MODERN ZONES OF RESTRICTIONS AND NON-ACCESS AND MANEUVER "A2 / AD" - DIFFICULTY STRUCTURED DEFENSE FRONTIERS WITH A NETCENTRIC LOOK. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE BALTIC “A2 / AD-FENCES
Today, the truly Western term "A2 / AD", which denotes the operational-strategic concept of limiting and prohibiting the access and maneuver of enemy sea, ground and air combat assets using conventional weapons, is increasingly on the agenda of most analytical agencies and military departments of North American states. and Europe. It partially takes root with us. The Pentagon, as well as the European Command of the US Armed Forces and the NATO Command in Europe have long formed a considerable list of A2 / AD zones in various conventional theaters of operations, an attempt to "break through" which could result in unacceptable damage for the North Atlantic Alliance for the continuation of hostilities. In the European theater of military operations, this list is represented by the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, the borders of the Baltic states with the Republic of Belarus, as well as the Republic of Crimea. At all these lines, a powerful "anti-aircraft / anti-missile umbrella" was erected from the S-300/400 air defense system, overcoming which by NATO tactical aviation forces would lead to huge losses in dozens of strike fighters.
A similar "A2 / AD-barrier" was also built directly on the sea section of the Baltic conventional theater of operations, where several dozen batteries of the K-300P "Bastion-P" and 3K60 "Ball" anti-ship systems are opposed to the surface ships of the NATO OVMS, capable of launching two powerful echelon of several hundred super-maneuverable 2, 3-fly anti-ship missiles 3M55 "Onyx" and subsonic Kh-35U "Uranus". No known NATO aircraft carrier strike group supported by the best air defense missile defense frigates and destroyers of the Daring class (Type 45), Sachsen (project F124) and Arley Burke can cope with such a number of "smart" elements of high-precision weapons. To repel the "star raid" of Russian anti-ship missiles, together with the Kh-31AD / Kh-58 anti-radar missiles launched from tactical fighters 2, 5 and 4, the NATO Naval Forces simply do not have enough total target channel of multifunctional radars that control anti-aircraft missile complexes SM-2, PAAMS ("Sylver") and SM-6.
Moreover, the proximity of the Baltic coast of the Leningrad region makes it possible to actively use ground-based electronic reconnaissance / electronic warfare systems 1L267 "Moscow-1", "Krasukha-4", etc., capable of suppressing the work of active radar homing heads of anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" and RBS-15Mk3, launched at surface ships of the Baltic Fleet of Russia. Support from ground-based electronic warfare systems in the open sea is impossible, therefore, all defense tasks fall exclusively on shipborne air defense systems and electronic warfare systems. The proximity of the coastal military infrastructure with friendly EW units in a network-centric war is the first important advantage of the littoral zone of restriction and denial of access and maneuver "A2 / AD" in comparison with a similar zone located far from its own shores.
The second significant tactical feature of the A2 / AD zone, installed in the Gulf of Finland and the southern part of the Baltic Sea, is the possibility of using ultra-low-noise diesel-electric submarines, project 877 "Halibut", project 636.3 "Varshavyanka" and etc. 677 " Lada ". In terms of acoustic secrecy, these submarines are ahead of even the most modern multipurpose nuclear attack submarines such as "Sea Wolf", "Shchuka-B", etc. 885 "Ash". Consequently, they are capable of approaching NATO naval strike groups at a distance of a couple of tens of kilometers, after which an underwater launch of 3M54E1 Caliber or 3M55 Onyx anti-ship missiles can be carried out. The emergence of a whole "swarm" of Russian anti-ship missiles in the immediate vicinity of the KUG of the United Naval Forces of NATO will be a real surprise for the operators of enemy shipborne air defense systems.
