It all began with the coming to power in the USSR of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. To retell for the hundredth time what happened to our country after that is a routine and uninteresting occupation. Therefore, let's go straight to the point. The task of this work is to understand how strongly the end of the Cold War influenced the reduction of the naval composition of the fleets of the warring parties - the USA and the USSR. Is it appropriate to talk about the collapse, early write-off and degradation of the Russian Navy in comparison with similar losses (if any) in the United States?
To an older reader, who survived the 90s on his own skin, the very formulation of the question will seem absurd: after all, everyone knows about the collapse of everything and everyone, about the reigning chaos and devastation. What can you talk about and argue about here? Everything is obvious and has been known for a long time! The author of this article is no exception.
However, you need to pull yourself together and take the place of an impartial researcher. It is obvious that all of us who survived the 90s are in the position of victims. And the victims, as you know, are not only in a special emotional state, but also tend to greatly exaggerate the tragedy of their situation. It's not their fault, it's just that fear has big eyes. Therefore, a legitimate question arises: was everything really that bad in the 90s? Compared to what is "bad" really "bad"? Compared to the 80s? Compared to modern times? Compared to the situation in the United States at the same time periods?
Indeed, who of those who lament the collapse of our Navy in the 90s objectively analyzed the reductions in the US Navy? But what if their cuts are even larger than ours? It turns out that then our losses are not so huge if the end of the Cold War hit our opponent equally painfully. Here it is, an action-packed detective - an investigation into the losses of the American fleet!
Another question: if the reduction really was a landslide, then is it not a consequence of objective processes? For example, the simultaneous disposal of a large amount of obsolete weapons. Then this is just an inevitable situation, and there is no need to talk about some kind of catastrophe.
Veterans of the Soviet Navy, as well as other patriotic readers, I ask you not to close this article after reading above. The most interesting will be ahead.
Investigation technique
To answer all the questions formulated above, you need to study and calculate all the changes in the naval composition of the US Navy and the USSR. At the same time, two processes are taking place - the replenishment of new ships and the decommissioning of those that are out of order. Between these two streams is the current state of the fleet - its combat strength. Thus, the task is reduced to careful consideration of these two streams.
The work turns out to be so voluminous that it requires the acceptance of certain conditions and assumptions. This is normal, because any measurement has its own error, its own tolerances. While dealing with this topic, the author faced a number of serious obstacles that formed these restrictions. We list them below.
- The calculations take into account all warships and submarines built after 1950, as well as earlier ones that were decommissioned after 1975. Thus, the study period is 1975-2015.
- The total displacement of ships is used as the main indicator in the calculations. This is due to the fact that for a number of US ships in foreign sources, only this indicator is indicated and there is no standard displacement. Searching outside the available databases is too laborious. In order for the calculations to be fair for both sides, it was also necessary to take into account the full displacement for the calculations for the USSR Navy.
- Very scarce information in available sources about post-war torpedo boats of all projects and missile boats of project 183R. They are excluded from the calculations. However, missile boats of later types (205, 205U, 12411, 206MR) were taken into account, because for the Soviet side, they were an important factor in combat power in the coastal zone.
- All warships with a total displacement of less than 200 tons, as well as landing ships with a total displacement of less than 4,000 tons are excluded from the count. The reason is the low combat value of these units.
- The date from which the warship ceased service in its original capacity is taken as the date of withdrawal from service. Those. ships that were not physically destroyed, but reclassified, for example, to a floating barracks, will be considered decommissioned at the time of transfer to the PKZ status.
Thus, the backbone of the combat strength, taken into account in the received data set, includes aircraft carriers and aircraft carriers, submarines, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, BOD, SKR, MRK, MPK, RCA, minesweepers and landing ships with a displacement of more than 4000 tons.
The results are presented in Table 1. As you can see, the table is quite difficult to understand. Therefore, we will divide it into several stages. Let us present the same information in the form of table 2 - the average values for five-year periods.
Table 3 shows the current value of the total displacement of ships and their number. Data are taken at the end of the year.
Already from these data, one can notice an interesting feature - the USSR Navy has more ships, but their total displacement is less than the American one. This is not surprising: almost half of the USSR's naval staff was occupied by light forces - MRK, MPK and boats. We were forced to build them, since the threats posed by the European allies of the United States in the coastal seas were significant. The Americans made do with only large ocean-going ships. But the "small" forces of the Soviet Navy must be taken into account. Despite the fact that these combat units were individually weaker than foreign frigates, they still played a significant role. And not only in the coastal seas. RTOs and IPCs were regular guests in the Mediterranean, South China and Red Seas.
First step. The height of the cold war (1975-1985)
1975 was taken as the starting point. The time of the established balance of the Cold War. Both sides by this moment, so to speak, have calmed down. No one dreamed of a quick victory, the forces were approximately equal, there was a systematic service. Hundreds of ships were on alert in the seas, constantly monitoring each other. Everything is measured and predictable. The scientific and technological revolution in the navy took place long ago, and no new breakthroughs were foreseen. There was a methodical improvement of missile weapons, the combat strength was slowly growing. Both sides are not going to extremes. One word is stagnation.
The tables show how the planned development of the fleets takes place without noticeable distortions in the direction of utilization, or, conversely, a sharp construction. Both sides are commissioning roughly the same tonnage, but the US is somewhat more occupied with recycling. This is due to the incapacitation of a number of aircraft carriers and cruisers during the Second World War in 1975-1980.
Overall figures show that in 10 years both sides have increased the tonnage of their fleets by about 800,000 tons.
