An extremely pleasant and intriguing event for us, as well as out of the ordinary for the command of the united naval forces of NATO, an event took place in early August 2017 in the waters of the North Atlantic, where a joint aircraft carrier strike group of the British aircraft carrier R08 HMS "Queen Elizabeth", the American nuclear aircraft carrier CVN -77 USS "George HW Bush ", 2 British Duke-class frigates (Type 23), US-class cruisers Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke, as well as the Norwegian frigate F313" Helge Ingstad "conducted naval maneuvers" Saxon Warrior-2017 ", aimed at increasing the level of efficiency and coordination of actions during crisis situations that have arisen against the backdrop of the emergence of new threats. In fact, the exercises were miserably failed due to the sudden appearance in the area of operations of the American and British AUG of an "unknown" submarine, barely "audible" sonar signs and other physical fields of which eloquently indicated that it was a low-noise multipurpose nuclear submarine, project 885 "Ash" …
The irrefutable reason for this conclusion was the information provided by the Norwegian resource Aldrimer.no, citing sources in the North Atlantic Alliance. It reported that in the search for the alleged K-561 "Kazan" was involved an almost full-fledged mixed anti-submarine squadron of NATO naval aviation, operating with Avb Bodø, Keflavik, Andoya, Lossimaus, as well as unnamed French air bases. It was not possible to find and escort the submarine either by means of magnetic anomaly sensors on patrol aircraft, or by integrating hydroacoustic information with the RSL and modern shipborne SAC AN / SQQ-89 (V) 3/6 installed on the RRC URO CG-58 USS " Philippine Sea "and EM URO CG-75 USS" Donald Cook ". This incident fully confirmed the earlier assumptions that even the standard modification of the MAPL pr.885 "Ash" (without a jet propulsion unit) has many times more stealth than the pr. 971 "Pike-B" and only slightly "falls short" of the class "Virginia" …
Later, for understandable reasons, the NATO Naval Forces command in every possible way began to deny the unsuccessful "hunt" for "Kazan", which found tremendous support and jubilation among the pseudo-liberal Russian media, regularly trying to denigrate and discredit any military-technical achievements of Russia. It is in this case that the inclusion of notes of sound jingoistic patriotism in news publications, with their further repost, becomes more relevant, because not all readers are well versed in the tactical and technical parameters of naval equipment and cannot independently get to the bottom of the truth, distinguishing disinformation from real situation. However, the August "anti-submarine commotion" in the waters of the Norwegian Sea is not the only incident in which NATO AUG and anti-submarine aircraft lost control over Russian multipurpose nuclear submarines. The most memorable moment can be considered the appearance of the Russian strategic submarine, project 955 Borey, in the Long Island Strait in 2012. So, according to the statement of the representative of the Russian defense department, the entry of a low-noise submarine nuclear missile carrier with an SLBM on board into the territorial waters of the United States with a further ascent near New York was necessary to adjust the ship's navigation devices.disabled during traditional combat duty.
Against this background, it is worth noting that the "critical" navigation element of this class of SSBNs is the inertial navigation complex "Symphony-U", equipped with the "Scandium" gyrocorrector. The accuracy of determining the underwater coordinates is about ± 1500-2000 m for it, which is a very good indicator. Such figures are achieved even during a weekly stay in underwater mode, which was confirmed during combat duty of the MAPL K-295 "Samara" (project 971 "Shchuka-B") in 2002 (the submarine is equipped with a similar navigation system "Symphony-071").
The failure of the "Symphony", designed to accurately determine the coordinates of the "Borey" in the conditions of the dominance of enemy patrol aircraft or a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, is extremely unlikely, and therefore the appearance of a submarine a few kilometers from the US coast can be interpreted as the first bit of a warning about the inadmissibility of attempts geostrategic pressure on Moscow's interests in the European and Middle East theaters of military operations. Even if we consider the "semi-fantastic" version with the failure of the PNK "Symphony-U", it can be noted that the submarine could remain submerged without disclosing its location. Using this method, the submarine could easily avoid approaching the American coast by using long-range onboard conformal acoustic antenna arrays and the MGK-600B "Irtysh-Amphora-B" bow SJC in a passive mode of operation (due to the direction finding of noise-emitting targets in the littoral zone). Moreover, the presence of the SSBN Borei would remain undisclosed. But "flexing their muscles", showing the insufficient effectiveness of the US Navy's anti-submarine weapons "at their own gates" was simply necessary, and our submariners coped with the task perfectly well.