The combat information and control systems of surface ships will have a minimum of time to take missiles for escort, capture, as well as further open fire. In the conditions of the open sea / ocean, the use of diesel-electric submarines in underwater mode will be extremely limited by a short cruising range and the need to ascend to start a diesel power plant and recharge batteries. Surfacing on alert by P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft and MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance UAVs scanning the water surface for the presence of our submarine's cuttings and snorkels may be an extremely risky necessity. As you can see, the creation of the “A2 / AD” zone in the littoral area has a number of advantages.
DEFENSE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE PLA IN THE SOUTH OPERATIONAL DIRECTION BEFORE THE START OF STRENGTHENING ANTI-AIR AND ANTI-WATER "KOSTYAKOV" IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF THE AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING THE US AIR FORCE STANDARD FOR CONFRONTING WITH CHINA
A similar list of zones "A2 / AD" is compiled by the Pentagon and for the Asia-Pacific region. They belong exclusively to the People's Republic of China. To date, these zones cover almost all of the waters of the Yellow and East China Seas (from the eastern coast of the PRC to the territorial waters of Taiwan and Japan in the disputed Spratly archipelago), which are part of the "first chain" of the strategically important borders of the PRC in the Pacific direction. The "First Chain" is a near 300-500-kilometer border in accordance with the "Three Lines" concept described in the PLA White Paper. Most of the operational and tactical aspects envisaged by the Three Chains concept for at least another fifteen years will fully correspond to the realities of a possible Sino-American conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, it is too early to put the section of the Chinese zone "A2 / AD" in the area of the disputed Diaoyu and Spratly archipelagos on a par with similar operational-strategic "barriers" of Russia in the Baltic and Kola operational directions. The US naval forces, together with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, are doing everything possible to infringe on Beijing's regional ambitions even in the near sea zone of the "first chain", not to mention the borders of the "second chain" Guam-Saipan. Official Washington, having received a convenient and "irrefutable" alibi, which consists in protecting the pro-American states of the APR and Southeast Asia from the "missile threat" from the DPRK and Beijing's territorial claims, has opened a real carte blanche for large-scale militarization of this unpredictable region. But the United States is not going to limit itself to just covering the aforementioned states. The main goal of carte blanche is to create an advanced military infrastructure of a strike profile, designed to "break through" the main defensive lines of the People's Liberation Army of China in the event of an escalation of a regional conflict.
To this end, the US Navy is regularly strengthening the operational and tactical capabilities of the 7th Fleet, the main objects of which are represented by the large naval bases of Yokosuka (Japan) and Apra (Guam). As can be seen from the example of the North Korean "nuclear program", any jump in the degree of tension in the region leads to the arrival in this part of the Pacific Ocean of two or three reinforced aircraft carrier strike groups consisting of 3 aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz" class (in the future, "Gerald Ford" will be added), 3-6 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and about 6 Arleigh Burke-class EVs.
Specialists of the US Department of Defense are well aware of all the risks associated with the possible activation of the Chinese fleet and air force in the Pacific theater of operations and off the coast of Indochina, and therefore they insure themselves through the technological adaptation of the Australian Tyndall airbase for the unlimited basing of the B-1B Lancer strategic missile-carrying bombers. These plans were repeatedly reported in 2015-2016 on Western news resources. "Lancers" make it possible to deliver pinpoint strikes with tactical long-range missile systems AGM-158B JASSM-ER on the military infrastructure on the island of Hainan, as well as on the entire southern coast of the PRC from the borders located over the central part of the South China Sea.
At the same time, the number of hardpoints makes it possible to place on each B-1B up to 24 cruise missiles of this type, while the B-2A "Spirit" units are designed for only 16 JASSM-ER, which makes the former an ideal strategic strike complex for carrying out a massive missile and air strike from ultra-low heights. Moreover, despite the "silence" of official sources in the Pentagon and Boeing, which today maintains and modernizes these "strategists", they can also be used for "decapitating" anti-ship operations against Chinese ship and aircraft carrier strike groups, where "a single caliber "Will be the long-range stealth anti-ship missile AGM-158C LRASM, developed on the basis of the JASSM-ER. So, 20 "Lancers" are carriers of 480 inconspicuous anti-ship missiles LRASM or KR JASSM-ER, which will be a very strong argument even taking into account the presence of the Chinese Navy's advanced EM URO Type 52D, equipped with BIUS H / ZBJ-1 and multi-channel shipborne SAM HHQ-9 …
An equally revealing detail is the previously announced plans to transfer strategic air tankers KC-10A "Extender" to the same AvB Tyndal. Now almost everyone has forgotten about this information, but the fact remains. The transfer of the largest tanker aircraft of the US Air Force to this region is necessary for Washington as air, because the combat radius of the B-1B "Lancer" strategic missile carriers is 5000 km, which will only allow to reach the launch lines of JASSM-ER / LRASM cruise missiles, to carry it out, and then immediately return to Tyndal AFB, while the operational-strategic situation may require prolonged patrolling of bombers over the Philippine and South China Seas, pending any action by the Chinese fleet. The fact is that in addition to the standard strategic strike functions, B-1B "Lancer" are capable of performing long-term combat duty, observing the actions of the enemy. For carrying out optical-electronic and radio-technical reconnaissance "Lancers" have 3 main tools:
Despite the low supersonic speed of the B-1B (1, 2M), in a network-centric theater of operations of the 21st century, this machine looks more than worthy due to the advanced avionics that allow it to perform a wide range of tasks. That is why their service life has been extended until 2040. On the basis of the above, a completely adequate question may arise: why relocate the cars to AvB Tindal, receiving additional "headache" and financial costs for expensive logistics and also the KC-10A "Extender", when you can deploy them much closer, for example, at one of the airbases of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces? This is explained quite simply.
All air bases located in Japan and South Korea are at greatest risk of a massive retaliatory missile attack from the Chinese Navy and Air Force, as well as the 2nd PLA Artillery Corps, which has a huge number of DF-3A / C medium-range ballistic missiles., designed to strike at the US military island military infrastructure within a radius of 1750 - 3000 km (within the first and second "chains"). Moreover, the Chinese army has several hundred strategic ground and air-based cruise missiles of the CJ-10 (DH-10) family with a range of about 2500 km, which are analogous to the "Caliber" and "Tomahawks". Single complex strike by cruise missiles and MRBMs in the amount of 300 - 500 units. will be enough to disable all US Air Force facilities operating in Japan and the Republic of Korea. At the same time, due to the distance from the Chinese coast in 800 - 1000 km, the Americans will not be saved even by several dozen "Aegis" ships with SM-3/6 anti-missile missiles, as well as the THAAD and "Patriot PAC-3" anti-missile systems covering Japanese air bases., because the flight time of the Dongfeng and Swords will be only a few minutes: no more than three minutes will remain for interception.
Another thing is the remote Australian Tyndal airbase, on the way to which, in the seas of Sulu, Sulawesi, Banda and the Timor Sea, it is possible to build four naval anti-missile lines from the set of Aegis-destroyers "Arley Burke" with the simultaneous "connection" of new Australian EMs URO "Hobbart". As you can see, Australia is a much more protected American outpost for basing strategic aviation in the Asia-Pacific region than the bridgeheads of Japan and the Republic of Korea. It is also noteworthy that the continuing instability in relations between the PRC and Indonesia will play into the hands of the Americans, the reason for which is Jakarta's dissatisfaction with the actions of the crews of the Chinese naval patrol ships in the Riau archipelago. The benefit is that in the event of a major conflict, the Indonesians will not only not interfere with the deployment of the US Navy's naval missile defense system in the inland seas of the archipelago, but they may well provide their territory for the US ILC / MTR units, etc., which will greatly “complicate life”to Beijing.
While the US Air Force Global Strike Command prepares to start developing a new safe air harbor for the B-1B in the Northern Territory of Australia, the degree of tension continues to increase in the South China Sea, where Beijing, on quite understandable grounds (from the position of a superpower), continues dispute the ownership of the island archipelago of Spratly and the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by states such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan. In the immediate vicinity of the airspace over Spratly, the US Navy's long-range P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft are regularly patrolling the sea depths for the presence of Chinese submarines and diesel-electric submarines using the tail sensor of magnetic anomalies, as well as visually observing any activity of the Chinese military on artificial islands using turret optoelectronic systems MX-20HD. Over the past 2 years, there have also been a number of incidents involving Arley Burke-class destroyers violating Spratly's maritime boundaries, sparking protests in official Beijing.
Most seriously, the Chinese were alarmed by the incident that occurred on December 16, 2016, when the USNS research vessel Bowditch attempted to explore the underwater space of the South China Sea (northwest of Subic Bay) using a small unmanned underwater sonar complex. Slocum G2 glider . Despite the fact that the command of the US Pacific Fleet claimed that it was an unclassified operation, its real purpose remained a mystery. One of the most plausible versions may be a hydroacoustic study of the bottom topography before the upcoming arrival in Biendong of American multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Virginia, Ohio classes (in the strike modification of SSGN SSGNs), with possible support from the ultra-low-noise diesel-electric submarines of pr. 636.3 Varshavyanka in service with the Vietnamese Navy. All these tricks did not go unnoticed by Beijing, and already in the summer of 2017, a decent asymmetrical response followed, which began to rapidly shift the balance of power in Southeast Asia towards the Celestial Empire.
FIRST SIGNS OF THE FORMATION OF THE "BYENDONG ZONE A2 / AD" IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
In particular, on June 22, 2017, the military-analytical resource "Military Parity", with reference to the news publication defensenews.com, published a message about the deployment of Y-8Q anti-submarine aircraft (in the amount of 4 or more units) at one of the air bases of the Hainan Island, as well as unmanned long-range reconnaissance drones "Harbin" BZK-005 and an early warning and control aircraft KJ-500 at the Lingshui airbase (southeast coast of the island). At first glance, this is a completely ordinary event, by Chinese standards, indicating that the PLA does not plan to sit idly by amid increasing operational and strategic pressure from the US Navy. Yes, such an interpretation is very accurate, but if we delve into the intricacies of the issue, then we are faced with the final phase of the creation of the first most complete and echeloned so-called "Biendong zone A2 / A2", which indicates the imminent "expulsion" of the American fleet from the central part of the South -Chinese Sea, where the Spratly archipelago and the Paracel Islands are located.
The events that took place from 18 to 24 February 2016 caused a great resonance in Southeast Asia. Then it was decided to deploy two HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile battalions on the island of Yongsindao (Woody), which is part of the Paracel archipelago. This moment alone markedly hampered the capabilities of the US Navy patrol aircraft in neutral airspace over the South China Sea. These divisions formed an almost continuous (not counting the low-altitude section) "anti-missile umbrella" together with HQ-9 batteries on the island of Hainan, thanks to which the carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy and the Vietnamese Air Force instantly lost their capabilities for total air control over the Paracel Islands.
The 5 color indicators of the Chinese fighter can display a much larger amount of tactical information than on a single monochrome CRT display of the Su-33 (this is a tactical map with terrain, and displayed markers of surface / ground air defense weapons with assumed lines of action, and electronic warfare stations, etc.). The air-to-air weapons are the same nomenclature as the JH-7A. In the same turn, the onboard radar with SHAR on the J-11B has a much larger diameter and energy capabilities, allowing it to detect a target of the type "F / A-18E / F with a suspension" at a distance of about 130 km. Consequently, the J-11B is already an extremely serious competitor for the US Navy carrier-based aircraft today. In the future, all existing J-11Bs can be upgraded to modification "D", which provides for equipping an onboard radar with a passive / active phased antenna array, the range of which can reach 250 - 300 km for a fighter-type target (EPR = 3 m2) … As an example, the Irbis-E radars received by the Celestial Empire together with two ordered Su-35S squadrons can be used to develop a new station.
The redeployment of J-11B to Yongxingdao Island makes it possible not only to regularly patrol the airspace of the two disputed archipelagos, but also to escort KJ-500 RLDN aircraft deployed on Hainan Island. In the event that the number of enemy carrier-based aircraft forces the use of all fighter squadrons based on island air bases, cover for the KJ-500 on duty can be assigned to the HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile divisions. In accordance with all of the above, we see clearly built anti-aircraft and anti-ship components of the Biendong A2 / AD zone, but there is also an underwater component that provides for the creation of an underwater “barrier” consisting of: diesel-electric submarines, diesel-sterling electric submarines with an air-independent power plant, anti-submarine aircraft carriers of the RSL, depth charges, as well as surface warships equipped with anti-submarine missile and torpedo systems. It was this component that began to strengthen in June 2017.
Its air component is represented by 4-engine turboprop anti-submarine aircraft Y-8Q, some of which have been relocated to Hainan. The vehicle can carry out patrol operations lasting from 8 to 11 hours and has a range of about 2,800 km, which is 36% less than the US P-3C Orion. However, the Y-8Q's cargo hold can accommodate more than 100 SQ-5 Sonobuoys sonar buoys, which is enough to maintain control over an underwater area of more than 5000 km2 (depending on the sonar qualities of the submarines moored). Unlike Orion, whose crew is 11 people, the Y-8Q requires only 7-8 people, among which, most likely, 2-3 pilots and 5 system operators who receive and decode acoustic information received via secure radio channels with RSL, as well as additional information from a magnetic anomaly detector, a nasal radar complex for viewing the water surface, third-party target designation equipment, etc. On the technological sketches of the Y-8Q posted on the Chinese Internet, one can draw attention to the presence of a turret optical-electronic surveillance and sighting complex directly in front of the cargo compartment. Operating in television and infrared channels, this turret sight is not the worst analogue of the American MX-20HD, and is capable of passive reconnaissance of small objects with high resolution at a distance of several tens of kilometers.
Internal weapon bays are designed for a combat load of about 10 tons, which can include both Yu-7 anti-ship missiles (with active-passive sonar seeker), anti-ship missiles and mines, and specialized “smart” underwater drones of the UUV “Haiyan” type ("Petrel-II HUG"), capable of continuous hydroacoustic and visual scanning of the underwater space, attention, for a month! An underwater glider with a length of 1800 and a diameter of 300 mm has a mass of 70 kg and is capable of diving to great depths (up to 1500 m) and has a cruising range of about 1000 km. The underwater reconnaissance drone has a maximum speed of 3 knots with a compact tail propulsion unit, as well as 0.8 knots when gliding in underwater currents. As for the ventral airborne radar in a radio-transparent fairing (located in the nose of the Chinese anti-submarine aircraft), it has the same qualities as the American AN / APY-10 (P-8A "Poseidon"): there is a synthetic aperture mode, as well as the possibility detection of small targets such as "periscope".
Looking at the anti-submarine capabilities of the Y-8Q aircraft, it becomes clear that the American Aegis cruisers / destroyers, with their vaunted AN / SQQ-89 (V) 10-15 sonar systems, are not PLO standards, just like the Poseidons. The smaller operator staff of the Y-8Q, given the superior information capabilities of search engines, indicates a more advanced and high-performance computing base of the "Chinese" avionics, and therefore any pseudo-analysts' reflections on the complete backwardness of Chinese electronics from Western ones look like sheer nonsense. Yes, there is some lag in terms of AFAR radars, as well as in the field of casting monocrystalline turbine blades by directional crystallization using a nickel-tungsten seed, but China will find a way out of this situation very soon. Just what is the creation of a promising wear- and heat-resistant niobium-titanium-aluminum alloy, which has almost 2 times lower density, but identical strength. The alloy was created by the summer of 2012 thanks to 20 years of research by the State Laboratory of Advanced Metals and Materials of the PRC. Let's return to the anti-submarine component of the A2 / AD zone in the South China Sea.