Second phase. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR (1986-1990)
1986 is marked by an increase in the utilization of ships in the USSR. Compared to 1984, it has more than doubled. But an even more dramatic leap is seen in 1987. In the USSR, the mass disposal of ships begins, reaching record numbers by 1990: 190 ships with a total tonnage of more than 400 thousand tons. Unprecedented scale.
In the United States, similar processes begin with a lag of several years, and the leap is less global. By 1990, the United States reaches the level of 250 thousand tons and 30 ships. This is 5 times more than the average level in previous years. However, in the USSR, such a jump is even stronger - 10 times.
How to explain this situation? First of all, the connection with the change in the leadership of the USSR is obvious. The undertakings of Gorbachev and the new commander of the Navy, Chernavin, towards winding down the Cold War are bearing some fruit. It is clear that the load on the economy from the side of military vehicles was enormous for both the United States and the USSR, and reductions were inevitable. In the context of that historical period (the end of the 80s), it is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion about the harm of such reductions - on the contrary, it should rather be welcomed. The only question is how these reductions are carried out, but this will be discussed later. For now, we will only note that with the beginning of disarmament in the USSR, a gigantic, unprecedented company for the disposal of ship stock begins, and that the United States is joining this campaign several years later. Obviously, only after they were convinced of the veracity of the USSR's intentions to begin reductions. And what is especially important, even having started similar reduction processes, the United States is in no hurry to overtake its Soviet partner in this matter - the write-off in general is 2 times less.
As for the replenishment of the fleets, both in the USSR and in the USA the volume of commissioning of new ships during this period continues to grow slowly. As a result, the started reductions do not have a strong effect on the combat strength: the total number of fleets is slightly decreasing, but not too sharply.
Stage three. Disarmament on the wreckage of the USSR (1991-2000)
The first years after the liquidation of the USSR, the new Russia adheres to the previously chosen course of mass utilization. Although the 1990 record has not been surpassed, the figures initially hovered around 300 thousand tons per year. But the construction of new ships looks like a car hitting a concrete wall - a sharp slowdown. Already in 1994, 10 times fewer ships were commissioned than in 1990. Mainly the Soviet legacy is being completed. It is not surprising that a 10-fold increase in the volume of utilization combined with a 10-fold decrease in the volume of construction leads to a gradual decline in the number of combat personnel. Over the 90s, it has decreased by more than 2 times.
The United States, as noted above, is in no hurry to overtake Russia. The Soviet record for recycling in 1990 was surpassed by the United States only in 1994. Further, the volumes are gradually decreasing. It seems that parity with Russia is now clearly visible. But this is only if you do not pay attention to the construction of new ships. And although it is declining in the United States, it is not as catastrophic as in Russia. The reason is clear: in conditions when your former opponent is desperately decommissioning his weapon, you can not strain too much. However, the numbers speak for themselves: in the United States, construction has not stopped, and even in relation to Russia it has increased many times. As a result, the total strength of the US Navy is declining very smoothly and insignificantly. If in Russia the decline is 2 times, then in the United States it is only 20% from 1991.
Stage four. Stability (2001-2010)
2002 becomes a record year for Russia: not a single new warship has been commissioned. The Soviet reserve as a whole was completed in the 90s, and there is nothing more to be introduced. And those crumbs that have not yet been completed are actually stopped in construction. The volumes for disposal are also drying up: almost everything that can be written off has already been written off, so the volumes continue to decline smoothly. The total size of the fleet has been decreasing by 1.5 times over 10 years. The fall is smooth, but continuous.
In the USA, in the same 10 years, the volume of utilization is also slightly decreasing, but remains 2-3 times higher than in Russia, for the first time in history during the period under study. But at the same time, construction remains at a fairly high level. Compared to RF, it is fantastic 30-40 times higher! All this allows the United States to renew the combat composition of the fleet, and its total number is dropping just as smoothly - by only 7% in 10 years (while in the Russian Federation the drop is 1.5 times). The total tonnage of the US fleet exceeds the Russian one by 3.5 times, although back in 1990 the lag was 1, 4 times.
Fifth stage. Volatile growth (2011-2015)
The last 5 years have been characterized by very low utilization volumes. There is simply nothing to write off, it seems. But with construction there is the first, still unstable growth. For the first time since 1987 (!) The volume of commissioning of new ships has exceeded the volume of dismantlement. It happened in 2012. Thanks to a certain revival of construction over these 5 years, the total number of combat personnel even increased, having gone through the bottom in 2011 (again, for the first time since 1987).
In the United States, the previously detected trend continues: a gradual decline in the number, preservation of moderate volumes of construction and write-offs. For 5 years, the combat strength of the US Navy has decreased by only 2, 8% and still exceeds the Russian one by about 3 times.
Preliminary findings
So, we have identified the main processes in the field of recycling and replenishment of ship stocks in 1975-2015. We can summarize preliminary results. But for now we will try to get around the decisive marks. We are just stating the facts.
Since 1987, both countries have launched massive arms reductions. The USSR confidently began this process first and resolutely, without regard to partners, increased the volume of utilization. The United States was more cautious and increased the volume of reductions only after the USSR. At the same time, both sides maintained the volume of construction of new ships. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia continued the process of reductions, but at the same time stopped construction. Following the Russian side, the United States in the same period (with a previously noted delay) increased the volume of dismantling, but did not abandon the construction of new ships. Further, Russia, having reached the bottom in 2011, gradually reduced the volume of write-offs to a minimum and made a timid attempt to resume construction (after 2012). At the same time, the United States reduced both construction and decommissioning volumes, while maintaining the overall high size of the fleet.
Photos used:
