced by 5-8 times. As a result, the fleet has lost a significant share of its combat capability and has ceased to be renewed. The United States utilized only about 300 thousand tons of displacement of modern ships and reduced the construction of new ones by about 30%, due to which the number of their fleet is decreasing extremely slowly, and the renewal with the infusion of fresh blood has never stopped.
In addition, we can now also state that 254 ships and submarines under the age of 25, which still had significant potential, were forcibly destroyed. This loss of the most valuable units is in fact a crime against the country's defenses.
At the same time, we must admit that the premature destruction of still combat-ready ships took place in the United States, but on a disproportionately smaller scale. The Americans wrote off about 98 important military units ahead of time, i.e. 2, 6 times smaller than Russia.
Now we can not only assert that everything was "bad" in the 90s, but in relation to the navy, we can support this emotional statement with concrete figures. In addition, we can make a political assessment of all the events described above. In the Gorbachev era, the reduction of the fleet can still be explained by some common sense, for example, the desire to reduce the military burden on the economy, end the Cold War and get rid of the obsolete junk of weapons accumulated in the previous 30 years. But the period of Yeltsin's rule deserves an unequivocal negative assessment that cannot be revised, like the results of the Second World War. It was during this period that the fleet was forced to destroy modern and combat-ready units in unprecedented quantities, and the industry almost completely stopped production. After coming to power V. V. Putin's situation has not changed radically, but on the whole, the course towards the speedy collapse of the fleet has obviously ceased to be the idea and goal of the authorities. The processes of thoughtless destruction of still combat-ready weapons were slowly slowed down, ending around 2010. The construction of new ships, although resumed, is proceeding at a completely insufficient pace, which cannot but grieve. And although there has been a slow growth in the combat strength since 2011, there is still nothing to rejoice in. So far, we are talking only about reaching the "bottom" and ending the continuous decline since 1987, but not about a decisive revival.
Used sources:
Yu. V. Apalkov: "Ships of the USSR Navy"
V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky: "Soviet Navy 1945-1995"