After the aforementioned events, the headquarters of the naval forces and the defense departments of the NATO member countries began to think more and more often about the shaky positions of their anti-submarine component, which is practically unable to block the 1,300-kilometer underwater lines in the Norwegian Sea and the Danish Strait from the penetration of our nuclear submarines that are part of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy. As expected, the UK is not the last to play a role in the effort to strengthen ASW in the North Atlantic. As you know, the leadership of Foggy Albion on a regular basis frightens the population with "bad Russians", "with their powerful submarines and nuclear-powered cruisers of pr. 1144.2, ready to strike at London with Granites" and so on.
So, on September 14, 2017, London represented by BAE Systems provided the US Naval Forces command with comprehensive information on the project of the promising Type 26 multipurpose frigate Global Combat Ship. The event is quite extraordinary: the self-sufficient American Navy, which for decades relied on warships launched from the stocks of the state shipyards Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron Works, sharply began to show interest in the foreign project of the frigate from the Old World, which is being built at the shipyard. shipyard in Scotstown. This choice of Americans has a multifaceted background.
First, this is the complete decommissioning of morally and technically obsolete frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry class (the last FFG-56 Sampson ship was decommissioned on September 29, 2015). Despite the continuation of service in the XXI century, frigates of this type did not go through the modernization program in the American fleet: an outdated single-channel shipborne anti-aircraft missile system SM-1 was installed on board, built around the "ancient" radar for illumination and guidance AN / SPG- 60 STIR (a simpler version of the Aegis AN / SPG-62) and the outdated Mk 86 fire control system. The US Navy decided not to announce an expensive frigate data update program in favor of the development and serial production of newer and more multifunctional littoral coastal zone warships of the LCS-1 "Freedom" and LCS-2 "Independece" types.
Secondly, this is the discrepancy between the technical parameters of littoral warships of the LCS-2/3 class with the requirements that are imposed on ships of the "frigate" class. Thus, the cruising range of the LCS-2 trimaran at a speed of 30 - 35 knots barely reaches 2,500 - 2,700 miles, while frigates of the Oliver Perry type can travel 4,500 miles at a speed of 20 knots. In long-distance campaigns, as well as anti-submarine patrolling of vast oceanic expanses, cruising range plays a decisive role in autonomy from refueling ships, which, during the escalation of a major regional conflict, are often in demand in the zones of operation of the main aircraft carrier strike orders. LCS are designed to control the near sea zone with a distance of 300 to 700 km from the coast. At the same time, the list of priority tasks includes: the fight against the "mosquito fleets" of the enemy using tactical missiles AGM-114L-8 (deployed in promising launchers SSMM), search / destruction of bottom and anchor mines with the use of unmanned sonar reconnaissance vehicles AN / VLD- 1 (V) 1 as part of the RMV and AN / AQS-20A complex, as well as delivering targeted massed strikes against enemy coastal targets at a distance of 200 km. For this, tactical cruise missiles (loitering ammunition) LAM of the XM-501LS complex, located in a vertical modular launcher CLU, are used. From this, the conclusion: "Litoral Combat Ship" in its current performance is practically not suitable for the implementation of long-term anti-submarine defense.
Thirdly, the interest of the US Navy in the British project Type 26 "GCS" is associated with the impossibility of sending a large number of "Arley Burke" class EMs to the North Atlantic, since these "Aegis" ships are intended to radically increase the strike and defensive capabilities of the US Navy in the Near East and the Asia-Pacific regions, where the Americans are trying with all their might to neutralize the active growth of the combat capabilities of Iran and the People's Republic of China. The British Type 26 Global Warships are capable of solving some of the above problems, and therefore the request made by BAE Systems from the US Navy can be considered a huge success for London, both strategically and economically.
The first thing that should be noted is the demand for an impressive number of Type 26 "Global Combat Ship" for the US Navy against the background of the complete absence of "frigate" class ships. To carry out anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific Ocean, Washington needs at least 30 to 40 such frigates. This will allow a good load of the Scotstown shipyard's capacities for another 9 - 12 years, while the planned contract can replenish the British treasury by several tens of billions of pounds. The greatest interest is aroused by the combat qualities of the "Global Combat Ship" in relation to the establishment of anti-submarine lines in the North Atlantic, from where the US Navy and the British Navy are expecting a "massive breakthrough" multipurpose nuclear submarines pr. 971 "Shchuka-B", as well as pr. 885 / M " Ash / M ".
The most advanced version of the frigate "Global Combat Ship" with advanced anti-submarine capabilities is the Type 26 ASW ("Anti-Submarine Warfare"), which will be equipped mainly with anti-submarine and anti-ship weapons, located in the universal built-in launchers Mk 41 VLS. The anti-submarine version of the Mk 41 provides for the use of specialized extended transport and launch containers Mk 15, in which the PLUR of the RUM-139VLA type will be located. Immediately after leaving the transport and launch container, the PLUR accelerates to supersonic speed due to the launch stage with a powerful solid-propellant engine. The thrust vector deflection system brings the RUM-139B to a ballistic flight trajectory for further penetration of combat "equipment" into the operational area of the enemy submarine. A compact anti-submarine torpedo Mk 46 Mod5A (length is 2700 mm, weight is 258 kg) is used as "equipment", which can overcome another 10 km after entering underwater mode, which provides a range of at least 30 - 35 km. At the same time, the unification of this anti-submarine missile with the Type 26 ASW weapons control system will require American and British specialists to introduce an element base typical for American Aegis ships. It is represented by the Mk 16 Mod 6/7 underwater target designation and control subsystem, designed to synchronize the PLUR RUM-139B inertial navigation system with the interfaces of the AN / SQS-53B integrated hull sonar systems and GAS with a flexible extended towed antenna AN / SQR-19. Meanwhile, there is still no data on the hardware-software adaptation of the Asroc-VL complex to the new British frigates. But even if Asrok goes into service with the Type 26 ASW frigates purchased by the Americans, this will not seriously affect their anti-submarine potential (without the support of patrol aircraft).
In particular, according to Western data published by the US Navy Admiral Jeremy Michael Boorda in 1995, the detection range of Russian submarines pr. 971 "Schuka-B" using the main integrated sonar AN / BQQ-5 (MAPL class " Los-Angeles ") was only 10 km in normal hydrological conditions. 19 years later, in his short article "The fight of people, not ideas", Rear Admiral of the Soviet Navy, retired Vladimir Yamkov, gave a small table of calculations of the detection range of SSBNs of the Borei class using the latest AN / BQQ-10 ultra-low-noise submarine of the class " Virginia ": it was 50 km (265 cab). Consequently, MAPLs pr. 885 / M or "Shchuka-B" can be detected at a distance of 60 and 70 km, respectively, due to the absence of a jet propulsion unit that reduces acoustic signature.
However, these indicators can be considered valid only for normal hydrological conditions. Now imagine the waters of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, where every winter is accompanied by the passage of powerful cyclones caused by the Icelandic minimum. They cause powerful storms that can last for several days and worsen the hydrological situation many times over. The bearing range in such conditions may decrease several times and not exceed 20 - 25 km, especially if the same Kazan or K-154 Tiger (improved project 971 with increased acoustic stealth) will carry out the transition from the Barents Sea to the Norwegian Sea at speeds up to 7 knots.
Above, we talked about the most advanced US sonar system AN / BQQ-10, installed on submarines of the "Sea Wolf" and "Virginia" classes, while the Type 26 "Global Combat Ship" frigates will be equipped with an integrated bow "bulb" HAC type AN / SQS-53B / C. Despite the fact that it is equipped with cruisers of the Ticonderoga class and destroyers of the Arleigh Burke class, the range in the 2nd convergence zone (in passive mode) reaches only 120 km under normal hydrological conditions, which is noticeably less than that of AN / BQQ-10. Based on this, it can be easily determined that even in a small storm, the detection range of Yasen-class submarines can barely reach 12 km. The presence of a GAS with a flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA) Sonar 2087 (Type 2087) does not "smooth out" the situation either. It is a low-frequency hydroacoustic instrument - an analogue of the domestic station "Vignette-EM" and is represented by a flexible sound-transparent composite tube with hundreds of piezoelectric elements-receivers of pressure generated by hydroacoustic waves from underwater and surface means. In addition to several hundred highly sensitive hydrophones (operating in the frequency range from 1 to 3 kHz), the structure is equipped with a sound-emitting towed device for active operation. The range of its action can be 140-150 km against a target of the "surface ship" type, while modern MAPLs or SSBNs can be detected at a distance of 50-75 km in favorable hydrological conditions and similar 12-15 km in stormy ones.
From all of the above, we conclude that even 20 or 25 "global warships" Type 26 "GCS" will not be able to control the entire 1,300-kilometer section of the North Atlantic for the operation of our submarines. The additional involvement of anti-submarine aircraft P-8A "Poseidon" and P-3C "Orion" will only superficially "brighten up the situation" due to the formation of a denser network of sonar buoys.
